diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 9c1632e..da98ded 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 *.json
 packer_compiled.lua
+lua/config/
diff --git a/after/ftplugin/markdown.lua b/after/ftplugin/markdown.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index c2ad48d..0000000
--- a/after/ftplugin/markdown.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-require("nvim-surround").buffer_setup({
-  surrounds = {
-    ["e"] = {
-      add = function()
-        local env = require("nvim-surround.config").get_input ("Environment: ")
-        return { { "\\begin{" .. env .. "}" }, { "\\end{" .. env .. "}" } }
-      end,
-    },
-    ["b"] = {
-      add = { "**", "**" },
-      find = "**.-**",
-      delete = "^(**)().-(**)()$",
-    },
-    ["i"] = {
-      add = { "*", "*" },
-      find = "*.-*",
-      delete = "^(*)().-(*)()$",
-    },
-  },
-})
diff --git a/after/ftplugin/tex.lua b/after/ftplugin/tex.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 77de062..0000000
--- a/after/ftplugin/tex.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-local config = require("nvim-surround.config")
-
-require("nvim-surround").buffer_setup({
-  surrounds = {
-    -- ["e"] = {
-    --   add = function()
-    --     local env = require("nvim-surround.config").get_input ("Environment: ")
-    --     return { { "\\begin{" .. env .. "}" }, { "\\end{" .. env .. "}" } }
-    --   end,
-    -- },
-    ["Q"] = {
-      add = { "``", "''" },
-      find = "%b``.-''",
-      delete = "^(``)().-('')()$",
-    },
-    ["q"] = {
-      add = { "`", "'" },
-      find = "`.-'",
-      delete = "^(`)().-(')()$",
-    },
-    ["b"] = {
-      add = { "\\textbf{", "}" },
-      -- add = function()
-      --   if vim.fn["vimtex#syntax#in_mathzone"]() == 1 then
-      --     return { { "\\mathbf{" }, { "}" } }
-      --   end
-      --   return { { "\\textbf{" }, { "}" } }
-      -- end,
-      find = "\\%a-bf%b{}",
-      delete = "^(\\%a-bf{)().-(})()$",
-    },
-    ["i"] = {
-      add = { "\\textit{", "}" },
-      -- add = function()
-      --   if vim.fn["vimtex#syntax#in_mathzone"]() == 1 then
-      --     return { { "\\mathit{" }, { "}" } }
-      --   end
-      --   return { { "\\textit{" }, { "}" } }
-      -- end,
-      find = "\\%a-it%b{}",
-      delete = "^(\\%a-it{)().-(})()$",
-    },
-    ["s"] = {
-      add = { "\\textsc{", "}" },
-      find = "\\textsc%b{}",
-      delete = "^(\\textsc{)().-(})()$",
-    },
-    ["t"] = {
-      add = { "\\texttt{", "}" },
-      -- add = function()
-      --   if vim.fn["vimtex#syntax#in_mathzone"]() == 1 then
-      --     return { { "\\mathtt{" }, { "}" } }
-      --   end
-      --   return { { "\\texttt{" }, { "}" } }
-      -- end,
-      find = "\\%a-tt%b{}",
-      delete = "^(\\%a-tt{)().-(})()$",
-    },
-    ["$"] = {
-      add = { "$", "$" },
-      -- find = "%b$.-$",
-      -- delete = "^($)().-($)()$",
-    },
-  },
-})
-
--- PdfAnnots
-function PdfAnnots()
-  local ok, pdf = pcall(vim.api.nvim_eval,
-    "vimtex#context#get().handler.get_actions().entry.file")
-  if not ok then
-    vim.notify "No file found"
-    return
-  end
-
-  local cwd = vim.fn.getcwd()
-  vim.fn.chdir(vim.b.vimtex.root)
-
-  if vim.fn.isdirectory('Annotations') == 0 then
-    vim.fn.mkdir('Annotations')
-  end
-
-  local md = vim.fn.printf("Annotations/%s.md", vim.fn.fnamemodify(pdf, ":t:r"))
-  vim.fn.system(vim.fn.printf('pdfannots -o "%s" "%s"', md, pdf))
-  vim.cmd.split(vim.fn.fnameescape(md))
-
-  vim.fn.chdir(cwd)
-end
-
--- -- LSP menu to preserve vimtex citation data
--- require('cmp').setup.buffer {
---   formatting = {
---     format = function(entry, vim_item)
---         vim_item.menu = ({
---           omni = (vim.inspect(vim_item.menu):gsub('%"', "")),
---           buffer = "[Buffer]",
---           -- formatting for other sources
---           })[entry.source.name]
---         return vim_item
---       end,
---   },
---   sources = {
---     { name = 'omni' },
---     { name = 'buffer' },
---     -- other sources
---   },
--- }
diff --git a/init.lua b/init.lua
old mode 100644
new mode 100755
index e8aa528..491b2aa
--- a/init.lua
+++ b/init.lua
@@ -1,60 +1,14 @@
--- GENERAL
-require "user.options"
-require "user.keymaps"
-require "user.plugins"
-require "user.autocommands"
-require "user.colorscheme"
-require "user.lsp.init"
-
--- PLUGINS
-
-require "user.autopairs"
-require "user.comment"
-require "user.impatient"
-require "user.surround"
---require "user.yanky"
-require "user.undotree"
-
--- Mappings
-require "user.whichkey"
-
--- Terminal
-require "user.toggleterm"
-
--- File Management
-require "user.nvim-tree"
-require "user.sessions"
-
--- Appearance
---require "user.bufferline"
-require "user.lualine"
-require "user.indentline"
-require "user.alpha"
-require "user.illuminate"
-
--- Autocomplete
-require "user.cmp"
-
--- LaTeX
-require "user.vimtex"
-
--- Markdown
-require "user.autolist"
-
--- Snippets
-require "user.luasnip"
-
--- Telescope
-require "user.telescope"
-require "user.dressing"
-
--- Treesitter
-require "user.treesitter"
-
--- Git
-require "user.gitsigns"
-
-
-
-
-
+require("autopairs")
+-- require("buffers") -- not wotking atm
+require("colorscheme")
+require("grammar")
+require("keymaps")
+require("lsp")
+require("lua-line")
+require("nvimtree")
+require("options")
+require("plugins")
+require("telescope")
+require("term")
+require("treesitter")
+require("whichkey")
diff --git a/lua/autopairs.lua b/lua/autopairs.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a76f41f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/autopairs.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---- If you want insert `(` after select function or method item
+--local cmp_autopairs = require('nvim-autopairs.completion.cmp')
+--local cmp = require('cmp')
+--cmp.event:on(
+--  'confirm_done',
+--  cmp_autopairs.on_confirm_done()
+--)
+--local Rule = require('nvim-autopairs.rule')
+--local npairs = require('nvim-autopairs')
+--
+--npairs.add_rule(Rule("$$","$$","tex"))
+--
+--local handlers = require('nvim-autopairs.completion.handlers')
+--
+--cmp.event:on(
+--  'confirm_done',
+--  cmp_autopairs.on_confirm_done({
+--    filetypes = {
+--      -- "*" is a alias to all filetypes
+--      ["*"] = {
+--        ["("] = {
+--          kind = {
+--            cmp.lsp.CompletionItemKind.Function,
+--            cmp.lsp.CompletionItemKind.Method,
+--          },
+--          handler = handlers["*"]
+--        }
+--      },
+--      lua = {
+--        ["("] = {
+--          kind = {
+--            cmp.lsp.CompletionItemKind.Function,
+--            cmp.lsp.CompletionItemKind.Method
+--          },
+--          ---@param char string
+--          ---@param item table item completion
+--          ---@param bufnr number buffer number
+--          ---@param rules table
+--          ---@param commit_character table<string>
+--          handler = function(char, item, bufnr, rules, commit_character)
+--            -- Your handler function. Inpect with print(vim.inspect{char, item, bufnr, rules, commit_character})
+--          end
+--        }
+--      },
+--      -- Disable for tex
+--      tex = false
+--    }
+--  })
+--)
+--
+---- you can use some built-in conditions
+--
+--local cond = require('nvim-autopairs.conds')
+--print(vim.inspect(cond))
+--
+--npairs.add_rules({
+--  Rule("$", "$",{"tex", "latex"})
+--    -- don't add a pair if the next character is %
+--    :with_pair(cond.not_after_regex("%%"))
+--    -- don't add a pair if  the previous character is xxx
+--    :with_pair(cond.not_before_regex("xxx", 3))
+--    -- don't move right when repeat character
+--    :with_move(cond.none())
+--    -- don't delete if the next character is xx
+--    :with_del(cond.not_after_regex("xx"))
+--    -- disable adding a newline when you press <cr>
+--    :with_cr(cond.none())
+--  },
+--  -- disable for .vim files, but it work for another filetypes
+--  Rule("a","a","-vim")
+--)
+--
+--npairs.add_rules({
+--  Rule("$$","$$","tex")
+--    :with_pair(function(opts)
+--        print(vim.inspect(opts))
+--        if opts.line=="aa $$" then
+--        -- don't add pair on that line
+--          return false
+--        end
+--    end)
+--   }
+--)
+--
+---- you can use regex
+---- press u1234 => u1234number
+--npairs.add_rules({
+--    Rule("u%d%d%d%d$", "number", "lua")
+--      :use_regex(true)
+--})
+--
+--
+--
+---- press x1234 => x12341234
+--npairs.add_rules({
+--    Rule("x%d%d%d%d$", "number", "lua")
+--      :use_regex(true)
+--      :replace_endpair(function(opts)
+--          -- print(vim.inspect(opts))
+--          return opts.prev_char:sub(#opts.prev_char - 3,#opts.prev_char)
+--      end)
+--})
+--
+--
+---- you can do anything with regex +special key
+---- example press tab to uppercase text:
+---- press b1234s<tab> => B1234S1234S
+--
+--npairs.add_rules({
+--  Rule("b%d%d%d%d%w$", "", "vim")
+--    :use_regex(true,"<tab>")
+--    :replace_endpair(function(opts)
+--          return
+--              opts.prev_char:sub(#opts.prev_char - 4,#opts.prev_char)
+--              .."<esc>viwU"
+--    end)
+--})
+--
+---- you can exclude filetypes
+--npairs.add_rule(
+--  Rule("$$","$$")
+--    :with_pair(cond.not_filetypes({"lua"}))
+--)
+----- check ./lua/nvim-autopairs/rules/basic.lua
+--
+--local npairs = require("nvim-autopairs")
+--local Rule = require('nvim-autopairs.rule')
+--
+--npairs.setup({
+--    check_ts = true,
+--    ts_config = {
+--        lua = {'string'},-- it will not add a pair on that treesitter node
+--        javascript = {'template_string'},
+--        java = false,-- don't check treesitter on java
+--    }
+--})
+--
+--local ts_conds = require('nvim-autopairs.ts-conds')
+--
+--
+---- press % => %% only while inside a comment or string
+--npairs.add_rules({
+--  Rule("%", "%", "lua")
+--    :with_pair(ts_conds.is_ts_node({'string','comment'})),
+--  Rule("$", "$", "lua")
+--    :with_pair(ts_conds.is_not_ts_node({'function'}))
+--})
+--
diff --git a/lua/user/bufferline.lua b/lua/buffers.lua
old mode 100644
new mode 100755
similarity index 98%
rename from lua/user/bufferline.lua
rename to lua/buffers.lua
index b4ff5e7..9d1a640
--- a/lua/user/bufferline.lua
+++ b/lua/buffers.lua
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ end
 bufferline.setup {
   options = {
     numbers = "none", -- | "ordinal" | "buffer_id" | "both" | function({ ordinal, id, lower, raise }): string,
-    close_command = "Bdelete! %d", -- can be a string | function, see "Mouse actions"
-    right_mouse_command = "Bdelete! %d", -- can be a string | function, see "Mouse actions"
+    close_command = "bdelete! %d", -- can be a string | function, see "Mouse actions"
+    right_mouse_command = "bdelete! %d", -- can be a string | function, see "Mouse actions"
     left_mouse_command = "buffer %d", -- can be a string | function, see "Mouse actions"
     middle_mouse_command = nil, -- can be a string | function, see "Mouse actions"
     -- NOTE: this plugin is designed with this icon in mind,
diff --git a/lua/colorscheme.lua b/lua/colorscheme.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c2f965d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/colorscheme.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- define colorscheme here
+--[[
+local colorscheme = "rose"
+
+local is_ok, _ = pcall(vim.cmd, "colorscheme " .. colorscheme)
+if not is_ok then
+    vim.notify("colorscheme " .. colorscheme .. " not found!")
+    return
+end
+]]--
+
+function ColorSchemes(color)
+    color = color or "rose-pine"
+    vim.cmd.colorscheme(color)
+
+    --vim.api.nvim_set_hl(0, "Normal", { bg = "none" })
+    --vim.api.nvim_set_hl(0, "NormalFloat", { bg = "none" })
+end
+
+ColorSchemes()
+
diff --git a/lua/grammar.lua b/lua/grammar.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..93c2044
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/grammar.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+require("grammar-guard").init()
+
+require("lspconfig").grammar_guard.setup({
+  cmd = { '/usr/bin/ltex-ls' }, -- add this if you install ltex-ls yourself
+	settings = {
+		ltex = {
+			enabled = { "latex", "tex", "bib", "markdown" },
+			language = "en",
+			diagnosticSeverity = "information",
+			setenceCacheSize = 2000,
+			additionalRules = {
+				enablePickyRules = true,
+				motherTongue = "en",
+			},
+			trace = { server = "verbose" },
+			dictionary = {},
+			disabledRules = {},
+			hiddenFalsePositives = {},
+		},
+	},
+})
diff --git a/lua/keymaps.lua b/lua/keymaps.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9467674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/keymaps.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+-- define common options
+local opts = {
+    noremap = true,      -- non-recursive
+    silent = true,       -- do not show message
+}
+
+-----------------
+-- Normal mode --
+-----------------
+
+-- Hint: see `:h vim.map.set()`
+-- Better window navigation
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-h>", "<C-w>h", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-j>", "<C-w>j", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-k>", "<C-w>k", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-l>", "<C-w>l", opts)
+
+-- Resize with arrows
+-- delta: 2 lines
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-Up>", ":resize -2<CR>", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-Down>", ":resize +2<CR>", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-Left>", ":vertical resize -2<CR>", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-Right>", ":vertical resize +2<CR>", opts)
+
+-- Open explorer
+--vim.keymap.set("n", "<leader>pv", vim.cmd.Ex, opts)
+
+-- Navigate buffers
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<BS>", ":bnext<CR>", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<S-TAB>", ":bprevious<CR>", opts)
+
+-- Telescope
+local builtin = require("telescope.builtin")
+--vim.keymap.set("n", "<leader>pf", builtin.find_files, {})
+--vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-p>", builtin.git_files, {})
+--vim.keymap.set("n", "<leader>ps", function ()
+--    builtin.grep_string( { search = vim.fn.input("Grep > ") } );
+--end)
+
+-- Harpoon
+local mark = require("harpoon.mark")
+local ui = require("harpoon.ui")
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<leader>a", mark.add_file)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-e>", ui.toggle_quick_menu)
+
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-h>", function () ui.nav_file(1) end)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-t>", function () ui.nav_file(2) end)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-n>", function () ui.nav_file(3) end)
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-s>", function () ui.nav_file(4) end)
+
+-- Undotree
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<leader>u", vim.cmd.UndotreeToggle)
+
+-- Fugitive
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<leader>gs", vim.cmd.Git)
+
+-- Put line bellow in-front of line
+vim.keymap.set("n", "J", "mzJ`z")
+
+-- Keep cursor in the middle
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-d>", "<C-d>zz")
+vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-u>", "<C-u>zz")
+vim.keymap.set("n", "n", "nzzzv")
+vim.keymap.set("n", "N", "Nzzzv")
+
+-- Don't loose buffer
+vim.keymap.set("x", "<leader>p", "\"_dP")
+
+
+-----------------
+-- Visual mode --
+-----------------
+
+-- Hint: start visual mode with the same area as the previous area and the same mode
+vim.keymap.set("v", "<", "<gv", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("v", ">", ">gv", opts)
+
+-- Move text on visual mode
+vim.keymap.set("v", "J", ":m '>+1<CR>gv=gv", opts)
+vim.keymap.set("v", "K", ":m '<-2<CR>gv=gv", opts)
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/mason.lua b/lua/lsp.lua
old mode 100644
new mode 100755
similarity index 95%
rename from lua/user/lsp/mason.lua
rename to lua/lsp.lua
index efe3245..6a52ce7
--- a/lua/user/lsp/mason.lua
+++ b/lua/lsp.lua
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ require("mason-lspconfig").setup({
     -- A list of servers to automatically install if they"re not already installed
     --ensure_installed = { "pylsp", "gopls", "lua_ls", "rust_analyzer" },
     --ensure_installed = { "pylsp", "lua_ls", "julials", "zls", "ltex", "texlab" },
-    ensure_installed = { "bashls", "pylsp", "lua_ls", "julials", "ltex", "texlab" },
+    ensure_installed = { "pylsp", "lua_ls", "julials", "zls", "ltex", "texlab" },
 })
 
 -- Set different settings for different languages" LSP
@@ -86,17 +86,18 @@ lspconfig.pylsp.setup({
     on_attach = on_attach,
 })
 
---lspconfig.julials.setup{}
---[[
-]]--
+--lspconfig.gopls.setup({
+--    on_attach = on_attach,
+--})
+
 lspconfig.julials.setup({
     --on_attach = on_attach,
-    --symbol_cache_download = true,
+    symbol_cache_download = true,
     --symbol_server = "https://symbol-server",
     on_new_config = function(new_config, _)
         local julia = vim.fn.expand("/usr/share/julia/bin/julia")
         if require'lspconfig'.util.path.is_file(julia) then
-            vim.notify("julials loaded?!")
+	    vim.notify("Hello!")
             new_config.cmd[1] = julia
         end
     end
@@ -106,14 +107,6 @@ lspconfig.texlab.setup({
     on_attach = on_attach,
 })
 
-lspconfig.ltex.setup({
-  settings = {
-		ltex = {
-			language = "en-GB",
-		},
-	},
-})
-
 lspconfig.zls.setup({
     on_attach = on_attach,
 })
@@ -122,6 +115,13 @@ lspconfig.bashls.setup({
     on_attach = on_attach,
 })
 
+lspconfig.ltex.setup({
+  settings = {
+		ltex = {
+			language = "en-GB",
+		},
+	},
+})
 -- source: https://rust-analyzer.github.io/manual.html#nvim-lsp
 --lspconfig.rust_analyzer.setup({
 --    on_attach = on_attach,
diff --git a/lua/lua-line.lua b/lua/lua-line.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e6ae731
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/lua-line.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+require("lualine").setup({})
+--[[
+require("lualine").setup {
+  options = {
+    icons_enabled = true,
+    theme = "auto",
+    component_separators = { left = "", right = ""},
+    section_separators = { left = "", right = ""},
+    disabled_filetypes = {
+      statusline = {},
+      winbar = {},
+    },
+    ignore_focus = {},
+    always_divide_middle = true,
+    globalstatus = false,
+    refresh = {
+      statusline = 1000,
+      tabline = 1000,
+      winbar = 1000,
+    }
+  },
+  sections = {
+    lualine_a = {"mode"},
+    lualine_b = {"branch", "diff", "diagnostics"},
+    lualine_c = {"filename"},
+    lualine_x = {"encoding", "fileformat", "filetype"},
+    lualine_y = {"progress"},
+    lualine_z = {"location"}
+  },
+  inactive_sections = {
+    lualine_a = {},
+    lualine_b = {},
+    lualine_c = {"filename"},
+    lualine_x = {"location"},
+    lualine_y = {},
+    lualine_z = {}
+  },
+  tabline = {},
+  winbar = {},
+  inactive_winbar = {},
+  extensions = {}
+}
+]]--
diff --git a/lua/nvimtree.lua b/lua/nvimtree.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..df3b05c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/nvimtree.lua
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+require("nvim-tree").setup()
diff --git a/lua/options.lua b/lua/options.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..daea7a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/options.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+-- Hint: use `:h <option>` to figure out the meaning if needed
+vim.opt.clipboard = "unnamedplus"   -- use system clipboard
+vim.opt.completeopt = {"menu", "menuone", "noselect"}
+vim.opt.mouse = "a"                 -- allow the mouse to be used in Nvim
+
+-- Fonts
+vim.opt.encoding="utf-8"
+vim.opt.guifont = "Meslo LG M Bold for Powerline:h10"
+
+-- Tab
+vim.opt.tabstop = 4                 -- number of visual spaces per TAB
+vim.opt.softtabstop = 4             -- number of spacesin tab when editing
+vim.opt.shiftwidth = 4              -- insert 4 spaces on a tab
+vim.opt.expandtab = true            -- tabs are spaces, mainly because of python
+
+-- UI config
+vim.opt.number = true               -- show absolute number
+vim.opt.relativenumber = true       -- add numbers to each line on the left side
+vim.opt.cursorline = false          -- highlight cursor line underneath the cursor horizontally
+vim.opt.splitbelow = true           -- open new vertical split bottom
+vim.opt.splitright = true           -- open new horizontal splits right
+vim.opt.termguicolors = true        -- enable 23-bit RGB color in the TUI
+vim.opt.showmode = false            -- we are experienced, wo don"t need the "-- INSERT --" mode hint
+
+-- File recovery options
+vim.opt.swapfile = false
+vim.opt.backup = false
+vim.opt.undodir = os.getenv("HOME") .. "/.vim/undodir"
+vim.opt.undofile = true
+
+-- Color column
+vim.opt.colorcolumn = "80"
+
+-- Searching
+vim.opt.incsearch = true            -- search as characters are entered
+vim.opt.hlsearch = false            -- do not highlight matches
+vim.opt.ignorecase = true           -- ignore case in searches by default
+vim.opt.smartcase = true            -- but make it case sensitive if an uppercase is entered
+
+
+
+
+
+-- Linter
+--vim.g.ale_completion_enabled = 1
+--vim.g.ale_completion_autoimport = 0
+--vim.g.ale_julia_executable="/usr/share/julia/bin/julia"
+--vim.g.ale_lint_on_enter = 0
+----vim.g.ale_linters_explicit = 1
+
+-- Leader key
+vim.g.mapleader = " "
+--vim.g.maplocalleader = " "
+vim.g.maplocalleader = "\\"
+
+-- REPL
+--vim.g.slime_target = "neovim"
+
+-- Airline
+vim.g.airline_powerline_fonts = 1
+
+-- Zig
+vim.g.zig_fmt_autosave = 1
+-- Set completeopt to have a better completion experience
+--set completeopt=menuone,noinsert,noselect
+vim.opt.completeopt = "menuone,noinsert,noselect"
+-- Enable completions as you type
+vim.g.completion_enable_auto_popup = 1
+
+-- Python
+vim.g.loaded_python_provider = 0
+vim.g.python3_host_prog = "/usr/local/bin/python"
+
+-- Close parenthesis
+--vim.g.AutoPairFlymode = 1
+--vim.g.AutoPairsShortcutBackInsert = "<M-b>"
+--vim.g.AutoPairsMapBS = 1
+
+-- PDF Viewer:
+-- http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man5/zathurarc.5.html
+vim.g["vimtex_view_method"] = "zathura"
+vim.g["vimtex_quickfix_mode"] =0
+
+-- Ignore mappings
+vim.g["vimtex_mappings_enabled"] = 1
+
+-- Auto Indent
+vim.g["vimtex_indent_enabled"] = 1
+
+-- Syntax highlighting
+vim.g["vimtex_syntax_enabled"] = 1
+
+-- Error suppression:
+-- https://github.com/lervag/vimtex/blob/master/doc/vimtex.txt
+
+vim.g["vimtex_log_ignore"] = ({
+  "Underfull",
+  "Overfull",
+  "specifier changed to",
+  "Token not allowed in a PDF string",
+})
+
+vim.g["vimtex_context_pdf_viewer"] = "zathura"
+
+-- vim.g["vimtex_complete_enabled"] = 1
+-- vim.g["vimtex_compiler_progname"] = "nvr"
+-- vim.g["vimtex_complete_close_braces"] = 1
diff --git a/lua/plugins.lua b/lua/plugins.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1b306cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/plugins.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+-- Install Packer automatically if it"s not installed(Bootstraping)
+-- Hint: string concatenation is done by `..`
+local ensure_packer = function()
+    local fn = vim.fn
+    local install_path = fn.stdpath("data").."/site/pack/packer/start/packer.nvim"
+    if fn.empty(fn.glob(install_path)) > 0 then
+        fn.system({"git", "clone", "--depth", "1", "https://github.com/wbthomason/packer.nvim", install_path})
+        vim.cmd [[packadd packer.nvim]]
+        return true
+    end
+    return false
+end
+local packer_bootstrap = ensure_packer()
+
+
+-- Reload configurations if we modify plugins.lua
+-- Hint
+--     <afile> - replaced with the filename of the buffer being manipulated
+vim.cmd([[
+  augroup packer_user_config
+    autocmd!
+    autocmd BufWritePost plugins.lua source <afile> | PackerSync
+  augroup end
+]])
+
+
+-- Install plugins here - `use ...`
+-- Packer.nvim hints
+--     after = string or list,           -- Specifies plugins to load before this plugin. See "sequencing" below
+--     config = string or function,      -- Specifies code to run after this plugin is loaded
+--     requires = string or list,        -- Specifies plugin dependencies. See "dependencies".
+--     ft = string or list,              -- Specifies filetypes which load this plugin.
+--     run = string, function, or table, -- Specify operations to be run after successful installs/updates of a plugin
+return require("packer").startup(function(use)
+    -- Packer can manage itself
+    use "wbthomason/packer.nvim"
+
+
+
+    --use "tanvirtin/monokai.nvim"
+    -- Autocomplete
+    use {
+        "williamboman/mason.nvim",
+        run = ":MasonUpdate" -- :MasonUpdate updates registry contents
+    }
+    use { "williamboman/mason-lspconfig.nvim"}
+    use { "neovim/nvim-lspconfig" }            -- previous installed
+    -- Cmp
+    use { "hrsh7th/nvim-cmp", config = [[require("config.nvim-cmp")]] }
+    use { "hrsh7th/cmp-nvim-lsp", after = "nvim-cmp" }
+    use { "hrsh7th/cmp-buffer", after = "nvim-cmp" }        -- buffer auto-completion
+    use { "hrsh7th/cmp-path", after = "nvim-cmp" }          -- path auto-completion
+    use { "hrsh7th/cmp-cmdline", after = "nvim-cmp" }       -- cmdline auto-completion
+    use "L3MON4D3/LuaSnip"
+    use "saadparwaiz1/cmp_luasnip"
+
+    -- helps Vimtex completions
+    use { "hrsh7th/cmp-omni" }
+
+    -- ALE Linter
+    use { "dense-analysis/ale" }
+
+    -- :FixWhitespace
+    use "bronson/vim-trailing-whitespace"
+    -- Close parenthesis
+    use {
+        "windwp/nvim-autopairs",
+        config = function() require("nvim-autopairs").setup {} end
+    }
+
+    -- gitgutter
+    use { "airblade/vim-gitgutter" }
+
+    -- Mappings
+    use { "folke/which-key.nvim" }
+
+    -- zig.vim
+    use { "ziglang/zig.vim" }
+
+    -- julia-vim
+    --use { "JuliaEditorSupport/julia-vim" }
+
+    -- LaTeX
+    use { "lervag/vimtex" } -- essential for LaTeX; Vimscript
+    use { "kdheepak/cmp-latex-symbols" }
+    use { "jbyuki/nabla.nvim" } -- show symbols in editor
+    use {
+        "brymer-meneses/grammar-guard.nvim",
+        requires = {
+            "neovim/nvim-lspconfig",
+            "williamboman/nvim-lsp-installer"
+        }
+    }
+
+    -- Devicons
+    use { "nvim-tree/nvim-web-devicons" }
+
+    -- Lua Line
+    use {
+        "nvim-lualine/lualine.nvim",
+        requires = { "nvim-tree/nvim-web-devicons", opt = true }
+    }
+
+    -- nvim tree
+    use { "nvim-tree/nvim-tree.lua" }
+
+    -- Airline
+    --[[
+    use "vim-airline/vim-airline"
+    use "vim-airline/vim-airline-themes"
+    ]]--
+
+    -- vim-visual-multi
+    use { "mg979/vim-visual-multi" }
+
+    -- Telescope fuzzy finder
+    use {
+        "nvim-telescope/telescope.nvim", tag = "0.1.1",
+        -- or                            , branch = "0.1.x",
+        requires = { {"nvim-lua/plenary.nvim"} }
+    }
+
+    use {
+        'nvim-telescope/telescope-fzf-native.nvim',
+        run = 'cmake -S. -Bbuild -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release && cmake --build build --config Release && cmake --install build --prefix build'
+    }
+
+    -- Nord colorscheme
+    --[[
+    use {
+        "arcticicestudio/nord-vim",
+        config = function ()
+            vim.cmd("colorscheme nord")
+            vim.api.nvim_set_hl(0, "Normal", { bg = "none" })
+            vim.api.nvim_set_hl(0, "NormalFloat", { bg = "none" })
+        end
+    }
+    ]]--
+
+    -- Rose-Pine
+    use ({
+        "rose-pine/neovim",
+        as = "rose-pine",
+        config = function ()
+            vim.cmd("colorscheme rose-pine")
+        end
+    })
+
+    -- Shadotheme
+    --[[
+    use ({
+        "Shadorain/shadotheme",
+        config = function ()
+            vim.cmd("colorscheme shado")
+        end
+    })
+    ]]--
+
+    -- Terminal toggle
+    use ({"akinsho/toggleterm.nvim", tag = "*",
+    config = function()
+        require("toggleterm").setup()
+    end
+    })
+
+    -- Alpha-nvim
+    use {
+        "goolord/alpha-nvim",
+        requires = { "nvim-tree/nvim-web-devicons" },
+        config = function ()
+            require"alpha".setup(require"alpha.themes.startify".config)
+        end
+    }
+
+    -- Source code coloring
+    use {
+        "nvim-treesitter/nvim-treesitter",
+        {run = ":TSUpdate"},
+    }
+    use "nvim-treesitter/playground"
+    -- Harpoon
+    use "nvim-lua/plenary.nvim"
+    use "ThePrimeagen/harpoon"
+    -- Undotree
+    use "mbbill/undotree"
+    -- Fugitive
+    use "tpope/vim-fugitive"
+    -- Buffers for nvim
+    use {"akinsho/bufferline.nvim", tag = "v3.*", requires = "nvim-tree/nvim-web-devicons"}
+
+
+    ---------------------------------------
+    -- NOTE: PUT YOUR THIRD PLUGIN HERE --
+    ---------------------------------------
+
+    -- Automatically set up your configuration after cloning packer.nvim
+    -- Put this at the end after all plugins
+    if packer_bootstrap then
+        require("packer").sync()
+    end
+end)
+
diff --git a/lua/user/telescope.lua b/lua/telescope.lua
old mode 100644
new mode 100755
similarity index 68%
rename from lua/user/telescope.lua
rename to lua/telescope.lua
index 7b0bff1..4af98e2
--- a/lua/user/telescope.lua
+++ b/lua/telescope.lua
@@ -100,39 +100,42 @@ telescope.setup {
     -- Now the picker_config_key will be applied every time you call this
     -- builtin picker
   },
-  load_extensions = { "yank_history", "bibtex" },
-  extensions = {
-    bibtex = {
-      depth = 1,
-      -- Depth for the *.bib file
-      custom_formats = {},
-      -- Custom format for citation label
-      format = '',
-      -- Format to use for citation label.
-      -- Try to match the filetype by default, or use 'plain'
-      global_files = {'~/texmf/bibtex/bib/Zotero.bib'},
-      -- Path to global bibliographies (placed outside of the project)
-      search_keys = { 'author', 'year', 'title' },
-      -- Define the search keys to use in the picker
-      citation_format = '{{author}} ({{year}}), {{title}}.',
-      -- Template for the formatted citation
-      citation_trim_firstname = true,
-      -- Only use initials for the authors first name
-      citation_max_auth = 2,
-      -- Max number of authors to write in the formatted citation
-      -- following authors will be replaced by "et al."
-      context = false,
-      -- Context awareness disabled by default
-      context_fallback = true,
-      -- Fallback to global/directory .bib files if context not found
-      -- This setting has no effect if context = false
-      wrap = false,
-      -- Wrapping in the preview window is disabled by default
-    },
-    -- Your extension configuration goes here:
-    -- extension_name = {
-    --   extension_config_key = value,
-    -- }
-    -- please take a look at the readme of the extension you want to configure
-  },
+  --load_extensions = { "yank_history", "bibtex" },
+  --extensions = {
+  --  bibtex = {
+  --    depth = 1,
+  --    -- Depth for the *.bib file
+  --    custom_formats = {},
+  --    -- Custom format for citation label
+  --    format = '',
+  --    -- Format to use for citation label.
+  --    -- Try to match the filetype by default, or use 'plain'
+  --    global_files = {'~/texmf/bibtex/bib/Zotero.bib'},
+  --    -- Path to global bibliographies (placed outside of the project)
+  --    search_keys = { 'author', 'year', 'title' },
+  --    -- Define the search keys to use in the picker
+  --    citation_format = '{{author}} ({{year}}), {{title}}.',
+  --    -- Template for the formatted citation
+  --    citation_trim_firstname = true,
+  --    -- Only use initials for the authors first name
+  --    citation_max_auth = 2,
+  --    -- Max number of authors to write in the formatted citation
+  --    -- following authors will be replaced by "et al."
+  --    context = false,
+  --    -- Context awareness disabled by default
+  --    context_fallback = true,
+  --    -- Fallback to global/directory .bib files if context not found
+  --    -- This setting has no effect if context = false
+  --    wrap = false,
+  --    -- Wrapping in the preview window is disabled by default
+  --  },
+  --  -- Your extension configuration goes here:
+  --  -- extension_name = {
+  --  --   extension_config_key = value,
+  --  -- }
+  --  -- please take a look at the readme of the extension you want to configure
+  --},
 }
+
+require('telescope').load_extension('fzf')
+
diff --git a/lua/term.lua b/lua/term.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2633d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/term.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+require("toggleterm").setup{
+    open_mapping = [[<C-\>]],
+    autochdir = false,
+}
+
+function _G.set_terminal_keymaps()
+    local opts = {buffer = 0}
+    vim.keymap.set('t', '<esc>', [[<C-\><C-n>]], opts)
+    vim.keymap.set('t', 'jk', [[<C-\><C-n>]], opts)
+    vim.keymap.set('t', '<C-h>', [[<Cmd>wincmd h<CR>]], opts)
+    vim.keymap.set('t', '<C-j>', [[<Cmd>wincmd j<CR>]], opts)
+    vim.keymap.set('t', '<C-k>', [[<Cmd>wincmd k<CR>]], opts)
+    vim.keymap.set('t', '<C-l>', [[<Cmd>wincmd l<CR>]], opts)
+    vim.keymap.set('t', '<C-w>', [[<C-\><C-n><C-w>]], opts)
+end
diff --git a/lua/treesitter.lua b/lua/treesitter.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..24abc0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/treesitter.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+require"nvim-treesitter.configs".setup {
+  -- A list of parser names, or "all" (the five listed parsers should always be installed)
+  ensure_installed = { "zig", "c", "lua", "vim", "vimdoc", "query" },
+
+  -- Install parsers synchronously (only applied to `ensure_installed`)
+  sync_install = false,
+
+  -- Automatically install missing parsers when entering buffer
+  -- Recommendation: set to false if you don"t have `tree-sitter` CLI installed locally
+  auto_install = true,
+
+  -- List of parsers to ignore installing (for "all")
+  ignore_install = { "javascript" },
+
+  ---- If you need to change the installation directory of the parsers (see -> Advanced Setup)
+  -- parser_install_dir = "/some/path/to/store/parsers", -- Remember to run vim.opt.runtimepath:append("/some/path/to/store/parsers")!
+
+  highlight = {
+    enable = true,
+
+    -- NOTE: these are the names of the parsers and not the filetype. (for example if you want to
+    -- disable highlighting for the `tex` filetype, you need to include `latex` in this list as this is
+    -- the name of the parser)
+    -- list of language that will be disabled
+    --disable = { "rust" },
+    -- Or use a function for more flexibility, e.g. to disable slow treesitter highlight for large files
+    --disable = function(_, buf)
+    --    local max_filesize = 100 * 1024 -- 100 KB
+    --    local ok, stats = pcall(vim.loop.fs_stat, vim.api.nvim_buf_get_name(buf))
+    --    if ok and stats and stats.size > max_filesize then
+    --        return true
+    --    end
+    --end,
+
+    -- Setting this to true will run `:h syntax` and tree-sitter at the same time.
+    -- Set this to `true` if you depend on "syntax" being enabled (like for indentation).
+    -- Using this option may slow down your editor, and you may see some duplicate highlights.
+    -- Instead of true it can also be a list of languages
+    additional_vim_regex_highlighting = false,
+  },
+}
+
diff --git a/lua/user/alpha.lua b/lua/user/alpha.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index c90303c..0000000
--- a/lua/user/alpha.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, alpha = pcall(require, "alpha")
-if not status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
-local dashboard = require("alpha.themes.dashboard")
-dashboard.section.header.val = {
- [[                                                    ]],
- [[ ███╗   ██╗███████╗ ██████╗ ██╗   ██╗██╗███╗   ███╗ ]],
- [[ ████╗  ██║██╔════╝██╔═══██╗██║   ██║██║████╗ ████║ ]],
- [[ ██╔██╗ ██║█████╗  ██║   ██║██║   ██║██║██╔████╔██║ ]],
- [[ ██║╚██╗██║██╔══╝  ██║   ██║╚██╗ ██╔╝██║██║╚██╔╝██║ ]],
- [[ ██║ ╚████║███████╗╚██████╔╝ ╚████╔╝ ██║██║ ╚═╝ ██║ ]],
- [[ ╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚══════╝ ╚═════╝   ╚═══╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚═╝ ]],
- [[                                                    ]],
-}
-dashboard.section.buttons.val = {
-  -- dashboard.button("e", "  New file", ":ene <BAR> startinsert <CR>"),
-  -- dashboard.button("p", "  Find project", ":Telescope projects <CR>"),
-  -- dashboard.button("t", "  Find text", ":Telescope live_grep <CR>"),
-	-- dashboard.button("d", "✗  Delete session", "<cmd>SessionsManager delete_session<CR>"),
-  dashboard.button("s", "  Sessions", "<cmd>SessionManager load_session<CR>"),
-  dashboard.button("r", "  Recent", ":Telescope oldfiles <CR>"),
-	dashboard.button("f", "  Find", ":Telescope find_files <CR>"),
-	dashboard.button("c", "  Config", ":e $MYVIMRC <CR>"),
-	dashboard.button("i", "  Info", "<cmd>e ~/.config/CheatSheet.md<cr>"),
-	dashboard.button("q", "  Quit", ":qa<CR>"),
-}
-
-local function footer()
--- NOTE: requires the fortune-mod package to work
-	-- local handle = io.popen("fortune")
-	-- local fortune = handle:read("*a")
-	-- handle:close()
-	-- return fortune
-	return ""
-end
-
-dashboard.section.footer.val = footer()
-
-dashboard.section.footer.opts.hl = "Type"
-dashboard.section.header.opts.hl = "Include"
-dashboard.section.buttons.opts.hl = "Keyword"
-
-dashboard.opts.opts.noautocmd = true
--- vim.cmd([[autocmd User AlphaReady echo 'ready']])
-alpha.setup(dashboard.opts)
diff --git a/lua/user/autocommands.lua b/lua/user/autocommands.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index c438738..0000000
--- a/lua/user/autocommands.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-vim.cmd [[
-  augroup _general_settings
-    autocmd!
-    autocmd FileType qf,help,man,lspinfo nnoremap <silent> <buffer> q :close<CR> 
-    autocmd TextYankPost * silent!lua require('vim.highlight').on_yank({higroup = 'Visual', timeout = 200}) 
-    autocmd BufWinEnter * :set formatoptions-=cro
-    autocmd FileType qf set nobuflisted
-  augroup end
-
-  augroup _git
-    autocmd!
-    autocmd FileType gitcommit setlocal wrap
-    autocmd FileType gitcommit setlocal spell
-  augroup end
-
-  augroup _markdown
-    autocmd!
-    autocmd FileType markdown setlocal wrap
-    autocmd FileType markdown setlocal spell
-  augroup end
-
-  augroup _auto_resize
-    autocmd!
-    autocmd VimResized * tabdo wincmd = 
-  augroup end
-
-  augroup _alpha
-    autocmd!
-    autocmd User AlphaReady set showtabline=0 | autocmd BufUnload <buffer> set showtabline=2
-  augroup end
-]]
-
--- Autoformat
--- augroup _lsp
---   autocmd!
---   autocmd BufWritePre * lua vim.lsp.buf.formatting()
--- augroup end
diff --git a/lua/user/autolist.lua b/lua/user/autolist.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 28cf955..0000000
--- a/lua/user/autolist.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
--- local status_ok, autolist = pcall(require, "autolist")
--- if not status_ok then
---   return
--- end
-
--- return {
---     "gaoDean/autolist.nvim",
---     ft = {
---       "markdown",
---       "text",
---       "tex",
---       "plaintex",
---     },
---     config = function()
---       local autolist = require("autolist")
---       autolist.setup()
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("i", "<CR>", autolist.new)
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("i", "<Tab>", autolist.indent)
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("i", "<S-Tab>", autolist.indent, "<C-D>")
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "o", autolist.new)
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "O", autolist.new_before)
---       -- autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", ">>", autolist.indent)
---       -- autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "<<", autolist.indent)
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "<leader>r", autolist.force_recalculate)
---       autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "<leader>x", autolist.invert_entry, "")
---         vim.api.nvim_create_autocmd("TextChanged", {
---           pattern = "-",
---           callback = function()
---             vim.cmd.normal({autolist.force_recalculate(nil, nil), bang = false})
---           end
---         })
---     end,
---   }
diff --git a/lua/user/autopairs.lua b/lua/user/autopairs.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 02f3774..0000000
--- a/lua/user/autopairs.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
--- Setup nvim-cmp.
-local status_ok, npairs = pcall(require, "nvim-autopairs")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-npairs.setup {
-  check_ts = true,
-  ts_config = {
-    lua = { "string", "source" },
-    javascript = { "string", "template_string" },
-    java = false,
-  },
-  disable_filetype = { "TelescopePrompt", "spectre_panel" },
-  disable_in_macro = true,
-  disable_in_replace_mode = true,
-  enable_moveright = true,
-  ignored_next_char = "",
-  enable_check_bracket_line = true,  --- check bracket in same line
-  -- enable_afterquote = true,  -- add bracket pairs after quote
-  -- enable_bracket_in_quote = true,
-  -- enable_abbr = false, -- trigger abbreviation
-  -- fast_wrap = {
-  --   map = "<C-l>",
-  --   chars = { "$", "{", "[", "(", '"', "'" },
-  --   pattern = string.gsub([=[[%'%"%)%>%]%)%}%,]]=], "%s+", ""),
-  --   offset = 1, -- Offset from pattern match
-  --   end_key = "L",
-  --   keys = "qwertyuiopzxcvbnmasdfghjkl",
-  --   check_comma = true,
-  --   highlight = "PmenuSel",
-  --   highlight_grey = "LineNr",
-  --   -- highlight = 'Search',
-  --   -- highlight_grey='Comment'
-  -- },
-}
-
-local npairs = require'nvim-autopairs'
-
-local Rule = require'nvim-autopairs.rule'
-
-local cond = require'nvim-autopairs.conds'
-
-npairs.add_rules({
-  Rule("`","'","tex"),
-  Rule("$","$","tex"),
-  Rule(' ', ' ')
-    :with_pair(function(opts)
-      local pair = opts.line:sub(opts.col, opts.col + 1)
-      return vim.tbl_contains({ '$$', '()', '{}', '[]' }, pair)
-    end)
-    :with_move(cond.none())
-    :with_cr(cond.none())
-    :with_del(function(opts)
-      local col = vim.api.nvim_win_get_cursor(0)[2]
-      local context = opts.line:sub(col - 1, col + 2)
-      return vim.tbl_contains({ '$  $', '(  )', '{  }', '[  ]' }, context)
-    end),
-  Rule("$ "," ","tex")
-    :with_pair(cond.not_after_regex(" "))
-    :with_del(cond.none()),
-  Rule("[ "," ","tex")
-    :with_pair(cond.not_after_regex(" "))
-    :with_del(cond.none()),
-  Rule("{ "," ","tex")
-    :with_pair(cond.not_after_regex(" "))
-    :with_del(cond.none()),
-  Rule("( "," ","tex")
-    :with_pair(cond.not_after_regex(" "))
-    :with_del(cond.none()),
-  }
-)
-
-
-require('nvim-autopairs').get_rule('$'):with_move(function(opts)
-  return opts.char == opts.next_char:sub(1, 1)
-end)
-
-
-local cmp_autopairs = require "nvim-autopairs.completion.cmp"
-local cmp_status_ok, cmp = pcall(require, "cmp")
-if not cmp_status_ok then
-  return
-end
-cmp.event:on("confirm_done", cmp_autopairs.on_confirm_done { map_char = { tex = "" } })
diff --git a/lua/user/cmp.lua b/lua/user/cmp.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index a292e18..0000000
--- a/lua/user/cmp.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-local cmp_status_ok, cmp = pcall(require, "cmp")
-if not cmp_status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-local snip_status_ok, luasnip = pcall(require, "luasnip")
-if not snip_status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-local check_backspace = function()
-  local col = vim.fn.col "." - 1
-  return col == 0 or vim.fn.getline("."):sub(col, col):match "%s"
-end
-
---   פּ ﯟ   some other good icons
-local kind_icons = {
-  Text = "",
-  Method = "m",
-  Function = "",
-  Constructor = "",
-  Field = "",
-  Variable = "",
-  Class = "",
-  Interface = "",
-  Module = "",
-  Property = "",
-  Unit = "",
-  Value = "",
-  Enum = "",
-  Keyword = "",
-  Snippet = "",
-  Color = "",
-  File = "",
-  Reference = "",
-  Folder = "",
-  EnumMember = "",
-  Constant = "",
-  Struct = "",
-  Event = "",
-  Operator = "",
-  TypeParameter = "",
-}
--- find more here: https://www.nerdfonts.com/cheat-sheet
-
-cmp.setup {
-	-- preselect = cmp.PreselectMode.None,
-  completion = {
-    -- autocomplete = {
-    --   cmp.TriggerEvent.TextChanged,
-    --   cmp.TriggerEvent.InsertEnter,
-    -- },
-    completeopt = "menu,noselect",
-    -- completeopt = "menuone,noinsert,noselect",
-    keyword_length = 1,
-  },
-  snippet = {
-    expand = function(args)
-      luasnip.lsp_expand(args.body) -- For `luasnip` users.
-    end,
-  },
-  mapping = {
-    ["<C-k>"] = cmp.mapping(cmp.mapping.select_prev_item(), { "i", "c" }),
-    ["<C-j>"] = cmp.mapping(cmp.mapping.select_next_item(), { "i", "c" }),
-    ["<CR>"] = cmp.mapping.confirm({ select = false }),
-      -- Set `select` to `false` to only confirm selected
-    ["<Tab>"] = cmp.mapping(function(fallback)
-      if luasnip.expandable() then
-        luasnip.expand()
-      elseif luasnip.expand_or_jumpable() then
-        luasnip.expand_or_jump()
-      elseif check_backspace() then
-        fallback()
-      else
-        fallback()
-      end
-    end, {
-      "i",
-      "s",
-    }),
-    ["<S-Tab>"] = cmp.mapping(function(fallback)
-      -- if cmp.visible() then
-      --   cmp.select_prev_item()
-      if luasnip.jumpable(-1) then
-        luasnip.jump(-1)
-      else
-        fallback()
-      end
-    end, {
-      "i",
-      "s",
-    }),
-  },
-  formatting = {
-    fields = { "kind", "abbr", "menu" },
-    format = function(entry, vim_item)
-      -- Kind icons
-      vim_item.kind = string.format("%s", kind_icons[vim_item.kind])
-      -- vim_item.kind = string.format('%s %s', kind_icons[vim_item.kind], vim_item.kind) -- This concatonates the icons with the name of the item kind
-      vim_item.menu = ({
-        -- omni = "[VimTex]",
-        omni = (vim.inspect(vim_item.menu):gsub('%"', "")),
-        nvim_lsp = "[LSP]",
-        luasnip = "[Snippet]",
-        buffer = "[Buffer]",
-        spell = "[Spell]",
-        latex_symbols = "[Symbols]",
-        cmdline = "[CMD]",
-        path = "[Path]",
-      })[entry.source.name]
-      return vim_item
-    end,
-  },
-  sources = cmp.config.sources({
-    { name = "nvim_lsp" },
-    { name = "luasnip" },
-    { name = "omni" },
-    { name = "buffer", keyword_length = 3 },
-    { name = "spell",
-      keyword_length = 4,
-      option = {
-          keep_all_entries = false,
-          enable_in_context = function()
-              return true
-          end
-      },
-    },
-    { name = "latex_symbols",
-      filetype = { "tex", "latex" },
-      option = { cache = true }, -- avoids reloading each time
-    },
-    { name = "path" },
-  }),
-  confirm_opts = {
-    behavior = cmp.ConfirmBehavior.Replace,
-    select = false,
-  },
-  view = {
-    entries = 'custom',
-  },
-  window = {
-    documentation = {
-      border = { "╭", "─", "╮", "│", "╯", "─", "╰", "│" },
-    }
-  },
-  performance = {
-     trigger_debounce_time = 500,
-     throttle = 550,
-     fetching_timeout = 80,
-  },
-}
-
-
--- TODO zotero import
-    -- { name = "cmp_zotcite",
-    --   filetype = { "tex", "latex", "pandoc", "markdown", "rmd", "quarto" },
-    -- },
-      -- could use but seems like vimtex has access to .bib
-
--- `/` cmdline setup.
-cmp.setup.cmdline('/', {
-  mapping = cmp.mapping.preset.cmdline(),
-  sources = {
-    {name = 'buffer'}
-  }
-})
-
-
--- `:` cmdline setup.
-cmp.setup.cmdline(':', {
-  mapping = cmp.mapping.preset.cmdline(),
-  sources = {
-    {name = 'path'},
-    {name = 'cmdline'}
-  }
-})
-
-
--- Toggle cmp entrirely
-vim.g.cmptoggle = true -- nvim-cmp off by default if false
-
-local cmp = require('cmp')
-cmp.setup {
-  enabled = function()
-    return vim.g.cmptoggle
-  end
-}
-
--- TODO was trying to get <C-j>, <C-k> to work in the command line
-
-  -- mapping = cmp.mapping.preset.cmdline({
-  --   ["<C-j>"] = cmp.mapping.select_next_item({ behavior = cmp.SelectBehavior.Insert }),
-  --   ["<C-k>"] = cmp.mapping.select_prev_item({ behavior = cmp.SelectBehavior.Insert }),
-  --   ["<CR>"] = cmp.mapping.confirm({ select = true }),
-    -- ['<C-j>'] = cmp.mapping(cmp.mapping.select_next_item()),
-    -- ['<C-k>'] = cmp.mapping(cmp.mapping.select_prev_item()),
-  -- }),
diff --git a/lua/user/colorscheme.lua b/lua/user/colorscheme.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index d77f17e..0000000
--- a/lua/user/colorscheme.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
--- GRUVBOX --
---[[
-local colorscheme = "rose-pine"
--- local colorscheme = "gruvbox-baby"
-
--- OTHER ---
-
--- local colorscheme = "duskfox"
--- local colorscheme = "melange"
--- local colorscheme = "tokyonight-night"
-
--- local colorscheme = "onedark"
---   -- style options: dark, darker, cool, deep, warm, warmer, light
---   require('onedark').setup {
---       style = 'dark'
---   }
---   require('onedark').load()
-
--- GENERAL --
-
-local status_ok, _ = pcall(vim.cmd, "colorscheme " .. colorscheme)
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-]]--
-
-function ColorSchemes(color)
-    color = color or "rose-pine"
-    vim.cmd.colorscheme(color)
-
-    --vim.api.nvim_set_hl(0, "Normal", { bg = "none" })
-    --vim.api.nvim_set_hl(0, "NormalFloat", { bg = "none" })
-end
-
-ColorSchemes()
-
-
diff --git a/lua/user/comment.lua b/lua/user/comment.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d234af..0000000
--- a/lua/user/comment.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, comment = pcall(require, "Comment")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-comment.setup {
-  ---Add a space b/w comment and the line
-  padding = true,
-  ---Whether the cursor should stay at its position
-  sticky = true,
-  ---Lines to be ignored while (un)comment
-  ignore = nil,
-  ---Function to call before (un)comment
-  pre_hook = nil,
-  mappings = {
-          ---Operator-pending mapping; `gcc` `gbc` `gc[count]{motion}` `gb[count]{motion}`
-          basic = false,
-          ---Extra mapping; `gco`, `gcO`, `gcA`
-          extra = false,
-      },
-}
-
-  ---LHS of toggle mappings in NORMAL mode
-  -- ---Enable keybindings
-  -- ---NOTE: If given `false` then the plugin won't create any mappings
-  ---Function to call before (un)comment
-  -- pre_hook = function(ctx)
-  --   local U = require "Comment.utils"
-  --
-  --   local status_utils_ok, utils = pcall(require, "ts_context_commentstring.utils")
-  --   if not status_utils_ok then
-  --     return
-  --   end
-  --
-  --   local location = nil
-  --   if ctx.ctype == U.ctype.block then
-  --     location = utils.get_cursor_location()
-  --   elseif ctx.cmotion == U.cmotion.v or ctx.cmotion == U.cmotion.V then
-  --     location = utils.get_visual_start_location()
-  --   end
-  --
-  --   local status_internals_ok, internals = pcall(require, "ts_context_commentstring.internals")
-  --   if not status_internals_ok then
-  --     return
-  --   end
-  --
-  --   return internals.calculate_commentstring {
-  --     key = ctx.ctype == U.ctype.line and "__default" or "__multiline",
-  --     location = location,
-  --   }
-  -- end,
diff --git a/lua/user/dressing.lua b/lua/user/dressing.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 16e5b1d..0000000
--- a/lua/user/dressing.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-require('dressing').setup({
-  input = {
-    -- Set to false to disable the vim.ui.input implementation
-    enabled = true,
-
-    -- Default prompt string
-    default_prompt = "Input:",
-
-    -- Can be 'left', 'right', or 'center'
-    prompt_align = "center",
-
-    -- When true, <Esc> will close the modal
-    insert_only = true,
-
-    -- When true, input will start in insert mode.
-    start_in_insert = true,
-
-    -- These are passed to nvim_open_win
-    anchor = "SW",
-    border = "rounded",
-    -- 'editor' and 'win' will default to being centered
-    relative = "cursor",
-
-    -- These can be integers or a float between 0 and 1 (e.g. 0.4 for 40%)
-    prefer_width = 40,
-    width = nil,
-    -- min_width and max_width can be a list of mixed types.
-    -- min_width = {20, 0.2} means "the greater of 20 columns or 20% of total"
-    max_width = { 140, 0.9 },
-    min_width = { 20, 0.2 },
-
-    -- Window transparency (0-100)
-    -- winblend = 20, -- causing errors
-    -- Change default highlight groups (see :help winhl)
-    -- winhighlight = "", -- causing errors
-
-    -- Set to `false` to disable
-    mappings = {
-      n = {
-        ["<Esc>"] = "Close",
-        ["<CR>"] = "Confirm",
-      },
-      i = {
-        ["<C-c>"] = "Close",
-        ["<CR>"] = "Confirm",
-        ["<Up>"] = "HistoryPrev",
-        ["<Down>"] = "HistoryNext",
-      },
-    },
-
-    override = function(conf)
-      -- This is the config that will be passed to nvim_open_win.
-      -- Change values here to customize the layout
-      return conf
-    end,
-
-    -- see :help dressing_get_config
-    get_config = nil,
-  },
-  select = {
-    -- Set to false to disable the vim.ui.select implementation
-    enabled = true,
-
-    -- Priority list of preferred vim.select implementations
-    backend = { "telescope", "fzf_lua", "fzf", "builtin", "nui" },
-
-    -- Trim trailing `:` from prompt
-    trim_prompt = true,
-
-    -- Options for telescope selector
-    -- These are passed into the telescope picker directly. Can be used like:
-    -- telescope = require('telescope.themes').get_ivy({...})
-    telescope = nil,
-
-    -- Options for fzf selector
-    fzf = {
-      window = {
-        width = 0.5,
-        height = 0.4,
-      },
-    },
-
-    -- Options for fzf_lua selector
-    fzf_lua = {
-      winopts = {
-        width = 0.5,
-        height = 0.4,
-      },
-    },
-
-    -- Options for nui Menu
-    nui = {
-      position = "50%",
-      size = nil,
-      relative = "editor",
-      border = {
-        style = "rounded",
-      },
-      buf_options = {
-        swapfile = false,
-        filetype = "DressingSelect",
-      },
-      -- win_options = {
-      --   winblend = 10, -- might also cause errors
-      -- },
-      max_width = 80,
-      max_height = 40,
-      min_width = 40,
-      min_height = 10,
-    },
-
-    -- Options for built-in selector
-    builtin = {
-      -- These are passed to nvim_open_win
-      anchor = "NW",
-      border = "rounded",
-      -- 'editor' and 'win' will default to being centered
-      relative = "editor",
-
-      -- Window transparency (0-100)
-      -- winblend = 10, -- causing errors
-      -- Change default highlight groups (see :help winhl)
-      -- winhighlight = "", -- causing errors
-
-      -- These can be integers or a float between 0 and 1 (e.g. 0.4 for 40%)
-      -- the min_ and max_ options can be a list of mixed types.
-      -- max_width = {140, 0.8} means "the lesser of 140 columns or 80% of total"
-      width = nil,
-      max_width = { 140, 0.8 },
-      min_width = { 40, 0.2 },
-      height = nil,
-      max_height = 0.9,
-      min_height = { 10, 0.2 },
-
-      -- Set to `false` to disable
-      mappings = {
-        ["<Esc>"] = "Close",
-        ["<C-c>"] = "Close",
-        ["<CR>"] = "Confirm",
-      },
-
-      override = function(conf)
-        -- This is the config that will be passed to nvim_open_win.
-        -- Change values here to customize the layout
-        return conf
-      end,
-    },
-
-    -- Used to override format_item. See :help dressing-format
-    format_item_override = {},
-
-    -- see :help dressing_get_config
-    get_config = nil,
-  },
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/gitsigns.lua b/lua/user/gitsigns.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index ff72b93..0000000
--- a/lua/user/gitsigns.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, gitsigns = pcall(require, "gitsigns")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-gitsigns.setup {
-  signs = {
-    add = { hl = "GitSignsAdd", text = "▎", numhl = "GitSignsAddNr", linehl = "GitSignsAddLn" },
-    change = { hl = "GitSignsChange", text = "▎", numhl = "GitSignsChangeNr", linehl = "GitSignsChangeLn" },
-    delete = { hl = "GitSignsDelete", text = "契", numhl = "GitSignsDeleteNr", linehl = "GitSignsDeleteLn" },
-    topdelete = { hl = "GitSignsDelete", text = "契", numhl = "GitSignsDeleteNr", linehl = "GitSignsDeleteLn" },
-    changedelete = { hl = "GitSignsChange", text = "▎", numhl = "GitSignsChangeNr", linehl = "GitSignsChangeLn" },
-  },
-  signcolumn = true, -- Toggle with `:Gitsigns toggle_signs`
-  numhl = false, -- Toggle with `:Gitsigns toggle_numhl`
-  linehl = false, -- Toggle with `:Gitsigns toggle_linehl`
-  word_diff = false, -- Toggle with `:Gitsigns toggle_word_diff`
-  watch_gitdir = {
-    interval = 1000,
-    follow_files = true,
-  },
-  attach_to_untracked = true,
-  current_line_blame = false, -- Toggle with `:Gitsigns toggle_current_line_blame`
-  current_line_blame_opts = {
-    virt_text = true,
-    virt_text_pos = "eol", -- 'eol' | 'overlay' | 'right_align'
-    delay = 1000,
-    ignore_whitespace = false,
-  },
-  current_line_blame_formatter_opts = {
-    relative_time = false,
-  },
-  sign_priority = 6,
-  update_debounce = 100,
-  status_formatter = nil, -- Use default
-  max_file_length = 40000,
-  preview_config = {
-    -- Options passed to nvim_open_win
-    border = "single",
-    style = "minimal",
-    relative = "cursor",
-    row = 0,
-    col = 1,
-  },
-  yadm = {
-    enable = false,
-  },
-}
diff --git a/lua/user/illuminate.lua b/lua/user/illuminate.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index d26cefe..0000000
--- a/lua/user/illuminate.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-vim.cmd('hi IlluminatedWordText guibg=#504945 gui=bold')
--- vim.cmd('hi IlluminatedWordRead guibg=#ffffff gui=bold')
--- vim.cmd('hi IlluminatedWordWrite guibg=#ffffff gui=bold')
diff --git a/lua/user/impatient.lua b/lua/user/impatient.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 84419e0..0000000
--- a/lua/user/impatient.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, impatient = pcall(require, "impatient")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-impatient.enable_profile()
diff --git a/lua/user/indentline.lua b/lua/user/indentline.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index fdf5870..0000000
--- a/lua/user/indentline.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, indent_blankline = pcall(require, "indent_blankline")
-if not status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
-vim.g.indent_blankline_buftype_exclude = { "terminal", "nofile" }
-vim.g.indent_blankline_filetype_exclude = {
-	"help",
-	"startify",
-	"dashboard",
-	"packer",
-	"neogitstatus",
-	"NvimTree",
-	"Trouble",
-}
-vim.g.indentLine_enabled = 1
--- vim.g.indent_blankline_char = "│"
-vim.g.indent_blankline_char = "▏"
--- vim.g.indent_blankline_char = "▎"
-vim.g.indent_blankline_show_trailing_blankline_indent = false
-vim.g.indent_blankline_show_first_indent_level = true
-vim.g.indent_blankline_use_treesitter = true
-vim.g.indent_blankline_show_current_context = true
-vim.g.indent_blankline_context_patterns = {
-	"class",
-	"return",
-	"function",
-	"method",
-	"^if",
-	"^while",
-	"jsx_element",
-	"^for",
-	"^object",
-	"^table",
-	"block",
-	"arguments",
-	"if_statement",
-	"else_clause",
-	"jsx_element",
-	"jsx_self_closing_element",
-	"try_statement",
-	"catch_clause",
-	"import_statement",
-	"operation_type",
-}
--- HACK: work-around for https://github.com/lukas-reineke/indent-blankline.nvim/issues/59
-vim.wo.colorcolumn = "99999"
-
--- vim.cmd [[highlight IndentBlanklineIndent1 guifg=#E06C75 gui=nocombine]]
--- vim.cmd [[highlight IndentBlanklineIndent2 guifg=#E5C07B gui=nocombine]]
--- vim.cmd [[highlight IndentBlanklineIndent3 guifg=#98C379 gui=nocombine]]
--- vim.cmd [[highlight IndentBlanklineIndent4 guifg=#56B6C2 gui=nocombine]]
--- vim.cmd [[highlight IndentBlanklineIndent5 guifg=#61AFEF gui=nocombine]]
--- vim.cmd [[highlight IndentBlanklineIndent6 guifg=#C678DD gui=nocombine]]
--- vim.opt.list = true
--- vim.opt.listchars:append "space:⋅"
--- vim.opt.listchars:append "space:"
--- vim.opt.listchars:append "eol:↴"
-
-indent_blankline.setup({
-	-- show_end_of_line = true,
-	-- space_char_blankline = " ",
-	show_current_context = true,
-	-- show_current_context_start = true,
-	-- char_highlight_list = {
-	--   "IndentBlanklineIndent1",
-	--   "IndentBlanklineIndent2",
-	--   "IndentBlanklineIndent3",
-	-- },
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/keymaps.lua b/lua/user/keymaps.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 9cd27b7..0000000
--- a/lua/user/keymaps.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-local opts = { noremap = true, silent = true }
-
-local term_opts = { silent = true }
-
--- Shorten function name
-local keymap = vim.api.nvim_set_keymap
-
---Remap space as leader key
-vim.g.mapleader = " "
---vim.g.maplocalleader = " "
---vim.g.maplocalleader = "Bslash"
-vim.g.maplocalleader = "\\"
-
--- Modes
---   normal_mode = "n",
---   insert_mode = "i",
---   visual_mode = "v",
---   visual_block_mode = "x",
---   term_mode = "t",
---   command_mode = "c",
-
-
--- NOTE Check mapping with :verbose map ____
-
--- Unmappings
-keymap("n", "<C-z>", "<nop>", opts)
-
-
--- Surround 
--- vim.keymap.set("v", '<C-s>', 'S', { remap = true }) -- see surround.lua
-
-
--- Spelling
-vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-s>", function()
-  require("telescope.builtin").spell_suggest(require("telescope.themes").get_cursor({
-      previewer = false,
-      layout_config = {
-        width = 50,
-        height = 15,
-      }
-    })
-  )
-end, { remap = true })
--- vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-s>", "z=", { remap = true}) 
--- keymap("n", "<C-s>", "<cmd>Telescope spell_suggest<cr>", { remap = true})
-
--- Kill search highlights
-keymap("n", "<CR>", ":noh<CR>", opts)
-
-
--- Find project files
-vim.keymap.set("n", "<C-p>", function ()
-  require('telescope.builtin').find_files(require('telescope.themes').get_dropdown({previewer = false})
-  )
-end, { remap = true })
-
-
--- Toggle comments
-  vim.keymap.set('n', '<C-c>', '<Plug>(comment_toggle_linewise_current)')
-  vim.keymap.set('x', '<C-c>', '<Plug>(comment_toggle_linewise_visual)')
-
--- Open help on word
-keymap("n", "<S-m>", ':execute "help " . expand("<cword>")<cr>', opts)
-
-
--- Fix 'Y', 'E'
-keymap("n", "Y", "y$", opts)
-keymap("n", "E", "ge", opts)
-keymap("v", "Y", "y$", opts)
-keymap("v", "E", "ge", opts)
-
-
--- Avoid cutting text pasted over
-keymap("v", "p", '"_dP', opts)
-
-
--- Center cursor
-keymap("n", "m", "zz", opts)
-keymap("v", "m", "zz", opts)
-
-
--- Better window navigation
-keymap("n", "<C-h>", "<C-w>h", opts)
-keymap("n", "<C-j>", "<C-w>j", opts)
-keymap("n", "<C-k>", "<C-w>k", opts)
-keymap("n", "<C-l>", "<C-w>l", opts)
-
-
--- Resize with arrows
--- keymap("n", "<C-Up>", ":resize -2<CR>", opts)
--- keymap("n", "<C-Down>", ":resize +2<CR>", opts)
-keymap("n", "<A-Left>", ":vertical resize -2<CR>", opts)
-keymap("n", "<A-Right>", ":vertical resize +2<CR>", opts)
-keymap("n", "<A-h>", ":vertical resize -2<CR>", opts)
-keymap("n", "<A-l>", ":vertical resize +2<CR>", opts)
-
-
--- Navigate buffers
-keymap("n", "<BS>", ":bnext<CR>", opts)
-keymap("n", "<S-TAB>", ":bprevious<CR>", opts)
-
-
--- Drag lines
-keymap("n", "<A-j>", "<Esc>:m .+1<CR>==", opts)
-keymap("n", "<A-k>", "<Esc>:m .-2<CR>==", opts)
-keymap("x", "<A-j>", ":move '>+1<CR>gv-gv", opts)
-keymap("x", "<A-k>", ":move '<-2<CR>gv-gv", opts)
-keymap("v", "<A-j>", ":m'>+<CR>gv", opts)
-keymap("v", "<A-k>", ":m-2<CR>gv", opts)
-
--- Toggle Terminal
-keymap("n", "<c-t>",":ToggleTerm", opts)
---keymap("n", "<c-v>",":ToggleTermSendCurrentLine", opts)
-
--- Horizontal lime movments --
-keymap("n", "<c-u>", "<c-u>zz", opts)
-keymap("n", "<c-d>", "<c-d>zz", opts)
-
-
--- Horizontal lime movments --
-keymap("v", "<S-h>", "g^", opts)
-keymap("v", "<S-l>", "g$", opts)
-keymap("n", "<S-h>", "g^", opts)
-keymap("n", "<S-l>", "g$", opts)
-
--- Indentation
-keymap("v", "<", "<gv", opts)
-keymap("v", ">", ">gv", opts)
-keymap("n", "<", "<S-v><<esc>", opts)
-keymap("n", ">", "<S-v>><esc>", opts)
-
-
--- Navigate display lines
-keymap("n", "J", "gj", opts)
-keymap("n", "K", "gk", opts)
-keymap("v", "J", "gj", opts)
-keymap("v", "K", "gk", opts)
-
-
--- Terminal --
--- Better terminal navigation
--- keymap("t", "<C-h>", "<C-\\><C-N><C-w>h", term_opts)
--- keymap("t", "<C-j>", "<C-\\><C-N><C-w>j", term_opts)
--- keymap("t", "<C-k>", "<C-\\><C-N><C-w>k", term_opts)
--- keymap("t", "<C-l>", "<C-\\><C-N><C-w>l", term_opts)
-
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/handlers.lua b/lua/user/lsp/handlers.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 72de422..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lsp/handlers.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-local M = {}
-
-local status_cmp_ok, cmp_nvim_lsp = pcall(require, "cmp_nvim_lsp")
-if not status_cmp_ok then
-	return
-end
-
-M.capabilities = vim.lsp.protocol.make_client_capabilities()
-M.capabilities.textDocument.completion.completionItem.snippetSupport = true
-M.capabilities = cmp_nvim_lsp.default_capabilities(M.capabilities)
-
-M.setup = function()
-	local signs = {
-		{ name = "DiagnosticSignError", text = "" },
-		{ name = "DiagnosticSignWarn", text = "" },
-		{ name = "DiagnosticSignHint", text = "" },
-		{ name = "DiagnosticSignInfo", text = "" },
-	}
-
-	for _, sign in ipairs(signs) do
-		vim.fn.sign_define(sign.name, { texthl = sign.name, text = sign.text, numhl = "" })
-	end
-
-	local config = {
-		virtual_text = false, -- disable virtual text
-		signs = {
-			active = signs, -- show signs
-		},
-		update_in_insert = true,
-		underline = true,
-		severity_sort = true,
-		float = {
-			focusable = true,
-			style = "minimal",
-			border = "rounded",
-			source = "always",
-			header = "",
-			prefix = "",
-		},
-	}
-
-	vim.diagnostic.config(config)
-
-	vim.lsp.handlers["textDocument/hover"] = vim.lsp.with(vim.lsp.handlers.hover, {
-		border = "rounded",
-	})
-
-	vim.lsp.handlers["textDocument/signatureHelp"] = vim.lsp.with(vim.lsp.handlers.signature_help, {
-		border = "rounded",
-	})
-end
-
-local function lsp_keymaps(bufnr)
-	local opts = { noremap = true, silent = true }
-	local keymap = vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap
-	keymap(bufnr, "n", "gD", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.declaration()<CR>", opts)
-	keymap(bufnr, "n", "gd", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.definition()<CR>", opts)
-	keymap(bufnr, "n", "N", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.hover()<CR>", opts)
-	keymap(bufnr, "n", "gI", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.implementation()<CR>", opts)
-	keymap(bufnr, "n", "gr", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.references()<CR>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "gl", "<cmd>lua vim.diagnostic.open_float()<CR>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>lf", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.format{ async = true }<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>li", "<cmd>LspInfo<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>lI", "<cmd>LspInstallInfo<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>la", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.code_action()<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>lj", "<cmd>lua vim.diagnostic.goto_next({buffer=0})<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>lk", "<cmd>lua vim.diagnostic.goto_prev({buffer=0})<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>lr", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.rename()<cr>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>ls", "<cmd>lua vim.lsp.buf.signature_help()<CR>", opts)
-	-- keymap(bufnr, "n", "<leader>lq", "<cmd>lua vim.diagnostic.setloclist()<CR>", opts)
-end
-
-M.on_attach = function(client, bufnr)
-	if client.name == "tsserver" then -- turns off formatting 
-		client.server_capabilities.documentFormattingProvider = false
-	end
-
-	if client.name == "lua_ls" then -- turns off formatting 
-		client.server_capabilities.documentFormattingProvider = false
-	end
-
-	lsp_keymaps(bufnr)
-	local status_ok, illuminate = pcall(require, "illuminate")
-	if not status_ok then
-		return
-	end
-	illuminate.on_attach(client)
-end
-
-return M
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/init.lua b/lua/user/lsp/init.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 5238726..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lsp/init.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, _ = pcall(require, "lspconfig")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-require "user.lsp.mason"
--- require "user.lsp.texlab"
-require ("user.lsp.handlers").setup()
-require "user.lsp.null-ls"
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/null-ls.lua b/lua/user/lsp/null-ls.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 28852ff..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lsp/null-ls.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-local null_ls_status_ok, null_ls = pcall(require, "null-ls")
-if not null_ls_status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
--- https://github.com/jose-elias-alvarez/null-ls.nvim/tree/main/lua/null-ls/builtins/formatting
-local formatting = null_ls.builtins.formatting
--- https://github.com/jose-elias-alvarez/null-ls.nvim/tree/main/lua/null-ls/builtins/diagnostics
-local diagnostics = null_ls.builtins.diagnostics
-
--- local sources = { null_ls.builtins.diagnostics.cspell, null_ls.builtins.code_actions.cspell }
-
-null_ls.setup({
-	debug = false,
-	sources = {
-		formatting.prettier.with({ extra_args = { "--no-semi", "--single-quote", "--jsx-single-quote" } }),
-		formatting.black.with({ extra_args = { "--fast" } }),
-		formatting.stylua,
-    -- null_ls.builtins.diagnostics.cspell,
-    -- null_ls.builtins.code_actions.cspell,
-    null_ls.builtins.completion.spell,
-    -- diagnostics.flake8
-	},
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/settings/jsonls.lua b/lua/user/lsp/settings/jsonls.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index e202e1e..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lsp/settings/jsonls.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-local default_schemas = nil
-local status_ok, jsonls_settings = pcall(require, "nlspsettings.jsonls")
-if status_ok then
-  default_schemas = jsonls_settings.get_default_schemas()
-end
-
-local schemas = {
-  {
-    description = "TypeScript compiler configuration file",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "tsconfig.json",
-      "tsconfig.*.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/tsconfig.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Lerna config",
-    fileMatch = { "lerna.json" },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/lerna.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Babel configuration",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".babelrc.json",
-      ".babelrc",
-      "babel.config.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/babelrc.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "ESLint config",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".eslintrc.json",
-      ".eslintrc",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/eslintrc.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Bucklescript config",
-    fileMatch = { "bsconfig.json" },
-    url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rescript-lang/rescript-compiler/8.2.0/docs/docson/build-schema.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Prettier config",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".prettierrc",
-      ".prettierrc.json",
-      "prettier.config.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/prettierrc",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Vercel Now config",
-    fileMatch = { "now.json" },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/now",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Stylelint config",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".stylelintrc",
-      ".stylelintrc.json",
-      "stylelint.config.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/stylelintrc",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "A JSON schema for the ASP.NET LaunchSettings.json files",
-    fileMatch = { "launchsettings.json" },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/launchsettings.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Schema for CMake Presets",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "CMakePresets.json",
-      "CMakeUserPresets.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kitware/CMake/master/Help/manual/presets/schema.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Configuration file as an alternative for configuring your repository in the settings page.",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".codeclimate.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/codeclimate.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "LLVM compilation database",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "compile_commands.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/compile-commands.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Config file for Command Task Runner",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "commands.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/commands.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "AWS CloudFormation provides a common language for you to describe and provision all the infrastructure resources in your cloud environment.",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "*.cf.json",
-      "cloudformation.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awslabs/goformation/v5.2.9/schema/cloudformation.schema.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "The AWS Serverless Application Model (AWS SAM, previously known as Project Flourish) extends AWS CloudFormation to provide a simplified way of defining the Amazon API Gateway APIs, AWS Lambda functions, and Amazon DynamoDB tables needed by your serverless application.",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "serverless.template",
-      "*.sam.json",
-      "sam.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/awslabs/goformation/v5.2.9/schema/sam.schema.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Json schema for properties json file for a GitHub Workflow template",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".github/workflow-templates/**.properties.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/github-workflow-template-properties.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "golangci-lint configuration file",
-    fileMatch = {
-      ".golangci.toml",
-      ".golangci.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/golangci-lint.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "JSON schema for the JSON Feed format",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "feed.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/feed.json",
-    versions = {
-      ["1"] = "https://json.schemastore.org/feed-1.json",
-      ["1.1"] = "https://json.schemastore.org/feed.json",
-    },
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Packer template JSON configuration",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "packer.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/packer.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "NPM configuration file",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "package.json",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/package.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "JSON schema for Visual Studio component configuration files",
-    fileMatch = {
-      "*.vsconfig",
-    },
-    url = "https://json.schemastore.org/vsconfig.json",
-  },
-  {
-    description = "Resume json",
-    fileMatch = { "resume.json" },
-    url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jsonresume/resume-schema/v1.0.0/schema.json",
-  },
-}
-
-local function extend(tab1, tab2)
-  for _, value in ipairs(tab2 or {}) do
-    table.insert(tab1, value)
-  end
-  return tab1
-end
-
-local extended_schemas = extend(schemas, default_schemas)
-
-local opts = {
-  settings = {
-    json = {
-      schemas = extended_schemas,
-    },
-  },
-  setup = {
-    commands = {
-      Format = {
-        function()
-          vim.lsp.buf.range_formatting({}, { 0, 0 }, { vim.fn.line "$", 0 })
-        end,
-      },
-    },
-  },
-}
-
-return opts
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/settings/pyright.lua b/lua/user/lsp/settings/pyright.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index c2a518d..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lsp/settings/pyright.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-return {
-  settings = {
-    python = {
-      analysis = {
-        typeCheckingMode = "off",
-      },
-    },
-  },
-}
diff --git a/lua/user/lsp/settings/sumneko_lua.lua b/lua/user/lsp/settings/sumneko_lua.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ac454a..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lsp/settings/sumneko_lua.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-return {
-	settings = {
-
-		Lua = {
-			diagnostics = {
-				globals = { "vim" },
-			},
-			workspace = {
-				library = {
-					[vim.fn.expand("$VIMRUNTIME/lua")] = true,
-					[vim.fn.stdpath("config") .. "/lua"] = true,
-				},
-			},
-		},
-	},
-}
diff --git a/lua/user/lualine.lua b/lua/user/lualine.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 3318ecd..0000000
--- a/lua/user/lualine.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, lualine = pcall(require, "lualine")
-if not status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
-local hide_in_width = function()
-	return vim.fn.winwidth(0) > 80
-end
-
-local diagnostics = {
-	"diagnostics",
-	sources = { "nvim_diagnostic" },
-	sections = { "error", "warn" },
-	symbols = { error = " ", warn = " " },
-	colored = false,
-	update_in_insert = false,
-	always_visible = true,
-}
-
-local diff = {
-	"diff",
-	colored = false,
-	symbols = { added = " ", modified = " ", removed = " " }, -- changes diff symbols
-  cond = hide_in_width
-}
-
-local mode = {
-	"mode",
-	fmt = function(str)
-		return "-- " .. str .. " --"
-	end,
-}
-
-local filetype = {
-	"filetype",
-	icons_enabled = false,
-	icon = nil,
-}
-
-local branch = {
-	"branch",
-	icons_enabled = true,
-	icon = "",
-}
-
-local location = {
-	"location",
-	padding = 0,
-}
-
--- cool function for progress
-local progress = function()
-	local current_line = vim.fn.line(".")
-	local total_lines = vim.fn.line("$")
-	local chars = { "__", "▁▁", "▂▂", "▃▃", "▄▄", "▅▅", "▆▆", "▇▇", "██" }
-	local line_ratio = current_line / total_lines
-	local index = math.ceil(line_ratio * #chars)
-	return chars[index]
-end
-
-local spaces = function()
-	return "spaces: " .. vim.api.nvim_buf_get_option(0, "shiftwidth")
-end
-
-lualine.setup({
-	options = {
-		icons_enabled = true,
-		theme = "auto",
-		component_separators = { left = "", right = "" },
-		section_separators = { left = "", right = "" },
-		disabled_filetypes = { "alpha", "dashboard", "NvimTree", "Outline" },
-		always_divide_middle = true,
-	},
-	sections = {
-		lualine_a = { branch, diagnostics },
-		lualine_b = { mode },
-		lualine_c = {},
-		-- lualine_x = { "encoding", "fileformat", "filetype" },
-		lualine_x = { diff, spaces, "encoding", filetype },
-		lualine_y = { location },
-		lualine_z = { progress },
-	},
-	inactive_sections = {
-		lualine_a = {},
-		lualine_b = {},
-		lualine_c = { "filename" },
-		lualine_x = { "location" },
-		lualine_y = {},
-		lualine_z = {},
-	},
-	tabline = {},
-	extensions = {},
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/luasnip.lua b/lua/user/luasnip.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index b353e10..0000000
--- a/lua/user/luasnip.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-local ls = require("luasnip")
-
-require("luasnip.loaders.from_snipmate").load({ paths = "~/.config/nvim/snippets/" })
diff --git a/lua/user/nvim-tree.lua b/lua/user/nvim-tree.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index f677c1f..0000000
--- a/lua/user/nvim-tree.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, nvim_tree = pcall(require, "nvim-tree")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-local config_status_ok, nvim_tree_config = pcall(require, "nvim-tree.config")
-if not config_status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-local tree_cb = nvim_tree_config.nvim_tree_callback
-
--- vim.g.loaded_netrw = 1
--- vim.g.loaded_netrwPlugin = 1
-vim.g.nvim_tree_respect_buf_cwd = 1
-
-nvim_tree.setup {
-  -- sync_root_with_cwd = true,
-  -- respect_buf_cwd = true,
-  -- disable_netrw = true,
-  -- hijack_netrw = true,
-  -- respect_buf_cwd = false,
-  -- update_cwd = false,
-  actions = {
-    open_file = {
-      quit_on_open =true,
-    },
-    change_dir = {
-      enable = true,
-      global = false,
-    },
-  },
-  git = {
-      enable = true,
-      ignore = false,
-      timeout = 500,
-    },
-  filters = {
-    custom = { ".git" },
-  },
-  update_focused_file = {
-    enable = true,
-    update_cwd = true,
-    -- ignore_list = {},
-    -- update_root = true,
-  },
-  renderer = {
-    root_folder_modifier = ":t",
-    icons = {
-      glyphs = {
-        default = "",
-        symlink = "",
-        folder = {
-          arrow_open = "",
-          arrow_closed = "",
-          default = "",
-          open = "",
-          empty = "",
-          empty_open = "",
-          symlink = "",
-          symlink_open = "",
-        },
-        git = {
-          unstaged = "",
-          staged = "S",
-          unmerged = "",
-          renamed = "➜",
-          untracked = "U",
-          deleted = "",
-          ignored = "◌",
-        },
-      },
-    },
-  },
-  diagnostics = {
-    enable = true,
-    show_on_dirs = true,
-    icons = {
-      hint = "",
-      info = "",
-      warning = "",
-      error = "",
-    },
-  },
---[[
-  view = {
-    width = 30,
-    side = "left",
-    mappings = {
-      list = {
-        { key = { "l", "<CR>", "o" }, cb = tree_cb "edit" },
-        { key = "h", cb = tree_cb "close_node" },
-        { key = "v", cb = tree_cb "vsplit" },
-      },
-    },
-  },
-]]--
-}
-
diff --git a/lua/user/options.lua b/lua/user/options.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index a19057b..0000000
--- a/lua/user/options.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-local options = {
-  spell = true,
-  spelllang = { 'en_gb' },
-  backup = false,                          -- creates a backup file
-  clipboard = "unnamedplus",               -- allows neovim to access the system clipboard
-  cmdheight = 2,                           -- more space in the neovim command line for displaying messages
-  completeopt = { "menuone", "noselect" }, -- mostly just for cmp
-  conceallevel = 0,                        -- so that `` is visible in markdown files
-  fileencoding = "utf-8",                  -- the encoding written to a file
-  hlsearch = true,                         -- highlight all matches on previous search pattern
-  ignorecase = true,                       -- ignore case in search patterns
-  mouse = "a",                             -- allow the mouse to be used in neovim
-  pumheight = 10,                          -- pop up menu height
-  showmode = false,                        -- we don't need to see things like -- INSERT -- anymore
-  showtabline = 2,                         -- always show tabs
-  smartcase = true,                        -- smart case
-  smartindent = false,                     -- make indenting smarter again
-  autoindent = false,                     -- make indenting smarter again
-  splitbelow = true,                       -- force all horizontal splits to go below current window
-  splitright = true,                       -- force all vertical splits to go to the right of current window
-  swapfile = false,                        -- creates a swapfile
-  termguicolors = true,                    -- set term gui colors (most terminals support this)
-  timeoutlen = 100,                        -- time to wait for a mapped sequence to complete (in milliseconds)
-  undofile = true,                         -- enable persistent undo
-  updatetime = 300,                        -- faster completion (4000ms default)
-  writebackup = false,                     -- if a file is being edited by another program (or was written to file while editing with another program), it is not allowed to be edited
-  expandtab = true,                        -- convert tabs to spaces
-  shiftwidth = 2,                          -- the number of spaces inserted for each indentation
-  tabstop = 2,                             -- insert 2 spaces for a tab
-  cursorline = true,                       -- highlight the current line
-  number = true,                           -- set numbered lines
-  relativenumber = true,                   -- set relative numbered lines
-  numberwidth = 4,                         -- set number column width to 2 {default 4}
-
-  signcolumn = "yes",                      -- always show the sign column, otherwise it would shift the text each time
-  wrap = true,                             -- display lines as one long line
-  breakindent = true,                      -- tab wrapped lines
-  linebreak = true,                        -- companion to wrap, don't split words
-  showbreak = "  ",                        -- set indent of wrapped lines
-  scrolloff = 7,                           -- minimal number of screen lines to keep above and below the cursor
-  sidescrolloff = 7,                       -- minimal number of screen columns either side of cursor if wrap is `false`
-  guifont = "monospace:h17",               -- the font used in graphical neovim applications
-}
-
--- INDENT -- (see also vimtex.lua)
-vim.g['tex_flavor'] = 'latex'
-vim.g['tex_indent_items'] = 0              -- turn off enumerate indent
-vim.g['tex_indent_brace'] = 0              -- turn off brace indent
--- vim.g['tex_indent_and'] = 0             -- whether to align with &
--- vim.g['latex_indent_enabled'] = 0
--- vim.g['vimtex_indent_enabled'] = 0
--- vim.g['did_indent'] = 1
-
-vim.opt.shortmess:append "c"
-
-for k, v in pairs(options) do
-  vim.opt[k] = v
-end
-
-vim.cmd "set whichwrap+=<,>,[,],h,l"
--- vim.cmd [[set iskeyword+=-]]            -- unites dashed words
-
--- CLIPBOARD -- (for yanky)
--- Mac users delete to avoid "target string not available" error
---vim.g.clipboard = {
---  name = "xsel_override",
---  copy = {
---    ["+"] = "xsel --input --clipboard",
---    ["*"] = "xsel --input --primary",
---  },
---  paste = {
---    ["+"] = "xsel --output --clipboard",
---    ["*"] = "xsel --output --primary",
---  },
---  cache_enabled = 1,
---}
-
diff --git a/lua/user/plugins.lua b/lua/user/plugins.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 2866bac..0000000
--- a/lua/user/plugins.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-local fn = vim.fn
-
--- Automatically install packer
-local install_path = fn.stdpath("data") .. "/site/pack/packer/start/packer.nvim"
-if fn.empty(fn.glob(install_path)) > 0 then
-	PACKER_BOOTSTRAP = fn.system({
-		"git",
-		"clone",
-		"--depth",
-		"1",
-		"https://github.com/wbthomason/packer.nvim",
-		install_path,
-	})
-	print("Installing packer close and reopen Neovim...")
-	vim.cmd([[packadd packer.nvim]])
-end
-
--- Autocommand that reloads neovim whenever you save the plugins.lua file
-vim.cmd([[
-  augroup packer_user_config
-    autocmd!
-    autocmd BufWritePost plugins.lua source <afile> | PackerSync
-  augroup end
-]])
-
--- Use a protected call so we don't error out on first use
-local status_ok, packer = pcall(require, "packer")
-if not status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
--- Have packer use a popup window
-packer.init({
-	display = {
-		open_fn = function()
-			return require("packer.util").float({ border = "rounded" })
-		end,
-	},
-})
-
--- Packer 
-return packer.startup(function(use)
-  -- Have packer manage itself
-  use { "wbthomason/packer.nvim" }
-  -- Useful lua functions used by lots of plugins
-  use { "nvim-lua/plenary.nvim" }
-
--- General
-  use { "windwp/nvim-autopairs" }
-  use { "numToStr/Comment.nvim" }
-  use { "lewis6991/impatient.nvim" }
-  use { "kylechui/nvim-surround" }
-  use { "mbbill/undotree" } -- Vimscript
-  -- use { "mg979/vim-visual-multi" } -- Vimscript
-  use { "glacambre/firenvim" } -- Vimscript
-  --use { "gbprod/yanky.nvim" }
-
--- Mappings
-	use { "folke/which-key.nvim" }
-
--- Terminal
-  use { "akinsho/toggleterm.nvim" }
-
--- File Management
-  use { "kyazdani42/nvim-tree.lua" }
-  use { "kyazdani42/nvim-web-devicons" }
-	use { "Shatur/neovim-session-manager" }
-
--- Appearance
---  use { "akinsho/bufferline.nvim" }
-  use { "nvim-lualine/lualine.nvim" }
-  use { "lukas-reineke/indent-blankline.nvim" }
-  use { "goolord/alpha-nvim" }
-  use { "RRethy/vim-illuminate" }
-
--- Colorschemes
-  use { 
-    "rose-pine/neovim",
-    as = "rose-pine",
-  }
-  -- use { "ellisonleao/gruvbox.nvim" }
-  -- use { "luisiacc/gruvbox-baby" }
-  -- use { "folke/tokyonight.nvim" }
-  -- use { "lunarvim/darkplus.nvim" }
-  -- use { "navarasu/onedark.nvim" }
-  -- use { "savq/melange" }
-  -- use { "EdenEast/nightfox.nvim" }
-  -- use { "navarasu/onedark.nvim" }
-
--- Cmp 
-  use { "hrsh7th/nvim-cmp" }
-	use { "hrsh7th/cmp-nvim-lsp" }
-  -- buffer completions
-  use { "hrsh7th/cmp-buffer" }
-  -- path completions
-  use { "hrsh7th/cmp-path" }
-  -- snippet completions
-	use { "saadparwaiz1/cmp_luasnip" }
-  -- command completions
-  use { "hrsh7th/cmp-cmdline" }
-  -- spelling completions
-  use { "f3fora/cmp-spell" }
-  -- helps Vimtex completions
-  use { "hrsh7th/cmp-omni" }
-  -- use { "aspeddro/cmp-pandoc.nvim" }
-
--- LSP
-  -- enable LSP
-	use { "neovim/nvim-lspconfig" }
-  -- simple to use language server installer
-  use { "williamboman/mason.nvim", run = ":MasonUpdate" }
-  use { "williamboman/mason-lspconfig.nvim" }
-  -- for formatters and linters
-	use { "jose-elias-alvarez/null-ls.nvim" }
-
--- LaTeX
-  use { "lervag/vimtex" } -- essential for LaTeX; Vimscript
-  use { "kdheepak/cmp-latex-symbols" }
-  use { "jbyuki/nabla.nvim" } -- show symbols in editor
-
--- Markdown
-  use({
-    "gaoDean/autolist.nvim",
-    ft = {
-      "markdown",
-      "text",
-      "tex",
-      "plaintex",
-    },
-    config = function()
-      local autolist = require("autolist")
-      autolist.setup()
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("i", "<CR>", autolist.new)
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("i", "<Tab>", autolist.indent)
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("i", "<S-Tab>", autolist.indent, "<C-D>")
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "o", autolist.new)
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "O", autolist.new_before)
-      -- autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", ">>", autolist.indent)
-      -- autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "<<", autolist.indent)
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "<leader>r", autolist.force_recalculate)
-      autolist.create_mapping_hook("n", "<leader>x", autolist.invert_entry, "")
-        vim.api.nvim_create_autocmd("TextChanged", {
-          pattern = "-",
-          callback = function()
-            vim.cmd.normal({autolist.force_recalculate(nil, nil), bang = false})
-          end
-        })
-    end,
-  })
-
--- Snippets
-  --snippet engine
-  use { "L3MON4D3/LuaSnip" }
-  -- a bunch of snippets to use
-  -- use { "garbas/vim-snipmate" }
-  -- use { "rafamadriz/friendly-snippets" }
-
--- Telescope
-	use { "nvim-telescope/telescope.nvim" }
-    -- , commit = "76ea9a898d3307244dce3573392dcf2cc38f340f" 
-	use { "stevearc/dressing.nvim" }
-  use { "nvim-telescope/telescope-bibtex.nvim",
-    config = function ()
-      require"telescope".load_extension("bibtex")
-    end,
-  }
-
--- Treesitter
-	use { "nvim-treesitter/nvim-treesitter" }
--- , commit = "8e763332b7bf7b3a426fd8707b7f5aa85823a5ac" 
-
--- Git
-	use { "lewis6991/gitsigns.nvim" }
-
-	-- Automatically set up your configuration after cloning packer.nvim
-	-- Put this at the end after all plugins
-	if PACKER_BOOTSTRAP then
-		require("packer").sync()
-	end
-end)
diff --git a/lua/user/sessions.lua b/lua/user/sessions.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 44eaf73..0000000
--- a/lua/user/sessions.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-local Path = require('plenary.path')
-
-require('session_manager').setup({
-  sessions_dir = Path:new(vim.fn.stdpath('data'), 'sessions'), -- The directory where the session files will be saved.
-  path_replacer = '__', -- The character to which the path separator will be replaced for session files.
-  colon_replacer = '++', -- The character to which the colon symbol will be replaced for session files.
-  autoload_mode = require('session_manager.config').AutoloadMode.Disabled, -- Define what to do when Neovim is started without arguments. Possible values: Disabled, CurrentDir, LastSession
-  autosave_last_session = true, -- Automatically save last session on exit and on session switch.
-  autosave_ignore_not_normal = true, -- Plugin will not save a session when no buffers are opened, or all of them aren't writable or listed.
-  autosave_ignore_dirs = {}, -- A list of directories where the session will not be autosaved.
-  autosave_ignore_filetypes = { -- All buffers of these file types will be closed before the session is saved.
-    'gitcommit',
-  },
-  autosave_ignore_buftypes = {}, -- All buffers of these bufer types will be closed before the session is saved.
-  autosave_only_in_session = true, -- Always autosaves session. If true, only autosaves after a session is active.
-  max_path_length = 80,  -- Shorten the display path if length exceeds this threshold. Use 0 if don't want to shorten the path at all.
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/surround.lua b/lua/user/surround.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 10dc29c..0000000
--- a/lua/user/surround.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-require("nvim-surround").setup({
-  keymaps = {
-      insert = false,
-      insert_line = false,
-      normal = false,
-      normal_cur = false,
-      normal_line = false,
-      normal_cur_line = false,
-      visual = "<S-s>",
-      visual_line = false,
-      delete = false,
-      change = false,
-  },
-  aliases = {
-      ["a"] = false,
-      ["b"] = false,
-      ["B"] = false,
-      ["r"] = false,
-      ["q"] = false,
-      ["s"] = false,
-  },
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/toggleterm.lua b/lua/user/toggleterm.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index f318115..0000000
--- a/lua/user/toggleterm.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, toggleterm = pcall(require, "toggleterm")
-if not status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
-toggleterm.setup({
-  --size = 20,
-	size = 8,
-	open_mapping = [[<c-t>]],
-	hide_numbers = true,
-	shade_filetypes = {},
-	shade_terminals = true,
-	shading_factor = 2,
-	start_in_insert = true,
-	insert_mappings = true,
-	persist_size = true,
-  -- direction = 'vertical' | 'horizontal' | 'tab' | 'float'
-	direction = "horizontal",
-	close_on_exit = true,
-	shell = vim.o.shell,
-	float_opts = {
-		border = "curved",
-		winblend = 0,
-		highlights = {
-			border = "Normal",
-			background = "Normal",
-		},
-	},
-})
-
-function _G.set_terminal_keymaps()
-  local opts = {noremap = true}
-  vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap(0, 't', '<esc>', [[<C-t><C-n>]], opts)
-  vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap(0, 't', 'jk', [[<C-t><C-n>]], opts)
-  vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap(0, 't', '<C-h>', [[<C-t><C-n><C-W>h]], opts)
-  vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap(0, 't', '<C-j>', [[<C-t><C-n><C-W>j]], opts)
-  vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap(0, 't', '<C-k>', [[<C-t><C-n><C-W>k]], opts)
-  vim.api.nvim_buf_set_keymap(0, 't', '<C-l>', [[<C-t><C-n><C-W>l]], opts)
-end
-
-vim.cmd('autocmd! TermOpen term://* lua set_terminal_keymaps()')
-
-local Terminal = require("toggleterm.terminal").Terminal
-local lazygit = Terminal:new({ cmd = "lazygit", hidden = true })
-
-function _LAZYGIT_TOGGLE()
-	lazygit:toggle()
-end
-
-local node = Terminal:new({ cmd = "node", hidden = true })
-
-function _NODE_TOGGLE()
-	node:toggle()
-end
-
-local ncdu = Terminal:new({ cmd = "ncdu", hidden = true })
-
-function _NCDU_TOGGLE()
-	ncdu:toggle()
-end
-
-local htop = Terminal:new({ cmd = "htop", hidden = true })
-
-function _HTOP_TOGGLE()
-	htop:toggle()
-end
-
-local python = Terminal:new({ cmd = "python", hidden = true })
-
-function _PYTHON_TOGGLE()
-	python:toggle()
-end
diff --git a/lua/user/treesitter.lua b/lua/user/treesitter.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index f8f7bac..0000000
--- a/lua/user/treesitter.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, configs = pcall(require, "nvim-treesitter.configs")
-if not status_ok then
-	return
-end
-
-configs.setup({
-  ensure_installed = {  -- list "all" or a list of languages
-    "markdown_inline", 
-    "markdown", 
-    "lua", 
-    "python", 
-    "vim", 
-    "yaml", 
-    --"perl", 
-    "json", 
-    "html", 
-    "vimdoc", 
-    --"haskell", 
-    "gitignore", 
-    "bibtex", 
-    "julia",
-  },
-	ignore_install = { "latex" }, -- List of parsers to ignore installing
-	highlight = {
-		enable = true, -- false will disable the whole extension
-		disable = { "css", "latex" }, -- list of language that will be disabled
-    -- additional_vim_regex_highlighting = { "latex", "markdown" },
-	},
-	autopairs = {
-		enable = true,
-	},
-	indent = { enable = true, disable = { "latex", "python", "css", "julia" } },
-})
diff --git a/lua/user/undotree.lua b/lua/user/undotree.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index e82bf80..0000000
--- a/lua/user/undotree.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-vim.g["undotree_SetFocusWhenToggle"] = true
-
diff --git a/lua/user/vimtex.lua b/lua/user/vimtex.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 14ddc43..0000000
--- a/lua/user/vimtex.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
--- PDF Viewer:
--- http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man5/zathurarc.5.html
-vim.g['vimtex_view_method'] = 'zathura'
-vim.g['vimtex_quickfix_mode'] =0
-
--- Ignore mappings
-vim.g['vimtex_mappings_enabled'] = 1
-
--- Auto Indent
-vim.g['vimtex_indent_enabled'] = 1
-
--- Syntax highlighting
-vim.g['vimtex_syntax_enabled'] = 1
-
--- Error suppression:
--- https://github.com/lervag/vimtex/blob/master/doc/vimtex.txt
-
-vim.g['vimtex_log_ignore'] = ({
-  'Underfull',
-  'Overfull',
-  'specifier changed to',
-  'Token not allowed in a PDF string',
-})
-
---vim.g['vimtex_context_pdf_viewer'] = 'okular'
-vim.g['vimtex_context_pdf_viewer'] = 'zathura'
-
--- vim.g['vimtex_complete_enabled'] = 1
--- vim.g['vimtex_compiler_progname'] = 'nvr'
--- vim.g['vimtex_complete_close_braces'] = 1
diff --git a/lua/user/whichkey.lua b/lua/user/whichkey.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index f97caeb..0000000
--- a/lua/user/whichkey.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
-local status_ok, which_key = pcall(require, "which-key")
-if not status_ok then
-  return
-end
-
-local setup = {
-  plugins = {
-    marks = false, -- shows a list of your marks on ' and `
-    registers = true, -- shows your registers on " in NORMAL or <C-r> in INSERT mode
-    spelling = {
-      enabled = true, -- enabling this will show WhichKey when pressing z= to select spelling suggestions
-      suggestions = 10, -- how many suggestions should be shown in the list?
-    },
-    -- the presets plugin, adds help for a bunch of default keybindings in Neovim
-    -- No actual key bindings are created
-    presets = {
-      operators = false, -- adds help for operators like d, y, ... and registers them for motion / text object completion
-      motions = false, -- adds help for motions
-      text_objects = false, -- help for text objects triggered after entering an operator
-      windows = false, -- default bindings on <c-w>
-      nav = false, -- misc bindings to work with windows
-      z = false, -- bindings for folds, spelling and others prefixed with z
-      g = false, -- bindings for prefixed with g
-    },
-  },
-  -- add operators that will trigger motion and text object completion
-  -- to enable native operators, set the preset / operators plugin above
-  -- operators = { gc = "Comments" },
-  key_labels = {
-    -- override the label used to display some keys. It doesn't effect WK in any other way.
-    -- For example:
-    -- ["<space>"] = "SPC",
-    -- ["<CR>"] = "RET",
-    -- ["<tab>"] = "TAB",
-  },
-  icons = {
-    breadcrumb = "»", -- symbol used in the command line area that shows your active key combo
-    separator = "➜", -- symbol used between a key and it's label
-    group = "+", -- symbol prepended to a group
-  },
-  popup_mappings = {
-    scroll_down = "<c-d>", -- binding to scroll down inside the popup
-    scroll_up = "<c-u>", -- binding to scroll up inside the popup
-  },
-  window = {
-    border = "rounded", -- none, single, double, shadow
-    position = "bottom", -- bottom, top
-    margin = { 1, 0, 1, 0 }, -- extra window margin [top, right, bottom, left]
-    padding = { 2, 2, 2, 2 }, -- extra window padding [top, right, bottom, left]
-    winblend = 0,
-  },
-  layout = {
-    height = { min = 4, max = 25 }, -- min and max height of the columns
-    width = { min = 20, max = 50 }, -- min and max width of the columns
-    spacing = 3, -- spacing between columns
-    align = "left", -- align columns left, center or right
-  },
-  ignore_missing = true, -- enable this to hide mappings for which you didn't specify a label
-  hidden = { "<silent>", "<cmd>", "<Cmd>", "<CR>", "call", "lua", "^:", "^ " }, -- hide mapping boilerplate
-  show_help = true, -- show help message on the command line when the popup is visible
-  triggers = "auto", -- automatically setup triggers
-  -- triggers = {"<leader>"} -- or specify a list manually
-  triggers_blacklist = {
-    -- list of mode / prefixes that should never be hooked by WhichKey
-    -- this is mostly relevant for key maps that start with a native binding
-    -- most people should not need to change this
-    i = { "j", "k" },
-    v = { "j", "k" },
-  },
-}
-
-local opts = {
-  mode = "n", -- NORMAL mode
-  prefix = "<leader>",
-  buffer = nil, -- Global mappings. Specify a buffer number for buffer local mappings
-  silent = true, -- use `silent` when creating keymaps
-  noremap = true, -- use `noremap` when creating keymaps
-  nowait = true, -- use `nowait` when creating keymaps
-}
-
--- hjknoyz
-
--- GENERAL MAPPINGS
-
-local mappings = {
-  ["b"] = { "<cmd>VimtexCompile<CR>"            , "build" },
-  ["c"] = { "<cmd>VimtexCountWords!<CR>"        , "count" },
-  ["d"] = { "<cmd>bdelete!<CR>"                 , "delete buffer" },
-  ["e"] = { "<cmd>NvimTreeToggle<CR>"           , "explorer" },
-  ["i"] = { "<cmd>VimtexTocOpen<CR>"            , "index" },
-  ["q"] = { "<cmd>wqa!<CR>"                     , "quit" },
-  ["r"] = { ""                                  , "reorder" },
-  -- ["r"] = { "<cmd>lua require('autolist').force_recalculate()<CR>" , "reorder list" },
-  ["u"] = { "<cmd>UndotreeToggle<CR>"           , "undo" },
-  ["v"] = { "<cmd>VimtexView<CR>"               , "view" },
-  ["w"] = { "<cmd>wa!<CR>"                      , "write" },
-  ["x"] = { ""                                  , "checkmark" },
-  -- ["x"] = { "<cmd>lua require('autolist').invert_entry()<CR>"  , "checkmark" },
-  a = {
-    name = "ACTIONS",
-    a = { "<cmd>lua PdfAnnots()<CR>", "annotate"},
-    b = { "<cmd>terminal bibexport -o %:p:r.bib %:p:r.aux<CR>", "bib export"},
-    c = { "<cmd>VimtexClean<CR>"            , "clean aux" },
-    g = { "<cmd>e ~/.config/nvim/templates/Glossary.tex<CR>", "edit glossary"},
-    h = { "<cmd>lua _HTOP_TOGGLE()<CR>", "htop" },
-    i = { "<cmd>IlluminateToggle<CR>"            , "illuminate" },
-    l = { "<cmd>lua vim.g.cmptoggle = not vim.g.cmptoggle<CR>", "LSP"},
-    p = { '<cmd>lua require("nabla").popup()<CR>', "preview symbols"},
-    r = { "<cmd>VimtexErrors<CR>"           , "report errors" },
-    s = { "<cmd>e ~/.config/nvim/snippets/tex.snippets<CR>", "edit snippets"},
-    u = { "<cmd>cd %:p:h<CR>"           , "update cwd" },
-    -- w = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.docx'<CR>" , "word"},
-    v = { "<plug>(vimtex-context-menu)"            , "vimtex menu" },
-  },
-  f = {
-    name = "FIND",
-      b = {
-        "<cmd>lua require('telescope.builtin').buffers(require('telescope.themes').get_dropdown{previewer = false})<CR>",
-        "buffers",
-      },
-      c = { "<cmd>Telescope bibtex<CR>"       , "citations" },
-      f = { "<cmd>Telescope live_grep theme=ivy<CR>", "project" },
-      g = { "<cmd>Telescope git_branches<CR>", "branches" },
-      h = { "<cmd>Telescope help_tags<CR>", "help" },
-      k = { "<cmd>Telescope keymaps<CR>", "keymaps" },
-      -- m = { "<cmd>Telescope man_pages<CR>", "man pages" },
-      r = { "<cmd>Telescope registers<CR>", "registers" },
-      t = { "<cmd>Telescope colorscheme<CR>", "theme" },
-      y = { "<cmd>YankyRingHistory<CR>"       , "yanks" },
-      -- c = { "<cmd>Telescope commands<CR>", "commands" },
-      -- r = { "<cmd>Telescope oldfiles<CR>", "recent" },
-  },
-  g = {
-    name = "GIT",
-    g = { "<cmd>lua _LAZYGIT_TOGGLE()<CR>", "lazygit" },
-    j = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.next_hunk()<CR>", "next hunk" },
-    k = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.prev_hunk()<CR>", "prev hunk" },
-    l = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.blame_line()<CR>", "blame" },
-    p = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.preview_hunk()<CR>", "preview hunk" },
-    r = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.reset_hunk()<CR>", "reset hunk" },
-    s = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.stage_hunk()<CR>", "stage hunk" },
-    u = {
-      "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.undo_stage_hunk()<CR>", "unstage hunk" },
-    o = { "<cmd>Telescope git_status<CR>", "open changed file" },
-    b = { "<cmd>Telescope git_branches<CR>", "checkout branch" },
-    c = { "<cmd>Telescope git_commits<CR>", "checkout commit" },
-    d = { "<cmd>Gitsigns diffthis HEAD<CR>", "diff" },
-  },
-  m = {
-    name = "MANAGE SESSIONS",
-    s = { "<cmd>SessionManager save_current_session<CR>", "save" },
-    d = { "<cmd>SessionManager delete_session<CR>", "delete" },
-    l = { "<cmd>SessionManager load_session<CR>", "load" },
-  },
-  p = {
-    name = "PANDOC",
-    w = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.docx'<CR>" , "word"},
-    m = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.md'<CR>"   , "markdown"},
-    h = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.html'<CR>" , "html"},
-    l = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.tex'<CR>"  , "latex"},
-    p = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.pdf'<CR>"  , "pdf"},
-    -- x = { "<cmd>echo "run: unoconv -f pdf path-to.docx""  , "word to pdf"},
-  },
-  s = {
-    name = "SURROUND",
-    s = { "<Plug>(nvim-surround-normal)", "surround" },
-    d = { "<Plug>(nvim-surround-delete)", "delete" },
-    c = { "<Plug>(nvim-surround-change)", "change" },
-  },
-  t = {
-    name = "TEMPLATES",
-    c = { "<cmd>PackerCompile<CR>", "Compile" },
-    p = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/PhilPaper.tex<CR>", 
-      "PhilPaper.tex",
-    },
-    l = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/Letter.tex<CR>",
-      "Letter.tex",
-    },
-    g = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/Glossary.tex<CR>", 
-      "Glossary.tex",
-    },
-    h = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/HandOut.tex<CR>", 
-      "HandOut.tex",
-    },
-    b = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/PhilBeamer.tex<CR>", 
-      "PhilBeamer.tex",
-    },
-    s = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/SubFile.tex<CR>", 
-      "SubFile.tex",
-    },
-    r = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/Root.tex<CR>", 
-      "Root.tex",
-    },
-    m = { 
-      "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/MultipleAnswer.tex<CR>", 
-      "MultipleAnswer.tex",
-    },
-  },
-}
-
-which_key.setup(setup)
-which_key.register(mappings, opts)
diff --git a/lua/user/yanky.lua b/lua/user/yanky.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index 08e8c2b..0000000
--- a/lua/user/yanky.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
---require("yanky").setup({
---  ring = {
---    history_length = 100,
---    storage = "shada",
---    sync_with_numbered_registers = true,
---    cancel_event = "update",
---  },
---  system_clipboard = {
---    sync_with_ring = true,
---  },
---})
diff --git a/lua/whichkey.lua b/lua/whichkey.lua
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2e8100b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lua/whichkey.lua
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+local status_ok, which_key = pcall(require, "which-key")
+if not status_ok then
+  return
+end
+
+local setup = {
+  plugins = {
+    marks = false, -- shows a list of your marks on ' and `
+    registers = true, -- shows your registers on " in NORMAL or <C-r> in INSERT mode
+    spelling = {
+      enabled = true, -- enabling this will show WhichKey when pressing z= to select spelling suggestions
+      suggestions = 10, -- how many suggestions should be shown in the list?
+    },
+    -- the presets plugin, adds help for a bunch of default keybindings in Neovim
+    -- No actual key bindings are created
+    presets = {
+      operators = false, -- adds help for operators like d, y, ... and registers them for motion / text object completion
+      motions = false, -- adds help for motions
+      text_objects = false, -- help for text objects triggered after entering an operator
+      windows = false, -- default bindings on <c-w>
+      nav = false, -- misc bindings to work with windows
+      z = false, -- bindings for folds, spelling and others prefixed with z
+      g = false, -- bindings for prefixed with g
+    },
+  },
+  -- add operators that will trigger motion and text object completion
+  -- to enable native operators, set the preset / operators plugin above
+  -- operators = { gc = "Comments" },
+  key_labels = {
+    -- override the label used to display some keys. It doesn't effect WK in any other way.
+    -- For example:
+    -- ["<space>"] = "SPC",
+    -- ["<CR>"] = "RET",
+    -- ["<tab>"] = "TAB",
+  },
+  icons = {
+    breadcrumb = "»", -- symbol used in the command line area that shows your active key combo
+    separator = "➜", -- symbol used between a key and it's label
+    group = "+", -- symbol prepended to a group
+  },
+  popup_mappings = {
+    scroll_down = "<c-d>", -- binding to scroll down inside the popup
+    scroll_up = "<c-u>", -- binding to scroll up inside the popup
+  },
+  window = {
+    border = "rounded", -- none, single, double, shadow
+    position = "bottom", -- bottom, top
+    margin = { 1, 0, 1, 0 }, -- extra window margin [top, right, bottom, left]
+    padding = { 2, 2, 2, 2 }, -- extra window padding [top, right, bottom, left]
+    winblend = 0,
+  },
+  layout = {
+    height = { min = 4, max = 25 }, -- min and max height of the columns
+    width = { min = 20, max = 50 }, -- min and max width of the columns
+    spacing = 3, -- spacing between columns
+    align = "left", -- align columns left, center or right
+  },
+  ignore_missing = true, -- enable this to hide mappings for which you didn't specify a label
+  hidden = { "<silent>", "<cmd>", "<Cmd>", "<CR>", "call", "lua", "^:", "^ " }, -- hide mapping boilerplate
+  show_help = true, -- show help message on the command line when the popup is visible
+  triggers = "auto", -- automatically setup triggers
+  -- triggers = {"<leader>"} -- or specify a list manually
+  triggers_blacklist = {
+    -- list of mode / prefixes that should never be hooked by WhichKey
+    -- this is mostly relevant for key maps that start with a native binding
+    -- most people should not need to change this
+    i = { "j", "k" },
+    v = { "j", "k" },
+  },
+}
+
+local opts = {
+  mode = "n", -- NORMAL mode
+  prefix = "<leader>",
+  buffer = nil, -- Global mappings. Specify a buffer number for buffer local mappings
+  silent = true, -- use `silent` when creating keymaps
+  noremap = true, -- use `noremap` when creating keymaps
+  nowait = true, -- use `nowait` when creating keymaps
+}
+
+-- hjknoyz
+
+-- GENERAL MAPPINGS
+
+local builtin = require("telescope.builtin")
+local mappings = {
+    c = {
+        name = "Commands",
+        e = { "<cmd>wqa!<CR>", "exit vim"},
+    },
+    l = {
+        name = "LaTeX",
+        b = { "<cmd>VimtexCompile<CR>"            , "build" },
+        c = { "<cmd>VimtexCountWords!<CR>"        , "count" },
+        v = { "<cmd>VimtexView<CR>"               , "view"  },
+
+    },
+    p = {
+        name = "Project",
+        v = {"<cmd>Ex<CR>"                        , "explorer"},
+        f = {builtin.find_files                   , "find-file"},
+        g = {builtin.git_files                    , "find-git-file"},
+    },
+  --["b"] = { "<cmd>VimtexCompile<CR>"            , "build" },
+  --["c"] = { "<cmd>VimtexCountWords!<CR>"        , "count" },
+  --["d"] = { "<cmd>bdelete!<CR>"                 , "delete buffer" },
+  --["e"] = { "<cmd>NvimTreeToggle<CR>"           , "explorer" },
+  --["i"] = { "<cmd>VimtexTocOpen<CR>"            , "index" },
+  --["q"] = { "<cmd>wqa!<CR>"                     , "quit" },
+  --["r"] = { ""                                  , "reorder" },
+  ---- ["r"] = { "<cmd>lua require('autolist').force_recalculate()<CR>" , "reorder list" },
+  --["u"] = { "<cmd>UndotreeToggle<CR>"           , "undo" },
+  --["v"] = { "<cmd>VimtexView<CR>"               , "view" },
+  --["w"] = { "<cmd>wa!<CR>"                      , "write" },
+  --["x"] = { ""                                  , "checkmark" },
+  ---- ["x"] = { "<cmd>lua require('autolist').invert_entry()<CR>"  , "checkmark" },
+  --a = {
+  --  name = "ACTIONS",
+  --  a = { "<cmd>lua PdfAnnots()<CR>", "annotate"},
+  --  b = { "<cmd>terminal bibexport -o %:p:r.bib %:p:r.aux<CR>", "bib export"},
+  --  c = { "<cmd>VimtexClean<CR>"            , "clean aux" },
+  --  g = { "<cmd>e ~/.config/nvim/templates/Glossary.tex<CR>", "edit glossary"},
+  --  h = { "<cmd>lua _HTOP_TOGGLE()<CR>", "htop" },
+  --  i = { "<cmd>IlluminateToggle<CR>"            , "illuminate" },
+  --  l = { "<cmd>lua vim.g.cmptoggle = not vim.g.cmptoggle<CR>", "LSP"},
+  --  p = { '<cmd>lua require("nabla").popup()<CR>', "preview symbols"},
+  --  r = { "<cmd>VimtexErrors<CR>"           , "report errors" },
+  --  s = { "<cmd>e ~/.config/nvim/snippets/tex.snippets<CR>", "edit snippets"},
+  --  u = { "<cmd>cd %:p:h<CR>"           , "update cwd" },
+  --  -- w = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.docx'<CR>" , "word"},
+  --  v = { "<plug>(vimtex-context-menu)"            , "vimtex menu" },
+  --},
+  --f = {
+  --  name = "FIND",
+  --    b = {
+  --      "<cmd>lua require('telescope.builtin').buffers(require('telescope.themes').get_dropdown{previewer = false})<CR>",
+  --      "buffers",
+  --    },
+  --    c = { "<cmd>Telescope bibtex<CR>"       , "citations" },
+  --    f = { "<cmd>Telescope live_grep theme=ivy<CR>", "project" },
+  --    g = { "<cmd>Telescope git_branches<CR>", "branches" },
+  --    h = { "<cmd>Telescope help_tags<CR>", "help" },
+  --    k = { "<cmd>Telescope keymaps<CR>", "keymaps" },
+  --    -- m = { "<cmd>Telescope man_pages<CR>", "man pages" },
+  --    r = { "<cmd>Telescope registers<CR>", "registers" },
+  --    t = { "<cmd>Telescope colorscheme<CR>", "theme" },
+  --    y = { "<cmd>YankyRingHistory<CR>"       , "yanks" },
+  --    -- c = { "<cmd>Telescope commands<CR>", "commands" },
+  --    -- r = { "<cmd>Telescope oldfiles<CR>", "recent" },
+  --},
+  --g = {
+  --  name = "GIT",
+  --  g = { "<cmd>lua _LAZYGIT_TOGGLE()<CR>", "lazygit" },
+  --  j = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.next_hunk()<CR>", "next hunk" },
+  --  k = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.prev_hunk()<CR>", "prev hunk" },
+  --  l = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.blame_line()<CR>", "blame" },
+  --  p = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.preview_hunk()<CR>", "preview hunk" },
+  --  r = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.reset_hunk()<CR>", "reset hunk" },
+  --  s = { "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.stage_hunk()<CR>", "stage hunk" },
+  --  u = {
+  --    "<cmd>lua require 'gitsigns'.undo_stage_hunk()<CR>", "unstage hunk" },
+  --  o = { "<cmd>Telescope git_status<CR>", "open changed file" },
+  --  b = { "<cmd>Telescope git_branches<CR>", "checkout branch" },
+  --  c = { "<cmd>Telescope git_commits<CR>", "checkout commit" },
+  --  d = { "<cmd>Gitsigns diffthis HEAD<CR>", "diff" },
+  --},
+  --m = {
+  --  name = "MANAGE SESSIONS",
+  --  s = { "<cmd>SessionManager save_current_session<CR>", "save" },
+  --  d = { "<cmd>SessionManager delete_session<CR>", "delete" },
+  --  l = { "<cmd>SessionManager load_session<CR>", "load" },
+  --},
+  --p = {
+  --  name = "PANDOC",
+  --  w = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.docx'<CR>" , "word"},
+  --  m = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.md'<CR>"   , "markdown"},
+  --  h = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.html'<CR>" , "html"},
+  --  l = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.tex'<CR>"  , "latex"},
+  --  p = { "<cmd>TermExec cmd='pandoc %:p -o %:p:r.pdf'<CR>"  , "pdf"},
+  --  -- x = { "<cmd>echo "run: unoconv -f pdf path-to.docx""  , "word to pdf"},
+  --},
+  --s = {
+  --  name = "SURROUND",
+  --  s = { "<Plug>(nvim-surround-normal)", "surround" },
+  --  d = { "<Plug>(nvim-surround-delete)", "delete" },
+  --  c = { "<Plug>(nvim-surround-change)", "change" },
+  --},
+  --t = {
+  --  name = "TEMPLATES",
+  --  c = { "<cmd>PackerCompile<CR>", "Compile" },
+  --  p = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/PhilPaper.tex<CR>",
+  --    "PhilPaper.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  l = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/Letter.tex<CR>",
+  --    "Letter.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  g = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/Glossary.tex<CR>",
+  --    "Glossary.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  h = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/HandOut.tex<CR>",
+  --    "HandOut.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  b = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/PhilBeamer.tex<CR>",
+  --    "PhilBeamer.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  s = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/SubFile.tex<CR>",
+  --    "SubFile.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  r = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/Root.tex<CR>",
+  --    "Root.tex",
+  --  },
+  --  m = {
+  --    "<cmd>read ~/.config/nvim/templates/MultipleAnswer.tex<CR>",
+  --    "MultipleAnswer.tex",
+  --  },
+  --},
+}
+
+which_key.setup(setup)
+which_key.register(mappings, opts)
+
diff --git a/minimal/minimal.bib b/minimal/minimal.bib
deleted file mode 100644
index 9d09214..0000000
--- a/minimal/minimal.bib
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14976 +0,0 @@
-@book{2004,
-  title = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaphysics}}},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = feb,
-  series = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaphysics}}},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this new series will be a much-needed focus for it. OSM will offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighboring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-926772-9},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AQYI8ZRX/2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MBBSHQZE/oxford-studies-in-metaphysics-9780199267729.html}
-}
-
-@book{2010,
-  title = {Reasons without {{Rationalism}}},
-  year = {Wed, 07/21/2010 - 12:00},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-14652-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RMRLHMZ7/2010 - Reasons without Rationalism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Abasnezhad2020,
-  title = {Leibnizian {{Identity}} and {{Paraconsistent Logic}}},
-  author = {Abasnezhad, Ali},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic},
-  volume = {41},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {236--243},
-  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
-  issn = {0144-5340},
-  doi = {10.1080/01445340.2020.1773213},
-  abstract = {The standard Leibnizian view of identity allows for substitutivity of identicals and validates transitivity of identity within classical semantics. However, in a series of works, Graham Priest argues that Leibnizian identity invalidates both principles when formalized in paraconsistent semantics. This paper aims to show the Leibnizian view of identity validates substitutivity of identicals and transitivity of identity whether the logic is classical or paraconsistent. After presenting Priest's semantics of identity, I show what a semantic expression of Leibnizian identity does amount to. Then, I argue that Priest's semantic definition of identity is not Leibnizian. Finally, I offer a semantics characterization of identity in paraconsistent logic that is truly Leibnizian. I demonstrate that the correct formalization of Leibnizian identity in paraconsistent logic also validates substitutivity of identicals and transitivity of identity.},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2020.1773213},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QYLBSWIN/Abasnezhad - 2020 - Leibnizian Identity and Paraconsistent Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Abramsky2011,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Categories}} and {{Categorical Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {New {{Structures}} for {{Physics}}},
-  author = {Abramsky, S. and Tzevelekos, N.},
-  editor = {Coecke, Bob},
-  year = {2011},
-  series = {Lecture {{Notes}} in {{Physics}}},
-  pages = {3--94},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  address = {{Berlin, Heidelberg}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-12821-9_1},
-  abstract = {The aim of these notes is to provide a succinct, accessible introduction to some of the basic ideas of category theory and categorical logic. The notes are based on a lecture course given at Oxford over the past few years. They contain numerous exercises, and hopefully will prove useful for self-study by those seeking a first introduction to the subject, with fairly minimal prerequisites. The coverage is by no means comprehensive, but should provide a good basis for further study; a guide to further reading is included.The main prerequisite is a basic familiarity with the elements of discrete mathematics: sets, relations and functions. An Appendix contains a summary of what we will need, and it may be useful to review this first. In addition, some prior exposure to abstract algebra\textemdash vector spaces and linear maps, or groups and group homomorphisms\textemdash would be helpful.},
-  isbn = {978-3-642-12821-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5VP5TULI/LNPnotes.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5WGNA75Y/Abramsky and Tzevelekos - 2011 - Introduction to Categories and Categorical Logic.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZBDEXKPS/2011_Book_NewStructuresForPhysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Acharya2013,
-  title = {N\'eti N\'eti {{Meaning}} and {{Function}} of an {{Enigmatic Phrase}} in the {{G\=argya-Aj\=ata\'satru}} Dialogue of {{B\d{r}had \=Ara\d{n}yaka Upani\d{s}ad II}}.1 and {{II}}.3},
-  author = {Acharya, Diwakar},
-  year = {2013},
-  journal = {Indo-Iranian Journal},
-  volume = {56},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {3--39},
-  publisher = {{Brill}},
-  address = {{The Netherlands}},
-  issn = {0019-7246},
-  doi = {10.1163/001972412-620402},
-  abstract = {This article argues that it is necessary to recognise Sections II.1 and II.3 of the B\d{r}had \=Ara\d{n}yaka Upani\d{s}ad as one discourse. Since nobody among traditional or modern scholars has paid attention to this structure, many problems have been neither seen nor solved. This article does so, and further, exposes textual problems embedded there and analyses them. In this very discourse the expression n\'eti n\'eti is introduced as an \=ade\'sa. Therefore, this article investigates the meaning and function of this expression there. This article also muses on possible implications of the entire discourse of G\=argya and Aj\=ata\'satru.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Women'S Studies ; Philosophy ; Languages \& Literatures},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EE9I85IJ/Acharya - 2013 - Néti néti Meaning and Function of an Enigmatic Phr.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Acharya2017,
-  title = {On the {{Meaning}} and {{Function}} of {{\=Ade\'s\'a}} in the {{Early Upani\d{s}ads}}},
-  author = {Acharya, Diwakar},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {539--567},
-  issn = {0022-1791, 1573-0395},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10781-017-9321-7},
-  abstract = {Many modern scholars working on the early Upanisads translate \=ade\'sa as substitute, substitution, or the method or rule of substitutio\textperiodcentered n. The choice of this translation, which often affects the larger analysis of the text, started only in 1960s, with the late Paul Thieme who understood `substitute/substitution' as the meaning of \=ade\'sa in the Pa\textasciimacron ninian tradition and introduced that meaning to Upanisadic analysis. After carefu\textperiodcentered{} lly analysing all relevant passages in their contexts\textemdash not\textperiodcentered{} just the individual sentences in which the term occurs, this paper rejects Thieme's idea. It shows that the term never violates its etymological meaning of indication, and argues that \=ade\'sa by itself does not mean substitute or replacement even in the Pa\textasciimacron ninian tradition. This paper further shows that \=ade\'sa, usually used in the plural, wa\textperiodcentered s once the formal term referring to the class/genre of Vedic teachings now known as Upanisads. As it analyses different passages from the early Upanisads, this paper touches o\textperiodcentered{} n the origin and composition of some of the Upanisads\textperiodcentered, for example arguing that the original Upanisadic teaching of the archaic \textperiodcentered Bra\textasciimacron hmana of the Va\textasciimacron jasaneyas begins eleven secti\textperiodcentered ons before the formal beginning of t\textperiodcentered he B\d{r}had \=Ara\d{n}yaka Upani\d{s}ad.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SNX8ETRW/Acharya - 2017 - On the Meaning and Function of Ādeśá in the Early .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Adams1974,
-  title = {Theories of Actuality},
-  author = {Adams, Robert Merrihew},
-  year = {1974},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {211--231},
-  abstract = {I discuss the question, In what the actuality of the actual world consists, Or what distinguishes it from the other possible worlds. I criticize the theories that the actuality of the actual world consists in its being chosen by god, In its being the best of all possible worlds, In its being 'this' one (the world in which 'this' statement is made), Or in its possession of a simple, Unanalyzable property of actuality. All of these theories are at least hinted at by leibniz, And one of them (the indexical theory) has recently been defended by david lewis. I propose a theory according to which "in the actual world 'p'" is defined as "the proposition that ('p') is true."},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/79KBB6RH/Adams - 1974 - Theories of actuality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Adams1981,
-  title = {Actualism and Thisness},
-  author = {Adams, Robert Merrihew},
-  year = {1981},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {3--41},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF01063914},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Metaphysics,Philosophy,Philosophy of Language},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LF6LMWKE/Adams - 1981 - Actualism and thisness.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Adams1982,
-  title = {Relations, {{Inherence}} and {{Subsistence}}: {{Or}}, {{Was Ockham}} a {{Nestorian}} in {{Christology}}?},
-  shorttitle = {Relations, {{Inherence}} and {{Subsistence}}},
-  author = {Adams, Marilyn McCord},
-  year = {1982},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {62--75},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TIIPHGYU/2215413.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Adams1989,
-  title = {William {{Ockham}}},
-  author = {Adams, Marilyn McCord},
-  year = {1989},
-  publisher = {{University of Notre Dame Press}},
-  abstract = {In this work Ockham proposes a simple theory of predication which he then uses in explicating the truth conditions of progressively more complicated kinds of propositions. It includes what he takes to be the correct semantic treatment of quantified propositions.},
-  isbn = {978-0-268-01945-7},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Addison1965,
-  title = {The {{Theory}} of {{Models}}},
-  author = {Addison, J. W.},
-  year = {1965},
-  publisher = {{Amsterdam, North-Holland Pub. Co.}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MB6GTYKJ/[J.W._Addison,_L._Henkin]_The_Theory_of_Models._Pr(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Akhlaghi2021,
-  title = {Does the {{Unity}} of {{Grounding Matter}}?},
-  author = {Akhlaghi, Farbod},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  number = {fzab008},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzab008},
-  abstract = {Is the notion of grounding arguably prevalent throughout moral philosophy the same as that found in metaphysics? Selim Berker has argued it is. This, he claims, has a `surprising' consequence: many central claims in normative ethics become claims within both normative ethics and meta-ethics. I argue that whatever important consequences the unity of grounding may have for moral philosophy, it does not, pace Berker, entail anything significant regarding the relationship between normative ethics and meta-ethics.}
-}
-
-@book{Allen2001,
-  title = {Logic {{Primer}}},
-  author = {Allen, Colin and Hand, Michael},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = feb,
-  edition = {Second Edition},
-  publisher = {{A Bradford Book}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-51126-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GC8ZG6WZ/Allen_Hand_2001_Logic Primer.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Alvarez2018,
-  title = {Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality},
-  author = {Alvarez, Maria},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {195},
-  number = {8},
-  pages = {3293--3310},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-1005-9},
-  abstract = {What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call `Factualism', which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are mental states or mental facts, and also against a variant of Factualism that says that some practical reasons are facts and others are false beliefs. I argue that the conception of practical reasons defended here (i) provides plausible answers to the second and third questions above; and (ii) gives a more unified and satisfactory picture of practical reasons than those offered by its rivals.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7M8VYSIB/Alvarez - 2018 - Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and ration.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Amodei2016,
-  title = {Concrete {{Problems}} in {{AI Safety}}},
-  author = {Amodei, Dario and Olah, Chris and Steinhardt, Jacob and Christiano, Paul and Schulman, John and Man{\'e}, Dan},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {arXiv:1606.06565 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1606.06565},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U4Z6LER8/Amodei et al. - 2016 - Concrete Problems in AI Safety.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ED2M8T3Y/1606.html}
-}
-
-@article{Andersen2017,
-  title = {Patterns, {{Information}}, and {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Andersen, H. K. and {Journal of Philosophy Inc.}},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {114},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {592--622},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil20171141142},
-  abstract = {This paper articulates an account of causation as a collection of information-theoretic relationships between patterns instantiated in the causal nexus. I draw on Dennett's account of real patterns to characterize potential causal relata as patterns with specific identification criteria and noise tolerance levels, and actual causal relata as those patterns instantiated at some spatiotemporal location in the rich causal nexus as originally developed by Salmon. The rich causal nexus serves the role of `pixels' in the Dennettian pattern ontology. I develop a representation framework using phase space to precisely characterize causal relata, including their degree(s) of counterfactual robustness, their causal profiles, causal connectivity, and to identify their privileged grain size or level. By doing so, I show how the philosophical notion of causation can be rendered in a format that is amenable for direct application of mathematical techniques from information theory such that the resulting informational measures are causal informational measures. This account provides a metaphysics of causation that supports interventionist semantics and causal modelling and discovery techniques.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P6M88ILK/Andersen and Journal of Philosophy Inc. - 2017 - Patterns, Information, and Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Anderson1976,
-  title = {Entailment: {{The Logic}} of {{Relevance}} and {{Necessity}}},
-  shorttitle = {Entailment},
-  author = {Anderson, Alan Ross and Belnap, Nuel D. and Dunn, J. Michael},
-  year = {1976},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {2nd edition edition},
-  volume = {I},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Princeton, N.J}},
-  abstract = {The Description for this book, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity. Vol. I, will be forthcoming.},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-07192-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M9WPTKXT/Anderson et al. - 1976 - Entailment The Logic of Relevance and Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Anderson2019,
-  title = {Entailment: {{The Logic}} of {{Relevance}} and {{Necessity}}},
-  shorttitle = {Entailment, {{Vol}}. {{II}}},
-  author = {Anderson, Alan Ross and Belnap, Nuel D. and Dunn, J. Michael},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jun,
-  volume = {II},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Princeton, N.J.}},
-  abstract = {In spite of a powerful tradition, more than two thousand years old, that in a valid argument the premises must be relevant to the conclusion, twentieth-century logicians neglected the concept of relevance until the publication of Volume I of this monumental work. Since that time relevance logic has achieved an important place in the field of philosophy: Volume II of Entailment brings to a conclusion a powerful and authoritative presentation of the subject by most of the top people working in the area. Originally the aim of Volume II was simply to cover certain topics not treated in the first volume--quantification, for example--or to extend the coverage of certain topics, such as semantics. However, because of the technical progress that has occurred since the publication of the first volume, Volume II now includes other material. The book contains the work of Alasdair Urquhart, who has shown that the principal sentential systems of relevance logic are undecidable, and of Kit Fine, who has demonstrated that, although the first-order systems are incomplete with respect to the conjectured constant domain semantics, they are still complete with respect to a semantics based on "arbitrary objects." Also presented is important work by the other contributing authors, who are Daniel Cohen, Steven Giambrone, Dorothy L. Grover, Anil Gupta, Glen Helman, Errol P. Martin, Michael A. McRobbie, and Stuart Shapiro. Robert G. Wolf's bibliography of 3000 items is a valuable addition to the volume. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-65464-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XTP3C8ID/Anderson et al. - 2019 - Entailment The Logic of Relevance and Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Anderson2019a,
-  title = {Hume, {{Causation}} and {{Counterfactuals}}},
-  author = {Anderson, Joshua},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Humanities Bulletin},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {36--49},
-  issn = {2517-4266},
-  abstract = {What is offered here is an interpretation of Hume's views on causation. While it might not be literally Hume's view, it is certainly consistent with Hume, and is probably what Hume should say on causation, in light of recent developments in science and logic. As a way in, it is argued that the considerations that Hume brings against rationalist theories of causation can be applied to counterfactual theories of causation. Since, counterfactuals, possible worlds and modality were not ideas that would have been overly familiar to Hume, some supplementation of Hume's arguments will be necessary.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2019 Humanities Bulletin},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {David Lewis},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MURXYCXY/Anderson - 2019 - Hume, Causation and Counterfactuals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Andre2022,
-  title = {Point-Set Topology with Topics},
-  author = {Andre, Robert},
-  year = {2022},
-  pages = {657},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NC6X4CZB/Andre - Point-set topology with topics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Andreka,
-  title = {Algebraic {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Andr{\'e}ka, Hajnal and N{\'e}meti, Istv{\'a}n and Sain, Ildik{\'o}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/G7NK3PT7/handbook.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Angell1989,
-  title = {Deducibility, {{Entailment}} and {{Analytic Containment}}},
-  booktitle = {Directions in {{Relevant Logic}}},
-  author = {Angell, Richard B.},
-  editor = {Norman, Jean and Sylvan, Richard},
-  year = {1989},
-  series = {Reason and {{Argument}}},
-  pages = {119--143},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  abstract = {The concept of entailment is often connected with deducibility: A is said to entail B iff B is logically deducible from A.1 It has also been connected to the concept of containment in Kant's sense of analytic containment: A entails B only if the meaning of B is contained in the meaning of A. But the concepts of deducibility and containment are two distinct concepts, and the failure to distinguish them leads to faulty attempts to merge them in formal systems. One such attempt is Anderson and Belnap's system, E, in which a Fitch-type theory of natural deduction is modified to incorporate a certain sense of ``containment''2. Another is Parry's system, AI, of ``analytic implication'' which began with a more restricted sense of containment but has usually been presented as a theory of deducibility (cf. Parry 33 and 72).},
-  isbn = {978-94-009-1005-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Axiom Schema,Conjunctive Normal Form,Deduction Rule,Natural Deduction,Normal Form}
-}
-
-@book{Angell2002,
-  title = {A-{{Logic}}},
-  author = {Angell, Richard Bradshaw},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = mar,
-  publisher = {{University Press of America}},
-  address = {{Lanham, Md.}},
-  abstract = {A-Logic is a new theory of formal logic based on substitution of synonyms rather than sameness of truth-values. In this book, it is contrasted, step-by-step, with today's mathematical logic. This approach reveals how A-Logic can resolve traditional logic's anomalies, such as the Liar's paradox, Hempel's Paradox of Confirmation, and Carnap's problem of dispositional predicates, while preserving all of standard logic's theorems.},
-  isbn = {978-0-7618-2235-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5R5WNKLS/Angell - 2002 - A-Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Annas1994,
-  title = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Ancient Philosophy}}: {{Volume XII}}: 1994},
-  author = {Annas, Julia},
-  year = {1994},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8I37LTCI/1994 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume XII 1994 - Annas.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HHKSCYAP/1994 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume XII 1994 - Annas.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Annas1995,
-  title = {Oxford {{Studies In Ancient Philosophy}}, {{Volume V}}},
-  author = {Annas, Julia},
-  year = {1995},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PCH46H7F/1995 - Oxford Studies In Ancient Philosophy, Volume V - Annas.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QCVBYVHM/1995 - Oxford Studies In Ancient Philosophy, Volume V - Annas.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Annas1995a,
-  title = {Virtue as a Skill},
-  author = {Annas, Julia},
-  year = {1995},
-  journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {227--243},
-  issn = {0967-2559},
-  doi = {10.1080/09672559508570812},
-  abstract = {The article argues that a consideration of the idea, common in ancient ethical theory, that virtue is a skill or craft, reveals that some common construals of it are mistaken. The analogy between virtue and skill is not meant to suggest that virtue is an unreflective habit of practiced action. Rather what interests ancient ethical theorists is the intellectual structure of a skill, one demanding grasp of the principles defining the field and an ability to reflect on the justification of particular actions. This is brought out with reference particularly to the discussion of virtue as analogous with skill in Plato's early Socratic dialogues. The demands made of the virtuous agent by philosophers who regard virtue as analogous to skill are akin to the demands made by more recent theories of morality which demand that the moral agent be able to reflect on her practices, extract the principles that these depend on, and produce justification when needed.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P8DVP54C/1995 - Virtue as a skill - Annas.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X5UF5AQR/1995 - Virtue as a skill - Annas.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Annas2011,
-  title = {Intelegent {{Virtue}}},
-  author = {Annas, Julia},
-  year = {2011},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KHRCUDZ7/2011 - Intelegent Virtue - Annas.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R2B435ZC/2011 - Intelegent Virtue - Annas.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Annas2015,
-  title = {Applying {{Virtue}} to {{Ethics}}},
-  author = {Annas, Julia},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--14},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CK7MHDQR/2015 - Applying Virtue to Ethics - Annas.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LBD6B4XS/2015 - Applying Virtue to Ethics - Annas.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Arieli1996,
-  title = {Reasoning with Logical Bilattices},
-  author = {Arieli, Ofer and Avron, Arnon},
-  year = {1996},
-  journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {25--63},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SVIZP29Q/Arieli and Avron - 1996 - Reasoning with logical bilattices.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Aristotle1984,
-  title = {Complete {{Works}} of {{Aristotle}}, {{Volume}} 1: {{The Revised Oxford Translation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Complete {{Works}} of {{Aristotle}}, {{Volume}} 1},
-  author = {Aristotle},
-  editor = {Barnes, Jonathan},
-  year = {1984},
-  month = sep,
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Princeton, NJ}},
-  abstract = {The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-01650-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CXUNXLJD/The complet works of Aristotle  the revised Oxford translation by Aristoteles. Jonathan Barnes (z-lib.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Aristotle1984a,
-  title = {Complete {{Works}} of {{Aristotle}}, {{Volume}} 2: {{The Revised Oxford Translation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Complete {{Works}} of {{Aristotle}}, {{Volume}} 2},
-  author = {Aristotle},
-  editor = {Barnes, Jonathan},
-  year = {1984},
-  month = sep,
-  edition = {Revised edition},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Princeton, NJ}},
-  abstract = {The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-01651-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QWQU6VZ9/Aristotle_Barnes_1984_Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Aristotle2000,
-  title = {Aristotle: {{Nicomachean Ethics}}},
-  shorttitle = {Aristotle},
-  author = {{Aristotle} and Crisp, Roger},
-  year = {2000},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  isbn = {978-0-511-80205-8},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3WNWVHDQ/[Aristotle,_Roger_Crisp]_Nicomachean_Ethics_(Cambr(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Armstrong1997,
-  title = {A {{World}} of {{States}} of {{Affairs}}},
-  author = {Armstrong, D. M.},
-  year = {1997},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}}
-}
-
-@book{Armstrong2004,
-  title = {Truth and {{Truthmakers}}},
-  author = {Armstrong, D. M.},
-  year = {2004},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Arntzenius1997,
-  title = {Transition {{Chances}} and {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Arntzenius, Frank},
-  year = {1997},
-  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {78},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {149--168},
-  issn = {1468-0114},
-  doi = {10.1111/1468-0114.00033},
-  abstract = {Abstract: The general claims of this paper are as follows. As a result of chaotic dynamics we can usually not know what the deterministic causes of events are. There will, however, be invariant forwards transition chances from earlier types of events, which we typically call the causes, to later types of events, which we typically call the effects. There will be no invariant backwards transition chances between these types of events. This asymmetry has the same origin and explanation as the arrow of time of thermodynamics.},
-  copyright = {1997 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EA29TJNS/Arntzenius - 1997 - Transition Chances and Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Arntzenius2003,
-  title = {On {{What We Know}} about {{Chance}}},
-  author = {Arntzenius, Frank and Hall, Ned},
-  year = {2003},
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {54},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {171--179},
-  issn = {0007-0882},
-  abstract = {[The 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii) that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence (iii) that nothing perfectly deserves the name 'chance', although something can come close enough by playing the role picked out by the amended principle. We show that in fact there must be 'chances' that perfectly play what Lewis takes to be the defining role. But this is not the happy conclusion it might seem, since these 'chances' behave too strangely to deserve the name. The lesson is simple: much more than the Principal Principle-more to the point, much more than the connection between chance and credence-informs our understanding of objective chance.]},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8IB45K6J/Arntzenius and Hall - 2003 - On What We Know about Chance.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Arntzenius2006,
-  title = {Time {{Travel}}: {{Double Your Fun}}},
-  shorttitle = {Time {{Travel}}},
-  author = {Arntzenius, Frank},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {599--616},
-  issn = {1747-9991},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00045.x},
-  abstract = {I start off by relating the standard philosophical account of what time travel is to models of time travel that have recently been discussed by physicists. I then discuss some puzzles associated with time travel. I conclude that philosophers' arguments against time travel are relevant when assessing the likelihood of the occurrence time travel in our world, and are relevant to the assessment whether time travel is physically possible.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y68N66QE/Arntzenius - 2006 - Time Travel Double Your Fun.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Asay2017,
-  title = {Run {{Aground}}: {{Kit Fine}}'s {{Critique}} of {{Truthmaker Theory}}},
-  shorttitle = {Run {{Aground}}},
-  author = {Asay, Jamin},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {67},
-  number = {268},
-  pages = {443--463},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JG6TGTBH/Asay_2017_Run Aground.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Athreya2006,
-  title = {Measure {{Theory}} and {{Probability Theory}}},
-  author = {Athreya, Krishna B. and Lahiri, Soumendra N.},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {2006th edition},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-387-32903-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/96F996MF/Athreya_Lahiri_2006_Measure Theory and Probability Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Awodey2008,
-  title = {Category {{Theory}}},
-  author = {Awodey, Steve},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {2 edition},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press, U.S.A.}},
-  address = {{Oxford ; New York}},
-  abstract = {Category theory is a branch of abstract algebra with incredibly diverse applications. This text and reference book is aimed not only at mathematicians, but also researchers and students of computer science, logic, linguistics, cognitive science, philosophy, and any of the other fields in which the ideas are being applied. Containing clear definitions of the essential concepts, illuminated with numerous accessible examples, and providing full proofs of all important propositions and theorems, this book aims to make the basic ideas, theorems, and methods of category theory understandable to this broad readership. Although assuming few mathematical pre-requisites, the standard of mathematical rigour is not compromised. The material covered includes the standard core of categories; functors; natural transformations; equivalence; limits and colimits; functor categories; representables; Yoneda's lemma; adjoints; monads. An extra topic of cartesian closed categories and the lambda-calculus is also provided - a must for computer scientists, logicians and linguists! This Second Edition contains numerous revisions to the original text, including expanding the exposition, revising and elaborating the proofs, providing additional diagrams, correcting typographical errors and, finally, adding an entirely new section on monoidal categories. Nearly a hundred new exercises have also been added, many with solutions, to make the book more useful as a course text and for self-study.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-923718-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A4H8WNSV/Awodey - 2008 - Category Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Bacon,
-  title = {A {{Case For Higher-Order Metaphysics}}},
-  booktitle = {Higher-Order {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Bacon, Andrew},
-  editor = {Fritz, Peter and Jones, Nicholas K.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MNW3IL9B/Bacon - A Case For Higher-Order Metaphysics.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EG68R39X/BACACF-4.html}
-}
-
-@article{Bacon2018,
-  title = {The {{Broadest Necessity}}},
-  author = {Bacon, Andrew},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {47},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {733--783},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-017-9447-9},
-  abstract = {In this paper the logic of broad necessity is explored. Definitions of what it means for one modality to be broader than another are formulated, and it is proven, in the context of higher-order logic, that there is a broadest necessity, settling one of the central questions of this investigation. It is shown, moreover, that it is possible to give a reductive analysis of this necessity in extensional language (using truth functional connectives and quantifiers). This relates more generally to a conjecture that it is not possible to define intensional connectives from extensional notions. This conjecture is formulated precisely in higher-order logic, and concrete cases in which it fails are examined. The paper ends with a discussion of the logic of broad necessity. It is shown that the logic of broad necessity is a normal modal logic between S4 and Triv, and that it is consistent with a natural axiomatic system of higher-order logic that it is exactly S4. Some philosophical reasons to think that the logic of broad necessity does not include the S5 principle are given.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/28I7VAYT/Bacon - 2018 - The Broadest Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bacon2019,
-  title = {The {{Logic}} of {{Opacity}}},
-  author = {Bacon, Andrew and Russell, Jeffrey Sanford},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {99},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {81--114},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12454},
-  abstract = {We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show that some of these logics are non-degenerate.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.12454},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U3Z552YM/Bacon and Russell - 2019 - The Logic of Opacity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bacon2019a,
-  title = {Substitution {{Structures}}},
-  author = {Bacon, Andrew},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1017--1075},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-019-09505-z},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/J7LW8DP3/Bacon - 2019 - Substitution Structures.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bacondraft,
-  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Structured Propositions}}},
-  author = {Bacon, Andrew},
-  year = {draft},
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SYR3293G/Bacon - A Theory of Structured Propositions.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LRBY87F3/BACATO-4.html}
-}
-
-@article{Bader2013,
-  title = {{Towards a Hyperintensional Theory of Intrinsicality}},
-  author = {Bader, Ralf M.},
-  editor = {Smylie, John},
-  year = {2013},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {110},
-  number = {10},
-  pages = {525--563},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil2013110109},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JCP83AW6/jphil_2013_0110_0010_0525_0563.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Bader2016,
-  title = {Conditions, {{Modifiers}}, and {{Holism}}},
-  booktitle = {Weighing {{Reasons}}},
-  author = {Bader, Ralf},
-  year = {2016},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0002},
-  abstract = {This chapter provides a framework for understanding two ways in which reasons can vary across contexts, namely through the effects of (1) conditions which take the form of enablers and disablers, as well as (2) modifiers which take the form of intensifiers and attenuators. The chapter establishes that the distinction between those features of the context that condition or modify a reason and those that constitute the reason is metaphysically robust and can be drawn in a non-arbitrary and non-pragmatic manner, and that the former features cannot be included in the specification of the reason. Moreover, it will be shown that intrinsicality as well as restricted forms of non-trivial separability can be preserved, thereby establishing that the additive theory of weighing reasons can be rendered consistent with these forms of context-dependence.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-931519-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {additivity,attenuators,disablers,enablers,holism,intensifiers,intrinsicality,separability},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2Q8EAWWJ/Bader - 2016 - Conditions, Modifiers, and Holism (FRAN).pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D2J42NEE/Bader - 2016 - Conditions, Modifiers, and Holism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bader2017,
-  title = {The {{Grounding Argument Against Non-Reductive Moral Realism}}},
-  author = {Bader, Ralf M.},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaethics},
-  volume = {12},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3D6YYTMC/BADTGAv1.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R97LXWEH/Bader - 2017 - The Grounding Argument Against Non-Reductive Moral.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Balaguer2016,
-  title = {A {{Solution}} to the {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Balaguer, Mark and Horgan, Terry},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {76},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {3--7},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/anw001},
-  abstract = {Abstract.   The paradox of analysis asks how a putative conceptual analysis can be both true and informative. If it is true then isn't it analytic? And if it is},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2AA2NGIJ/Balaguer and Horgan - 2016 - A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{BalcerakJackson2013,
-  title = {Conceptual {{Analysis}} and {{Epistemic Progress}}},
-  author = {Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {190},
-  number = {15},
-  pages = {3053--3074},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0120-0},
-  abstract = {This essay concerns the question of how we make genuine epistemic progress through conceptual analysis. Our way into this issue will be through consideration of the paradox of analysis. The paradox challenges us to explain how a given statement can make a substantive contribution to our knowledge, even while it purports merely to make explicit what one's grasp of the concept under scrutiny consists in. The paradox is often treated primarily as a semantic puzzle. However, in ``Sect. 1'' I argue that the paradox raises a more fundamental epistemic problem, and in ``Sects.1 and 2'' I argue that semantic proposals\textemdash even ones designed to capture the Fregean link between meaning and epistemic significance\textemdash fail to resolve that problem. Seeing our way towards a real solution to the paradox requires more than semantics; we also need to understand how the process of analysis can yield justification for accepting a candidate conceptual analysis. I present an account of this process, and explain how it resolves the paradox, in ``Sect. 3''. I conclude in ``Sect. 4'' by considering the implications for the present account concerning the goal of conceptual analysis, and by arguing that the apparent scarcity of short and finite illuminating analyses in philosophically interesting cases provides no grounds for pessimism concerning the possibility of philosophical progress through conceptual analysis.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VY657C2H/Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress.pdf}
-}
-
-@unpublished{Ball2008,
-  title = {Semantics, {{Meta-Semantics}}, and {{Ontology}}: {{A Critique}} of the {{Method}} of {{Truth}} in {{Metaphysics}}},
-  shorttitle = {Semantics, {{Meta-Semantics}}, and {{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Ball, Brian A. and Edgington, Dorothy and Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2008}
-}
-
-@article{Ballarin2004,
-  title = {The {{Interpretation}} of {{Necessity}} and the {{Necessity}} of {{Interpretation}}},
-  author = {Ballarin, Roberta},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {101},
-  number = {12},
-  pages = {609--638},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 2004 Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VKNBGKHX/Ballarin - 2004 - The Interpretation of Necessity and the Necessity .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ballarin2005,
-  title = {Validity and {{Necessity}}},
-  author = {Ballarin, Roberta},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {34},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {275--303},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-004-7800-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Carnap,Kripke,Logic,modal logic,necessity,possible world semantics,validity},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TSSFHQL4/Ballarin - 2005 - Validity and Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bar-Hillel1972,
-  title = {Newcomb's {{Paradox Revisited}}},
-  author = {{Bar-Hillel}, Maya and Margalit, Avishai},
-  year = {1972},
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {23},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {295--304},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, The British Society for the Philosophy of Science]}},
-  issn = {0007-0882}
-}
-
-@article{Barasz2021,
-  title = {Robust {{Cooperation}} in the {{Prisoner}}'s {{Dilemma}}: {{Program Equilibrium}} via {{Provability Logic}}},
-  shorttitle = {Robust {{Cooperation}} in the {{Prisoner}}'s {{Dilemma}}},
-  author = {Barasz, Mihaly and Christiano, Paul and Fallenstein, Benja and Herreshoff, Marcello and LaVictoire, Patrick and Yudkowsky, Eliezer},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {arXiv:1401.5577 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1401.5577},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {We consider the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma between algorithms with read-access to one anothers' source codes, and we use the modal logic of provability to build agents that can achieve mutual cooperation in a manner that is robust, in that cooperation does not require exact equality of the agents' source code, and unexploitable, meaning that such an agent never cooperates when its opponent defects. We construct a general framework for such "modal agents", and study their properties.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory,Computer Science - Logic in Computer Science,F.4.1},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SI6QID7D/Barasz et al. - 2021 - Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Prog.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HVEWB8VS/1401.html}
-}
-
-@article{Barcan1946,
-  title = {A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication},
-  author = {Barcan, Ruth C.},
-  year = {1946},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {115--118},
-  issn = {00224812},
-  doi = {10.2307/2269159},
-  abstract = {The following quantification system is an extension of the Lewis calculus S2 to include quanification.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SL7C4LT4/1946 - A functional calculus of first order based on strict implication - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Barcan1946a,
-  title = {The {{Deduction Theorem}} in a {{Functional Calculus}} of {{First Order Based}} on {{Strict Implication}}},
-  author = {Barcan, Ruth C.},
-  year = {1946},
-  journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {115--118},
-  abstract = {The following quantification system is an extension of the Lewis calculus S2 to include quanification.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D52LQ4TL/1946 - The deduction theorem in a functional calculus of first order based on strict implication - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@phdthesis{Barcan1946b,
-  title = {A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication},
-  author = {Barcan, Ruth Charlotte},
-  year = {1946},
-  lccn = {BC135 .B3},
-  school = {Yale},
-  keywords = {Logic,Symbolic and mathematical}
-}
-
-@article{Barcan1947,
-  title = {The {{Identity}} of {{Individuals}} in a {{Strict Functional Calculus}} of {{Second Order}}},
-  author = {Barcan, Ruth C.},
-  year = {1947},
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {12--15},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/32PWYX3E/1947 - The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Barcan1948,
-  title = {Review: {{Arthur Francis Smullyan}}, {{Modality}} and {{Description}}},
-  author = {Barcan, Ruth C.},
-  year = {1948},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {149--150},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PC5WXICM/1948 - Review Arthur Francis Smullyan, Modality and Description - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Barcan1953,
-  title = {Strict Implication, Deducibility and the Deduction Theorem},
-  author = {Barcan, Ruth C.},
-  year = {1953},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {18},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {234--236},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GJM365RX/1953 - Strict implication, deducibility and the deduction theorem - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Barendregt1985,
-  title = {The {{Lambda Calculus}}, {{Its Syntax}} and {{Semantics}} ({{Studies}} in {{Logic}} and the {{Foundations}} of {{Mathematics}}, {{Volume}} 103). {{Revised Edition}}},
-  author = {Barendregt, H. P.},
-  year = {1985},
-  month = nov,
-  edition = {Revised edition},
-  publisher = {{North Holland}},
-  address = {{Amsterdam ; New York : New York, N.Y}},
-  abstract = {The revised edition contains a new chapter which provides an elegant description of the semantics. The various classes of lambda calculus models are described in a uniform manner. Some didactical improvements have been made to this edition. An example of a simple model is given and then the general theory (of categorical models) is developed. Indications are given of those parts of the book which can be used to form a coherent course.},
-  isbn = {978-0-444-87508-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UCEE7KB7/Barendregt - 1985 - The Lambda Calculus, Its Syntax and Semantics (Stu.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Baron2017,
-  title = {How {{Mathematics Can Make}} a {{Difference}}},
-  author = {Baron, Sam and Colyvan, Mark and Ripley, David},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosopher's Imprint},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {3},
-  publisher = {{University of Michigan}},
-  address = {{Ann Arbor, MI}},
-  issn = {1533-628X},
-  abstract = {Standard approaches to counterfactuals in the philosophy of explanation are geared toward causal explanation. We show how to extend the counterfactual theory of explanation to non-causal cases, involving extra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts (in part) by mathematical facts. Using a structural equation framework, we model impossible perturbations to mathematics and the resulting differences made to physical explananda in two important cases of extra-mathematical explanation. We address some objections to our approach.},
-  copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D6UV8WAI/Baron et al. - 2017 - How Mathematics Can Make a Difference.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LGJTPNTG/1.html}
-}
-
-@article{BarredoArrieta2020,
-  title = {Explainable {{Artificial Intelligence}} ({{XAI}}): {{Concepts}}, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible {{AI}}},
-  shorttitle = {Explainable {{Artificial Intelligence}} ({{XAI}})},
-  author = {Barredo Arrieta, Alejandro and {D{\'i}az-Rodr{\'i}guez}, Natalia and Del Ser, Javier and Bennetot, Adrien and Tabik, Siham and Barbado, Alberto and Garcia, Salvador and {Gil-Lopez}, Sergio and Molina, Daniel and Benjamins, Richard and Chatila, Raja and Herrera, Francisco},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Information Fusion},
-  volume = {58},
-  pages = {82--115},
-  issn = {1566-2535},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.inffus.2019.12.012},
-  abstract = {In the last few years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has achieved a notable momentum that, if harnessed appropriately, may deliver the best of expectations over many application sectors across the field. For this to occur shortly in Machine Learning, the entire community stands in front of the barrier of explainability, an inherent problem of the latest techniques brought by sub-symbolism (e.g. ensembles or Deep Neural Networks) that were not present in the last hype of AI (namely, expert systems and rule based models). Paradigms underlying this problem fall within the so-called eXplainable AI (XAI) field, which is widely acknowledged as a crucial feature for the practical deployment of AI models. The overview presented in this article examines the existing literature and contributions already done in the field of XAI, including a prospect toward what is yet to be reached. For this purpose we summarize previous efforts made to define explainability in Machine Learning, establishing a novel definition of explainable Machine Learning that covers such prior conceptual propositions with a major focus on the audience for which the explainability is sought. Departing from this definition, we propose and discuss about a taxonomy of recent contributions related to the explainability of different Machine Learning models, including those aimed at explaining Deep Learning methods for which a second dedicated taxonomy is built and examined in detail. This critical literature analysis serves as the motivating background for a series of challenges faced by XAI, such as the interesting crossroads of data fusion and explainability. Our prospects lead toward the concept of Responsible Artificial Intelligence, namely, a methodology for the large-scale implementation of AI methods in real organizations with fairness, model explainability and accountability at its core. Our ultimate goal is to provide newcomers to the field of XAI with a thorough taxonomy that can serve as reference material in order to stimulate future research advances, but also to encourage experts and professionals from other disciplines to embrace the benefits of AI in their activity sectors, without any prior bias for its lack of interpretability.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Accountability,Comprehensibility,Data Fusion,Deep Learning,Explainable Artificial Intelligence,Fairness,Interpretability,Machine Learning,Privacy,Responsible Artificial Intelligence,Transparency},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8DNM48LM/Barredo Arrieta et al. - 2020 - Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) Concept.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Barwise1981,
-  title = {Situations and {{Attitudes}}},
-  author = {Barwise, Jon and Perry, John},
-  year = {1981},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {78},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {668--691},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2026578},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BBMS5MAN/Barwise and Perry - 1981 - Situations and Attitudes.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Basin1993,
-  title = {A Conservative Extension of First-Order Logic and Its Applications to Theorem Proving},
-  booktitle = {Foundations of {{Software Technology}} and {{Theoretical Computer Science}}},
-  author = {Basin, David and Matthews, Se{\'a}n},
-  editor = {Shyamasundar, Rudrapatna K.},
-  year = {1993},
-  series = {Lecture {{Notes}} in {{Computer Science}}},
-  pages = {151--160},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  address = {{Berlin, Heidelberg}},
-  doi = {10.1007/3-540-57529-4_50},
-  abstract = {We define a weak second-order extension of first-order logic. We prove a second-order cut elimination theorem for this logic and use this to prove a conservativity and a realisability result. We give applications to formal program development and theorem proving, in particular, in modeling techniques in formal metatheory.},
-  isbn = {978-3-540-48211-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Natural Deduction,Recursive Predicate,Schematic Theorem,Sequent Calculus,Theorem Prove},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/H5MSRAED/Basin and Matthews - 1993 - A conservative extension of first-order logic and .pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Battaglia2018,
-  title = {Relational Inductive Biases, Deep Learning, and Graph Networks},
-  author = {Battaglia, Peter W. and Hamrick, Jessica B. and Bapst, Victor and {Sanchez-Gonzalez}, Alvaro and Zambaldi, Vinicius and Malinowski, Mateusz and Tacchetti, Andrea and Raposo, David and Santoro, Adam and Faulkner, Ryan and Gulcehre, Caglar and Song, Francis and Ballard, Andrew and Gilmer, Justin and Dahl, George and Vaswani, Ashish and Allen, Kelsey and Nash, Charles and Langston, Victoria and Dyer, Chris and Heess, Nicolas and Wierstra, Daan and Kohli, Pushmeet and Botvinick, Matt and Vinyals, Oriol and Li, Yujia and Pascanu, Razvan},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = oct,
-  number = {arXiv:1806.01261},
-  eprint = {1806.01261},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1806.01261},
-  abstract = {Artificial intelligence (AI) has undergone a renaissance recently, making major progress in key domains such as vision, language, control, and decision-making. This has been due, in part, to cheap data and cheap compute resources, which have fit the natural strengths of deep learning. However, many defining characteristics of human intelligence, which developed under much different pressures, remain out of reach for current approaches. In particular, generalizing beyond one's experiences--a hallmark of human intelligence from infancy--remains a formidable challenge for modern AI. The following is part position paper, part review, and part unification. We argue that combinatorial generalization must be a top priority for AI to achieve human-like abilities, and that structured representations and computations are key to realizing this objective. Just as biology uses nature and nurture cooperatively, we reject the false choice between "hand-engineering" and "end-to-end" learning, and instead advocate for an approach which benefits from their complementary strengths. We explore how using relational inductive biases within deep learning architectures can facilitate learning about entities, relations, and rules for composing them. We present a new building block for the AI toolkit with a strong relational inductive bias--the graph network--which generalizes and extends various approaches for neural networks that operate on graphs, and provides a straightforward interface for manipulating structured knowledge and producing structured behaviors. We discuss how graph networks can support relational reasoning and combinatorial generalization, laying the foundation for more sophisticated, interpretable, and flexible patterns of reasoning. As a companion to this paper, we have released an open-source software library for building graph networks, with demonstrations of how to use them in practice.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HH7QPJLK/Battaglia et al. - 2018 - Relational inductive biases, deep learning, and gr.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DT3U7QFQ/1806.html}
-}
-
-@article{Bealer1983,
-  title = {Remarks on {{Classical Analysis}}},
-  author = {Bealer, George},
-  year = {1983},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {80},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {711--712},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy Inc}},
-  doi = {10.2307/2026014},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y2JD25FT/Bealer - 1983 - Remarks on Classical Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bealer1999,
-  title = {A {{Theory Of The A Priori}}},
-  author = {Bealer, George},
-  year = {1999},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {33},
-  pages = {29--55},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.2},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1999},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GL6C8MWW/Bealer - 1999 - A Theory Of The A Priori.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KRPTKD92/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@book{Beall2003,
-  title = {Liars and {{Heaps}}: {{New Essays}} on {{Paradox}}},
-  shorttitle = {Liars and {{Heaps}}},
-  author = {Beall, J. C.},
-  year = {2003},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4QE55LJB/[JC_Beall]_Liars_and_Heaps_New_Essays_on_Paradox(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Beckers2021,
-  title = {Causal {{Sufficiency}} and {{Actual Causation}}},
-  author = {Beckers, Sander},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1341--1374},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-021-09601-z},
-  abstract = {Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due to Halpern \& Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl's first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern \& Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern \& Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/94VKVR9P/Beckers_2021_Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Beckers2022,
-  title = {Causal {{Explanations}} and {{XAI}}},
-  author = {Beckers, Sander},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = feb,
-  number = {arXiv:2201.13169},
-  eprint = {2201.13169},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2201.13169},
-  abstract = {Although standard Machine Learning models are optimized for making predictions about observations, more and more they are used for making predictions about the results of actions. An important goal of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is to compensate for this mismatch by offering explanations about the predictions of an ML-model which ensure that they are reliably action-guiding. As action-guiding explanations are causal explanations, the literature on this topic is starting to embrace insights from the literature on causal models. Here I take a step further down this path by formally defining the causal notions of sufficient explanations and counterfactual explanations. I show how these notions relate to (and improve upon) existing work, and motivate their adequacy by illustrating how different explanations are action-guiding under different circumstances. Moreover, this work is the first to offer a formal definition of actual causation that is founded entirely in action-guiding explanations. Although the definitions are motivated by a focus on XAI, the analysis of causal explanation and actual causation applies in general. I also touch upon the significance of this work for fairness in AI by showing how actual causation can be used to improve the idea of path-specific counterfactual fairness.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HQYZ3MUK/Beckers - 2022 - Causal Explanations and XAI.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UKTYMNF3/2201.html}
-}
-
-@article{Beckles-Raymond2020,
-  title = {Implicit {{Bias}}, ({{Global}}) {{White Ignorance}}, and {{Bad Faith}}: {{The Problem}} of {{Whiteness}} and {{Anti-black Racism}}},
-  shorttitle = {Implicit {{Bias}}, ({{Global}}) {{White Ignorance}}, and {{Bad Faith}}},
-  author = {Beckles-Raymond, Gabriella},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy},
-  volume = {37},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {169--189},
-  issn = {1468-5930},
-  doi = {10.1111/japp.12385},
-  abstract = {In Britain, policy-makers tend to view racism as a social attitude rather than an institutional/structural phenomenon. Not until the publication of the MacPherson Report (1999) was the idea of `institutional racism' officially recognised. According to Jules Holroyd, implicit bias as a concept can help us understand and combat the kind of unwitting prejudice the Macpherson report describes. This article explores whether implicit bias is indeed a viable framework for understanding institutional/structural racism. To do so, I bring together Charles Mills' notion of `global white ignorance' and Lewis Gordon's interpretation of `bad faith'. Through Mills' and Gordon's analyses, which together illuminate both the structural and psychic dimensions of racism I offer an account of the psychodynamics of racism far more consistent with our observations of how racism actually operates in Britain. Specifically, we see that institutional/structural racism is neither unconscious nor is it unmotivated as implicit bias would suggest. As such, I reject implicit bias as a useful or necessary explanatory framework for helping us understand institutional racism as a structural phenomenon.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} Society for Applied Philosophy, 2019},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/japp.12385},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R6WR3U2Q/Beckles‐Raymond - 2020 - Implicit Bias, (Global) White Ignorance, and Bad F.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z3BSWXV7/japp.html}
-}
-
-@book{Beebee2017,
-  title = {Making a {{Difference}}: {{Essays}} on the {{Philosophy}} of {{Causation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Making a {{Difference}}},
-  editor = {Beebee, Helen and Hitchcock, Christopher and Price, Huw},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {Illustrated edition},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, United Kingdom}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-874691-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A6EJIM4P/Beebee et al. - 2017 - Making a Difference Essays on the Philosophy of C.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Belnap1960,
-  title = {Entailment and {{Relevance}}},
-  author = {Belnap, Nuel D.},
-  year = {1960},
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {25},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {144--146},
-  publisher = {{Association for Symbolic Logic}},
-  issn = {0022-4812},
-  doi = {10.2307/2964210},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Documents/Philosophy/Papers/ModalSemantics/Quotes/Belnap1960 - Extracted Annotations (15012022, 085137).md;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3TQTEH69/Belnap - 1960 - Entailment and Relevance.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Belnap1977,
-  title = {A {{Useful Four-Valued Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {Modern {{Uses}} of {{Multiple-Valued Logic}}},
-  author = {Belnap, Nuel D.},
-  editor = {Dunn, J. Michael and Epstein, George},
-  year = {1977},
-  series = {Episteme},
-  pages = {5--37},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-010-1161-7_2},
-  abstract = {It is argued that a sophisticated question-answering machine that has the capability of making inferences from its data base should employ a certain four-valued logic, the motivating consideration being that minor inconsistencies in its data should not be allowed to lead (as in classical logic) to irrelevant conclusions. The actual form of the four-valued logic is `deduced' from an interplay of this motivating consideration with certain ideas of Dana Scott concerning `approximation lattices.'},
-  isbn = {978-94-010-1161-7},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Approximation Lattice,Atomic Formula,Atomic Sentence,Complete Lattice,Epistemic State}
-}
-
-@article{Benacerraf1965,
-  title = {What {{Numbers Could}} Not {{Be}}},
-  author = {Benacerraf, Paul},
-  year = {1965},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {74},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {47--73},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.2307/2183530},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7QMKKZ3Q/2183530.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Benardete1993,
-  title = {Real Definitions: {{Quine}} and {{Aristotle}}},
-  shorttitle = {Real Definitions},
-  author = {Benardete, Jos{\'e} A.},
-  year = {1993},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {72},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {265--282},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00989676},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UJD5GAZ5/Benardete - 1993 - Real definitions Quine and Aristotle.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Bengio2019,
-  title = {A {{Meta-Transfer Objective}} for {{Learning}} to {{Disentangle Causal Mechanisms}}},
-  author = {Bengio, Yoshua and Deleu, Tristan and Rahaman, Nasim and Ke, Rosemary and Lachapelle, S{\'e}bastien and Bilaniuk, Olexa and Goyal, Anirudh and Pal, Christopher},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = feb,
-  number = {arXiv:1901.10912},
-  eprint = {1901.10912},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1901.10912},
-  abstract = {We propose to meta-learn causal structures based on how fast a learner adapts to new distributions arising from sparse distributional changes, e.g. due to interventions, actions of agents and other sources of non-stationarities. We show that under this assumption, the correct causal structural choices lead to faster adaptation to modified distributions because the changes are concentrated in one or just a few mechanisms when the learned knowledge is modularized appropriately. This leads to sparse expected gradients and a lower effective number of degrees of freedom needing to be relearned while adapting to the change. It motivates using the speed of adaptation to a modified distribution as a meta-learning objective. We demonstrate how this can be used to determine the cause-effect relationship between two observed variables. The distributional changes do not need to correspond to standard interventions (clamping a variable), and the learner has no direct knowledge of these interventions. We show that causal structures can be parameterized via continuous variables and learned end-to-end. We then explore how these ideas could be used to also learn an encoder that would map low-level observed variables to unobserved causal variables leading to faster adaptation out-of-distribution, learning a representation space where one can satisfy the assumptions of independent mechanisms and of small and sparse changes in these mechanisms due to actions and non-stationarities.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4F3UI7P9/Bengio et al. - 2019 - A Meta-Transfer Objective for Learning to Disentan.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JEVT66V6/1901.html}
-}
-
-@article{Bengson2007,
-  title = {Know-How and Concept Possession},
-  author = {Bengson, John and Moffett, Marc A.},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {136},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {31--57},
-  abstract = {We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter.},
-  keywords = {ability,Concept possession,Intellectualism,Know-how,Propositional knowledge,understanding},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C3QJFTRM/2007 - Know-how and concept possession - Bengson, Moffett.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TPMGJ454/2007 - Know-how and concept possession - Bengson, Moffett.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Bengson2011,
-  title = {Knowing {{How}}: {{Essays}} on {{Knowledge}}, {{Mind}}, and {{Action}}},
-  author = {Bengson, J and Moffett, MA},
-  editor = {Bengson, John and Moffett, Marc A.},
-  year = {2011},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-538936-4},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DUVXXBAL/2011 - Knowing How Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action - Unknown.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V849U8AL/2011 - Knowing How Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action - Bengson, Moffett.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Bengson2011a,
-  title = {Nonpropositional {{Intellectualism}}},
-  booktitle = {Knowing {{How}}: {{Essays}} on {{Knowledge}}, {{Mind}}, and {{Action}}},
-  author = {Bengson, John and Moffett, Marc},
-  editor = {Bengson, John and Moffett, Marc A.},
-  year = {2011},
-  pages = {161--195},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {The question of the grounds of knowledge how can be distinguished from the question of the nature of knowledge how. We defend an intellectualist answer to the former question and an objectualist (nonpropositionalist, nondispositionalist) answer to the latter question. The central idea is that to know how to A is to stand in an objectual understanding relation to a way of A-ing. We propose a theory of the relevant type of understanding in terms of conceptions of ways of acting, grounded in propositional attitudes. The resulting view\textemdash an objectualist intellectualism\textemdash preserves all three of the following attractive theses: (1) knowing how is not merely a kind of knowing that, (2) knowing how is practical (it bears a substantive connection to action), and (3) knowing how is a cognitive achievement (it is a form of practical knowledge).},
-  keywords = {ability,action,anti-intellectualism,conceptions,Intellectualism,knowledge,knowledge how,objectual attitudes,of knowing how,practical,propositional attitudes,propositionalism,understanding,understanding is a part,ways of acting},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X8VTJ7VD/2011 - Nonpropositional Intellectualism - Bengson, Moffett.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YD8SDNPV/2011 - Nonpropositional Intellectualism - Bengson, Moffett.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bennett1974,
-  title = {Counterfactuals and {{Possible Worlds}}},
-  author = {Bennett, Jonathan},
-  year = {1974},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {381--402},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {0045-5091, 1911-0820},
-  doi = {10.1080/00455091.1974.10716947},
-  abstract = {This article is a selective review of David Lewis's Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), a challenging, provocative, absorbingly interesting attempt to analyze statements of the form ``If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q.'' I shall follow Lewis in calling these ``counterfactuals,'' and shall nearly follow him in abbreviating them to the form P\textrightarrow Q. Chapter 1, which is nearly a third of the whole, gives the analysis and proves that it endows counterfactuals with some properties which they evidently do have. Chapter 2 presents some ``alternative formulations'' of the analysis\textemdash a logical jeu d'esprit which I shall not discuss except for the section ( \textsection{} 2.6) about ``cotenability.''},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Bennett2011,
-  title = {By {{Our Bootstraps}}},
-  author = {Bennett, Karen},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {25},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {27--41},
-  issn = {1520-8583},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00207.x},
-  copyright = {Journal Compilation \textcopyright{} 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5V7E34H6/Bennett - 2011 - By Our Bootstraps1.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bennett2011a,
-  title = {Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required)},
-  author = {Bennett, Karen},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {154},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {79--104},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-011-9703-8},
-  abstract = {A variety of relations widely invoked by philosophers\textemdash composition, constitution, realization, micro-basing, emergence, and many others\textemdash are species of what I call `building relations'. I argue that they are conceptually intertwined, articulate what it takes for a relation to count as a building relation, and argue that\textemdash contra appearances\textemdash it is an open possibility that these relations are all determinates of a common determinable, or even that there is really only one building relation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Composition,Constitution,Dependence,Epistemology,Ethics,Fundamentality,Grounding,Metaphysics,Philosophy,Philosophy of Language,Philosophy of Mind,Supervenience},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4L9JVKLB/Bennett - 2011 - Construction area (no hard hat required).pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Benson-tilsen,
-  title = {Udt with {{Known Search Order}}},
-  author = {{Benson-tilsen}, Tsvi},
-  abstract = {Abstract. We consider logical agents in a predictable universe running a variant of updateless decision theory. We give an algorithm to predict the behavior of such agents in the special case where the order in which they search for proofs is simple, and where they know this order. As a corollary, ``playing chicken with the universe '' by diagonalizing against potential spurious proofs is the only way to guarantee optimal behavior for this class of simple agents. Contents},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3C36IXNT/Benson-tilsen - Udt with Known Search Order.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XFUZYKE5/summary.html}
-}
-
-@article{Benthem2017,
-  title = {A Bimodal Perspective on Possibility Semantics},
-  author = {{van Benthem}, Johan and Bezhanishvili, Nick and Holliday, Wesley H.},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1353--1389},
-  issn = {0955-792X},
-  doi = {10.1093/logcom/exw024},
-  abstract = {Abstract. In this article, we develop a bimodal perspective on possibility semantics, a framework allowing partiality of states that provides an alternative mo},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WMS58FLV/Benthem et al. - 2017 - A bimodal perspective on possibility semantics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Benzmuller2004,
-  title = {Higher-Order Semantics and Extensionality},
-  author = {Benzm{\"u}ller, Christoph and Brown, Chad E. and Kohlhase, Michael},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {69},
-  number = {04},
-  pages = {1027--1088},
-  issn = {0022-4812, 1943-5886},
-  doi = {10.2178/jsl/1102022211},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/44W6AUNT/euclid.jsl.1102022211.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Benzmuller2013,
-  title = {Quantified {{Multimodal Logics}} in {{Simple Type Theory}}},
-  author = {Benzm{\"u}ller, Christoph and Paulson, Lawrence C.},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Logica Universalis},
-  volume = {7},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {7--20},
-  issn = {1661-8300},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11787-012-0052-y},
-  abstract = {We present an embedding of quantified multimodal logics into simple type theory and prove its soundness and completeness. A correspondence between QK{$\pi$} models for quantified multimodal logics and Henkin models is established and exploited. Our embedding supports the application of off-the-shelf higher-order theorem provers for reasoning within and about quantified multimodal logics. Moreover, it provides a starting point for further logic embeddings and their combinations in simple type theory.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YMHKPFRS/Benzmüller and Paulson - 2013 - Quantified Multimodal Logics in Simple Type Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Berker,
-  title = {The {{Explanatory Ambitions}} of {{Moral Principles}}},
-  author = {Berker, Selim},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12246},
-  abstract = {Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue ``No.'' If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties' instantiation\textemdash unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action's specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FSJXII4M/Berker - The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bernstein2015,
-  title = {A {{Closer Look}} at {{Trumping}}},
-  author = {Bernstein, Sara},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Acta Analytica},
-  volume = {30},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {41--57},
-  issn = {1874-6349},
-  doi = {10.1007/s12136-014-0231-y},
-  abstract = {This paper argues that so-called trumping preemption is in fact overdetermination or early preemption and is thus not a distinctive form of redundant causation. The paper draws a novel lesson from cases thought to be trumping: that the boundary between preemption and overdetermination should be reconsidered.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Overdetermination,Preemption,Redundant causation,Trumping},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/II846GZL/Bernstein - 2015 - A Closer Look at Trumping.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Berto2018,
-  title = {Williamson on {{Counterpossibles}}},
-  author = {Berto, Francesco and French, Rohan and Priest, Graham and Ripley, David},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {47},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {693--713},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-017-9446-x},
-  abstract = {A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson's objections.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JF9PTCHR/Berto et al. - 2018 - Williamson on Counterpossibles.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Berto2019,
-  title = {Simple {{Hyperintensional Belief Revision}}},
-  author = {Berto, F.},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {84},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {559--575},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1},
-  abstract = {I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to `framing effects': logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MRUWTEDU/Berto - 2019 - Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Berto2019b,
-  title = {Impossible {{Worlds}}},
-  author = {Berto, Francesco and Jago, Mark},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {Impossible Worlds},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {"Impossible Worlds" published on  by Oxford University Press.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-185058-5},
-  langid = {american},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L435UHWA/Berto and Jago - Impossible Worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bertrand2019,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Explanation}} by {{Constraint}}},
-  author = {Bertrand, Michael},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {84},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1325--1340},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-018-0009-5},
-  abstract = {It is often thought that metaphysical grounding underwrites a distinctive sort of metaphysical explanation. However, it would be a mistake to think that all metaphysical explanations are underwritten by metaphysical grounding. In service of this claim, I offer a novel kind of metaphysical explanation called metaphysical explanation by constraint, examples of which have been neglected in the literature. I argue that metaphysical explanations by constraint are not well understood as grounding explanations.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YHK3H8QX/Bertrand - 2019 - Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bezhanishvili2016,
-  title = {Locales, {{Nuclei}}, and {{Dragalin Frames}}},
-  author = {Bezhanishvili, Guram and Holliday, Wesley Halcrow},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Advances in Modal Logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  abstract = {It is a classic result in lattice theory that a poset is a complete lattice iff it can be realized as fixpoints of a closure operator on a powerset. Dragalin [9,10] observed that a poset is a locale (complete Heyting algebra) iff it can be realized as fixpoints of a nucleus on the locale of upsets of a poset. He also showed how to generate a nucleus on upsets by adding a structure of ``paths'' to a poset, forming what we call a Dragalin frame. This allowed Dragalin to introduce a semantics for intuitionistic logic that generalizes Beth and Kripke semantics. He proved that every spatial locale (locale of open sets of a topological space) can be realized as fixpoints of the nucleus generated by a Dragalin frame. In this paper, we strengthen Dragalin's result and prove that every locale\textemdash not only spatial locales\textemdash can be realized as fixpoints of the nucleus generated by a Dragalin frame. In fact, we prove the stronger result that for every nucleus on the upsets of a poset, there is a Dragalin frame based on that poset that generates the given nucleus. We then compare Dragalin's approach to generating nuclei with the relational approach of Fairtlough and Mendler [11], based on what we call FM-frames. Surprisingly, every Dragalin frame can be turned into an equivalent FM-frame, albeit on a different poset. Thus, every locale can be realized as fixpoints of the nucleus generated by an FM-frame. Finally, we consider the relational approach of Goldblatt [13] and characterize the locales that can be realized using Goldblatt frames.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/75WPV63Y/eScholarship UC item 2s0134zx.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bigaj2012,
-  title = {Causation {{Without Influence}}},
-  author = {Bigaj, Tomasz},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {76},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-011-9329-4},
-  abstract = {David Lewis's latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event's influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis's influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis's influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Counterfactual Analysis,Counterfactual Dependence,Counterfactual Theory,Influence Theory,Redundant Causation},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XPM6GXPR/Bigaj - 2012 - Causation Without Influence.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Bishop2020,
-  title = {Artificial {{Intelligence}} Is Stupid and Causal Reasoning Won't Fix It},
-  author = {Bishop, John Mark},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jul,
-  number = {arXiv:2008.07371},
-  eprint = {2008.07371},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2008.07371},
-  abstract = {Artificial Neural Networks have reached Grandmaster and even super-human performance across a variety of games: from those involving perfect-information (such as Go) to those involving imperfect-information (such as Starcraft). Such technological developments from AI-labs have ushered concomitant applications across the world of business - where an AI brand tag is fast becoming ubiquitous. A corollary of such widespread commercial deployment is that when AI gets things wrong - an autonomous vehicle crashes; a chatbot exhibits racist behaviour; automated credit scoring processes discriminate on gender etc. - there are often significant financial, legal and brand consequences and the incident becomes major news. As Judea Pearl sees it, the underlying reason for such mistakes is that, 'all the impressive achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting'. The key, Judea Pearl suggests, is to replace reasoning by association with causal-reasoning - the ability to infer causes from observed phenomena. It is a point that was echoed by Gary Marcus and Ernest Davis in a recent piece for the New York Times: 'we need to stop building computer systems that merely get better and better at detecting statistical patterns in data sets - often using an approach known as Deep Learning - and start building computer systems that from the moment of their assembly innately grasp three basic concepts: time, space and causality'. In this paper, foregrounding what in 1949 Gilbert Ryle termed a category mistake, I will offer an alternative explanation for AI errors: it is not so much that AI machinery cannot grasp causality, but that AI machinery - qua computation - cannot understand anything at all.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Computers and Society},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6GAJLN8Q/Bishop - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence is stupid and causal reaso.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MCR3EBVP/2008.html}
-}
-
-@article{Bjerring2014,
-  title = {On Counterpossibles},
-  author = {Bjerring, Jens Christian},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {168},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {327--353},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-013-0133-7},
-  abstract = {The traditional Lewis\textendash Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents\textemdash counterpossibles\textemdash can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised" seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would have been thrilled" seems false. Many have proposed to extend the Lewis\textendash Stalnaker semantics with impossible worlds to make room for a non-trivial or non-vacuous treatment of counterpossibles. Roughly, on the extended Lewis\textendash Stalnaker semantics, we evaluate a counterfactual of the form "If A had been true, then C would have been true" by going to closest world\textemdash whether possible or impossible\textemdash in which A is true and check whether C is also true in that world. If the answer is "yes", the counterfactual is true; otherwise it is false. Since there are impossible worlds in which the mathematically impossible happens, there are impossible worlds in which Hobbes manages to square the circle. And intuitively, in the closest such impossible worlds, sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan are not thrilled\textemdash they remain sick and unmoved by the mathematical developments in Europe. If so, the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan at the time would have been thrilled" comes out false, as desired. In this paper, I will critically investigate the extended Lewis\textendash Stalnaker semantics for counterpossibles. I will argue that the standard version of the extended semantics, in which impossible worlds correspond to maximal, logically inconsistent entities, fails to give the correct semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles. In light of the negative arguments, I will then outline a new version of the extended Lewis\textendash Stalnaker semantics that can avoid these problems.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GQP98VFU/Bjerring - 2014 - On counterpossibles.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Black1944,
-  title = {The "{{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}"},
-  author = {Black, Max},
-  year = {1944},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {LIII},
-  number = {211},
-  pages = {263--267},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/LIII.211.263},
-  abstract = {MAX BLACK;  THE ``PARADOX OF ANALYSIS'', Mind, Volume LIII, Issue 211, 1 July 1944, Pages 263\textendash 267, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIII.211.263},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L7Z2RC8A/Black - 1944 - THE “PARADOX OF ANALYSIS”.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Black1945,
-  title = {The "{{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}" {{Again}}: {{A Reply}}},
-  shorttitle = {{{THE}} ``{{PARADOX OF ANALYSIS}}'' {{AGAIN}}},
-  author = {Black, Max},
-  year = {1945},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {LIV},
-  number = {215},
-  pages = {272--273},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/LIV.215.272},
-  abstract = {MAX BLACK;  THE ``PARADOX OF ANALYSIS'' AGAIN: A REPLY, Mind, Volume LIV, Issue 215, 1 July 1945, Pages 272\textendash 273, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIV.215.272},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XYMVVHB7/Black - 1945 - THE “PARADOX OF ANALYSIS” AGAIN A REPLY.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Blackburn2002,
-  title = {Modal {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Blackburn, Patrick and {de Rijke}, Maarten and Venema, Yde},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = aug,
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  abstract = {This modern, advanced textbook reviews modal logic, a field which caught the attention of computer scientists in the late 1970's. The development is mathematical; prior acquaintance with first-order logic and its semantics is assumed, and familiarity with the basic mathematical notions of set theory is required. The authors focus on the use of modal languages as tools to analyze the properties of relational structures, including their algorithmic and algebraic aspects. Applications to issues in logic and computer science such as completeness, computability and complexity are considered.},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-52714-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Computers / Programming Languages / General,Mathematics / Discrete Mathematics,Mathematics / History \& Philosophy},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YM2ZSQAA/Blackburn et al. - 2002 - Modal Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Blamey1986,
-  title = {Partial {{Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {Handbook of {{Philosophical Logic}}},
-  author = {Blamey, Stephen},
-  editor = {Gabbay, D. and Guenthner, F.},
-  year = {1986},
-  series = {Synthese {{Library}}},
-  number = {166},
-  pages = {1--70},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4_1},
-  abstract = {There is a confusing diversity of philosophical motivations and practical applications for logics in which sentences do not have to be either `true' or `false', or in which singular terms do not have to `denote' anything, or both. And a correspondingly wide variety of formal approaches has grown up for treating this kind of departure from traditional classical logic. In this chapter we shall pursue one simple approach, which is guided by an emphasis on functors rather than the sentences or singular terms which they take as arguments and yield as compounds. We shall pull together bits and pieces from various places, suggest a few novelties, and aim to present an apparatus of semantics to handle truth-value gaps and denotation failures in a uniform way.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright 1986 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht},
-  isbn = {978-94-010-8801-5 978-94-009-5203-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Computational Linguistics,Logic,Mathematical Logic and Foundations}
-}
-
-@article{Blizard1989,
-  title = {Multiset Theory},
-  author = {Blizard, Wayne D.},
-  year = {1989},
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {30},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {36--66},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1093634995},
-  abstract = {Project Euclid - mathematics and statistics online},
-  mrnumber = {MR990203},
-  zmnumber = {0668.03027},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GM4CG5FT/euclid.ndjfl.1093634995.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Blizard1991,
-  title = {The Development of Multiset Theory},
-  author = {Blizard, Wayne D.},
-  year = {1991},
-  journal = {Modern Logic},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {319--352},
-  issn = {1047-5982, 1943-7390},
-  abstract = {Multisets (sets with repeated elements) are of interest in mathematics, physics, philosophy, logic, linguistics and computer science. The development of multiset theory is surveyed from its earliest beginnings to its most recent applications in mathematics, logic and computational mathematics.},
-  langid = {english},
-  mrnumber = {MR1112352},
-  zmnumber = {0744.03054},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JJPUD4MT/euclid.rml.1204834739.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Block1999,
-  title = {Conceptual {{Analysis}}, {{Dualism}}, and the {{Explanatory Gap}}},
-  author = {Block, Ned and Stalnaker, Robert},
-  year = {1999},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {108},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--46},
-  publisher = {{[Duke University Press, Philosophical Review]}},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.2307/2998259},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V2E6DYAY/Block and Stalnaker - 1999 - Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory .pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Blok2014,
-  title = {Algebraizable {{Logics}}},
-  author = {Blok, W. J. and Pigozzi, Don},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = mar,
-  publisher = {{Advanced Reasoning Forum}},
-  abstract = {W. J. Blok and Don Pigozzi set out to try to answer the question of what it means for a logic to have algebraic semantics. In this seminal book they transformed the study of algebraic logic by giving a general framework for the study of logics by algebraic means. The Dutch mathematician W. J. Blok (1947-2003) received his doctorate from the University of Amsterdam in 1979 and was Professor of Mathematics at the University of Illinois, Chicago until his death in an automobile accident. Don Pigozzi (1935- ) grew up in Oakland, California, received his doctorate from the University of California, Berkeley in 1970, and was Professor of Mathematics at Iowa State University until his retirement in 2002. The Advanced Reasoning Forum is pleased to make available in its Classic Reprints series this exact reproduction of the 1989 text, with a new errata sheet prepared by Don Pigozzi.},
-  isbn = {978-1-938421-18-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QA489MXP/[W._J._Blok,_Don_Pigozzi]_Algebraizable_Logics(BookZZ.org) (1).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bokulich2011,
-  title = {How Scientific Models Can Explain},
-  author = {Bokulich, Alisa},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {180},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {33--45},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-009-9565-1},
-  abstract = {Scientific models invariably involve some degree of idealization, abstraction, or fictionalization of their target system. Nonetheless, I argue that there are circumstances under which such false models can offer genuine scientific explanations. After reviewing three different proposals in the literature for how models can explain, I shall introduce a more general account of what I call model explanations, which specify the conditions under which models can be counted as explanatory. I shall illustrate this new framework by applying it to the case of Bohr's model of the atom, and conclude by drawing some distinctions between phenomenological models, explanatory models, and fictional models.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FBXGZRQB/Bokulich - 2011 - How scientific models can explain.pdf}
-}
-
-@phdthesis{Bonsangue1997,
-  title = {Topological {{Dualities}} in {{Semantics}}},
-  author = {Bonsangue, Marcello M.},
-  year = {1997},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2VTAKTJ8/ENTCS-8.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Boolos1971,
-  title = {The {{Iterative Conception}} of {{Set}}},
-  author = {Boolos, George},
-  year = {1971},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {8},
-  pages = {215--231},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2025204},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1971 Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UVYWY5KI/Boolos - 1971 - The Iterative Conception of Set.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Boolos1975,
-  title = {On {{Second-Order Logic}}},
-  author = {Boolos, George S.},
-  year = {1975},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {72},
-  number = {16},
-  pages = {509--527},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2025179},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MVJI6Y3E/Boolos - 1975 - On Second-Order Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Boolos1984,
-  title = {To {{Be}} Is to Be a {{Value}} of a {{Variable}} (or to Be {{Some Values}} of {{Some Variables}})},
-  author = {Boolos, George},
-  year = {1984},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {81},
-  number = {8},
-  pages = {430},
-  issn = {0022362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2026308},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LLVUGBL4/2026308.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Boolos1989,
-  title = {{Iteration Again:}},
-  shorttitle = {{Iteration Again}},
-  author = {Boolos, George and {University of Arkansas Press}},
-  editor = {Minar, Edward},
-  year = {1989},
-  journal = {Philosophical Topics},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {5--21},
-  issn = {0276-2080},
-  doi = {10.5840/philtopics19891721},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4BAQPPXG/philtopics_1989_0017_0002_0005_0021.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bosi2021,
-  title = {Topologies for the {{Continuous Representability}} of {{All Continuous Total Preorders}}},
-  author = {Bosi, Gianni and Zuanon, Magal{\`i}},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications},
-  volume = {188},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {420--431},
-  issn = {1573-2878},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10957-020-01790-y},
-  abstract = {In this paper, we present a new simple axiomatization of useful topologies, i.e., topologies on an arbitrary set, with respect to which every continuous total preorder admits a continuous utility representation. In particular, we show that, for completely regular spaces, a topology is useful, if and only if it is separable, and every isolated chain of open and closed sets is countable. As a specific application to optimization theory, we characterize the continuous representability of all continuous total preorders, which admit both a maximal and a minimal element.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GZ4I4NS3/Bosi_Zuanon_2021_Topologies for the Continuous Representability of All Continuous Total Preorders.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bottou2013,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Reasoning}} and {{Learning Systems}}},
-  author = {Bottou, L{\'e}on and Peters, Jonas and {Qui{\~n}onero-Candela}, Joaquin and Charles, Denis X. and Chickering, D. Max and Portugaly, Elon and Ray, Dipankar and Simard, Patrice and Snelson, Ed},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {arXiv:1209.2355 [cs, math, stat]},
-  eprint = {1209.2355},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, math, stat},
-  abstract = {This work shows how to leverage causal inference to understand the behavior of complex learning systems interacting with their environment and predict the consequences of changes to the system. Such predictions allow both humans and algorithms to select changes that improve both the short-term and long-term performance of such systems. This work is illustrated by experiments carried out on the ad placement system associated with the Bing search engine.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Information Retrieval,Computer Science - Machine Learning,Mathematics - Statistics Theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9P9C34F6/Bottou et al. - 2013 - Counterfactual Reasoning and Learning Systems.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7CNKEHU7/1209.html}
-}
-
-@article{Bou2011,
-  title = {The Logic of Distributive Bilattices},
-  author = {Bou, F{\'e}lix and Rivieccio, Umberto},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL},
-  volume = {19},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {183--216},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {1367-0751},
-  doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzq041},
-  abstract = {Abstract.  Bilattices, introduced by Ginsberg (1988, Comput. Intell., 265\textendash 316) as a uniform framework for inference in artificial intelligence, are algebraic st},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z67998VP/Bou and Rivieccio - 2011 - The logic of distributive bilattices.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Braddon-Mitchell2009,
-  title = {Conceptual {{Analysis}} and {{Philosophical Naturalism}}},
-  author = {{Braddon-Mitchell}, David and Nola, Robert},
-  year = {2009},
-  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
-  abstract = {Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysicaltruths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. Acountercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis withphilosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the lateDavid Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis(sometimes known as "the Canberra Plan" because many of its proponents have beenassociated with Australian National University in Canberra) is a tool for locating in thescientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in everyday discourse. Thiscollection gathers work from a range of prominent philosophers who are working within thistradition, offering important new work as well as critical evaluations of the methodology. Itscenterpiece is an important posthumous paper by David Lewis, "Ramseyan Humility,"published here for the first time. The contributors first address issues of philosophy of mind,semantics, and the new methodology's a priori character, then turn to matters of metaphysics, andfinally consider problems regarding normativity. Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism isone of the first efforts to apply this approach to such a wide range of philosophicalissues.Contributors: David Braddon-Mitchell, Mark Colyvan,Frank Jackson, Justine Kingsbury, Fred Kroon, David Lewis, Dustin Locke, Kelby Mason, JonathanMcKeown-Green, Peter Menzies, Robert Nola, Daniel Nolan, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, Denis Robinson,Steve Stich, Daniel StoljarThe hardcover edition does not include a dustjacket.},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-01256-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Criticism,Philosophy / History \& Surveys / General,Philosophy / Mind \& Body},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7G5STST5/[]_Conceptual_Analysis_And_Philosophical_Naturalis(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Bradley1963,
-  title = {Appearance and Reality: {{A}} Metaphysical Essay},
-  shorttitle = {Appearance and Reality},
-  author = {Bradley, F. H.},
-  year = {1963},
-  month = mar,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Knowledge,Metaphysics,Philosophy / Epistemology,Philosophy / General,Philosophy / History \& Surveys / Modern,Philosophy / Metaphysics,Reality,Theory of}
-}
-
-@phdthesis{Brast-McKie2020,
-  type = {{{http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text}}},
-  title = {Towards a {{Logic}} of {{Essence}} and {{Ground}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {2020},
-  address = {{Oxford, UK}},
-  abstract = {This thesis develops the philosophical and formal foundations for a logic of essence and ground which aim to regiment the informal locutions 'necessary for' and 'sufficient for', respectively.},
-  langid = {english},
-  school = {University of Oxford},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BJW35LFV/Brast-McKie - 2020 - Towards a logic of essence and ground.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZWJDX43B/uuid378febb5-c81b-496a-9f42-e2edf554f057.html}
-}
-
-@article{Brast-McKie2020a,
-  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Reduction}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {Draft}
-}
-
-@article{Brast-McKie2020c,
-  title = {A {{Modalised Semantics}} for {{Essence}} and {{Ground}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {Draft}
-}
-
-@article{Brast-McKie2020d,
-  title = {A {{Complete Logic}} of {{Ground}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {Review of Symbolic Logic}
-}
-
-@article{Brast-McKie2021,
-  title = {Identity and {{Aboutness}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1471--1503},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-021-09612-w},
-  abstract = {This paper develops a theory of propositional identity which distinguishes necessarily equivalent propositions that differ in subject-matter. Rather than forming a Boolean lattice as in extensional and intensional semantic theories, the space of propositions forms a non-interlaced bilattice. After motivating a departure from tradition by way of a number of plausible principles for subject-matter, I will provide a Finean state semantics for a novel theory of propositions, presenting arguments against the convexity and nonvacuity constraints which Fine (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4545, 199\textendash 226 13, 14, 15) introduces. I will then move to compare the resulting logic of propositional identity (PI1) with Correia's (The Review of Symbolic Logic, 9, 103\textendash 122 9) logic of generalised identity (GI), as well as the first degree fragment of Angell's (2) logic of analytic containment (AC). The paper concludes by extending PI1 to include axioms and rules for a subject-matter operator, providing a much broader theory of subject-matter than the principles with which I will begin.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X4BEWJDW/Brast-McKie - 2021 - Identity and Aboutness.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Brast-McKieDraft,
-  title = {The {{Varieties}} of {{Constitutive Explanation}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {Draft}
-}
-
-@article{Brast-McKieDrafta,
-  title = {A {{State Semantics}} for a {{Modalised Logic}} of {{Constiutive Explanation}}},
-  author = {{Brast-McKie}, Benjamin},
-  year = {Draft}
-}
-
-@article{Bricker2014,
-  title = {The {{Methodology}} of {{Modal Logic}} as {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Bricker, Phillip},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {88},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {717--725},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12100},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2014 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K47NY8XU/Bricker - 2014 - The Methodology of Modal Logic as Metaphysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bricker2015,
-  title = {Composition as a {{Kind}} of {{Identity}}},
-  author = {Bricker, Phillip},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  pages = {1--31},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2015.1040447}
-}
-
-@incollection{Bricker2016,
-  title = {Ontological {{Commitment}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Bricker, Phillip},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2016},
-  edition = {Winter 2016},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {Ontology, as etymology suggests, is the study of being, ofwhat there is. The ontologist asks: What entities or kinds of entityexist? Are there abstract entities, such as sets or numbers, inaddition to concrete entities, such as people and puddles and protons?Are there properties or universals in addition to (or instead of) theparticular entities that, as we say, instantiate them? Questions suchas these have divided philosophers down the ages, and divide them noless to this day., Meta-ontology concerns itself with the nature andmethodology of ontology, with the interpretation and significance ofontological questions such as those exhibited above. The problemof ontological commitment is a problem in meta-ontology ratherthan ontology proper.[1] The meta-ontologist asks (among otherthings): What entities or kinds of entity exist according to agiven theory or discourse, and thus are amongits ontological commitments? Having a criterion ofontological commitment for theories is needed, arguably, if one is tosystematically and rigorously attack the problem of ontology:typically, we accept entities into our ontology via acceptingtheories that are ontologically committed to those entities. Acriterion of ontological commitment, then, is a pre-requisite forontological inquiry., On its face, the notion of ontological commitment for theories is asimple matter. Theories have truth conditions. These truth conditionstell us how the world must be in order for the theory to be true; theymake demands on the world. Sometimes, perhaps always, they demand ofthe world that certain entities or kinds of entity exist. Theontological commitments of a theory, then, are just the entities orkinds of entity that must exist in order for the theory to betrue. End of story (compare Rayo 2007: 428)., But complications arise as soon as one tries to specify a theory'struth conditions: different accounts of truth conditions lead todifferent accounts of ontological commitment. Moreover, theoriescouched in ordinary language do not wear their truthconditions\textemdash or their ontological commitments\textemdash on theirsleeves. Thus, the need arises to find a criterion ofontological commitment: a test or method that can be applied totheories in a neutral way to determine the theory's ontologicalcommitments. For example, perhaps the theory should first betranslated into a canonical formal language, such as the language offirst-order predicate logic, where truth conditions, and thusontological commitments, are easier to specify. But whenever thesetranslations are controversial, so will be the verdicts as toontological commitment. And, even when translated into a formallanguage, such as the language of first-order predicate logic,different ontological standpoints may disagree as to the existentialpresuppositions of the theory. The notion of ontological commitment,introduced to help resolve disputes in ontology, becomes hostage tothose very disputes. Strife over the ontological commitments oftheories begins to appear inevitable., The following article canvasses and evaluates the most prominentapproaches to ontological commitment. It starts with Quineanapproaches that focus on the existential quantifier and the values ofthe variables. It then contrasts Quinean approaches with more generalentailment approaches that drop the preoccupation with thequantifier. It then considers a strengthening of the entailmentapproach that requires that ontological commitments of a theorybe truthmakers for that theory. It then steps back to examinehow, and to what extent, the notion of ontological commitment can beapplied to ordinary language. The article concludes by consideringless orthodox views associated with Frege and with Carnap.},
-  keywords = {Alexius,Carnap,existence,Frege,Gottlob,grounding,logic and ontology,logical consequence,logicism and neologicism,Meinong,metaphysical,modality: varieties of,nominalism: in metaphysics,Ontology,possible worlds,Properties,propositions,quantifiers and quantification,Quine,Realism,Rudolf,states of affairs,tropes,truthmakers,Willard van Orman}
-}
-
-@article{Briggs2012,
-  title = {Interventionist Counterfactuals},
-  author = {Briggs, Rachael},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {160},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {139--166},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-012-9908-5},
-  abstract = {A number of recent authors (Galles and Pearl, Found Sci 3 (1):151\textendash 182, 1998; Hiddleston, No\^us 39 (4):232\textendash 257, 2005; Halpern, J Artif Intell Res 12:317\textendash 337, 2000) advocate a causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals. But the precise logical significance of the causal modeling semantics remains murky. Particularly important, yet particularly under-explored, is its relationship to the similarity-based semantics for counterfactuals developed by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, 1973b). The causal modeling semantics is both an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals, and an account of which inferences involving counterfactuals are valid. As an account of truth conditions, it is incomplete. While Lewis's similarity semantics lets us evaluate counterfactuals with arbitrarily complex antecedents and consequents, the causal modeling semantics makes it hard to ascertain the truth conditions of all but a highly restricted class of counterfactuals. I explain how to extend the causal modeling language to encompass a wider range of sentences, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the extended language. Extending the truth conditions for counterfactuals has serious consequences concerning valid inference. The extended language is unlike any logic of Lewis's: modus ponens is invalid, and classical logical equivalents cannot be freely substituted in the antecedents of conditionals.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PU3ILZGQ/Briggs - 2012 - Interventionist counterfactuals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Briggs2015,
-  title = {Foundations of {{Probability}}},
-  author = {Briggs, Rachael},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {44},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {625--640},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-015-9377-3},
-  abstract = {The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GS976RIE/Briggs - 2015 - Foundations of Probability.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Broersen2009,
-  title = {A {{Complete STIT Logic}} for {{Knowledge}} and {{Action}}, and {{Some}} of {{Its Applications}}},
-  booktitle = {Declarative {{Agent Languages}} and {{Technologies VI}}},
-  author = {Broersen, Jan},
-  editor = {Baldoni, Matteo and Son, Tran Cao and {van Riemsdijk}, M. Birna and Winikoff, Michael},
-  year = {2009},
-  series = {Lecture {{Notes}} in {{Computer Science}}},
-  pages = {47--59},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  address = {{Berlin, Heidelberg}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_4},
-  abstract = {This paper presents a complete temporal STIT logic for reasoning about multi-agency. I discuss its application for reasoning about norms, knowledge, autonomy, and other multi-agent concepts. Also I give some arguments in favor of taking STIT formalisms instead of dynamic logics as the basis for logics for representing multi-agent system notions.},
-  isbn = {978-3-540-93920-7},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Actual World,Atomic Proposition,Deontic Logic,Dynamic Logic,Modal Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KXK88YCE/Broersen - 2009 - A Complete STIT Logic for Knowledge and Action, an.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Brogaard,
-  title = {Why {{Counterpossibles Are Non-Trivial}}},
-  booktitle = {Synthese Volume},
-  author = {Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joe},
-  editor = {Hendricks, Vincent},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E6VY6N5F/BROWCA.html}
-}
-
-@article{Brogaard2013,
-  title = {Remarks on Counterpossibles},
-  author = {Brogaard, Berit and Salerno, Joe},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {190},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {639--660},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0196-6},
-  abstract = {Since the publication of David Lewis' Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form `If p were the case, q would be the case' is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis' semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism, the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. We do so while retaining a Lewisian semantics, which is to say, the approach we favor does not require us to abandon classical logic or a similarity semantics. It does however require us to countenance impossible worlds. An impossible worlds treatment of counterpossibles is suggested (but not defended) by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), and developed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:325\textendash 527, 1997), Kment (Mind 115:261\textendash 310, 2006a: Philos Perspect 20:237\textendash 302, 2006b), and Vander Laan (In: Jackson F, Priest G (eds) Lewisian themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). We follow this tradition, and develop an account of comparative similarity for impossible worlds.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V7M3BS6C/Brogaard and Salerno - 2013 - Remarks on counterpossibles.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Broome2013,
-  title = {Rationality {{Through Reasoning}}},
-  author = {Broome, John},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = aug,
-  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
-  abstract = {Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.   Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else. Offers a new answer to the `motivation question' of how a normative belief motivates an action.},
-  googlebooks = {ketvAAAAQBAJ},
-  isbn = {978-1-118-60911-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Epistemology,Philosophy / General},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P7TZ4QRB/Broome - 2013 - Rationality Through Reasoning.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Brower2015,
-  title = {Medieval {{Theories}} of {{Relations}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Brower, Jeffrey},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2015},
-  edition = {Winter 2015},
-  abstract = {The purpose of this entry is to provide a systematic introduction tomedieval views about the nature and ontological status of relations.Given the current state of our knowledge of medieval philosophy,especially with regard to relations, it is not possible to discuss allthe nuances of even the best-known medieval philosophers' views.In what follows, therefore, we shall restrict our aim to identifying anddescribing (a) the main types of position that were developed duringthe Middle Ages, and (b) the most important considerations that shapedtheir development. We shall have occasion along the way, however, toexamine in detail certain aspects of the views of importantrepresentatives of all the main medieval positions, including PeterAbelard (1079\textendash 1142), Gilbert of Poitiers (1085\textendash 1154), Albert theGreat (1200\textendash 1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225\textendash 1274), John Duns Scotus(1265\textendash 1308), Henry Harclay (1270\textendash 1317), Peter Auriol (1280\textendash 1322), andWilliam Ockham (1285\textendash 1347).},
-  keywords = {categories: medieval theories of,Medieval philosophy,Ockham [Occam],Properties,Realism,substance,tropes,universals: the medieval problem of,William}
-}
-
-@misc{Buehler2014,
-  title = {Counterfactuals {{Notes}}},
-  author = {Buehler, R. Jay},
-  year = {2014},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IQS4BMXZ/Buehler - 2014 - Counterfactuals Notes.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bunge1974,
-  title = {The Relations of Logic and Semantics to Ontology},
-  author = {Bunge, Mario},
-  year = {1974},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {195--209},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00247222},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4PTY44U8/Bunge - 1974 - The relations of logic and semantics to ontology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Bungert2015,
-  title = {Rejection Sensitivity and Symptom Severity in Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder: {{Effects}} of Childhood Maltreatment and Self-Esteem},
-  shorttitle = {Rejection Sensitivity and Symptom Severity in Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder},
-  author = {Bungert, Melanie and Liebke, Lisa and Thome, Janine and Haeussler, Katrin and Bohus, Martin and Lis, Stefanie},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {4},
-  issn = {2051-6673},
-  doi = {10.1186/s40479-015-0025-x},
-  abstract = {Interpersonal dysfunction in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is characterized by an `anxious preoccupation with real or imagined abandonment' (DSM-5). This symptom description bears a close resemblance to that of rejection sensitivity, a cognitive affective disposition that affects perceptions, emotions and behavior in the context of social rejection. The present study investigates the level of rejection sensitivity in acute and remitted BPD patients and its relation to BPD symptom severity, childhood maltreatment, and self-esteem.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M6HHMSPZ/Bungert et al. - 2015 - Rejection sensitivity and symptom severity in pati.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{BURGESS1997,
-  title = {Quinus Ab {{Omni N\ae vo Vindicatus}}},
-  author = {BURGESS, JOHN P.},
-  year = {1997},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {sup1},
-  pages = {25--65},
-  issn = {0045-5091},
-  doi = {10.1080/00455091.1997.10715961},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6C8UPPKU/00455091.1997.html;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A72E797Y/00455091.1997.html;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M9IIKAL6/00455091.1997.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Burgess1998,
-  title = {Quinus {{Ab Omni Naevo Vindicatus}}},
-  booktitle = {Meaning and {{Reference}}},
-  author = {Burgess, John P.},
-  editor = {Kazmi, Ali A.},
-  year = {1998},
-  pages = {25--66},
-  publisher = {{University of Calgary Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5V5MWAC8/00455091.1997.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Burgess1999,
-  title = {Which {{Modal Logic Is}} the {{Right One}}?},
-  author = {Burgess, John P.},
-  year = {1999},
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {81--93},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1039096306},
-  abstract = {The question, "Which modal logic is the right one for logical necessity?," divides into two questions, one about model-theoretic validity, the other about proof-theoretic demonstrability. The arguments of Halld\'en and others that the right validity argument is S5, and the right demonstrability logic includes S4, are reviewed, and certain common objections are argued to be fallacious. A new argument, based on work of Supecki and Bryll, is presented for the claim that the right demonstrability logic must be contained in S5, and a more speculative argument for the claim that it does not include S4.2 is also presented.},
-  mrnumber = {MR1811204},
-  zmnumber = {0972.03018},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P2EECMI3/euclid.ndjfl.1039096306.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Byrne1999,
-  title = {Cosmic {{Hermeneutics}}},
-  author = {Byrne, Alex},
-  year = {1999},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {33},
-  pages = {347--383},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.16},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1999},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PB62ETND/Byrne - 1999 - Cosmic Hermeneutics.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Byrne2019,
-  title = {Counterfactuals in {{Explainable Artificial Intelligence}} ({{XAI}}): {{Evidence}} from {{Human Reasoning}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterfactuals in {{Explainable Artificial Intelligence}} ({{XAI}})},
-  booktitle = {Proceedings of the {{Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference}} on {{Artificial Intelligence}}},
-  author = {Byrne, Ruth M. J.},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = aug,
-  pages = {6276--6282},
-  publisher = {{International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization}},
-  address = {{Macao, China}},
-  doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2019/876},
-  abstract = {Counterfactuals about what could have happened are increasingly used in an array of Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications, and especially in explainable AI (XAI). Counterfactuals can aid the provision of interpretable models to make the decisions of inscrutable systems intelligible to developers and users. However, not all counterfactuals are equally helpful in assisting human comprehension. Discoveries about the nature of the counterfactuals that humans create are a helpful guide to maximize the effectiveness of counterfactual use in AI.},
-  isbn = {978-0-9992411-4-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8RRH79BE/Byrne - 2019 - Counterfactuals in Explainable Artificial Intellig.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cabrer2015,
-  title = {Distributive Bilattices from the Perspective of Natural Duality Theory},
-  author = {Cabrer, L. M. and Priestley, H. A.},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Algebra universalis},
-  volume = {73},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {103--141},
-  issn = {1420-8911},
-  doi = {10.1007/s00012-015-0316-5},
-  abstract = {This paper provides a fresh perspective on the representation of distributive bilattices and of related varieties. The techniques of natural duality are employed to give, economically and in a uniform way, categories of structures dually equivalent to these varieties. We relate our dualities to the product representations for bilattices and to pre-existing dual representations by a simple translation process which is an instance of a more general mechanism for connecting dualities based on Priestley duality to natural dualities. Our approach gives us access to descriptions of algebraic/categorical properties of bilattices and also reveals how `truth' and `knowledge' may be seen as dual notions.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IBGZAB5S/Cabrer and Priestley - 2015 - Distributive bilattices from the perspective of na.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cabrer2015a,
-  title = {Distributive Bilattices from the Perspective of Natural Duality Theory},
-  author = {Cabrer, L. M. and Priestley, H. A.},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Algebra universalis},
-  volume = {73},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {103--141},
-  issn = {1420-8911},
-  doi = {10.1007/s00012-015-0316-5},
-  abstract = {This paper provides a fresh perspective on the representation of distributive bilattices and of related varieties. The techniques of natural duality are employed to give, economically and in a uniform way, categories of structures dually equivalent to these varieties. We relate our dualities to the product representations for bilattices and to pre-existing dual representations by a simple translation process which is an instance of a more general mechanism for connecting dualities based on Priestley duality to natural dualities. Our approach gives us access to descriptions of algebraic/categorical properties of bilattices and also reveals how `truth' and `knowledge' may be seen as dual notions.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LLDY43JF/Cabrer and Priestley - 2015 - Distributive bilattices from the perspective of na.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cabrer2016,
-  title = {Natural {{Dualities Through Product Representations}}: {{Bilattices}} and {{Beyond}}},
-  shorttitle = {Natural {{Dualities Through Product Representations}}},
-  author = {Cabrer, L. M. and Priestley, H. A.},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Studia Logica. An International Journal for Symbolic Logic},
-  pages = {1--26},
-  issn = {0039-3215, 1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11225-016-9651-6},
-  abstract = {This paper focuses on natural dualities for varieties of bilattice-based algebras. Such varieties have been widely studied as semantic models in situations where information is incomplete or inconsistent. The most popular tool for studying bilattices-based algebras is product representation. The authors recently set up a widely applicable algebraic framework which enabled product representations over a base variety to be derived in a uniform and categorical manner. By combining this methodology with that of natural duality theory, we demonstrate how to build a natural duality for any bilattice-based variety which has a suitable product representation over a dualisable base variety. This procedure allows us systematically to present economical natural dualities for many bilattice-based varieties, for most of which no dual representation has previously been given. Among our results we highlight that for bilattices with a generalised conflation operation (not assumed to be an involution or commute with negation). Here both the associated product representation and the duality are new. Finally we outline analogous procedures for pre-bilattice-based algebras (so negation is absent).},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03G25,06B10,06D50,Bilattice,Computational Linguistics,Conflation,Double Ockham algebra,Logic,Mathematical Logic and Foundations,Natural duality,Primary: 08C20,Product representation,Secondary: 03G10},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QG29ZFEC/Cabrer and Priestley - 2016 - Natural Dualities Through Product Representations.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Caie2019,
-  title = {Classical {{Opacity}}},
-  author = {Caie, Michael and Goodman, Jeremy and Lederman, Harvey},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {n/a},
-  number = {n/a},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12587},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2019 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.12587},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U437PBPD/Caie et al. - Classical Opacity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cameron2007,
-  title = {Truthmakers and Necessary Connections},
-  author = {Cameron, Ross Paul},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {161},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {27--45},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-006-9152-7},
-  abstract = {In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis' `Things-qua-truthmakers' theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3\textendash 5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EJ399F8G/Cameron - 2007 - Truthmakers and necessary connections.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cameron2008,
-  title = {How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist},
-  author = {Cameron, Ross},
-  year = {2008},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {3},
-  pages = {410--421},
-  abstract = {When there is truth, there must be some thing to account for that truth: some thing that couldn't exist and the true proposition fail to be true. That is the truthmaker principle. True propositions are made true by entities in the mind-independently existing external world. The truthmaker principle seems attractive to many metaphysicians, but many have wanted to weaken it and accept not that every true proposition has a truthmaker but only that some important class of propositions require truthmakers. Let us, following Armstrong, call the claim that all true propositions, without exception, have a truthmaker, Truthmaker Maximalism. Why might one be tempted to the spirit of truthmaker theory but reject Truthmaker Maximalism? Well, you might deny that necessary truths need truthmakers, for one, and insist that only contingent truths have truthmakers. But I think it's fair to say that the most common motivation for rejecting maximalism concerns negative truths. (Continues...)},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/44FE8KVF/2008 - How to be a truthmaker maximalist - Cameron.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9SN6KXSU/2008 - How to be a truthmaker maximalist - Cameron.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cameron2008a,
-  title = {Truthmakers and {{Ontological Commitment}}: {{Or How}} to {{Deal}} with {{Complex Objects}} and {{Mathematical Ontology}} without {{Getting}} into {{Trouble}}},
-  author = {Cameron, Ross},
-  year = {2008},
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  pages = {0--18},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K3DTY5G3/2008 - Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MJ3AKHE7/2008 - Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RYWM4FIS/2008 - Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology without Getting into Trouble.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cameron2008b,
-  title = {Turtles {{All}} the {{Way}} down: {{Regress}}, {{Priority}} and {{Fundamentality}}},
-  shorttitle = {Turtles {{All}} the {{Way}} Down},
-  author = {Cameron, Ross P.},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {58},
-  number = {230},
-  pages = {1--14},
-  issn = {1467-9213},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x},
-  abstract = {I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E4GPF45V/Cameron - 2008 - Turtles All the Way down Regress, Priority and Fu.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cameron2009,
-  title = {How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology},
-  author = {Cameron, Ross P.},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {151},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {249--264},
-  issn = {0031-8116},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-009-9442-2},
-  keywords = {a radically minimal ontology,complex objects are one,do not,i am attracted to,i hold,many of the entities,nihilism á musical nihilism,ontological commitment á compositional,over in everyday speech,really exist,such,we quantify},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GIWXTKV9/2009 - How to have a radically minimal ontology - Cameron.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P6W2INF7/2009 - How to have a radically minimal ontology - Cameron.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YNFVMJTB/2009 - How to have a radically minimal ontology - Cameron.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cameron2014,
-  title = {On the {{Lack}} of {{Direction}} in {{Rayo}}'s {{The Construction}} of {{Logical Space}}},
-  author = {Cameron, Ross},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {427--441},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EBWQ9BEN/2014 - On the Lack of Direction in Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space - Cameron.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Campbell,
-  title = {Occidental {{Mythology}}},
-  author = {Campbell, Joseph},
-  abstract = {The Masks of God is the summation of Joseph Campbell s lifelong study of the origins and function of myth. In volume 3 of the series, Occidental Mythology, Campbell examines the themes that underlie the art, worship and literature of the Western world. Occidental Mythology traces European consciousness from the Levantine earth-goddesses of the Bronze Age and the subsequent tribal invasions that shaped Judaic and Greek myth before examining the influence of Persia, Rome, Islam and Christian Europe on ancient beliefs. The Masks of God traces mankind s history as a search for meaning through the ideas, themes and quests of culture and religion.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PP8TQYN2/Campbell - Occidental Mythology.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Campbell2007,
-  title = {Causation and {{Explanation}}},
-  editor = {Campbell, Joseph Keim and O'Rourke, Michael and Silverstein, Harry S.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {First Edition},
-  publisher = {{A Bradford Book}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-03363-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XD89JPP3/Campbell et al. - 2007 - Causation and Explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Campion2016,
-  title = {Topologies {{Generated}} by {{Nested Collections}}},
-  author = {Campi{\'o}n, Mar{\'i}a Jes{\'u}s and Indur{\'a}in, Esteban and Knoblauch, Vicki},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Bulletin of the Malaysian Mathematical Sciences Society},
-  volume = {39},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {545--561},
-  issn = {2180-4206},
-  doi = {10.1007/s40840-015-0124-2},
-  abstract = {We study binary relations and topologies induced by means of nested collections of subsets of a given nonempty set. Dually, given a topological space, we characterize properties of the topology in terms of suitable nested families of open subsets. By means of this relationship between nested collections of sets and nested topologies, we study the representability of total preorders via (semi-)continuous real-valued order isomorphisms.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZNELZCWE/Campión et al_2016_Topologies Generated by Nested Collections.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cariani2020,
-  title = {Conditional {{Heresies}}},
-  author = {Cariani, Fabrizio and Goldstein, Simon},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {101},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {251--282},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12565},
-  abstract = {The principles of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) and Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA) have received substantial attention in isolation. Both principles are plausible generalizations about natural language conditionals. There is however little discussion of their interaction. This paper aims to remedy this gap and explore the significance of having both principles constrain the logic of the conditional. Our negative finding is that, together with elementary logical assumptions, CEM and SDA yield a variety of implausible consequences. Despite these incompatibility results, we open up a narrow space to satisfy both. We show that, by simultaneously appealing to the alternative-introducing analysis of disjunction and to the theory of homogeneity presuppositions, we can satisfy both. Furthermore, the theory that validates both principles resembles a recent semantics that is defended by Santorio on independent grounds. The cost of this approach is that it must give up the transitivity of entailment: we suggest that this is a feature, not a bug, and connect it with recent developments of intransitive notions of entailment.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.12565},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D3H7TY26/Cariani and Goldstein - 2020 - Conditional Heresies.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KMWN83XK/phpr.html}
-}
-
-@article{Carnap1936,
-  title = {Testability and Meaning},
-  author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
-  year = {1936},
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {419---471}
-}
-
-@article{Carnap1937,
-  title = {Testability and Meaning (Part 2)},
-  author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
-  year = {1937},
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {1--40}
-}
-
-@article{Carnap1946,
-  title = {Modalities {{And Quantification}}},
-  author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
-  year = {1946},
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KB7UEA3Y/1946 - Modalities And Quantification - Carnap.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R525G5NL/1946 - Modalities And Quantification - Carnap.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Carnap1947,
-  title = {Meaning and {{Necessity}}},
-  author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
-  year = {1947},
-  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Carr2013,
-  title = {Natural {{Deduction Pack}}},
-  author = {Carr, Alastair},
-  year = {2013},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PD6ZS5CZ/Natural Deduction Pack (1).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Carroll1895,
-  title = {{{WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES}}},
-  author = {Carroll, Lewis},
-  year = {1895},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {IV},
-  number = {14},
-  pages = {278--280},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/IV.14.278},
-  abstract = {LEWIS CARROLL; WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES, Mind, Volume IV, Issue 14, 1 April 1895, Pages 278\textendash 280, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/IV.14.278},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4R7YAZK8/Carroll - 1895 - WHAT THE TORTOISE SAID TO ACHILLES.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Carroll2016,
-  title = {Laws of {{Nature}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Carroll, John W.},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2016},
-  edition = {Fall 2016},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {Science includes many principles at least once thought to be laws ofnature: Newton's law of gravitation, his three laws of motion,the ideal gas laws, Mendel's laws, the laws of supply anddemand, and so on. Other regularities important to science were notthought to have this status. These include regularities that, unlikelaws, were (or still are) thought by scientists to stand in need ofexplanation. These include the regularity of the ocean tides, theperihelion of Mercury's orbit, the photoelectric effect, thatthe universe is expanding, and so on. Scientists also use laws but notother regularities to sort out what is possible: It is based on theirconsistency with Einstein's laws of gravity that cosmologistsrecognize the possibility that our universe is closed and thepossibility that it is open (Maudlin 2007, 7\textendash 8). In statisticalmechanics, the laws of an underlying physical theory are used todetermine the dynamically possible trajectories through the statespace of the system (Roberts 2008, 12\textendash 16). , Philosophers of science and metaphysicians address various issuesabout laws, but the basic question is: What is it to be alaw? Two influential answers are David Lewis's systems approach(1973, 1983, 1986, 1994) and David Armstrong's universalsapproach (1978, 1983, 1991, 1993). Other treatments includeantirealist views (van Fraassen 1989, Giere 1999, Ward 2002, Mumford2004) and antireductionist views (Carroll 1994 and 2008, Lange 2000and 2009, Maudlin 2007). Besides the basic question, the recentliterature has also focused on (i) whether laws supervene on mattersof fact, (ii) the role laws play in the problem of induction, (iii)whether laws involve metaphysical necessity, and (iv) the role of lawsin physics and how that contrasts with the role of laws in the specialsciences.},
-  keywords = {Carl,causation: counterfactual theories of,causation: the metaphysics of,conditionals,conditionals: counterfactual,David,David: metaphysics,determinism: causal,dispositions,Hempel,Hume,induction: problem of,interpretations of,laws of nature: ceteris paribus,Lewis,metaphysics,possible worlds,probability,properties,scientific explanation,supervenience}
-}
-
-@book{Cartwright1983,
-  title = {How the {{Laws}} of {{Physics Lie}}},
-  author = {Cartwright, Nancy},
-  year = {1983},
-  month = jun,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-824704-3},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GFBGFC89/1983 - How the Laws of Physics Lie - Cartwright.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cartwright1984,
-  title = {How the {{Laws}} of {{Physics Lie}}},
-  author = {Cartwright, Nancy and McMullin, Ernan},
-  year = {1984},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {American Journal of Physics},
-  volume = {52},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {474--476},
-  issn = {0002-9505, 1943-2909},
-  doi = {10.1119/1.13641},
-  abstract = {Scitation is the online home of leading journals and conference proceedings from AIP Publishing and AIP Member Societies},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/933B4PYE/Cartwright and McMullin - 1984 - How the Laws of Physics Lie.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cartwright1994,
-  title = {Speaking of {{Everything}}},
-  author = {Cartwright, Richard L.},
-  year = {1994},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {28},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--20},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2215917},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VAKL8Y85/2215917.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Cath2011,
-  title = {Knowing {{How Without Knowing That}}},
-  booktitle = {Knowing {{How}}: {{Essays}} on {{Knowledge}}, {{Mind}}, and {{Action}}},
-  author = {Cath, Yuri},
-  editor = {Bengson, John and Moffett, Marc A.},
-  year = {2011},
-  pages = {1--20},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5BC3F86K/2011 - Knowing How Without Knowing That - Cath.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/76V7ELIB/2011 - Knowing How Without Knowing That - Cath.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Chalmers2001,
-  title = {Conceptual {{Analysis}} and {{Reductive Explanation}}},
-  author = {Chalmers, David J. and Jackson, Frank},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {110},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {315--360},
-  publisher = {{Duke University Press}},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-110-3-315},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EFGSXAQV/Chalmers and Jackson - 2001 - Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Chalmers2009,
-  title = {Metametaphysics: {{New Essays}} on the {{Foundations}} of {{Ontology}}},
-  shorttitle = {Metametaphysics},
-  author = {Chalmers, D. and Manley, D. and Wasserman, R.},
-  year = {2009},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4TSFDIIH/[David_Chalmers,_David_Manley,_Ryan_Wasserman]_Met(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Chandler1976,
-  title = {Plantinga and the Contingently Possible},
-  author = {Chandler, Hugh S.},
-  year = {1976},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {36},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {106--109},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/36.2.106},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WICSVY9G/Chandler - 1976 - Plantinga and the contingently possible.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Chang1983,
-  title = {The {{Tao}} of {{Loving Couple}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Tao}} of {{Loving Couple}}},
-  author = {Chang, Jolan},
-  year = {1983},
-  edition = {1st ed edition},
-  publisher = {{Dutton Adult}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-525-24183-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AB4X3E7B/Chang_1738_The Tao of Loving Couple.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Chang1992,
-  title = {The {{Tao}} of {{Love And Sex}}: {{The Ancient Chinese Way}} to {{Ecstasy}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Tao}} of {{Love And Sex}}},
-  author = {Chang, Jolan},
-  year = {1992},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {Revised ed. edition},
-  publisher = {{Penguin}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {Two thousand years ago, at a time when the Christian West was frantically repressing sexuality, the Chinese were enjoying an erotic life that fused the sensual and the spiritual, in which sexual guilt and sexual aberrations like sadism and masochism were all but absent. This bestselling book by a leading modern exponent of Taoism makes that erotic life available to all who seek it. With its emphasis on male restraint and female pleasure and its healing vision of sex as an expression of a deeper cosmic balance, The Tao of Love and Sex offers us nothing less than a new model of loving, at once exciting and serene, passionate and compassionate.},
-  isbn = {978-0-14-019338-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NL5K59S5/Chang_1992_The Tao of Love And Sex.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Chia1984,
-  title = {Taoist {{Secrets}} of {{Love}}: {{Cultivating Male Sexual Energy}}},
-  shorttitle = {Taoist {{Secrets}} of {{Love}}},
-  author = {Chia, Mantak},
-  year = {1984},
-  month = sep,
-  edition = {1st Edition},
-  publisher = {{Aurora Press}},
-  address = {{New York, N.Y}},
-  abstract = {Reveals the ancient sexual secrets of the Taoist sages. This book teaches: higher taoist practices for alchemical transmutation of body, mind and spirit; the secret of achieving and maintaining full sexual potency; the Taoist valley orgasm - pathway to higher bliss; and, how to conserve and store sperm in the body.},
-  isbn = {978-0-943358-19-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U4J5IJ5R/Chia_1984_Taoist Secrets of Love.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Chia2002,
-  title = {The {{Multi-Orgasmic Couple}}: {{Sexual Secrets Every Couple Should Know}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Multi-Orgasmic Couple}}},
-  author = {Chia, Mantak and Chia, Maneewan and Abrams, Douglas and Abrams, Rachel Carlton},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {Reprint edition},
-  publisher = {{HarperOne}},
-  address = {{San Francisco}},
-  isbn = {978-0-06-251614-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/58WELJ3E/Chia et al. - 2002 - The Multi-Orgasmic Couple Sexual Secrets Every Co.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Chia2005,
-  title = {Healing {{Love}} through the {{Tao}}: {{Cultivating Female Sexual Energy}}},
-  shorttitle = {Healing {{Love}} through the {{Tao}}},
-  author = {Chia, Mantak},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {New edition},
-  publisher = {{Destiny Books}},
-  address = {{Rochester, Vt}},
-  abstract = {For thousands of years the sexual principles and techniques presented here were taught by Taoist masters in secret only to a small number of people (sworn to silence), in the royal courts and esoteric circles of China. This is the first book to make this ancient knowledge available to the West. The foundation of healing love is the cultivation, transformation, and circulation of sexual energy, known as jing.Jing energy is creative, generative energy that is vital for the development of chi(vital life-force energy) and shen(spiritual energy), which enables higher practices of spiritual development. Jing is produced in the sexual organs, and it is energy women lose continually through menstruation and child bearing. Mantak Chia teaches powerful techniques developed by Taoist masters for the conservation of jing and how it is used to revitalize women's physical, mental, and spiritual well-being. Among the many benefits conferred by these practices are a reduction in the discomfort caused by menstruation and the ability to attain full-body orgasm.},
-  isbn = {978-1-59477-068-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8M4ANGIE/Chia - 2005 - Healing Love through the Tao Cultivating Female S.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Chisholm1981,
-  title = {The {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}: {{A Solution}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Chisholm, Roderick M. and Potter, Richard C.},
-  year = {1981},
-  journal = {Metaphilosophy},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--6},
-  issn = {1467-9973},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9973.1981.tb00110.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1981.tb00110.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N4HJV9YM/Chisholm and Potter - 1981 - The Paradox of Analysis A Solution.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Christensen2015,
-  title = {Essence, {{Essence}}, and {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Christensen, Ryan},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Studia Philosophica Estonica},
-  volume = {7},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {72--87},
-  issn = {1736-5899},
-  doi = {10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.05},
-  abstract = {I argue that three different notions of essence\textemdash temporal, definitional, and modal\textemdash are all distinct notions, and are all philosophically useful. After defining the different notions, I discuss the philosophical problems each addresses.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c)},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Aristotelian essentialism,essence,necessity,temporal essence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TFEKSY4T/Christensen - 2015 - Essence, Essence, and Essence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Church1943,
-  title = {Review: {{W}}. {{V}}. {{Quine}}, {{On Existence Conditions}} for {{Elements}} and {{Classes}}},
-  shorttitle = {Review},
-  author = {Church, Alonzo},
-  year = {1943},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {31--32},
-  issn = {0022-4812},
-  doi = {10.2307/2267994},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9IPVDB8F/Church - 1943 - Review.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Ciardelli2018,
-  title = {Inquisitive {{Semantics}}},
-  author = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Groenendijk, Jeroen and Roelofsen, Floris},
-  year = {2018},
-  series = {Oxford {{Surveys}} in {{Semantics}} and {{Pragmatics}}},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198814788.001.0001},
-  abstract = {There is an age-old tradition in linguistics and philosophy to identify the meaning of a entence with its truth-conditions. This can be explained by the fact that linguistic and philosophical investigations are usually carried out in a logical framework that was originally designed to characterize valid reasoning. Indeed, in order to determine whether an argument is valid, it suffices to know the truth-conditions of the premises and conclusion. However, argumentation is neither the sole, nor the primary function of language. One task that language more widely and ordinarily fulfils is to enable the exchange of information between conversational participants. Inquisitive semantics is a new logical framework for the analysis of this fundamental usage of language. Information exchange can be seen as a process of raising and resolving issues. Inquisitive semantics provides a new formal notion of issues, which makes it possible to model various concepts that are crucial for the analysis of linguistic information exchange in a more refined and more principled way than has been possible in previous frameworks. This book provides a detailed exposition of inquisitive semantics, and demonstrates its benefits with a range of applications in the semantic analysis of questions, coordination, modals, conditionals, and intonation.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-881478-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {conditionals,coordination,inquisitive semantics,intonational meaning,modals,questions},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K8SRGJWC/Ciardelli et al. - 2018 - Inquisitive Semantics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ciardelli2018a,
-  title = {Two Switches in the Theory of Counterfactuals},
-  author = {Ciardelli, Ivano and Zhang, Linmin and Champollion, Lucas},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {41},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {577--621},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10988-018-9232-4},
-  abstract = {Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causal reasoning,Counterfactuals,Crowdsourcing survey,Disjunctive antecedents,Experimental semantics,Inquisitive semantics,Minimal change semantics,Ordering semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JBJQZL6Z/Ciardelli et al. - 2018 - Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Clark1998,
-  title = {The {{Extended Mind}}},
-  author = {Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {58},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {7--19},
-  issn = {0003-2638, 1467-8284},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/58.1.7},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TPQPSHYL/Clark and Chalmers - 1998 - The Extended Mind.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UWXQSCQ2/Clark and Chalmers - 1998 - The Extended Mind.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/393SZJ8L/7.html;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QIC7NBW5/7.html}
-}
-
-@article{Clark2006,
-  title = {Word and {{Action}}: {{Reconciling Rules}} and {{Know-How}} in {{Moral Cognition}}},
-  author = {Clark, Andy},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {30},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {267--289},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IF43G28C/2006 - Word and Action Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition - Clark.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RLTH6CQA/2006 - Word and Action Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition - Clark.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Cohen1990,
-  title = {On {{What Cannot Be}}},
-  booktitle = {Truth or {{Consequences}}: {{Essays}} in {{Honor}} of {{Nuel Belnap}}},
-  author = {Cohen, Daniel},
-  editor = {Dunn, J. Michael and Gupta, Anil},
-  year = {1990},
-  pages = {123--132},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-0681-5_9},
-  abstract = {A curious thing about the problem of counterpossibles is that for all its complexity it too can be put in Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: What is meant by 'if p then q'; when 'p'; could not be the case? Unfortunately, and despite some valiant attempts, the answer cannot be given in a word, and so the problem remains.},
-  isbn = {978-94-009-0681-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Impossible World,Indicative Conditional,Modus Ponens,Relevant Logic,Vacuous Truth},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JHVPZ2MK/Cohen - 1990 - On What Cannot Be.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Collins2004,
-  title = {Causation and {{Counterfactuals}}},
-  editor = {Collins, John and Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. and Block, Ned and Putnam, Hilary},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = jun,
-  series = {Representation and {{Mind}} Series},
-  publisher = {{A Bradford Book}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, MA, USA}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-03317-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SDGCQPJG/Collins et al. - 2004 - Causation and Counterfactuals.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Collins2004a,
-  title = {Causation and {{Counterfactuals}}},
-  editor = {Collins, John},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {Illustrated edition},
-  publisher = {{Bradford Books}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-53256-3},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@incollection{Collins2007,
-  title = {Counterfactuals, {{Causation}}, and {{Preemption}}},
-  booktitle = {Philosophy of {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Collins, John},
-  editor = {Jacquette, Dale},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = jan,
-  series = {Handbook of the {{Philosophy}} of {{Science}}},
-  pages = {1127--1143},
-  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
-  address = {{Amsterdam}},
-  doi = {10.1016/B978-044451541-4/50029-4},
-  abstract = {This chapter provides an overview of the concepts related to counterfactuals, causation, and preemption. A counterfactual is a conditional statement in the subjunctive mood. The philosophical importance of counterfactuals stems from the fact that they seem to be closely connected to the concept of causation. The counterfactual ``If A were true, then C would be true'' with antecedent A and consequent C is sometimes written ``A 1\textrightarrow{} C'' in order to distinguish it from other kinds of conditional statement. For example, the counterfactual must be distinguished from both the material conditional of first-order logic, and the ``strict conditional'' of entailment. The truth-functional material conditional ``A \textrightarrow{} C'' is logically equivalent to ``{$\sim$}A V C'' and thus has truth-conditions weaker than those of the corresponding counterfactual conditional. Not every counterfactual with a false antecedent or a true consequent is true. This chapter presents the standard Stalnaker\textendash Lewis semantics for the counterfactual conditional and develops some of the logical features of counterfactuals. It presents Lewis's original counterfactual theory of causation, and explains the problems that eventually led him to abandon the theory in its original form. The chapter also discusses the current state of counterfactual theories of causation, by presenting three recent contending accounts, due to Lewis, Yablo, and Hall.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9BEAZHEP/Collins - 2007 - Counterfactuals, Causation, and Preemption.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Conway2013,
-  title = {A {{Course}} in {{Point Set Topology}}},
-  author = {Conway, John B.},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = nov,
-  edition = {2014th edition},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  address = {{Utrecht}},
-  isbn = {978-90-6764-202-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z6ZL8DK4/Conway_2013_A Course in Point Set Topology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Copeland,
-  title = {On When a Semantics Is Not a Semantics: {{Some}} Reasons for Disliking the {{Routley-Meyer}} Semantics for Relevance Logic},
-  shorttitle = {On When a Semantics Is Not a Semantics},
-  author = {Copeland, B. J.},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {399--413},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00258440},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FJB6AF8C/Copeland - On when a semantics is not a semantics Some reaso.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Copelanda,
-  title = {Pure Semantics and Applied Semantics},
-  author = {Copeland, B. J.},
-  journal = {Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {197--204},
-  issn = {0167-7411, 1572-8749},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00142493},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/F2HB3H72/Copeland - Pure semantics and applied semantics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Corkum2022,
-  title = {Is `Cause' Ambiguous?},
-  author = {Corkum, Phil},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-022-01809-2},
-  abstract = {Causal pluralists hold that that there is not just one determinate kind of causation. Some causal pluralists hold that `cause' is ambiguous among these different kinds. For example, Hall argues that `cause' is ambiguous between two causal relations, which he labels dependence and production. The view that `cause' is ambiguous, however, wrongly predicts zeugmatic conjunction reduction, and wrongly predicts the behaviour of ellipsis in causal discourse. So `cause' is not ambiguous. If we are to disentangle causal pluralism from the ambiguity claim, we need to consider what other linguistic approaches are available to the causal pluralist. I consider and reject proposals that `cause' is a general term, that the term is an indexical, and that the term conveys different kinds of causation through implicature or presupposition. Finally, I argue that causal pluralism is better handled by treating `cause' as a univocal term within a dynamic interpretation framework.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Ambiguity,Causal pluralism,Causation},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I9GNATU7/Corkum - 2022 - Is ‘cause’ ambiguous.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2004,
-  title = {Semantics for {{Analytic Containment}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Studia Logica},
-  volume = {77},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {87--104},
-  issn = {1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1023/B:STUD.0000034187.37935.24},
-  abstract = {In 1977, R. B. Angell presented a logic for analytic containment, a notion of ``relevant'' implication stronger than Anderson and Belnap's entailment. In this paper I provide for the first time the logic of first degree analytic containment, as presented in [2] and [3], with a semantical characterization\textemdash leaving higher degree systems for future investigations. The semantical framework I introduce for this purpose involves a special sort of truth-predicates, which apply to pairs of collections of formulas instead of individual formulas, and which behave in some respects like Gentzen's sequents. This semantics captures very general properties of the truth-functional connectives, and for that reason it may be used to model a vast range of logics. I briefly illustrate the point with classical consequence and Anderson and Belnap's ``tautological entailments''.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/85ZQBL23/Correia - 2004 - Semantics for Analytic Containment.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Correia2005,
-  title = {Existential {{Dependence}} and {{Cognate Notions}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2005},
-  publisher = {{Philosophia Verlag}}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2006,
-  title = {Generic {{Essence}}, {{Objectual Essence}}, and {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Nous},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {753--767},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00632.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AU8L6Q2R/2006 - Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, and Modality - Correia.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2007,
-  title = {({{Finean}}) {{Essence}} and ({{Priorean}}) {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Dialectica},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {63--84},
-  issn = {1746-8361},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01079.x},
-  abstract = {In Fine 1994, Kit Fine challenges the (widespread) view that the notion of essence is to be understood in terms of the metaphysical modalities, and he argues that it is not essence which reduces to metaphysical modality, but rather metaphysical modality which reduces to essence. In this paper I put forward a modal account of essence and argue that it is immune from Fine's objections. The account presupposes a non-standard, independently motivated conception of the metaphysical modalities which I dub Priorean. Arthur Prior never endorsed that very conception, but in some respects his own views on the topic are so close to it, and different from all (most?) currently accepted views, that the label `Priorean' is perfectly appropriate.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XZMCHM9U/Correia - 2007 - (Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YTJAWHJR/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2008,
-  title = {Ontological {{Dependence}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1013--1032},
-  issn = {1747-9991},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00170.x},
-  abstract = {`Ontological dependence' is a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a rich family of properties and relations, often taken to be among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations. Notions of ontological dependence are usually thought of as `carving reality at its ontological joints', and as marking certain forms of ontological `non-self-sufficiency'. The use of notions of dependence goes back as far as Aristotle's characterization of substances, and these notions are still widely used to characterize other concepts and to formulate metaphysical claims. This paper first gives an overview of the varieties of these notions, and then discusses some of their main applications.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2008 The Author. Journal Compilation \textcopyright{} 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I5DDLK66/Correia - 2008 - Ontological Dependence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2010,
-  title = {Grounding and {{Truth-Functions}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {Logique Et Analyse},
-  volume = {53},
-  number = {211},
-  pages = {251},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GGNV6AN6/Correia - 2010 - Grounding and Truth-Functions.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Correia2012,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Grounding}}: {{Understanding}} the {{Structure}} of {{Reality}}},
-  shorttitle = {Metaphysical {{Grounding}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  year = {2012},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YMUIBDUW/[Fabrice_Correia,_Benjamin_Schnieder_(Editors)]_Me(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2012a,
-  title = {On the {{Reduction}} of {{Necessity}} to {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {84},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {639--653},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00436.x},
-  abstract = {In his influential paper ``Essence and Modality'', Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9TUS7GR4/Correia - 2012 - On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Correia2012c,
-  title = {Grounding: {{An Opinionated Introduction}}},
-  shorttitle = {Grounding},
-  booktitle = {Metaphysical {{Grounding}}: {{Understanding}} the {{Structure}} of {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  editor = {Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  year = {2012},
-  pages = {1},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2B3Y25EC/Correia and Schnieder - 2012 - Grounding An Opinionated Introduction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2014,
-  title = {Logical {{Grounds}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {7},
-  number = {01},
-  pages = {31--59},
-  issn = {1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020313000300},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XC4PYS3M/Correia - 2014 - LOGICAL GROUNDS.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2016,
-  title = {An {{Impure Logic}} of {{Representational Grounding}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  pages = {1--32},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-016-9409-7},
-  abstract = {I give a semantic characterisation of a system for the logic of grounding similar to the system introduced by Kit Fine in his ``Guide to Ground'', as well as a semantic characterisation of a variant of that system which excludes the possibility of what Fine calls `zero-grounding'.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YSWK6UL4/Correia - 2016 - An Impure Logic of Representational Grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2016a,
-  title = {On the {{Logic}} of {{Factual Equivalence}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {9},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {103--122},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020315000258},
-  abstract = {Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation's being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my ``Grounding and Truth-Functions'' (2010), that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell's logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FQQJSPC6/Correia - 2016 - ON THE LOGIC OF FACTUAL EQUIVALENCE.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2017,
-  title = {Real {{Definitions}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {52--73},
-  issn = {1758-2237},
-  doi = {10.1111/phis.12091},
-  abstract = {I offer and defend an account of real definitions. I put forward two versions of the account, one formulated in terms of the notion of generalised identity and of a suitable notion of grounding (RD1), and the other one formulated in terms of the former notion and of a suitable notion of comparative joint-carvingness (RD2). Given a plausible assumption, (RD1) and (RD2) turn out to be equivalent. I give a sketch of a unified account of the three notions involved in (RD1) and (RD2) from which the assumption can be derived.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/W3IYEBBX/Correia - 2017 - Real Definitions.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2019,
-  title = {Grounding, {{Essence}}, and {{Identity}}},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice and Skiles, Alexander},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {98},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {642--670},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12468},
-  abstract = {Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are\textemdash as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree\textemdash widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agust\'in Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EI5EVDRE/Correia and Skiles - 2019 - Grounding, Essence, and Identity.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QZB3AURT/PenUlt.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U5MW66ZV/Draft.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2021,
-  title = {Fundamentality from Grounding Trees},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03054-2},
-  abstract = {I provide and defend two natural accounts of (both relative and absolute) fundamentality for facts that do justice to the idea that the ``degree of fundamentality'' enjoyed by a fact is a matter of how far, from a ground-theoretic perspective, the fact is from the ungrounded facts.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZDKVCDBN/Correia_2021_Fundamentality from grounding trees.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2021a,
-  title = {The Logic of Relative Fundamentality},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1279--1301},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1709-8},
-  abstract = {I introduce a proof system for the logic of relative fundamentality, as well as a natural semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete. I then ``modalise'' the logic, and finally I discuss the properties of grounding given a suggested account of this notion in terms of necessity and relative fundamentality.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VXM7SD42/Correia_2021_The logic of relative fundamentality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Correia2021b,
-  title = {A Kind Route from Grounding to Fundamentality},
-  author = {Correia, Fabrice},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03163-y},
-  abstract = {I offer an account of fundamentality for facts in terms of metaphysical grounding. The account does justice to the idea that whether a fact is absolutely fundamental, and whether a fact is more fundamental than, or as fundamental as, another fact, are a matter of where in a grounding-induced hierarchy of kinds of facts these facts appear.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C837U9I4/Correia_2021_A kind route from grounding to fundamentality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cotton,
-  title = {Explanation and Justification in Machine Learning: {{A}} Survey},
-  author = {Cotton, Courtenay and Brian, O.},
-  pages = {6},
-  abstract = {We present a survey of the research concerning explanation and justification in the Machine Learning literature and several adjacent fields. Within Machine Learning, we differentiate between two main branches of current research: interpretable models, and prediction interpretation and justification.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3IT4S65D/Cotton - n-Join courtenay@n-join.com.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Cowling2012,
-  title = {Ideological Parsimony},
-  author = {Cowling, Sam},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {190},
-  number = {17},
-  pages = {3889--3908},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0231-7},
-  abstract = {The theoretical virtue of parsimony values the minimizing of theoretical commitments, but theoretical commitments come in two kinds: ontological and ideological. While the ontological commitments of a theory are the entities it posits, a theory's ideological commitments are the primitive concepts it employs. Here, I show how we can extend the distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony, commonly drawn regarding ontological commitments, to the domain of ideological commitments. I then argue that qualitative ideological parsimony is a theoretical virtue. My defense proceeds by demonstrating the merits of qualitative ideological parsimony and by showing how the qualitative conception of ideological parsimony undermines two notable arguments from ideological parsimony: David Lewis' defense of modal realism and Ted Sider's defense of mereological nihilism.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7LXAPCAH/Cowling - 2012 - Ideological parsimony.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Cresswell1973,
-  title = {Logics and {{Languages}}},
-  author = {Cresswell, Max},
-  year = {1973},
-  publisher = {{London: Methuen [Distributed in the U.S.A. By Harper \& Row}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N5YWF7HH/Cresswell - 1973 - Logics and Languages.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YH6USBT8/CRELAL.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Crisp2000,
-  title = {Particularizing {{Particularism}}},
-  booktitle = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  author = {Crisp, Roger},
-  editor = {Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2000},
-  pages = {23--47},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/H5MYMDNG/2000 - Particularizing Particularism - Crisp.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S4HCB3JR/2000 - Particularizing Particularism - Crisp.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Czelakowski2001,
-  title = {Protoalgebraic {{Logics}}},
-  author = {Czelakowski, Janusz},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = apr,
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  abstract = {The main aim of this monograph is to provide a structured study of the algebraic method in metalogic. In contrast to traditional algebraic logic, where the focus is on the algebraic forms of specific deductive systems, abstract algebraic logic is concerned with the process of algebraization itself. This book presents in a systematic way recent ideas in abstract algebraic logic centered around the notion of the Leibniz operator. The stress is put on the taxonomy of deductive systems. Isolating a list of plausible properties of the Leibniz operator serves as a basis for distinguishing certain natural classes of sentential logics. The hierarchy of deductive systems presented in the book comprises, among others, the following classes: protoalgebraic logics, equivalential logics, algebraizable logics, and Fregean logics. Because of the intimate connection between algebraic and logical structures, the book also provides a uniform treatment of various topics concerning deduction theorems and quasivarieties of algebras. The presentation of the above classes of logics is accompanied by a wealth of examples illustrating the general theory. An essential part of the book is formed by the numerous exercises integrated into the text. This book is both suitable for logically and algebraically minded graduate and advanced graduate students of mathematics, computer science and philosophy, and as a reference work for the expert.},
-  isbn = {978-0-7923-6940-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / General,Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / Semantics,Mathematics / Algebra / General,Mathematics / General,Mathematics / History \& Philosophy,Mathematics / Logic,Philosophy / Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L9PKHSPH/[Janusz_Czelakowski__(auth.)]_Protoalgebraic_Logic(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Dalio2018,
-  title = {Big {{Debt Crises}}},
-  author = {Dalio, Ray},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = nov,
-  edition = {Boxed Set edition},
-  publisher = {{Bridgewater}},
-  abstract = {"Ray Dalio's excellent study provides an innovative way of thinking about debt crises and the policy response." - Ben Bernanke "Ray Dalio's book is must reading for anyone who aspires to prevent or manage through the next financial crisis." - Larry Summers "A terrific piece of work from one of the world's top investors who has devoted his life to understanding markets and demonstrated that understanding by navigating the 2008 financial crisis well." - Hank Paulson "An outstanding history of financial crises, including the devastating crisis of 2008, with a very valuable framework for understanding why the engine of the financial system occasionally breaks down, and what types of policy actions by central banks and governments are necessary to resolve systemic financial crises. This should serve as a play book for future policy makers, with practical guidance about what to do and what not to do." - Tim Geithner On the 10th anniversary of the 2008 financial crisis, one of the world's most successful investors, Ray Dalio, shares his unique template for how debt crises work and principles for dealing with them well. This template allowed his firm, Bridgewater Associates, to anticipate events and navigate them well while others struggled badly. As he explained in his \#1 New York Times Bestseller, Principles: Life \& Work, Dalio believes that most everything happens over and over again through time so that by studying their patterns one can understand the cause-effect relationships behind them and develop principles for dealing with them well. In this 3-part research series, he does that for big debt crises and shares his template in the hopes reducing the chances of big debt crises happening and helping them be better managed in the future. The template comes in three parts provided in three books: 1) The Archetypal Big Debt Cycle (which explains the template), 2) 3 Detailed Cases (which examines in depth the 2008 financial crisis, the 1930's Great Depression, and the 1920's inflationary depression of Germany's Weimar Republic), and 3) Compendium of 48 Cases (which is a compendium of charts and brief descriptions of the worst debt crises of the last 100 years). Whether you're an investor, a policy maker, or are simply interested, the unconventional perspective of one of the few people who navigated the crises successfully, A Template for Understanding Big Debt Crises will help you understand the economy and markets in revealing new ways.},
-  isbn = {978-1-73268-980-0},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Dancy1993,
-  title = {Moral {{Reasons}}},
-  author = {Dancy, Jonathan},
-  year = {1993},
-  publisher = {{Blackwell}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EH8SWQSI/1993 - Moral Reasons - Dancy.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GLTBMR5S/1993 - Moral Reasons - Dancy.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Dancy2000,
-  title = {The {{Particularist}}' s {{Progress}}},
-  booktitle = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  author = {Dancy, Jonathan},
-  editor = {Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2000},
-  pages = {130--156},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}}
-}
-
-@book{Dancy2004,
-  title = {Ethics without Principle},
-  author = {Dancy, Jonathan},
-  year = {2004},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D7RK5NCT/2004 - Ethics without principle - Dancy.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UPF6NTW9/2004 - Ethics without principle - Dancy.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dandelet2021,
-  title = {Epistemic {{Coercion}}},
-  author = {Dandelet, Sophia},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Ethics},
-  volume = {131},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {489--510},
-  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
-  issn = {0014-1704},
-  doi = {10.1086/713146},
-  abstract = {In cases of self-gaslighting, the subject worries that other people will be skeptical of one of her beliefs\textemdash for instance, the belief that she has been sexually harassed. Prompted by this worry, she scrutinizes her original belief and ultimately gives it up. This kind of self-doubt is sometimes presented as one of the characteristic harms that women face under sexism, but it is difficult to say what exactly the harm could consist in. I suggest that self-gaslighting is morally problematic because it involves a coerced change in the way that the subject structures her inquiry.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GP2C497Q/Dandelet_2021_Epistemic Coercion.pdf}
-}
-
-@phdthesis{Dang2010,
-  title = {Symmetric Sets and Graph Models of Set and Multiset Theories},
-  author = {Dang, Hoang-Vu},
-  year = {2010},
-  address = {{Trinity College}},
-  school = {University of Cambridge},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CY9C5VYR/dangthesis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dasgupta2009,
-  title = {Individuals: {{An Essay}} in {{Revisionary Metaphysics}}},
-  shorttitle = {Individuals},
-  author = {Dasgupta, Shamik},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
-  volume = {145},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {35--67},
-  issn = {0031-8116},
-  abstract = {We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least, there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world I call "generalism".},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 2009 Springer}
-}
-
-@article{Dasgupta2014,
-  title = {{The Possibility of Physicalism:}},
-  shorttitle = {{The Possibility of Physicalism}},
-  author = {Dasgupta, Shamik and {Journal of Philosophy Inc.}},
-  editor = {Smylie, John},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {111},
-  number = {9},
-  pages = {557--592},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil20141119/1037},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7W98XJCS/jphil_2014_0111_42257_0557_0592.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dasgupta2014a,
-  title = {On the {{Plurality}} of {{Grounds}}},
-  author = {Dasgupta, Shamik},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Philosopher's Imprint},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {20},
-  publisher = {{University of Michigan}},
-  address = {{Ann Arbor, MI}},
-  issn = {1533-628X},
-  abstract = {This paper argues that ground is irreducibly plural: a group of facts can be grounded together, as a collective, even though no member of the group has a ground on its own. This kind of plural grounding is applied to the metaphysics of individuals and quantities, yielding a ``structuralist'' view in each case. Some more general implications of plural grounding are also discussed.},
-  copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UZCVVPYU/Dasgupta_2014_On the Plurality of Grounds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dasgupta2015a,
-  title = {Symmetry as an {{Epistemic Notion}} ({{Twice Over}})},
-  author = {Dasgupta, Shamik},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  pages = {axu049},
-  issn = {0007-0882, 1464-3537},
-  doi = {10.1093/bjps/axu049},
-  abstract = {Symmetries in physics are a guide to reality. That much is well known. But what is less well known is why symmetry is a guide to reality. What justifies inferences that draw conclusions about reality from premises about symmetries? I argue that answering this question reveals that symmetry is an epistemic notion twice over. First, these inferences must proceed via epistemic lemmas: premises about symmetries in the first instance justify epistemic lemmas about our powers of detection, and only from those epistemic lemmas can we draw conclusions about reality. Second, in order to justify those epistemic lemmas, the notion of symmetry must be defined partly in epistemic terms. 1 Symmetry-to-Reality Reasoning 1.1 A rough introduction to symmetry 1.2 The symmetry-to-reality inference 1.3 Two questions 1.4 Two answers 1.5 Preliminary clarifications 2 Against Redundancy 2.1 Redundancy 2.2 Is absolute velocity redundant? 2.3 Some redundancies 3 Against Objectivity 4 From Symmetry to Detection 4.1 The epistemic approach 4.2 The Occamist norm 4.3 From symmetry to detection 5 The Meaning of `Symmetry' 5.1 A framework 5.2 Formal definitions 5.3 Ontic definitions 6 Epistemic Definitions 6.1 Taking observation seriously 6.2 How things look 6.3 Observation sentences 6.4 Observational equivalence 7 Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over) 7.1 Observational equivalence and metaphysics 7.2 The Occamist norm revisted 7.3 Consequences 8 Conclusion},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5ST22DGB/Dasgupta - 2015 - Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion (Twice Over).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dasgupta2016,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Rationalism}}},
-  author = {Dasgupta, Shamik},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {379--418},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12082},
-  abstract = {The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a ``grounding'' explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a ``rationalist'' metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are ``metaphysically brute'' and that the world could in so many ways have been different.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ASGBA2E2/Dasgupta - 2016 - Metaphysical Rationalism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dasgupta2017,
-  title = {Constitutive {{Explanation}}},
-  author = {Dasgupta, Shamik},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {74--97},
-  issn = {1758-2237},
-  doi = {10.1111/phis.12102},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PKYYY8DZ/Dasgupta - 2017 - Constitutive Explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Dattatreya1988,
-  title = {Avadhuta {{Gita}}: {{Song}} of the {{Free}}},
-  shorttitle = {Avadhuta {{Gita}}},
-  author = {{Dattatreya}},
-  year = {1988},
-  month = mar,
-  edition = {3rd edition},
-  publisher = {{Ramakrishna Math}},
-  address = {{Mylapore}},
-  abstract = {One of the purest statements of nondualistic (Advaita) Vedanta made 3,000 years ago by Dattatreya Avadhuta, who sang it spontaneously after purifying himself in meditation and becoming absorbed in the uninterrupted bliss of Brahman.},
-  isbn = {978-81-7120-037-5},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Davey2002a,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Lattices}} and {{Order}}},
-  author = {Davey, B. A. and Priestley, H. A.},
-  year = {2002},
-  edition = {Second},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  abstract = {Ordered structures have been increasingly recognized in recent years due to an explosion of interest in theoretical computer science and all areas of discrete mathematics. This book covers areas such as ordered sets and lattices. A key feature of ordered sets, one which is emphasized in the text, is that they can be represented pictorially. Lattices are also considered as algebraic structures and hence a purely algebraic study is used to reinforce the ideas of homomorphisms and of ideals encountered in group theory and ring theory. Exposure to elementary abstract algebra and the rotation of set theory are the only prerequisites for this text. For the new edition, much has been rewritten or expanded and new exercises have been added.},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-78451-1},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/26535IEZ/2002 - Introduction to Lattices and Order - Davey, Priestley.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Davidson1963,
-  title = {Actions, {{Reasons}}, and {{Causes}}},
-  author = {Davidson, Donald},
-  year = {1963},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {60},
-  number = {23},
-  pages = {685--700},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2023177},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PGYAVFVV/Davidson - 1963 - Actions, Reasons, and Causes.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Davidson1967,
-  title = {Truth and Meaning},
-  author = {Davidson, Donald},
-  year = {1967},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {304--323},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00485035},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Metaphysics,Philosophy,Philosophy of Language},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3IAUBE2T/Davidson - 1967 - Truth and meaning.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Davies1980,
-  title = {Two {{Notions}} of {{Necessity}}},
-  author = {Davies, Martin and Humberstone, Lloyd},
-  year = {1980},
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
-  volume = {38},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--30},
-  issn = {0031-8116},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2LTY3TUC/4319391.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Deigan2019,
-  title = {A Plea for Inexact Truthmaking},
-  author = {Deigan, Michael},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10988-019-09279-2},
-  abstract = {Kit Fine (2017) distinguishes between inexact and exact truthmaking. He argues that the former can be defined from the latter, but not vice versa, and so concludes that truthmaker semanticists should treat the exact variety of truthmaking as primitive. I argue that this gets things backwards. We can define exact truthmaking in terms of inexact truthmaking and we can't define inexact truthmaking in terms of exact truthmaking. I conclude that it's inexact truthmaking, rather than exact truthmaking, that truthmaker semanticists should treat as the primitive semantic relation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Mereology,Minimality,Philosophy of language,Situation semantics,Truthmaker semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5HFBX3R2/Deigan - 2019 - A plea for inexact truthmaking.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Demski2020,
-  title = {Embedded {{Agency}}},
-  author = {Demski, Abram and Garrabrant, Scott},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {arXiv:1902.09469 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1902.09469},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {Traditional models of rational action treat the agent as though it is cleanly separated from its environment, and can act on that environment from the outside. Such agents have a known functional relationship with their environment, can model their environment in every detail, and do not need to reason about themselves or their internal parts. We provide an informal survey of obstacles to formalizing good reasoning for agents embedded in their environment. Such agents must optimize an environment that is not of type "function"; they must rely on models that fit within the modeled environment; and they must reason about themselves as just another physical system, made of parts that can be modified and that can work at cross purposes.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E6LUKMRE/Demski and Garrabrant - 2020 - Embedded Agency.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B84A89R8/1902.html}
-}
-
-@article{deRosset2013,
-  title = {Grounding {{Explanations}}},
-  author = {{deRosset}, Louis},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Philosopher's Imprint},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {7},
-  publisher = {{University of Michigan}},
-  address = {{Ann Arbor, MI}},
-  issn = {1533-628X},
-  abstract = {A compelling idea holds that reality has a layered structure.  We often disagree about what inhabits the bottom layer (or even if there is one), but we agree that higher up we find chemical, biological, geological, psychological, sociological, economic, etc., entities: molecules, human beings, diamonds, mental states, cities, interest rates, and so on.  How is this intuitive talk of a layered structure of entities to be understood?  Traditionally, philosophers have proposed to understand layered structure in terms of either reduction or supervenience.  But these traditional views face well-known problems.  A plausible alternative is that layered structure is to be explicated by appeal to explanations of a certain sort, termed grounding explanations.  Grounding explanations tell us what obtains in virtue of what.  Unfortunately, the use of grounding explanations to articulate the layered conception faces a problem, which I call the collapse.  The collapse turns on the question of how to ground the facts stated by the explanations themselves.  In this paper I make a suggestion about how to ground explanations that avoids the collapse.  Briefly, the suggestion is that the fact stated by a grounding explanation is grounded in its explanans.},
-  copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y6DZCY4W/deRosset - 2013 - Grounding Explanations.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{deRosset2015,
-  title = {Better {{Semantics}} for the {{Pure Logic}} of {{Ground}}},
-  author = {{deRosset}, Louis},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
-  volume = {56},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {229--252},
-  issn = {2153-960X},
-  doi = {10.1111/phib.12065},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L3FRZZID/deRosset - 2015 - Better Semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Deutsch2012,
-  title = {Constructor {{Theory}}},
-  author = {Deutsch, David},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {arXiv:1210.7439 [physics]},
-  eprint = {1210.7439},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {physics},
-  abstract = {Constructor theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations - those that can be caused to happen and those that cannot. This is a departure from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics which is to predict what will happen from initial conditions and laws of motion. Several converging motivations for expecting constructor theory to be a fundamental branch of physics are discussed. Some principles of the theory are suggested and its potential for solving various problems and achieving various unifications is explored. These include providing a theory of information underlying classical and quantum information; generalising the theory of computation to include all physical transformations; unifying formal statements of conservation laws with the stronger operational ones (such as the ruling-out of perpetual motion machines); expressing the principles of testability and of the computability of nature (currently deemed methodological and metaphysical respectively) as laws of physics; allowing exact statements of emergent laws (such as the second law of thermodynamics); and expressing certain apparently anthropocentric attributes such as knowledge in physical terms.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Physics - Computational Physics,Physics - History and Philosophy of Physics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6Q8TCJ7G/Deutsch - 2012 - Constructor Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Deutsch2013,
-  title = {Constructor Theory},
-  author = {Deutsch, David},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {190},
-  number = {18},
-  pages = {4331--4359},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0279-z},
-  abstract = {Constructor theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations\textendash those that can be caused to happen and those that cannot. This is a departure from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics which is to predict what will happen from initial conditions and laws of motion. Several converging motivations for expecting constructor theory to be a fundamental branch of physics are discussed. Some principles of the theory are suggested and its potential for solving various problems and achieving various unifications is explored. These include providing a theory of information underlying classical and quantum information; generalising the theory of computation to include all physical transformations; unifying formal statements of conservation laws with the stronger operational ones (such as the ruling-out of perpetual motion machines); expressing the principles of testability and of the computability of nature (currently deemed methodological and metaphysical respectively) as laws of physics; allowing exact statements of emergent laws (such as the second law of thermodynamics); and expressing certain apparently anthropocentric attributes such as knowledge in physical terms.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IPX2BZLM/Deutsch - 2013 - Constructor theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Deutsch2015,
-  title = {Constructor Theory of Information},
-  author = {Deutsch, David and Marletto, Chiara},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society A},
-  volume = {471},
-  number = {2174},
-  pages = {20140540},
-  issn = {1364-5021, 1471-2946},
-  doi = {10.1098/rspa.2014.0540},
-  abstract = {We propose a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible\textemdash i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. It includes conjectured, exact laws of physics expressing the regularities that allow information to be physically instantiated. Although these laws are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, information is not regarded as an a priori mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. This theory solves a problem at the foundations of existing information theory, namely that information and distinguishability are each defined in terms of the other. It also explains the relationship between classical and quantum information, and reveals the single, constructor-theoretic property underlying the most distinctive phenomena associated with the latter, including the lack of in-principle distinguishability of some states, the impossibility of cloning, the existence of pairs of variables that cannot simultaneously have sharp values, the fact that measurement processes can be both deterministic and unpredictable, the irreducible perturbation caused by measurement, and locally inaccessible information (as in entangled systems).},
-  copyright = {. \textcopyright{} 2014 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EPFFIS5T/Deutsch and Marletto - 2015 - Constructor theory of information.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Diaz-Leon2015,
-  title = {What {{Is Social Construction}}?},
-  author = {Diaz-Leon, E.},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {23},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {1137--1152},
-  issn = {1468-0378},
-  doi = {10.1111/ejop.12033},
-  abstract = {In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing which one is more suited to the task.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2013 John Wiley \& Sons Ltd},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ejop.12033},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XFZZRBB4/Diaz‐Leon - 2015 - What Is Social Construction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ditter2022,
-  title = {Essence and {{Necessity}}},
-  author = {Ditter, Andreas},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {51},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {653--690},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-021-09646-0},
-  abstract = {What is the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence? This paper defends the view that the relation is one of identity: metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence. My argument consists in showing that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which metaphysical necessity is just a special case of essence. The argument is made against the backdrop of a novel, higher-order logic of essence (HLE), whose core features are introduced in the first part of the paper. The second part investigates the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence in the context of HLE. Reductive hypotheses are among the most natural hypotheses to be explored in the context of HLE. But they also have to be weighed against their non-reductive rivals. I investigate three different reductive hypotheses and argue that two of them fare better than their non-reductive rivals: they are simpler, more natural, and more systematic. Specifically, I argue that one candidate reduction, according to which metaphysical necessity is truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions, is superior to the others, including one proposed by Kit Fine, according to which metaphysical necessity is truth in virtue of the nature of all objects. The paper concludes by offering some reasons to think that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which the logic of metaphysical necessity includes S4, but not S5.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Broad necessity,Essence,Higher-order logic,Metaphysical necessity,Modality,S4,S5},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FCZ4R27G/Ditter - 2022 - Essence and Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dixon2016,
-  title = {What {{Is}} the {{Well-Foundedness}} of {{Grounding}}?},
-  author = {Dixon, T. Scott},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {125},
-  number = {498},
-  pages = {439--468},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzv112},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RZ8UR2VX/fzv112.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{DmitriGallow2021,
-  title = {A {{Model-Invariant Theory}} of {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Dmitri Gallow, J.},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {130},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {45--96},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-8699682},
-  abstract = {This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn't cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that that C caused (didn't cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M. The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or noninertial behavior to its effect.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CPTNSMW2/Dmitri Gallow_2021_A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XSWHIBV3/A-Model-Invariant-Theory-of-Causation.html}
-}
-
-@article{DmitriGallow2021a,
-  title = {A {{Model-Invariant Theory}} of {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Dmitri Gallow, J.},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {130},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {45--96},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-8699682},
-  abstract = {This article provides a theory of causation in the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn't cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that that C caused (didn't cause) E once one has removed an inessential variable from M. The article suggests that, if this theory is true, then one should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or noninertial behavior to its effect.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NLM3Y3JV/Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4CKQDCQG/A-Model-Invariant-Theory-of-Causation.html}
-}
-
-@book{Dohrn2020,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Conditionals}}: {{Orthodoxy}} and Its {{Challenges}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterfactual {{Conditionals}}},
-  author = {Dohrn, Daniel},
-  year = {2020},
-  publisher = {{Milan: Mimesis International}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LU7DU28T/DOHCCO.html}
-}
-
-@book{Dohrn2020a,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Conditionals}}: {{Orthodoxy}} and Its {{Challenges}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterfactual {{Conditionals}}},
-  author = {Dohrn, Daniel},
-  year = {2020},
-  publisher = {{Milan: Mimesis International}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VQSDP9L9/Dohrn - 2020 - Counterfactual Conditionals Orthodoxy and its Cha.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7KKZME7U/DOHCCO.html}
-}
-
-@article{Dor2006,
-  title = {Is {{There Anything We Might Call Dissent}} in {{Israel}}? ({{And}}, {{If There Is}}, {{Why Isn}}'t {{There}}?)},
-  shorttitle = {Is {{There Anything We Might Call Dissent}} in {{Israel}}?},
-  author = {Dor, Daniel},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Critical Inquiry},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {278--287},
-  issn = {0093-1896},
-  doi = {10.1086/500704},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WN8G5Q7I/Dor - 2006 - Is There Anything We Might Call Dissent in Israel.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dorr2004a,
-  title = {Non-Symmetric Relations},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Oxford studies in metaphysics},
-  volume = {1},
-  pages = {155--192},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KMT7D689/Dorr - 2004 - Non-symmetric relations.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Dorr2005,
-  title = {What {{We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology}}},
-  booktitle = {Fictionalism in {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian},
-  editor = {Kalderon, Mark Eli},
-  year = {2005},
-  pages = {234--86},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}
-}
-
-@incollection{Dorr2007,
-  title = {There {{Are No Abstract Objects}}},
-  booktitle = {Contemporary {{Debates}} in {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian},
-  editor = {Sider, Theodore and Hawthorne, John and Zimmerman, Dean W.},
-  year = {2007},
-  publisher = {{Blackwell}}
-}
-
-@article{Dorr2014,
-  title = {Quantifier {{Variance}} and the {{Collapse Theorems}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {The Monist},
-  volume = {97},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {503--570},
-  issn = {0026-9662, 2153-3601},
-  doi = {10.1093/monist/97.4.503},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2014, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y2XC3FUD/Dorr - 2014 - Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Theorems.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dorr2014a,
-  title = {Semantic {{Plasticity}} and {{Speech Reports}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian and Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {123},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {281--338},
-  issn = {0031-8108, 1558-1470},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-2683531},
-  abstract = {Most meanings we express belong to large families of variant meanings, among which it would be implausible to suppose that some are much more apt for being expressed than others. This abundance of candidate meanings creates pressure to think that the proposition attributing any particular meaning to an expression is modally plastic: its truth depends very sensitively on the exact microphysical state of the world. However, such plasticity seems to threaten ordinary counterfactuals whose consequents contain speech reports, since it is hard to see how we could reasonably be confident in a counterfactual whose consequent can be true only if a certain very finely tuned microphysical configuration obtains. This essay develops the foregoing puzzle and explores several possible solutions.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HGVWMTLM/Dorr and Hawthorne - 2014 - Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dorr2016,
-  title = {Contingent {{Existence}} and {{Iterated Modality}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  pages = {anw071},
-  issn = {0003-2638, 1467-8284},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/anw071},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EAI36GX6/Dorr - 2016 - Contingent Existence and Iterated Modality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dorr2016a,
-  title = {To {{Be F Is To Be G}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {30},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {39--134},
-  issn = {1520-8583},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpe.12079},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JEULTVNC/Dorr - 2016 - To Be F Is To Be G.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dorr2020,
-  title = {Diamonds Are {{Forever}}},
-  author = {Dorr, Cian and Goodman, Jeremy},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {54},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {632--665},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12271},
-  abstract = {We defend the thesis that every necessarily true proposition is always true. Since not every proposition that is always true is necessarily true, our thesis is at odds with theories of modality and time, such as those of Kit Fine and David Kaplan, which posit a fundamental symmetry between modal and tense operators. According to such theories, just as it is a contingent matter what is true at a given time, it is likewise a temporary matter what is true at a given possible world; so a proposition that is now true at all worlds, and thus necessarily true, may yet at some past or future time be false in the actual world, and thus not always true. We reconstruct and criticize several lines of argument in favor of this picture, and then argue against the picture on the grounds that it is inconsistent with certain sorts of contingency in the structure of time.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nous.12271},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8WI3TBAN/DiamondsAreForever.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GZGPGS22/DORDAFv3.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UITS7D5S/nous.html}
-}
-
-@book{Dowe2000,
-  title = {Physical {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Dowe, Phil},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {Illustrated edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-78049-0},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Dretske1977,
-  title = {Laws of {{Nature}}},
-  author = {Dretske, Fred I.},
-  year = {1977},
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {44},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {248--268},
-  issn = {0031-8248},
-  abstract = {It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are expressed by singular statements of fact describing the relationship between universal properties and magnitudes.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WCEAMTLF/Dretske - 1977 - Laws of Nature.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dreyfus1991,
-  title = {Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise},
-  author = {Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Dreyfus, Stuart E.},
-  year = {1991},
-  journal = {Human Studies},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {229--250},
-  abstract = {Page 1. Human Studies 14: 229-250, 1991. 9 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. Towards a phenomenology of ethical expertise HUBERT L. DREYFUS Department of Philosophy, University},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P5ZXY4JH/1991 - Towards a phenomenology of ethical expertise - Dreyfus, Dreyfus.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dreyfus2002,
-  title = {Intelligence without Representation: {{Merleau-Ponty}}'s Critique of Mental Representation},
-  author = {Dreyfus, Hubert L},
-  year = {2002},
-  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {367--383},
-  abstract = {Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in MerleauPonty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are ``stored'', not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either. Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip.}
-}
-
-@incollection{Dunn1986,
-  title = {Relevance {{Logic}} and {{Entailment}}},
-  booktitle = {Handbook of {{Philosophical Logic}}: {{Volume III}}: {{Alternatives}} in {{Classical Logic}}},
-  author = {Dunn, J. Michael},
-  editor = {Gabbay, D. and Guenthner, F.},
-  year = {1986},
-  series = {Synthese {{Library}}},
-  pages = {117--224},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4_3},
-  abstract = {Note carefully that the title of this piece is not `A Survey of Relevance Logic'. Such a project would be impossible given the development of the field and even the space limitations of this Handbook. For example Anderson and Belnap's [1975] book Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, volume 1 runs over 500 pages, and is their summary of just `half' of the work done by them and their co-workers up to about the early 70s.1},
-  isbn = {978-94-009-5203-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Axiom Scheme,Classical Logic,Modal Logic,Modus Ponens,Natural Deduction}
-}
-
-@book{Dunn1990,
-  title = {Truth or {{Consequences}}: {{Essays}} in {{Honor}} of {{Nuel Belnap}}},
-  shorttitle = {Truth or {{Consequences}}},
-  editor = {Dunn, M. and Segerberg, Krister},
-  year = {1990},
-  month = oct,
-  edition = {1990th edition},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht ; Boston}},
-  isbn = {978-0-7923-0920-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6QUVDC2G/Dunn and Segerberg - 1990 - Truth or Consequences Essays in Honor of Nuel Bel.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Dunn2001,
-  title = {Algebraic {{Methods}} in {{Philosophical Logic}}},
-  author = {Dunn, J. Michael and Hardegree, Gary},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = jun,
-  series = {Oxford {{Logic Guides}}},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {This comprehensive text demonstrates how various notions of logic can be viewed as notions of universal algebra. It is aimed primarily for logisticians in mathematics, philosophy, computer science and linguistics with an interest in algebraic logic, but is also accessible to those from a non-logistics background. It is suitable for researchers, graduates and advanced undergraduates who have an introductory knowledge of algebraic logic providing more advanced concepts, as well as more theoretical aspects. The main theme is that standard algebraic results (representations) translate into standard logical results (completeness). Other themes involve identification of a class of algebras appropriate for classical and non-classical logic studies, including: gaggles, distributoids, partial- gaggles, and tonoids. An imporatant sub title is that logic is fundamentally information based, with its main elements being propositions, that can be understood as sets of information states. Logics are considered in various senses e.g. systems of theorems, consequence relations and, symmetric consequence relations.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-853192-0},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2FC5L9CT/[J._Michael_Dunn,_Gary_Hardegree] Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Dunn2002,
-  title = {Relevance {{Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {Handbook of {{Philosophical Logic}}},
-  author = {Dunn, J. Michael and Restall, Greg},
-  editor = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Guenthner, F.},
-  year = {2002},
-  series = {Handbook of {{Philosophical Logic}}},
-  pages = {1--128},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0460-1_1},
-  abstract = {The title of this piece is not `A Survey of Relevance Logic'. Such a project was impossible in the mid 1980s when the first version of this article was published, due to the development of the field and even the space limitations of the Handbook. The situation is if anything, more difficult now. For example Anderson and Belnap and Dunn's two volume [1975; 1992] work Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, runs to over 1200 pages, and is their summary of just some of the work done by them and their coworkers up to about the late 1980s. Further, the comprehensive bibliography (prepared by R. G. Wolf) contains over 3000 entries in work on relevance logic and related fields.},
-  isbn = {978-94-017-0460-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Axiom Scheme,Classical Logic,Modal Logic,Natural Deduction,Relevance Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XPAHTS69/Dunn and Restall - 2002 - Relevance Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dupre2020,
-  title = {Idealisation in Semantics: Truth-Conditional Semantics for Radical Contextualists},
-  shorttitle = {Idealisation in Semantics},
-  author = {Dupre, Gabe},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {1--30},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2020.1712225},
-  abstract = {In this paper, I shall provide a novel response to the argument from context-sensitivity against truth-conditional semantics. It is often argued that the contextual influences on truth-conditions outstrip the resources of standard truth-conditional accounts, and so truth-conditional semantics rests on a mistake. The argument assumes that truth-conditional semantics is legitimate if and only if natural language sentences have truth-conditions. I shall argue that this assumption is mistaken. Truth-conditional analyses should be viewed as idealised approximations of the complexities of natural language meaning. From this perspective, disparity between the scientific model and its real-world target is to be expected. I elaborate on what such an approach to semantics would look like.},
-  keywords = {contextualism,minimalism,natural language semantics,Philosophy of language,philosophy of linguistics,scientific models},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1712225},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6DQFMSEQ/Dupre - 2020 - Idealisation in semantics truth-conditional seman.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/474G7Z7E/0020174X.2020.html}
-}
-
-@article{Dworkin1995,
-  title = {Unprincipled {{Ethics}}},
-  author = {Dworkin, Gerald},
-  year = {1995},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
-  volume = {20},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {224--239},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I2Y5UANI/1995 - Unprincipled Ethics - Dworkin.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZB4IU3NQ/1995 - Unprincipled Ethics - Dworkin.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Dyrkolbotn2017,
-  title = {On {{Preemption}} and {{Overdetermination}} in {{Formal Theories}} of {{Causality}}},
-  author = {Dyrkolbotn, Sjur K.},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science},
-  volume = {259},
-  eprint = {1710.03390},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  pages = {1--15},
-  issn = {2075-2180},
-  doi = {10.4204/EPTCS.259.1},
-  abstract = {One of the key challenges when looking for the causes of a complex event is to determine the causal status of factors that are neither individually necessary nor individually sufficient to produce that event. In order to reason about how such factors should be taken into account, we need a vocabulary to distinguish different cases. In philosophy, the concept of overdetermination and the concept of preemption serve an important purpose in this regard, although their exact meaning tends to remain elusive. In this paper, I provide theory-neutral definitions of these concepts using structural equations in the Halpern-Pearl tradition. While my definitions do not presuppose any particular causal theory, they take such a theory as a variable parameter. This enables us to specify formal constraints on theories of causality, in terms of a pre-theoretic understanding of what preemption and overdetermination actually mean. I demonstrate the usefulness of this by presenting and arguing for what I call the principle of presumption. Roughly speaking, this principle states that a possible cause can only be regarded as having been preempted if there is independent evidence to support such an inference. I conclude by showing that the principle of presumption is violated by the two main theories of causality formulated in the Halpern-Pearl tradition. The paper concludes by defining the class of empirical causal theories, characterised in terms of a fixed-point of counterfactual reasoning about difference-making. It is argued that theories of actual causality ought to be empirical.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Logic in Computer Science},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XS423MER/Dyrkolbotn - 2017 - On Preemption and Overdetermination in Formal Theo.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LJJPZT2R/1710.html}
-}
-
-@article{Easwaran2016,
-  title = {Dr. {{Truthlove}} or: {{How I Learned}} to {{Stop Worrying}} and {{Love Bayesian Probabilities}}*},
-  shorttitle = {Dr. {{Truthlove}} Or},
-  author = {Easwaran, Kenny},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {816--853},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12099},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B5NSAKIX/Easwaran - 2016 - Dr. Truthlove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying a.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Edgington1995,
-  title = {On {{Conditionals}}},
-  author = {Edgington, Dorothy},
-  year = {1995},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {104},
-  number = {414},
-  pages = {235--329},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/104.414.235},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/THXL2G4U/Edgington - 1995 - On Conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Edgington2004,
-  title = {Two {{Kinds}} of {{Possibility}}},
-  author = {Edgington, Dorothy},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
-  volume = {78},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  issn = {1467-8349},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00112.x},
-  abstract = {I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.},
-  copyright = {The Aristotelian Society 2004},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00112.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I4GZGSZG/Edgington - 2004 - Two Kinds of Possibility.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Efird2008a,
-  title = {What Is the {{Principle}} of {{Recombination}}?},
-  author = {Efird, David and Stoneham, Tom},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Dialectica},
-  volume = {62},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {483--494},
-  issn = {1746-8361},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01159.x},
-  abstract = {In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue that it need not be subject to any restrictions.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I48HMCBE/Efird and Stoneham - 2008 - What is the Principle of Recombination.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ehsan2021,
-  title = {The {{Who}} in {{Explainable AI}}: {{How AI Background Shapes Perceptions}} of {{AI Explanations}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Who}} in {{Explainable AI}}},
-  author = {Ehsan, Upol and Passi, Samir and Liao, Q. Vera and Chan, Larry and Lee, I.-Hsiang and Muller, Michael and Riedl, Mark O.},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {arXiv:2107.13509 [cs]},
-  eprint = {2107.13509},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {Explainability of AI systems is critical for users to take informed actions and hold systems accountable. While "opening the opaque box" is important, understanding who opens the box can govern if the Human-AI interaction is effective. In this paper, we conduct a mixed-methods study of how two different groups of whos--people with and without a background in AI--perceive different types of AI explanations. These groups were chosen to look at how disparities in AI backgrounds can exacerbate the creator-consumer gap. We quantitatively share what the perceptions are along five dimensions: confidence, intelligence, understandability, second chance, and friendliness. Qualitatively, we highlight how the AI background influences each group's interpretations and elucidate why the differences might exist through the lenses of appropriation and cognitive heuristics. We find that (1) both groups had unwarranted faith in numbers, to different extents and for different reasons, (2) each group found explanatory values in different explanations that went beyond the usage we designed them for, and (3) each group had different requirements of what counts as humanlike explanations. Using our findings, we discuss potential negative consequences such as harmful manipulation of user trust and propose design interventions to mitigate them. By bringing conscious awareness to how and why AI backgrounds shape perceptions of potential creators and consumers in XAI, our work takes a formative step in advancing a pluralistic Human-centered Explainable AI discourse.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Computers and Society,Computer Science - Human-Computer Interaction},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RHDZI53I/Ehsan et al. - 2021 - The Who in Explainable AI How AI Background Shape.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BWHNQK4V/2107.html}
-}
-
-@article{Eklund2009,
-  title = {On Some Recent Criticisms of the 'linguistic' Approach to Ontology},
-  author = {Eklund, Matti},
-  year = {2009},
-  journal = {Dialectica},
-  volume = {63},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {313--323},
-  issn = {00122017},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01190.x},
-  abstract = {Some philosophers, e.g. John Heil (2003) and Heather Dyke (2007), have recently argued against the methodology of undertaking ontology via the study of lan- guage. (``the linguistic tail wagging the ontological dog'', as Heil puts it in one place (2003, p. 189).) I will here argue that they fail to characterize a genuine (non-strawman) target. Later I turn to what a genuinely linguistic approach to ontology might be; and what's really at issue between those who favour a linguis- tic approach and those who are against it.}
-}
-
-@article{Eklund2014,
-  title = {Rayo's {{Metametaphysics}}‏},
-  author = {Eklund, Matti},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Inquiry, 2014‏},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {483--497}
-}
-
-@article{Eklund2019,
-  title = {Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions},
-  author = {Eklund, Matti},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {196},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {1225--1247},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-016-1155-4},
-  abstract = {The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley's regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present my favored solutions to these problems.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CAQANM4Y/Eklund - 2019 - Regress, unity, facts, and propositions.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Eldredge2016,
-  title = {Analysis and {{Probability}} on {{Infinite-Dimensional Spaces}}},
-  author = {Eldredge, Nathaniel},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {arXiv:1607.03591 [math]},
-  eprint = {1607.03591},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {math},
-  abstract = {These lecture notes contain an introduction to some of the fundamental ideas and results in analysis and probability on infinite-dimensional spaces, mainly Gaussian measures on Banach spaces. They originated as the notes for a topics course at Cornell University in 2011.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {28C20; 60B11; 60H07; 60G15,Mathematics - Probability},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SLSS92FV/Eldredge_2016_Analysis and Probability on Infinite-Dimensional Spaces.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X8YYQXUG/1607.html}
-}
-
-@unpublished{Elgin,
-  title = {The {{Opacity}} of {{Definition}}},
-  author = {Elgin, Samuel},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VHSFC9BK/Elgin - The Opacity of Definition.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ellis1977,
-  title = {An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics},
-  author = {Ellis, Brian and Jackson, Frank and Pargetter, Robert},
-  year = {1977},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {6},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {355--357},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00262069},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VS3DJMFG/Ellis et al. - 1977 - An objection to possible-world semantics for count.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Enderton2001,
-  title = {A {{Mathematical Introduction}} to {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Enderton, Herbert B.},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {2 edition},
-  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
-  address = {{San Diego}},
-  abstract = {A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, Second Edition, offers increased flexibility with topic coverage, allowing for choice in how to utilize the textbook in a course. The author has made this edition more accessible to better meet the needs of today's undergraduate mathematics and philosophy students. It is intended for the reader who has not studied logic previously, but who has some experience in mathematical reasoning. Material is presented on computer science issues such as computational complexity and database queries, with additional coverage of introductory material such as sets. * Increased flexibility of the text, allowing instructors more choice in how they use the textbook in courses. * Reduced mathematical rigour to fit the needs of undergraduate students},
-  isbn = {978-0-12-238452-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BXG34E7K/Enderton and Enderton - 2001 - A Mathematical Introduction to Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Epstein2015,
-  title = {The {{Ant Trap}}: {{Rebuilding}} the {{Foundations}} of the {{Social Sciences}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Ant Trap}}},
-  author = {Epstein, Brian},
-  year = {2015},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8QX2Y8ZH/Epstein - 2015 - The Ant Trap Rebuilding the Foundations of the So.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Epstein2019,
-  title = {What Are Social Groups? {{Their}} Metaphysics and How to Classify Them},
-  shorttitle = {What Are Social Groups?},
-  author = {Epstein, Brian},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {196},
-  number = {12},
-  pages = {4899--4932},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-017-1387-y},
-  abstract = {This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing and explaining the nature of social groups. I argue against prominent views that attempt to unify all social groups or to divide them into simple typologies. Instead I argue that social groups are enormously diverse, but show how we can investigate their natures nonetheless. I analyze social groups from a bottom-up perspective, constructing profiles of the metaphysical features of groups of specific kinds. We can characterize any given kind of social group with four complementary profiles: its ``construction'' profile, its ``extra essentials'' profile, its ``anchor'' profile, and its ``accident'' profile. Together these provide a framework for understanding the nature of groups, help classify and categorize groups, and shed light on group agency.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/G45LJXNQ/Epstein - 2019 - What are social groups Their metaphysics and how .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Erasmus2020,
-  title = {What Is {{Interpretability}}?},
-  author = {Erasmus, Adrian and Brunet, Tyler D. P. and Fisher, Eyal},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Philosophy \& Technology},
-  issn = {2210-5441},
-  doi = {10.1007/s13347-020-00435-2},
-  abstract = {We argue that artificial networks are explainable and offer a novel theory of interpretability. Two sets of conceptual questions are prominent in theoretical engagements with artificial neural networks, especially in the context of medical artificial intelligence: (1) Are networks explainable, and if so, what does it mean to explain the output of a network? And (2) what does it mean for a network to be interpretable? We argue that accounts of ``explanation'' tailored specifically to neural networks have ineffectively reinvented the wheel. In response to (1), we show how four familiar accounts of explanation apply to neural networks as they would to any scientific phenomenon. We diagnose the confusion about explaining neural networks within the machine learning literature as an equivocation on ``explainability,'' ``understandability'' and ``interpretability.'' To remedy this, we distinguish between these notions, and answer (2) by offering a theory and typology of interpretation in machine learning. Interpretation is something one does to an explanation with the aim of producing another, more understandable, explanation. As with explanation, there are various concepts and methods involved in interpretation: Total or Partial, Global or Local, and Approximative or Isomorphic. Our account of ``interpretability'' is consistent with uses in the machine learning literature, in keeping with the philosophy of explanation and understanding, and pays special attention to medical artificial intelligence systems.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5B6SN6IV/Erasmus et al. - 2020 - What is Interpretability.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Etchemendy,
-  title = {Models, Semantics and Logical Truth},
-  author = {Etchemendy, John},
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {91--106},
-  issn = {0165-0157, 1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00635758},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CB239EJT/Etchemendy - Models, semantics and logical truth.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Evans1976,
-  title = {Truth and {{Meaning}}: {{Essays}} in {{Semantics}}},
-  shorttitle = {Truth and {{Meaning}}},
-  author = {Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John Henry},
-  year = {1976},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SF63NDFT/[Gareth_Evans,_John_McDowell]_Truth_and_Meaning_E(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Evans1979,
-  title = {{Reference and Contingency:}},
-  shorttitle = {{Reference and Contingency}},
-  author = {Evans, Gareth and {The Hegeler Institute}},
-  editor = {Sugden, Sherwood J. B.},
-  year = {1979},
-  journal = {Monist},
-  volume = {62},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {161--189},
-  issn = {0026-9662},
-  doi = {10.5840/monist197962220},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CCJ2NTCZ/monist62-0161.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Evans2018,
-  title = {Learning {{Explanatory Rules}} from {{Noisy Data}}},
-  author = {Evans, Richard and Grefenstette, Edward},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jan,
-  number = {arXiv:1711.04574},
-  eprint = {1711.04574},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, math},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1711.04574},
-  abstract = {Artificial Neural Networks are powerful function approximators capable of modelling solutions to a wide variety of problems, both supervised and unsupervised. As their size and expressivity increases, so too does the variance of the model, yielding a nearly ubiquitous overfitting problem. Although mitigated by a variety of model regularisation methods, the common cure is to seek large amounts of training data---which is not necessarily easily obtained---that sufficiently approximates the data distribution of the domain we wish to test on. In contrast, logic programming methods such as Inductive Logic Programming offer an extremely data-efficient process by which models can be trained to reason on symbolic domains. However, these methods are unable to deal with the variety of domains neural networks can be applied to: they are not robust to noise in or mislabelling of inputs, and perhaps more importantly, cannot be applied to non-symbolic domains where the data is ambiguous, such as operating on raw pixels. In this paper, we propose a Differentiable Inductive Logic framework, which can not only solve tasks which traditional ILP systems are suited for, but shows a robustness to noise and error in the training data which ILP cannot cope with. Furthermore, as it is trained by backpropagation against a likelihood objective, it can be hybridised by connecting it with neural networks over ambiguous data in order to be applied to domains which ILP cannot address, while providing data efficiency and generalisation beyond what neural networks on their own can achieve.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Neural and Evolutionary Computing,Mathematics - Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TMR8MGG7/Evans and Grefenstette - 2018 - Learning Explanatory Rules from Noisy Data.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YHSF7994/1711.html}
-}
-
-@misc{Evans2018a,
-  title = {Can {{Neural Networks Understand Logical Entailment}}?},
-  author = {Evans, Richard and Saxton, David and Amos, David and Kohli, Pushmeet and Grefenstette, Edward},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = feb,
-  number = {arXiv:1802.08535},
-  eprint = {1802.08535},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1802.08535},
-  abstract = {We introduce a new dataset of logical entailments for the purpose of measuring models' ability to capture and exploit the structure of logical expressions against an entailment prediction task. We use this task to compare a series of architectures which are ubiquitous in the sequence-processing literature, in addition to a new model class---PossibleWorldNets---which computes entailment as a "convolution over possible worlds". Results show that convolutional networks present the wrong inductive bias for this class of problems relative to LSTM RNNs, tree-structured neural networks outperform LSTM RNNs due to their enhanced ability to exploit the syntax of logic, and PossibleWorldNets outperform all benchmarks.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Neural and Evolutionary Computing},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/383QY397/Evans et al. - 2018 - Can Neural Networks Understand Logical Entailment.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SBMVSA3K/1802.html}
-}
-
-@article{Fara2009,
-  title = {Dear {{Haecceitism}}},
-  author = {Fara, Delia Graff},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {70},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {285--297},
-  issn = {0165-0106, 1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-008-9149-3},
-  abstract = {If a counterpart theorist's understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis's does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3\textendash 32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a `cheap substitute for haecceitism,' which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier (Journal of Philosophy 65(5):113\textendash 126, 1968; 68(7):203\textendash 211, 1971) ban on there being multiple intra-world counterparts. I argue here that serious problems for `cheap haecceitism' lurk very close to its surface, and they emerge when we consider the effect of using an actuality operator in our language. Among the most serious of the problems is the result that being the case in some possible world does not always suffice for possibly being the case. The result applies to any counterpart theory that employs a purely qualitative counterpart relation. The upshot is that if we are to admit haecceitist possibilities, as we should, then we must reject any purely qualitative relation as the one involved in the analysis of what might have been for an individual.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HXRICNX6/Fara - 2009 - Dear Haecceitism.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Feinberg2012,
-  title = {Handbook of {{Markov Decision Processes}}: {{Methods}} and {{Applications}}},
-  shorttitle = {Handbook of {{Markov Decision Processes}}},
-  author = {Feinberg, Eugene A. and Shwartz, Adam},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = dec,
-  publisher = {{Springer Science \& Business Media}},
-  abstract = {Eugene A. Feinberg Adam Shwartz This volume deals with the theory of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and their applications. Each chapter was written by a leading expert in the re spective area. The papers cover major research areas and methodologies, and discuss open questions and future research directions. The papers can be read independently, with the basic notation and concepts ofSection 1.2. Most chap ters should be accessible by graduate or advanced undergraduate students in fields of operations research, electrical engineering, and computer science. 1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES The theory of Markov Decision Processes-also known under several other names including sequential stochastic optimization, discrete-time stochastic control, and stochastic dynamic programming-studiessequential optimization ofdiscrete time stochastic systems. The basic object is a discrete-time stochas tic system whose transition mechanism can be controlled over time. Each control policy defines the stochastic process and values of objective functions associated with this process. The goal is to select a "good" control policy. In real life, decisions that humans and computers make on all levels usually have two types ofimpacts: (i) they cost orsavetime, money, or other resources, or they bring revenues, as well as (ii) they have an impact on the future, by influencing the dynamics. In many situations, decisions with the largest immediate profit may not be good in view offuture events. MDPs model this paradigm and provide results on the structure and existence of good policies and on methods for their calculation.},
-  googlebooks = {TpwKCAAAQBAJ},
-  isbn = {978-1-4615-0805-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Business \& Economics / General,Business \& Economics / Management,Business \& Economics / Management Science,Business \& Economics / Operations Research,Mathematics / Calculus,Mathematics / Functional Analysis,Mathematics / Probability \& Statistics / General,Technology \& Engineering / Mechanical},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9S3HIFFU/Handbook of Markov Decision Processes Methods and Applications (Eugene A. Feinberg, Adam Shwartz (eds.)) (z-lib.org).djvu}
-}
-
-@article{Felka2018,
-  title = {Comments on {{Stephen Yablo}}'s {{Aboutness}}},
-  author = {Felka, Katharina},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {83},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1181--1194},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-017-9935-x},
-  abstract = {This paper concerns Yablo's theory of asserted content as it is developed in his new book Aboutness. Yablo's central idea is that in order to specify the asserted content of a sentence, we have to subtract those parts of its full semantic content that concern irrelevant subject matters. The paper argues that it is doubtful whether Yablo's account successfully deals with its most basic envisaged application: to account for a difference of apparent truth value in cases of ordinary presupposition failure. In addition, some doubts are raised concerning the success of the extension of Yablo's account to fictional talk, the informativeness of identity statements, and ontological commitments of number talk.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ECV8IBKG/Felka - 2018 - Comments on Stephen Yablo’s Aboutness.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Fernandez-Loria2021,
-  title = {Explaining {{Data-Driven Decisions}} Made by {{AI Systems}}: {{The Counterfactual Approach}}},
-  shorttitle = {Explaining {{Data-Driven Decisions}} Made by {{AI Systems}}},
-  author = {{Fern{\'a}ndez-Lor{\'i}a}, Carlos and Provost, Foster and Han, Xintian},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = oct,
-  number = {arXiv:2001.07417},
-  eprint = {2001.07417},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2001.07417},
-  abstract = {We examine counterfactual explanations for explaining the decisions made by model-based AI systems. The counterfactual approach we consider defines an explanation as a set of the system's data inputs that causally drives the decision (i.e., changing the inputs in the set changes the decision) and is irreducible (i.e., changing any subset of the inputs does not change the decision). We (1) demonstrate how this framework may be used to provide explanations for decisions made by general, data-driven AI systems that may incorporate features with arbitrary data types and multiple predictive models, and (2) propose a heuristic procedure to find the most useful explanations depending on the context. We then contrast counterfactual explanations with methods that explain model predictions by weighting features according to their importance (e.g., SHAP, LIME) and present two fundamental reasons why we should carefully consider whether importance-weight explanations are well-suited to explain system decisions. Specifically, we show that (i) features that have a large importance weight for a model prediction may not affect the corresponding decision, and (ii) importance weights are insufficient to communicate whether and how features influence decisions. We demonstrate this with several concise examples and three detailed case studies that compare the counterfactual approach with SHAP to illustrate various conditions under which counterfactual explanations explain data-driven decisions better than importance weights.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9TQTYPLM/Fernández-Loría et al. - 2021 - Explaining Data-Driven Decisions made by AI System.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2Q92PVNL/2001.html}
-}
-
-@article{Field2017,
-  title = {Prospects for a {{Naive Theory}} of {{Classes}}},
-  author = {Field, Hartry and Lederman, Harvey and {\O}gaard, Tore Fjetland},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {58},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {461--506},
-  publisher = {{Duke University Press}},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1215/00294527-2017-0010},
-  abstract = {The naive theory of properties states that for every condition there is a property instantiated by exactly the things which satisfy that condition. The naive theory of properties is inconsistent in classical logic, but there are many ways to obtain consistent naive theories of properties in nonclassical logics. The naive theory of classes adds to the naive theory of properties an extensionality rule or axiom, which states roughly that if two classes have exactly the same members, they are identical. In this paper we examine the prospects for obtaining a satisfactory naive theory of classes. We start from a result by Ross Brady, which demonstrates the consistency of something resembling a naive theory of classes. We generalize Brady's result somewhat and extend it to a recent system developed by Andrew Bacon. All of the theories we prove consistent contain an extensionality rule or axiom. But we argue that given the background logics, the relevant extensionality principles are too weak. For example, in some of these theories, there are universal classes which are not declared coextensive. We elucidate some very modest demands on extensionality, designed to rule out this kind of pathology. But we close by proving that even these modest demands cannot be jointly satisfied. In light of this new impossibility result, the prospects for a naive theory of classes are bleak.},
-  keywords = {3E70,extensionality axiom,naive class theory,naive comprehension,nonclassical logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KCL2RFRU/Field et al_2017_Prospects for a Naive Theory of Classes.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KCATJ74E/00294527-2017-0010.html}
-}
-
-@article{Fine,
-  title = {Properties, Propositions and Sets},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {6},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {135--191},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00262054},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DBTAKGQR/Fine - Properties, propositions and sets.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1972,
-  title = {In so Many Possible Worlds.},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1972},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {516--520},
-  publisher = {{University of Notre Dame}},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1093890715},
-  abstract = {Project Euclid - mathematics and statistics online},
-  langid = {english},
-  mrnumber = {MR0319706},
-  zmnumber = {0205.30306},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/W46BAQTU/Fine - 1972 - In so many possible worlds..pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1974,
-  title = {Models for Entailment},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1974},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {347--372},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00257480},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SKQMYARP/Fine - 1974 - Models for entailment.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1975,
-  title = {Vagueness, Truth and Logic},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1975},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {30},
-  number = {3-4},
-  pages = {265--300},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00485047},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Metaphysics,Philosophy,Philosophy of Language},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YRXL9NJD/Fine - 1975 - Vagueness, truth and logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1975a,
-  title = {Critical {{Notice}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1975},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {84},
-  number = {335},
-  pages = {451--458},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, Mind Association]}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BQQRXDHC/Fine - 1975 - Critical Notice.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine1977,
-  title = {Postscript},
-  booktitle = {Worlds, {{Times}}, and {{Selves}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1977},
-  publisher = {{Duckworth}},
-  address = {{London}}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1977a,
-  title = {Properties, Propositions and Sets},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1977},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {6},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {135--191},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4X4JIZLE/1977 - Properties, propositions and sets - Fine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EVV333XY/1977 - Properties, propositions and sets - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1986,
-  title = {Analytic Implication},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1986},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {169--179},
-  publisher = {{University of Notre Dame}},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1093636609},
-  abstract = {Project Euclid - mathematics and statistics online},
-  langid = {english},
-  mrnumber = {MR842145},
-  zmnumber = {0621.03006},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5RUEFMX4/Fine - 1986 - Analytic implication..pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/THE9GQQQ/1093636609.html}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1991,
-  title = {The {{Study}} of {{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1991},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {25},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {263--294},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2215504},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2TKVCCUW/Fine - 1991 - The Study of Ontology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1994,
-  title = {Essence and {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1994},
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {8},
-  pages = {1--16},
-  issn = {1520-8583},
-  doi = {10.2307/2214160},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NIJ8DYS9/Fine - 1994 - Essence and Modality The Second Philosophical Per.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine1994a,
-  title = {Senses of {{Essence}}},
-  booktitle = {Modality, {{Morality}} and {{Belief}}. {{Essays}} in {{Honor}} of {{Ruth Barcan Marcus}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {{Sinnott-Armstrong}, Walter and Raffman, Diana and Asher, Nicholas},
-  year = {1994},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1995,
-  title = {Ontological {{Dependence}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1995},
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  volume = {95},
-  pages = {269--290},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LGTHDRYT/1995 - Ontological Dependence - Fine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PRKRIGW8/1995 - Ontological Dependence - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1995a,
-  title = {The {{Logic}} of {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1995},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {24},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {241--273},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/INWQ87TH/1995 - The Logic of Essence - Fine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZVP5LP52/1995 - The Logic of Essence - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine1999,
-  title = {Things and {{Their Parts}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1999},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
-  volume = {23},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {61--74},
-  issn = {1475-4975},
-  doi = {10.1111/1475-4975.00004},
-  copyright = {1999 Blackwell Publishers, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GKRKER87/Pine - 1999 - Things and Their Parts.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PG8GZHVJ/Pine - 1999 - Things and Their Parts.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2000,
-  title = {Semantics for the {{Logic}} of {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {29},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {543--584},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1023/A:1026591900038},
-  abstract = {This paper provides a possible worlds semantics for the system of the author's previous paper 'The Logic of Essence'. The basic idea behind the semantics is that a statement should be taken to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects just in case it is true in any possible world compatible with the nature of those objects. It is shown that a slight variant of the original system is sound and complete under the proposed semantics.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {essence,Logic,modality,possible worlds,semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HGDCPXTW/Fine - 2000 - Semantics for the Logic of Essence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2001,
-  title = {The {{Question}} of {{Realism}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2001},
-  journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--30},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8XIG7ZSW/dod-idx.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine2002,
-  title = {Varieties of {{Necessity}}},
-  booktitle = {Conceivability and {{Possibility}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {Gendler, Tamar Szabo and Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2002},
-  pages = {253--281},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Up}}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine2003,
-  title = {The {{Problem}} of {{Possibilia}}},
-  booktitle = {Oxford {{Handbook}} of {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {Loux, Michael J and Zimmerman, Dean W},
-  year = {2003},
-  pages = {161--179},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EF8XN9Z9/2003 - The Problem of Possibilia - Fine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MS4UYFEA/2003 - The Problem of Possibilia - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2003a,
-  title = {The {{Non-Identity}} of a {{Material Thing}} and {{Its Matter}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {112},
-  number = {446},
-  pages = {195--234},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/112.446.195},
-  abstract = {There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this `opacity' defence has intolerable consequences for the functioning of our language and that the original argument should therefore be allowed to stand.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BIKDUTFY/Fine - 2003 - The Non‐Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matte.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V8PF5VLQ/Fine - 2003 - The Non‐Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matte.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Fine2005,
-  title = {Modality and {{Tense}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = jul,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-927870-1},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PJ6B7XMS/2005 - Modality and Tense - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2006,
-  title = {The {{RealIty}} of {{Tense}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {150},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {399--414},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-005-5515-8},
-  abstract = {I argue for a version of tense-logical realism that privileges tensed facts without privileging any particular temporal standpoint from which they obtain.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8GCFGW8D/Fine - 2006 - The RealIty of Tense.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2008,
-  title = {Coincidence and {{Form}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
-  volume = {82},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {101--118},
-  issn = {1467-8349},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00164.x},
-  abstract = {How can a statue and a piece of alloy be coincident at any time at which they exist and yet differ in their modal properties? I argue that this question demands an answer and that the only plausible answer is one that posits a difference in the form of the two objects.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2008 The Aristotelian Society},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JUUWP2ZL/Fine - 2008 - I—Coincidence and Form.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine2009,
-  title = {The {{Question}} of {{Ontology}}},
-  booktitle = {Metametaphysics: {{New Essays}} on the {{Foundations}} of {{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {Chalmers, David John and Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan},
-  year = {2009},
-  pages = {157--177},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ACA44YPK/[David_Chalmers,_David_Manley,_Ryan_Wasserman]_Met(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2010,
-  title = {Towards a Theory of Part},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {cvii},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {559--589},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3YYE8GD4/2010 - Towards a theory of part - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2010a,
-  title = {Some {{Puzzles}} of {{Ground}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {51},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {97--118},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1215/00294527-2010-007},
-  abstract = {I describe some paradoxes of ground and relate them to the semantic paradoxes.},
-  langid = {english},
-  mrnumber = {MR2666572},
-  zmnumber = {05720472},
-  keywords = {Logic,paradox,Truth},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SJF2E79E/euclid.ndjfl.1273002112.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine2012,
-  title = {Guide to {{Ground}}},
-  booktitle = {Metaphysical {{Grounding}}: {{Understanding}} the {{Structure}} of {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  year = {2012},
-  pages = {37--80},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/534375IH/2012 - Guide to Ground - Fine(2).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2012a,
-  title = {{Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {Smylie, John},
-  year = {2012},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {109},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {221--246},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil201210938},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6JWNHIJ3/Fine - 2012 - Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2012b,
-  title = {A Difficulty for the Possible Worlds Analysis of Counterfactuals},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {189},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {29--57},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0094-y},
-  abstract = {I present a puzzle concerning counterfactual reasoning and argue that it should be solved by giving up the principle of substitution for logical equivalents.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ILILVXHL/Fine - 2012 - A difficulty for the possible worlds analysis of c.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2012c,
-  title = {The {{Pure Logic}} of {{Ground}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2012},
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {01},
-  pages = {1--25},
-  issn = {1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020311000086},
-  abstract = {I lay down a system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FAKSF5IF/Fine - 2012 - THE PURE LOGIC OF GROUND.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2013,
-  title = {Fundamental {{Truth}} and {{Fundamental Terms}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {87},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {725--732},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12072},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2013 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DM5G3VJP/Fine - 2013 - Fundamental Truth and Fundamental Terms.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2013a,
-  title = {Truth-{{Maker Semantics}} for {{Intuitionistic Logic}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {43},
-  number = {2-3},
-  pages = {549--577},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-013-9281-7},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Conditional,Construction,Forcing,Intuitionism,Intuitionistic logic,Logic,Realism,Truthmaker,Truthmaking},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7NKUT8SZ/Fine - 2013 - Truth-Maker Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2013b,
-  title = {A Note on Partial Content},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {73},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {413--419},
-  issn = {0003-2638, 1467-8284},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/ant039},
-  abstract = {It is shown that certain natural constraints trivialize the concept of partial content and it is suggested, in the light of this difficulty, that the principle that partial content is preserved under the substitution of logical equivalents should be given up.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {confirmation,impossibility theorem,non-classical logic,partial content,partial truth},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UVBS5VAG/Fine - 2013 - A note on partial content.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2014,
-  title = {Permission and {{Possible Worlds}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Dialectica},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {317--336},
-  issn = {1746-8361},
-  doi = {10.1111/1746-8361.12068},
-  abstract = {I attempt to argue that if statements of permission are to serve as a guide to action then no possible worlds account of their truth-conditions can be correct.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2014 The Author dialectica \textcopyright{} 2014 Editorial Board of dialectica},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4MI96P4U/Fine - 2014 - Permission and Possible Worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2015a,
-  title = {Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {296--311},
-  issn = {2053-4477},
-  doi = {10.1017/apa.2014.26},
-  abstract = {I argue in favor of a distinctive generic form of essence and ground and show how the two notions thereby complement one another as forms of necessary and sufficient condition.},
-  keywords = {essence,generic,ground,metametaphysics,metaphysics,philosophical logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5QQ2BAZJ/2015 - Unified foundations for essence and ground - Fine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2015b,
-  title = {The Possibility of Vagueness},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  pages = {1--27},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0625-9},
-  abstract = {I present a new approach to the logic and semantics of vagueness.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Borderline case,Determinacy,Epistemology,Logic,Metaphysics,Philosophy of Language,Philosophy of Science,semantics,Sorites,Transcendental,Truth,Vague},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XDBNTB4V/Fine - 2015 - The possibility of vagueness.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2016,
-  title = {Angellic {{Content}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {199--226},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-015-9371-9},
-  abstract = {I provide a truthmaker semantics for Angell's system of analytic implication and establish completeness.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X4Q7VRIK/Fine - 2016 - Angellic Content.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2016a,
-  title = {Identity Criteria and Ground},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {173},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--19},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-014-0440-7},
-  abstract = {I propose formulating identity criteria as generic statements of ground, thereby avoiding objections that have been made to the more usual formulations.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z4NLX45K/Fine_2016_Identity criteria and ground.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2017,
-  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Truthmaker Content II}}: {{Subject-Matter}}, {{Common Content}}, {{Remainder}} and {{Ground}}},
-  shorttitle = {A {{Theory}} of {{Truthmaker Content II}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {46},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {675--702},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-016-9419-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2N2P8LN2/Fine - 2017 - A Theory of Truthmaker Content II Subject-matter,.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Fine2017a,
-  title = {Truthmaker {{Semantics}}},
-  booktitle = {A {{Companion}} to the {{Philosophy}} of {{Language}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2017},
-  edition = {2nd edition},
-  pages = {556--577},
-  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
-  address = {{Malden, MA}},
-  doi = {10.1002/9781118972090.ch22},
-  abstract = {This chapter explains the basic framework of truthmaker or 'exact' semantics, an approach to semantics that has recently received a growing amount of interest, and discusses a number of different applications within philosophy and linguistics. The idea of truthmaking is the idea of something on the side of the world - a fact, perhaps, or a state of affairs - verifying, or making true, something on the side of language or thought - a statement, perhaps, or a proposition. The chapter focuses on the ultimate truthmakers, on what in the world ultimately makes something true, and the question of how the truthmakers make the statements of our language true is of no great concern. It also focuses on the immediate truthmakers, and the question of how they make the statements of the language true will be of greatest concern.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
-  isbn = {978-1-118-97209-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {basic framework,exact semantics,immediate truthmakers,language true,linguistics,philosophy,ultimate truthmakers},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DPAGXJAY/Fine - 2017 - Truthmaker Semantics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2017b,
-  title = {Ignorance of Ignorance},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  pages = {1--15},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-017-1406-z},
-  abstract = {I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5BYGGD59/Fine - 2017 - Ignorance of ignorance.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2017c,
-  title = {Naive {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {98--113},
-  issn = {1758-2237},
-  doi = {10.1111/phis.12092},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KX9HR4PS/Fine - 2017 - Naive Metaphysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2017d,
-  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Truthmaker Content I}}: {{Conjunction}}, {{Disjunction}} and {{Negation}}},
-  shorttitle = {A {{Theory}} of {{Truthmaker Content I}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {46},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {625--674},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-016-9413-y},
-  abstract = {I develop a basic theory of content within the framework of truthmaker semantics and, in the second part, consider some of the applications to subject matter, common content, logical subtraction and ground.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8C9I4L68/Fine - 2017 - A Theory of Truthmaker Content I Conjunction, Dis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2018,
-  title = {Compliance and {{Comand I}}\textemdash{{Categorical Imperatives}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {609--633},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S175502031700020X},
-  abstract = {I develop a semantics for imperatives within the truthmaker framework by taking the meaning of an imperative to be given by the actions that are in compliance with or in contravention to the imperative.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03B45,entailment,free choice,imperative logic,partial content,possible worlds semantics,Ross’s paradox,truthmaker semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ABQ9UWTD/Fine - 2018 - COMPLIANCE AND COMMAND I—CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2018a,
-  title = {Compliance and {{Command II}}, {{Imperatives}} and {{Deontics}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {634--664},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020318000059},
-  abstract = {I extend the previously given truth-maker semantics and logic for imperatives to deontic statements.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03B45,deontic logic,free choice permission,imperative logic,obligation,permission,possible worlds semantics,truthmaker semantics,up-dating},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MIA5PBWY/Fine - 2018 - COMPLIANCE AND COMMAND II, IMPERATIVES AND DEONTIC.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2019,
-  title = {Logic for Exact Entailment},
-  author = {Fine, Kit and Jago, Mark},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {536--556},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020318000151},
-  abstract = {An exact truthmaker for A is a state which, as well as guaranteeing A's truth, is wholly relevant to it. States with parts irrelevant to whether A is true do not count as exact truthmakers for A. Giving semantics in this way produces a very unusual consequence relation, on which conjunctions do not entail their conjuncts. This feature makes the resulting logic highly unusual. In this paper, we set out formal semantics for exact truthmaking and characterise the resulting notion of entailment, showing that it is compact and decidable. We then investigate the effect of various restrictions on the semantics. We also formulate a sequent-style proof system for exact entailment and give soundness and completeness results.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03B47,03B60,exact entailment,mereology,non-classical logic,semantics,sequent calculus,truthmaking},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8PTTA4CU/Fine and Jago - 2019 - LOGIC FOR EXACT ENTAILMENT.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2020,
-  title = {Yablo on Subject-Matter},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {177},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {129--171},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1183-7},
-  abstract = {I discuss Yablo's approach to truthmaker semantics and compare it with my own, with special focus on the idea of a proposition being true of or being restricted to some subject-matter, the idea of propositional containment, and the development of an `incremental' semantics for the conditional. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between truth-maker approach and the standard possible worlds approach to semantics.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CNRGAEKX/Fine - 2020 - Yablo on subject-matter.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2020a,
-  title = {The {{Identity}} of {{Social Groups}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Metaphysics},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {81--91},
-  publisher = {{Ubiquity Press}},
-  issn = {2515-8279},
-  doi = {10.5334/met.45},
-  abstract = {Article: The Identity of Social Groups},
-  copyright = {Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:    Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a  Creative Commons Attribution License  that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.  Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.  Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See  The Effect of Open Access ).  All third-party images reproduced on this journal are shared under Educational Fair Use. For more information on  Educational Fair Use , please see  this useful checklist prepared by Columbia University Libraries .   All copyright  of third-party content posted here for research purposes belongs to its original owners.  Unless otherwise stated all references to characters and comic art presented on this journal are \textcopyright, \textregistered{} or \texttrademark{} of their respective owners. No challenge to any owner's rights is intended or should be inferred.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/28EJLFYE/Fine - 2020 - The Identity of Social Groups.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Fine2020b,
-  title = {Vagueness: {{A Global Approach}}},
-  shorttitle = {Vagueness},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2020},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2021,
-  title = {Truthmaking and the Is\textendash Ought Gap},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {887--914},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-01996-8},
-  abstract = {This paper is an attempt to apply the truthmaker approach, recently developed by a number of authors, to the problem of providing an adequate formulation of the is\textendash ought gap. I begin by setting up the problem and criticizing some other accounts of how the problem should be stated; I then introduce the basic apparatus of truth-making and show how it may be extended to include both descriptive and normative truth-makers; I next consider how the gap principle should be formulated, attempting to deal as systematically as possible with the `harmless' counter-examples; I also consider the relationship between the gap principle and various other doctrines concerning the separation between the normative and descriptive realms; and I conclude this part of the paper with some general remarks in favor of adopting the truth-maker approach over some of the alternative approaches. The paper concludes with a formal appendix, which gives precise expression to some of claims made in the previous informal part of the paper.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/54PSKPLD/Fine - 2021 - Truthmaking and the is–ought gap.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fine2021a,
-  title = {Verisimilitude and {{Truthmaking}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {86},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1239--1276},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-019-00152-z},
-  abstract = {I provide and defend a hyper-intensional account of verisimilitude within the truthmaker framework.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NP755FT2/Fine - 2021 - Verisimilitude and Truthmaking.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Finea,
-  title = {The {{Metaphysics}} and {{Mathematics}} of {{Arbitrary Objects}}, by {{Leon Horsten}}. {{Cambridge}}: {{Cambridge University Press}}, 2019. {{Pp}}. Xviii + 232.},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Metaphysics}} and {{Mathematics}} of {{Arbitrary Objects}}, by {{Leon Horsten}}. {{Cambridge}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzaa059},
-  abstract = {This book is an attempt to develop a metaphysical and mathematical account of arbitrary objects. It is focused on two main applications: structuralism in the ph},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/38NVG58Q/Fine - The Metaphysics and Mathematics of Arbitrary Objec.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{FineaDraft,
-  title = {Naive {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {2010},
-  abstract = {I offer an alternative way of delimiting metaphysics in which there is a crucial distinction between naive and foundational metaphysics - the metaphysics, respectively, of appearance and reality - and in which naive metaphysics plays a critical role},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PZI9S6H9/Naive_Metaphysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fineb,
-  title = {Some {{Remarks}} on the {{Role}} of {{Essence}} in {{Kripke}}'s ``{{Naming}} and {{Necessity}}''},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  journal = {Theoria},
-  volume = {n/a},
-  number = {n/a},
-  issn = {1755-2567},
-  doi = {10.1111/theo.12363},
-  abstract = {I discuss the use Kripke makes of the concept of essence in ``Naming and Necessity''.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {essence,Kripke,necessity},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/theo.12363},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y6YPHYB8/theo.html}
-}
-
-@article{FinebDraft,
-  title = {The {{World}} of {{Truthmaking}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {Draft},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LUSK67LA/KitFine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UC5W8FWM/KitFine.docx}
-}
-
-@incollection{FinegDraft,
-  title = {Williamson on {{Fine}} on {{Prior}}},
-  booktitle = {Williamson on {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  editor = {McCullagh, Mark and {Yli-Vakkuri}, Juhani},
-  year = {2010},
-  abstract = {I respond to the criticisms Williamson makes in his book 'Modal Logic as Metaphysics' to my proposed Priorian reduction of possibilist discourse.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7HCHT2AQ/Williamson_on_Fine_on_Prior.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fineundefined/ed,
-  title = {{{COMPLIANCE AND COMMAND I}}\textemdash{{CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES}}},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {undefined/ed},
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  pages = {1--25},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S175502031700020X},
-  abstract = {I develop a semantics for imperatives within the truthmaker framework by taking the meaning of an imperative to be given by the actions that are in compliance with or in contravention to the imperative.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03B45,entailment,free choice,imperative logic,partial content,possible worlds semantics,Ross’s paradox,truthmaker semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FNI9RIFU/Fine - COMPLIANCE AND COMMAND I—CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fischer2021,
-  title = {Three {{Concepts}} of {{Actual Causation}}},
-  author = {Fischer, Enno},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
-  issn = {0007-0882},
-  doi = {10.1086/715201}
-}
-
-@article{Fishburn1986,
-  title = {The {{Axioms}} of {{Subjective Probability}}},
-  author = {Fishburn, Peter C.},
-  year = {1986},
-  journal = {Statistical Science},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {335--358},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JYSGLGMN/Fishburn - 1986 - The Axioms of Subjective Probability.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AGQDZNXS/FISTAO-9.html}
-}
-
-@article{Fitch1937,
-  title = {Modal {{Functions}} in {{Two-Valued Logic}}},
-  author = {Fitch, Frederic B.},
-  year = {1937},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {23},
-  pages = {125--8},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3FE6N6H4/1937 - Modal Functions in Two-Valued Logic - Fitch.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ABELJUI6/1937 - Modal Functions in Two-Valued Logic - Fitch.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitch1939,
-  title = {Note on {{Modal Functions}}},
-  author = {Fitch, Frederic B.},
-  year = {1939},
-  journal = {The journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {115--6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EJ7666MH/1939 - Note on Modal Functions - Fitch.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SEZMB4ID/1939 - Note on Modal Functions - Fitch.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitch1946,
-  title = {Review: {{J}}. {{C}}. {{C}}. {{McKinsey}}, {{On}} the {{Syntactical Construction}} of {{Systems}} of {{Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Fitch, Frederic B.},
-  year = {1946},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {98--99},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LPD6RH7Y/1946 - Review J. C. C. McKinsey, On the Syntactical Construction of Systems of Modal Logic - Fitch.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SMKNVRFR/1946 - Review J. C. C. McKinsey, On the Syntactical Construction of Systems of Modal Logic - Fitch.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitch1949,
-  title = {The {{Problem}} of the {{Morning Star}} and the {{Evening Star}}},
-  author = {Fitch, Frederic B.},
-  year = {1949},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {137--141},
-  issn = {0031-8248},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1949 Philosophy of Science Association},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XRII3RT7/Fitch - 1949 - The Problem of the Morning Star and the Evening St.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitelson2007,
-  title = {Steps {{Toward}} a {{Computational Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Fitelson, Branden and Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {36},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {227--247},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-006-9038-7},
-  abstract = {In this paper, the authors describe their initial investigations in computational metaphysics. Our method is to implement axiomatic metaphysics in an automated reasoning system. In this paper, we describe what we have discovered when the theory of abstract objects is implemented in prover9 (a first-order automated reasoning system which is the successor to otter). After reviewing the second-order, axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we show (1) how to represent a fragment of that theory in prover9's first-order syntax, and (2) how prover9 then finds proofs of interesting theorems of metaphysics, such as that every possible world is maximal. We conclude the paper by discussing some issues for further research.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PFYZD4D8/Fitelson and Zalta - 2007 - Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitting1989,
-  title = {Bilattices and the Theory of Truth},
-  author = {Fitting, Melvin},
-  year = {1989},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {18},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {225--256},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00274066},
-  abstract = {Conclusion While Kripke's original paper on the theory of truth used a three-valued logic, we believe a four-valued version is more natural. Its use allows for possible inconsistencies in information about the world, yet contains Kripke's development within it. Moreover, using a four-valued logic makes it possible to work with complete lattices rather than complete semi-lattices, and thus the mathematics is somewhat simplified. But more strikingly, the four-valued version has a wide, natural generalization to the family of interlaced bilattices. Thus, with little more work, the theory is extended to a broad class of settings. Indeed, a result like Theorem 6.2 would not even be possible to state without the interlaced bilattice machinery. We hope the notion of interlaced bilattice will make apparent further such connections.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6QRDU58U/Fitting - 1989 - Bilattices and the theory of truth.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Fitting1989a,
-  title = {Bilattices and the {{Semantics}} of {{Logic Programming}}},
-  author = {Fitting, Melvin},
-  year = {1989},
-  abstract = {Bilattices, due to M. Ginsberg, are a family of truth value spaces that allow elegantly for missing or conflicting information. The simplest example is Belnap's four-valued logic, based on classical two-valued logic. Among other examples are those based on finite many-valued logics, and on probabilistic valued logic. A fixed point semantics is developed for logic programming, allowing any bilattice as the space of truth values. The mathematics is little more complex than in the classical two-valued setting, but the result provides a natural semantics for distributed logic programs, including those involving confidence factors. The classical two-valued and the Kripke/Kleene three-valued semantics become special cases, since the logics involved are natural sublogics of Belnap's logic, the logic given by the simplest bilattice. 1 Introduction Often useful information is spread over a number of sites ("Does anybody know, did Willie wear a hat when he left this morning?") that can be speci...},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2VFKB88T/Fitting - 1989 - Bilattices and the Semantics of Logic Programming.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4AUXW69D/1-s2.0-074310669190014G-main.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Fitting1990,
-  title = {Bilattices in Logic Programming},
-  booktitle = {, {{Proceedings}} of the {{Twentieth International Symposium}} on {{Multiple-Valued Logic}}, 1990},
-  author = {Fitting, Melvin},
-  year = {1990},
-  month = may,
-  pages = {238--246},
-  doi = {10.1109/ISMVL.1990.122627},
-  abstract = {Bilattices are a family of multiple-valued logics. Those meeting certain natural conditions have provided the basis for the semantics of a family of logic programming languages. Consideration is given to further restrictions on bilattices in order to narrow things down to logic programming languages that can, at least in principle, be implemented. Appropriate bilattice background information is presented, so the work is relatively self-contained. The backgrounds of logic programming and bilattices are given. Logic programming syntax is discussed, along with fixpoint semantics. Smullyan-style propositional rules are discussed},
-  keywords = {Attenuation,bilattices,Computer languages,Computer science,Educational institutions,Expert systems,fixpoint semantics,Joining processes,logic programming,logic programming languages,many-valued logics,Mathematics,multiple-valued logics,Multivalued logic,Smullyan-style propositional rules,Writing},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8QBMHCV7/BilInLP.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitting1991,
-  title = {Kleene's {{Logic}}, {{Generalized}}},
-  author = {Fitting, Melvin},
-  year = {1991},
-  journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {797--810},
-  issn = {0955-792X, 1465-363X},
-  doi = {10.1093/logcom/1.6.797},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IT7N5BEG/1-6-797.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitting1994,
-  title = {Kleene's {{Three Valued Logics And Their Children}}},
-  author = {Fitting, Melvin},
-  year = {1994},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Fundam. Inf.},
-  volume = {20},
-  number = {1,2,3},
-  pages = {113--131},
-  issn = {0169-2968},
-  abstract = {Kleene's strong three-valued logic extends naturally to a four-valued logic proposed by Belnap. We introduce a guard connective into Belnap's logic and consider a few of its properties. Then we show that by using it four-valued analogs of Kleene's weak three-valued logic, and the asymmetric logic of Lisp are also available. We propose an extension of these ideas to the family of distributive bilattices. Finally we show that for bilinear bilattices the extensions do not produce any new equivalences.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CTUNB3TN/KleeneThree.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fitting2002,
-  title = {Bilattices Are Nice Things},
-  author = {Fitting, Melvin},
-  year = {2002},
-  journal = {Self-reference},
-  pages = {53--77},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BJKMB3P6/Fitting - 2002 - Bilattices are nice things.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Florio2014,
-  title = {Set {{Theory}}, {{Type Theory}}, and {{Absolute Generality}}},
-  author = {Florio, Salvatore and Shapiro, Stewart},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {123},
-  number = {489},
-  pages = {157--174},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzu039},
-  abstract = {Abstract.  In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, \O ystein Linnebo and Ag},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E5BIZLPM/Florio and Shapiro - 2014 - Set Theory, Type Theory, and Absolute Generality.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/W4SLRZHP/1285242.html}
-}
-
-@book{Fodor1989,
-  title = {Psychosemantics: {{The Problem}} of {{Meaning}} in the {{Philosophy}} of {{Mind}}},
-  shorttitle = {Psychosemantics},
-  author = {Fodor, Jerry A.},
-  year = {1989},
-  month = sep,
-  edition = {1st edition},
-  publisher = {{A Bradford Book}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  abstract = {Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm theoretical ground and rebuts externalist, holist, and naturalist threats to its position. This book is included in the series Explorations in Cognitive Science, edited by Margaret A. Boden. A Bradford Book.},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-56052-8},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Fogal,
-  title = {Explaining Normative Reasons},
-  author = {Fogal, Daniel and Risberg, Olle},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {n/a},
-  number = {n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12393},
-  abstract = {In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to {$\varphi$} is for it to explain why there's normative support for {$\varphi$}-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism\textemdash ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness\textemdash as well as the popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of `weighing' reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls `redundant reasons'.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nous.12393},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IR9JY4IY/Fogal and Risberg - Explaining normative reasons.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MAHZKGX5/nous.html}
-}
-
-@article{Follesdal1968,
-  title = {Quine on {{Modality}}},
-  author = {F{\o}llesdal, Dagfinn},
-  year = {1968},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {19},
-  number = {1/2},
-  pages = {147--157},
-  issn = {0039-7857},
-  doi = {10.2307/20114636},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DEZ72I5B/20114636.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Fong2019,
-  title = {An {{Invitation}} to {{Applied Category Theory}}: {{Seven Sketches}} in {{Compositionality}}},
-  shorttitle = {An {{Invitation}} to {{Applied Category Theory}}},
-  author = {Fong, Brendan and Spivak, David I.},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {1 edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  abstract = {Category theory is unmatched in its ability to organize and layer abstractions and to find commonalities between structures of all sorts. No longer the exclusive preserve of pure mathematicians, it is now proving itself to be a powerful tool in science, informatics, and industry. By facilitating communication between communities and building rigorous bridges between disparate worlds, applied category theory has the potential to be a major organizing force. This book offers a self-contained tour of applied category theory. Each chapter follows a single thread motivated by a real-world application and discussed with category-theoretic tools. We see data migration as an adjoint functor, electrical circuits in terms of monoidal categories and operads, and collaborative design via enriched profunctors. All the relevant category theory, from simple to sophisticated, is introduced in an accessible way with many examples and exercises, making this an ideal guide even for those without experience of university-level mathematics.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QIBKE6RM/Fong and Spivak - 2019 - An Invitation to Applied Category Theory Seven Sk.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Font2003,
-  title = {A {{Survey}} of {{Abstract Algebraic Logic}}},
-  author = {Font, J. M. and Jansana, R. and Pigozzi, D.},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Studia Logica. An International Journal for Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {74},
-  number = {1-2},
-  pages = {13--97},
-  issn = {0039-3215, 1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1023/A:1024621922509},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Computational Linguistics,Logic,Mathematical Logic and Foundations},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4T5ZJCMQ/Font et al. - 2003 - A Survey of Abstract Algebraic Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Forbes1992,
-  title = {Melia on {{Modalism}}},
-  author = {Forbes, Graeme},
-  year = {1992},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {57--63},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00354469},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Philosophy,Philosophy of Mind,Philosophy of Religion},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8HBTCUID/Forbes - 1992 - Melia on Modalism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Forrest1986,
-  title = {Ways Worlds Could Be},
-  author = {Forrest, Peter},
-  year = {1986},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {64},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {15--24},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048408612342201},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M38FH7YX/Forrest - 1986 - Ways worlds could be.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Forrest2015,
-  title = {The Mereology of Structural Universals},
-  author = {Forrest, Peter},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  issn = {2300-9802},
-  abstract = {This paper explores the mereology of structural universals, using the structural richness of a non-classical mereology without unique fusions. The paper focuses on a problem posed by David Lewis, who using the example of methane, and assuming classical mereology, argues against any purely mereological theory of structural universals. The problem is that being a methane molecule would have to contain being a hydrogen atom four times over, but mereology does not have the concept of the same part occurring several times. This paper takes up the challenge by providing mereological analysis of three operations sufficient for a theory of structural universals: (1) Reflexive binding, i.e. identifying two of the places of a universal; (2) Existential binding, i.e. the language-independent correlate of an existential quantification; and (3) Conjunction.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2015 Logic and Logical Philosophy},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N37LBYLG/Forrest - 2015 - The mereology of structural universals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fox1987,
-  title = {Truthmaker},
-  author = {Fox, John F.},
-  year = {1987},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {65},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {188--207},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048408712342871},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UA8V9TZB/Fox - 1987 - Truthmaker.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Frazier2013,
-  title = {Natural {{Theology}} in {{Eastern Religions}}},
-  author = {Frazier, Jessica},
-  year = {2013},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199556939.013.0011},
-  abstract = {This chapter examines natural theology perspectives from Eastern religions. It begins by exploring the possibility of a broader definition of `natural theology' that encompasses the various forms it takes outside the Abrahamic religions. The chapter then considers the ways in which Eastern natural theologies can offer answers to Western questions, by focusing on Hindu approaches to the causal argument. Hindu conceptions of the divine provide a glimpse of what the options would be if the West had not decided to uphold divine transcendence by means of the doctrine of . This doctrine is a curious item in the Western natural theological vocabulary as it is not wholly based on revelation, and is largely there to uphold the Hebrew personalism of the Bible and the neo-Platonic value of the perfection of the divine nature.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-955693-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Eastern Religion ; Western Religion ; Natural Theology ; Hinduism ; Causal Argument},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UZ6NFEGX/Frazier - 2013 - Natural Theology in Eastern Religions.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Frazier2017,
-  title = {Hindu {{Worldviews}}: {{Theories}} of {{Self}}, {{Ritual}} and {{Reality}}},
-  shorttitle = {Hindu {{Worldviews}}},
-  author = {Frazier, Jessica},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = feb,
-  publisher = {{Bloomsbury Academic}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {Designed to help readers deepen their understanding of Hinduism, and reflecting themes central to the study of religion and culture, Jessica Frazier explores classical Hindu theories of self, the body, the cosmos, and human action. Case studies from Hindu texts provide readers with direct access to primary sources in translation, ranging from ancient cosmology to philosophical teachings and modern ritual practices. Hinduism is often depicted as being so diverse that it is the most difficult of all of the world religions to understand or explain. Hindu Worldviews explains core ideas about the human mind and body, showing how they fit into concepts of the Self, and practices of embodiment in Hinduism. It draws on western theoretical concepts as a point of entry, connecting contemporary Hindu culture directly with both western and classical Hindu theories. Through the theme of the Self in classical Hindu sources, the chapters provide an interpretative framework for understanding classical approaches to ethics, liberation, and views of the body and the mind. These provide a key to the rationale behind many forms of modern practice such as divinisation rituals, worship of deities, and theological reflection. Reflecting central themes in courses on Hinduism and Indian Philosophy, Hindu Worldviews provides an accessible new perspective on both Hinduism and modern theory in the study of religion.},
-  isbn = {978-1-4742-5155-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VNS2C6SU/Frazier - 2017 - Hindu Worldviews Theories of Self, Ritual and Rea.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Frazier2019,
-  title = {Brahman in the {{Early Upanisads}} "{{Speakers}} of {{Highest Truth}}"},
-  author = {Frazier, Jessica},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {In Dialogue with Classical Indian Traditions},
-  pages = {84--103},
-  abstract = {This chapter explores the way that some of the early Upanisads build up a picture of Brahman as the \&\#39;highest truth\&\#39; that encompasses other theories about reality. It focuses on the way Yajnavalkya\&\#39;s debate in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DFE9TT6N/Frazier - Brahman in the Early Upanisads Speakers of Highes.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{French2017a,
-  title = {A {{Simple Sequent Calculus}} for {{Angell}}'s {{Logic}} of {{Analytic Containment}}},
-  author = {French, Rohan},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Studia Logica. An International Journal for Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {105},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {971--994},
-  issn = {0039-3215, 1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11225-017-9719-y},
-  abstract = {We give a simple sequent calculus presentation of R.B. Angell's logic of analytic containment, recently championed by Kit Fine as a plausible logic of partial content.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IQIHXY98/French - 2017 - A Simple Sequent Calculus for Angell’s Logic of An.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{French2019,
-  title = {Counterpossible {{Conditionals}}},
-  booktitle = {Impossible {{Worlds}}},
-  author = {French, Rohan and Priest, Graham and Ripley, David},
-  editor = {Berto, Francesco and Jago, Mark},
-  year = {2019},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {Vacuism is the view that all counterpossibles are trivially true. There are reasons to think it incorrect. An impossible worlds semantics for counterfactuals is offered, which makes room for non-trivial counterpossibles. One principle which pins down its application is the Strangeness of Impossibility condition: for any given possible world, any impossible worlds is further away from it than any possible world is. A number of Williamson's objections to the non-vacuist approach are discussed and it is argued that they can be overcome. The question of whether counterfactuals in general should permit the substitution of rigidly coreferential terms is then raised. Having defended non-vacusim against Williamson's objections, a range of arguments in its favour are considered.},
-  chapter = {Impossible Worlds},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-185058-5},
-  langid = {american},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CDCF6EUB/Berto and Jago - 2019 - Counterpossible Conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{French2020,
-  title = {Classical {{Counterpossibles}}},
-  author = {French, Rohan and Girard, Patrick and Ripley, David},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  pages = {1--17},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020319000637},
-  abstract = {We present four classical theories of counterpossibles that combine modalities and counterfactuals. Two theories are anti-vacuist and forbid vacuously true counterfactuals, two are quasi-vacuist and allow counterfactuals to be vacuously true when their antecedent is not only impossible, but also inconceivable. The theories vary on how they restrict the interaction of modalities and counterfactuals. We provide a logical cartography with precise acceptable boundaries, illustrating to what extent nonvacuism about counterpossibles can be reconciled with classical logic.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03A99,03B45,conditional logic,counterfactuals,counterpossibles,impossible worlds,modal logic,modalities}
-}
-
-@article{Fridland2014,
-  title = {They've Lost Control: {{Reflections}} on Skill},
-  author = {Fridland, Ellen},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {191},
-  number = {February},
-  pages = {2729--2750},
-  keywords = {anti-intellectualism,Automaticity,control,Intellectualism,Know how,skill}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2015,
-  title = {Higher-{{Order Contingentism}}, {{Part}} 1: {{Closure}} and {{Generation}}},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter and Goodman, Jeremy},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Unpublished paper},
-  pages = {1--48},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IUVXGJI9/2015 - Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 1 Closure and Generation - Fritz, Goodman.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QYKZLMK3/2015 - Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 1 Closure and Generation - Fritz, Goodman.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2015a,
-  title = {Propositional {{Contingentism}}},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Unpublished paper},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VZ7NMP8J/2015 - Propositional Contingentism - Fritz.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XNE5KRJV/2015 - Propositional Contingentism - Fritz.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2017,
-  title = {{{CAN MODALITIES SAVE NAIVE SET THEORY}}?},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter and Lederman, Harvey and Liu, Tiankai and Scott, Dana},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  pages = {1--27},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020317000168},
-  abstract = {To the memory of Prof. Grigori Mints, Stanford University Born: June 7, 1939, St. Petersburg, Russia Died: May 29, 2014, Palo Alto, California},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03B45,modal logic,naive comprehension,set theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GCQ983FH/Fritz et al. - 2017 - CAN MODALITIES SAVE NAIVE SET THEORY.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2017a,
-  title = {{{LOGICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM}}},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {203--236},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020317000028},
-  abstract = {Robert Stalnaker has recently advocated propositional contingentism, the claim that it is contingent what propositions there are. He has proposed a philosophical theory of contingency in what propositions there are and sketched a possible worlds model theory for it. In this paper, such models are used to interpret two propositional modal languages: one containing an existential propositional quantifier, and one containing an existential propositional operator. It is shown that the resulting logic containing an existential quantifier is not recursively axiomatizable, as it is recursively isomorphic to second-order logic, and a natural candidate axiomatization for the resulting logic containing an existential operator is shown to be incomplete.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03B45,contingentism,modal logic,propositional quantifiers,propositions},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7LXDE7BY/Fritz - 2017 - LOGICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2017b,
-  title = {How {{Fine-Grained}} Is {{Reality}}?},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {Filosofisk Supplement},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {52--57},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/48SVIB2S/Fritz - 2017 - How Fine-Grained is Reality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2019,
-  title = {Structure by Proxy, with an Application to Grounding},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02450-z},
-  abstract = {An argument going back to Russell shows that the view that propositions are structured is inconsistent in standard type theories. Here, it is shown that such type theories may nevertheless provide entities which can serve as proxies for structured propositions. As an illustration, such proxies are applied to the case of grounding, as standard views of grounding require a degree of propositional structure which suffices for a version of Russell's argument. While this application solves some of the problems grounding faces, it introduces problematic limitations: it becomes impossible to quantify unrestrictedly over the relata of ground. The proposed proxies may thus not save grounding, but they shed light on what exactly Russell's argument does and does not show.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IIKUZDGC/Fritz - 2019 - Structure by proxy, with an application to groundi.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fritz2021,
-  title = {On {{Stalnaker}}'s {{Simple Theory}} of {{Propositions}}},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--31},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-020-09557-6},
-  abstract = {Robert Stalnaker recently proposed a simple theory of propositions using the notion of a set of propositions being consistent, and conjectured that this theory is equivalent to the claim that propositions form a complete atomic Boolean algebra. This paper clarifies and confirms this conjecture. Stalnaker also noted that some of the principles of his theory may be given up, depending on the intended notion of proposition. This paper therefore also investigates weakened constraints on consistency and the corresponding classes of Boolean algebras.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3LVPGMUP/Fritz - 2021 - On Stalnaker’s Simple Theory of Propositions.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Fritzforthcoming,
-  title = {Higher-{{Order Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Fritz, Peter and Jones, Nicholas K.},
-  year = {forthcoming},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5IH2UF7C/FRIHM-3.html}
-}
-
-@article{Fuhrmann1990,
-  title = {Models for Relevant Modal Logics},
-  author = {Fuhrmann, Andr{\'e}},
-  year = {1990},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Studia Logica},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {501--514},
-  issn = {1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00370161},
-  abstract = {Semantics are given for modal extensions of relevant logics based on the kind of frames introduced in [7]. By means of a simple recipe we may obtain from a class FRM (L) of unreduced frames characterising a (non-modal) logic L, frame-classes FRM{$\square$} (L.M) characterising conjunctively regular modal extensions L.M of L. By displaying an incompleteness phenomenon, it is shown how the recipe fails when reduced frames are under consideration.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZGRDWSKF/Fuhrmann - 1990 - Models for relevant modal logics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Fumerton1983,
-  title = {The {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Fumerton, Richard A.},
-  year = {1983},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {43},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {477--497},
-  publisher = {{[International Phenomenological Society, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Wiley]}},
-  issn = {0031-8205},
-  doi = {10.2307/2107643},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/F76URPKQ/Fumerton - 1983 - The Paradox of Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Gaal2009,
-  title = {Point {{Set Topology}}},
-  author = {Gaal, Steven A.},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = apr,
-  edition = {2009th edition},
-  publisher = {{Dover Publications}},
-  address = {{Mineola, N.Y}},
-  isbn = {978-0-486-47222-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/98AR4FTN/Gaal_2009_Point Set Topology.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Gabbay1986,
-  title = {Handbook of {{Philosophical Logic}}: {{Volume III}}: {{Alternatives}} to {{Classical Logic}}},
-  shorttitle = {Handbook of {{Philosophical Logic}}},
-  editor = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Guenthner, Franz},
-  year = {1986},
-  series = {Synthese {{Library}}},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4},
-  abstract = {This volume presents a number of systems of logic which can be considered as alternatives to classical logic. The notion of what counts as an alternative is a somewhat problematic one. There are extreme views on the matter of what is the 'correct' logical system and whether one logical system (e. g. classical logic) can represent (or contain) all the others. The choice of the systems presented in this volume was guided by the following criteria for including a logic as an alternative: (i) the departure from classical logic in accepting or rejecting certain theorems of classical logic following intuitions arising from significant application areas and/or from human reasoning; (ii) the alternative logic is well-established and well-understood mathematically and is widely applied in other disciplines such as mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, psychology, or linguistics. A number of other alternatives had to be omitted for the present volume (e. g. recent attempts to formulate so-called 'non-monotonic' reason\- ing systems). Perhaps these can be included in future extensions of the Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Chapter 1 deals with partial logics, that is, systems where sentences do not always have to be either true or false, and where terms do not always have to denote. These systems are thus, in general, geared towards reasoning in partially specified models. Logics of this type have arisen mainly from philo\- sophical and linguistic considerations; various applications in theoretical computer science have also been envisaged.},
-  isbn = {978-94-010-8801-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BE7S4Q3S/Gabbay and Guenthner - 1986 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic Volume III Alter.pdf}
-}
-
-@unpublished{Gallow,
-  title = {How to {{Trace}} a {{Causal Process}}},
-  author = {Gallow, J. Dmitri},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7AQ3FRBW/GALHTT-2.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RFZDNVFD/GALHTT-2.html}
-}
-
-@book{Gamut1991,
-  title = {Logic, {{Language}}, and {{Meaning}}},
-  author = {Gamut, L.T.F.},
-  year = {1991},
-  volume = {2},
-  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4PWMM6QT/1-6-797.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5APGW24X/Gamut_2.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Garay1995,
-  title = {Quantum Gravity and Minimum Length},
-  author = {Garay, Luis J.},
-  year = {1995},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {International Journal of Modern Physics A},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {02},
-  eprint = {gr-qc/9403008},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  pages = {145--165},
-  issn = {0217-751X, 1793-656X},
-  doi = {10.1142/S0217751X95000085},
-  abstract = {The existence of a fundamental scale, a lower bound to any output of a position measurement, seems to be a model-independent feature of quantum gravity. In fact, different approaches to this theory lead to this result. The key ingredients for the appearance of this minimum length are quantum mechanics, special relativity and general relativity. As a consequence, classical notions such as causality or distance between events cannot be expected to be applicable at this scale. They must be replaced by some other, yet unknown, structure.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology,High Energy Physics - Theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7NAHYNG7/Garay - 1995 - Quantum gravity and minimum length.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/42EFZYCB/9403008.html}
-}
-
-@article{Gargov1999,
-  title = {Knowledge, {{Uncertainty}} and {{Ignorance}} in {{Logic}}: {{Bilattices}} and Beyond},
-  shorttitle = {Knowledge, {{Uncertainty}} and {{Ignorance}} in {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Gargov, George},
-  year = {1999},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics},
-  volume = {9},
-  number = {2-3},
-  pages = {195--283},
-  issn = {1166-3081},
-  doi = {10.1080/11663081.1999.10510967},
-  abstract = {In the paper we present a survey of some approaches to the semantics of many-valued propositional systems. These approaches are inspired on one hand by classical problems in the investigations of logical aspects of epistemic activity: knowledge and truth, contradictions, beliefs, reliability of data, etc. On the other hand they reflect contemporary concerns of researchers in Artificial Intelligence (and Cognitive Science in general) with inferences drawn from imperfect information, even from total ignorance. We treat the mathematical apparatus that has emerged recently: algebraic structures related to the new logical systems in the same way Boolean algebras correspond to classical logic.},
-  keywords = {bilattices,info-algebras,knowledge,logical practices,many-valued logics,set expansions,truth values,uncertainty},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KGZ4IEFF/Gargov - 1999 - Knowledge, Uncertainty and Ignorance in Logic Bil.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Garson2016,
-  title = {Modal {{Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Garson, James},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2016},
-  edition = {Spring 2016},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {A modal is an expression (like `necessarily' or`possibly') that is used to qualify the truth of ajudgement. Modal logic is, strictly speaking, the study of thedeductive behavior of the expressions `it is necessarythat' and `it is possible that'. However, the term`modal logic' may be used more broadly for a family ofrelated systems. These include logics for belief, for tense and othertemporal expressions, for the deontic (moral) expressions such as`it is obligatory that' and `it is permittedthat', and many others. An understanding of modal logic isparticularly valuable in the formal analysis of philosophical argument,where expressions from the modal family are both common and confusing.Modal logic also has important applications in computer science.},
-  keywords = {actualism,logic: classical,logic: deontic,logic: free,logic: intensional,logic: provability,logic: relevance,logic: temporal,possible worlds}
-}
-
-@book{Gaskin2008,
-  title = {The Unity of the Proposition},
-  author = {Gaskin, Richard},
-  year = {2008},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EYUBD9LY/2008 - The unity of the proposition - Gaskin.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/J5LHE9UL/2008 - The unity of the proposition - Gaskin.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Geldner1908,
-  title = {Vedismus Und {{Brahmanismus}}},
-  author = {Geldner, Karl Friedrich},
-  year = {1908},
-  publisher = {{JCB Mohr}}
-}
-
-@article{Geldner1928,
-  title = {Vedismus Und {{Brahmanismus}}},
-  author = {Geldner, Karl F.},
-  year = {1928},
-  journal = {Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch},
-  volume = {9},
-  publisher = {{Mohr}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UUZXYB5T/1076177913.html}
-}
-
-@article{Genco2021,
-  title = {Grounding, {{Quantifiers}}, and {{Paradoxes}}},
-  author = {Genco, Francesco A. and Poggiolesi, Francesca and Rossi, Lorenzo},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1417--1448},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-021-09604-w},
-  abstract = {The notion of grounding is usually conceived as an objective and explanatory relation. It connects two relata if one\textemdash the ground\textemdash determines or explains the other\textemdash the consequence. In the contemporary literature on grounding, much effort has been devoted to logically characterize the formal aspects of grounding, but a major hard problem remains: defining suitable grounding principles for universal and existential formulae. Indeed, several grounding principles for quantified formulae have been proposed, but all of them are exposed to paradoxes in some very natural contexts of application. We introduce in this paper a first-order formal system that captures the notion of grounding and avoids the paradoxes in a novel and non-trivial way. The system we present formally develops Bolzano's ideas on grounding by employing Hilbert's {$\epsilon$}-terms and an adapted version of Fine's theory of arbitrary objects.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8B5HTB9A/Genco et al. - 2021 - Grounding, Quantifiers, and Paradoxes.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Gentzen1964,
-  title = {Investigations into {{Logical Deduction}}},
-  author = {Gentzen, Gerhard},
-  year = {1964},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {288--306},
-  issn = {0003-0481},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1964 North American Philosophical Publications},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8XRNZ7GR/Gentzen - 1964 - Investigations into Logical Deduction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Georgi2014,
-  title = {A Propositional Semantics for Substitutional Quantification},
-  author = {Georgi, Geoff},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {172},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1183--1200},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-014-0343-7},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Ethics,Kripke,Metaphysics,Ontological commitment,Philosophy,Philosophy of Language,Philosophy of Mind,semantics,Substitutional quantification,Truth},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JVFZRU56/Georgi - 2014 - A propositional semantics for substitutional quant.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Georgi2015,
-  title = {A Propositional Semantics for Substitutional Quantification},
-  author = {Georgi, Geoff},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {172},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1183--1200},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-014-0343-7},
-  abstract = {The standard truth-conditional semantics for substitutional quantification, due to Saul Kripke, does not specify what proposition is expressed by sentences containing the particular substitutional quantifier. In this paper, I propose an alternative semantics for substitutional quantification that does. The key to this semantics is identifying an appropriate propositional function to serve as the content of a bound occurrence of a formula containing a free substitutional variable. I apply this semantics to traditional philosophical reasons for interest in substitutional quantification, namely, theories of truth and ontological commitment.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Kripke,Ontological commitment,Semantics,Substitutional quantification,Truth},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PIBZYLP6/Georgi - 2015 - A propositional semantics for substitutional quant.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Gerstenberg2020,
-  title = {A Counterfactual Simulation Model of Causal Judgments for Physical Events},
-  author = {Gerstenberg, Tobias and Goodman, Noah and Lagnado, David and Tenenbaum, Joshua},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = mar,
-  institution = {{PsyArXiv}},
-  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/7zj94},
-  abstract = {How do people make causal judgments about physical events? We introduce the counterfactual simulation model (CSM) which predicts causal judgments in physical settings by comparing what actually happened with what would have happened in relevant counterfactual situations. The CSM postulates different aspects of causation that capture the extent to which a cause made a difference to whether and how the outcome occurred, and whether the cause was sufficient and robust. We test the CSM in several experiments in which participants make causal judgments about dynamic collision events. A preliminary study establishes a very close quantitative mapping between causal and counterfactual judgments. Experiment 1 demonstrates that counterfactuals are necessary for explaining causal judgments. Participants' judgments differed dramatically between pairs of situations in which what actually happened was identical, but where what would have happened differed. Experiment 2 features multiple candidate causes and shows that participants' judgments are sensitive to different aspects of causation. The CSM provides a better fit to participants' judgments than a heuristic model which uses features based on what actually happened. We discuss how the CSM can be used to model the semantics of different causal verbs, how it captures related concepts such as physical support, and how its predictions extend beyond the physical domain.},
-  keywords = {causality,Cognitive Psychology,Concepts and Categories,counterfactuals,intuitive physics,Judgment and Decision Making,mental simulation,Reasoning,Social and Behavioral Sciences},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DHB37A4Q/Gerstenberg et al. - 2021 - A counterfactual simulation model of causal judgment (1).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Gerstenberg2021,
-  title = {A Counterfactual Simulation Model of Causation by Omission},
-  author = {Gerstenberg, Tobias and Stephan, Simon},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Cognition},
-  volume = {216},
-  pages = {104842},
-  issn = {1873-7838},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104842},
-  abstract = {When do people say that an event that did not happen was a cause? We extend the counterfactual simulation model (CSM) of causal judgment (Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, \& Tenenbaum, 2021) and test it in a series of three experiments that look at people's causal judgments about omissions in dynamic physical interactions. The problem of omissive causation highlights a series of questions that need to be answered in order to give an adequate causal explanation of why something happened: what are the relevant variables, what are their possible values, how are putative causal relationships evaluated, and how is the causal responsibility for an outcome attributed to multiple causes? The CSM predicts that people make causal judgments about omissions in physical interactions by using their intuitive understanding of physics to mentally simulate what would have happened in relevant counterfactual situations. Prior work has argued that normative expectations affect judgments of omissive causation. Here we suggest a concrete mechanism of how this happens: expectations affect what counterfactuals people consider, and the more certain people are that the counterfactual outcome would have been different from what actually happened, the more causal they judge the omission to be. Our experiments show that both the structure of the physical situation as well as expectations about what will happen affect people's judgments.},
-  langid = {english},
-  pmid = {34303272},
-  keywords = {Causality,Causation,Counterfactuals,Humans,Intuitive physics,Judgment,Mental simulation,Omission,Social Behavior},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/F633FSWX/Gerstenberg and Stephan - 2021 - A counterfactual simulation model of causation by .pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{GhiLuWoZa-06,
-  title = {Conservative Extensions in Modal Logics},
-  booktitle = {Advances in Modal Logics Volume 6},
-  author = {Ghilardi, S. and Lutz, C. and Wolter, F. and Zakharyaschev, M.},
-  editor = {Governatori, Guido and Hodkinson, Ian and Venema, Yde},
-  year = {2006},
-  pages = {187--207},
-  publisher = {{College Publications}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YHSH3JLK/Ghilardi et al. - 2006 - Conservative extensions in modal logics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Giambrone1989,
-  title = {Completeness and Conservative Extension Results for Some Boolean Relevant Logics},
-  author = {Giambrone, Steve and Meyer, Robert K.},
-  year = {1989},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Studia Logica. An International Journal for Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--14},
-  issn = {1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00370629},
-  abstract = {This paper presents completeness and conservative extension results for the boolean extensions of the relevant logic T of Ticket Entailment, and for the contractionless relevant logics TW and RW. Some surprising results are shown for adding the sentential constant t to these boolean relevant logics; specifically, the boolean extensions with t are conservative of the boolean extensions without t, but not of the original logics with t. The special treatment required for the semantic normality of T is also shown along the way.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4HEXJTFX/Giambrone and Meyer - 1989 - Completeness and conservative extension results fo.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Gibbard1981,
-  title = {Counterfactuals and {{Two Kinds}} of {{Expected Utility}}},
-  booktitle = {{{IFS}}: {{Conditionals}}, {{Belief}}, {{Decision}}, {{Chance}} and {{Time}}},
-  author = {Gibbard, Allan and Harper, William L.},
-  editor = {Harper, William L. and Stalnaker, Robert and Pearce, Glenn},
-  year = {1981},
-  series = {The {{University}} of {{Western Ontario Series}} in {{Philosophy}} of {{Science}}},
-  pages = {153--190},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8},
-  abstract = {We begin with a rough theory of rational decision-making. In the first place, rational decision-making involves conditional propositions: when a person weighs a major decision, it is rational for him to ask, for each act he considers, what would happen if he performed that act. It is rational, then, for him to consider propositions of the form `If I were to do a, then c would happen'. Such a proposition we shall call a counterfactual, and we shall form counterfactuals with a connective `{$\Square\rightarrow$}' on this pattern: `If I were to do a, then c would happen' is to be written `I do a `{$\Square\rightarrow$}' c happens'.},
-  isbn = {978-94-009-9117-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Conditional Probability,Conditionalized State,Decision Problem,Expected Utility,Logical Truth},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PYVFQQ38/Gibbard and Harper - 1981 - Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Gill1989a,
-  title = {Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity},
-  shorttitle = {Aristotle on Substance},
-  author = {Gill, Mary Louise},
-  year = {1989},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Princeton, N.J}},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-07334-7},
-  lccn = {B491.M3 G55 1989},
-  keywords = {Aristotle,History,Matter,Substance (Philosophy)}
-}
-
-@article{Ginsberg1988,
-  title = {Multivalued {{Logics}}: {{A Uniform Approach}} to {{Inference}} in {{Artificial Intelligence}}},
-  shorttitle = {Multivalued {{Logics}}},
-  author = {Ginsberg, Matthew L.},
-  year = {1988},
-  journal = {Computational Intelegence},
-  volume = {4},
-  pages = {265--316},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IUX6RTXI/Multivalued Logics_ A Uniform Approach to Inference in Artificial Intelligence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ginsberg1990,
-  title = {Bilattices and {{Modal Operators}}},
-  author = {Ginsberg, Matthew L.},
-  year = {1990},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {41--69},
-  issn = {0955-792X, 1465-363X},
-  doi = {10.1093/logcom/1.1.41},
-  abstract = {A bilattice is a set equipped with two partial orders and a negation operation that inverts one of them while leaving the other unchanged; it has been suggested that the truth values used by inference systems should be chosen from such a structure instead of the two-point set \{t, f\}. Given such a choice, we redefine a modal operator to be a function on the bilattice selected. We show that this definition generalizes both Kripke's possible worlds approach and Moore's autoepistemic logic, and also use recent developments in the formalization of logic programs to construct a procedure for determining the truth value of a sentence when the underlying knowledge base involves modal operators of this form.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L6E3AETE/Ginsberg - 1990 - Bilattices and Modal Operators.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Girard1987,
-  title = {Linear Logic},
-  author = {Girard, Jean-Yves},
-  year = {1987},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Theoretical Computer Science},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--101},
-  issn = {0304-3975},
-  doi = {10.1016/0304-3975(87)90045-4},
-  abstract = {The familiar connective of negation is broken into two operations: linear negation which is the purely negative part of negation and the modality ``of course'' which has the meaning of a reaffirmation. Following this basic discovery, a completely new approach to the whole area between constructive logics and programmation is initiated.}
-}
-
-@article{Giraud2013,
-  title = {Constructing Formal Semantics from an Ontological Perspective. {{The}} Case of Second-Order Logics},
-  author = {Giraud, Thibaut},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {191},
-  number = {10},
-  pages = {2115--2145},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-013-0387-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Metaphysics,Nominalism,Ontological commitment,Ontology,Philosophy of Language,Philosophy of Science,Realism,second-order logic,semantics,tropes,Truthmaker},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SSIK94NV/Giraud - 2013 - Constructing formal semantics from an ontological .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Glick2013,
-  title = {Practical {{Modes}} of {{Presentation}}},
-  author = {Glick, Ephraim},
-  year = {2013},
-  journal = {Nous},
-  volume = {00},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GC64ZKQR/2013 - Practical Modes of Presentation - Glick.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V9KGKYKY/2013 - Practical Modes of Presentation - Glick.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Glymour2019,
-  title = {The {{Evaluation}} of {{Discovery}}: {{Models}}, {{Simulation}} and {{Search}} through ``{{Big Data}}''},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Evaluation}} of {{Discovery}}},
-  author = {Glymour, Clark and Ramsey, Joseph D. and Zhang, Kun},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Open Philosophy},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {39--48},
-  publisher = {{De Gruyter Open Access}},
-  issn = {2543-8875},
-  doi = {10.1515/opphil-2019-0005},
-  abstract = {A central theme in western philosophy was to find formal methods that can reliably discover empirical relationships and their explanations from data assembled from experience. As a philosophical project, that ambition was abandoned in the 20th century and generally dismissed as impossible. It was replaced in philosophy by neo-Kantian efforts at reconstruction and justification, and in professional statistics by the more limited ambition to estimate a small number of parameters in pre-specified hypotheses. The influx of ``big data'' from climate science, neuropsychology, biology, astronomy and elsewhere implicitly called for a revival of the grander philosophical ambition. Search algorithms are meeting that call, but they pose a problem: how are their accuracies to be assessed in domains where experimentation is limited or impossible? Increasingly, the answer is through simulation of data from models of the kind of process in the domain. In some cases, these innovations require rethinking how the accuracy and informativeness of inference methods can be assessed. Focusing on causal inference, we give an example from neuroscience, but to show that the model/simulation strategy is not confined to causal inference, we also consider two classification problems from astrophysics: identifying exoplanets and identifying dark matter concentrations.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Big Data,computerized search,discovery,simulation},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TJRWF7MV/Glymour et al. - 2019 - The Evaluation of Discovery Models, Simulation an.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Goldblatt,
-  title = {Topoi: {{The Categorial Analysis}} of {{Logic}}},
-  shorttitle = {Topoi},
-  author = {Goldblatt, Robert},
-  abstract = {A classic exposition of a branch of mathematical logic that uses category theory, this text is suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students and accessible to both philosophically and mathematically oriented readers. Robert Goldblatt is Professor of Pure Mathematics at New Zealand's Victoria University. 1983 edition.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TEX9K4UZ/Goldblatt - Topoi The Categorial Analysis of Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Goldfarb2003,
-  title = {Deductive {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Goldfarb, Warren},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = oct,
-  publisher = {{Hackett Publishing Co, Inc}},
-  address = {{Indianapolis, IN}},
-  isbn = {978-0-87220-660-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HKA2ZB79/[Warren_Goldfarb]_Deductive_logic(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Goldfarb2010,
-  title = {Frege's Conception of Logic},
-  booktitle = {The {{Cambridge Companion}} to {{Frege}}},
-  author = {Goldfarb, Warren},
-  editor = {Ricketts, Tom and Potter, Michael},
-  year = {2010},
-  pages = {63--85},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  isbn = {978-0-511-77831-5}
-}
-
-@article{Goldstein2020,
-  title = {The Counterfactual Direct Argument},
-  author = {Goldstein, Simon},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {43},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {193--232},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10988-019-09272-9},
-  abstract = {Many have accepted that ordinary counterfactuals and might counterfactuals are duals. In this paper, I show that this thesis leads to paradoxical results when combined with a few different unorthodox yet increasingly popular theses, including the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Given Duality and several other theses, we can quickly infer the validity of another paradoxical principle, `The Counterfactual Direct Argument', which says that `A{$>$} (B or C)' entails `A{$>$} (not B{$>$} C)'. First, I provide a collapse theorem for the `counterfactual direct argument' (CDA). The counterfactual direct argument entails the logical equivalence of the subjunctive and material conditional, given a variety of assumptions. Second, I provide a semantics that validates the counterfactual direct argument without collapse. This theory further develops extant dynamic accounts of conditionals. I give a new semantics for disjunction, on which A or B is only true in a context when A and B are both unsettled. The resulting framework validates CDA while invalidating other commonly accepted principles concerning the conditional and disjunction.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JN9MB4IU/Goldstein - 2020 - The counterfactual direct argument.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Goldstein2021,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Contamination}}},
-  author = {Goldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {1--17},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048402.2021.1886129},
-  abstract = {Many defend the thesis that when someone knows p, they couldn't easily have been wrong about p. But the notion of easy possibility in play is relatively under-theorized. One structural idea in the literature, the principle of Counterfactual Closure (CC), connects easy possibility with counterfactuals: if it easily could have happened that p, and if p were the case then q would be the case, then it follows that it easily could have happened that q. We first argue that, while CC is false, there is a true restriction of it to cases involving counterfactual dependence on a coin flip. The failure of CC falsifies a model where the easy possibilities are counterfactually similar to actuality. Next, we show that extant normality models, where the easy possibilities are the sufficiently normal ones, are incompatible with the restricted CC thesis involving coin flips. Next, we develop a new kind of normality theory that can accommodate the restricted version of CC. This new theory introduces a principle of Counterfactual Contamination, which says, roughly, that any world is fairly abnormal if at that world very abnormal events counterfactually depend on a coin flip. Finally, we explain why coin flips and other related events have a special status. A central take-home lesson is that the correct principle in the vicinity of Safety is importantly normality-theoretic rather than (as it is usually conceived) similarity-theoretic.},
-  keywords = {counterfactuals,knowledge,safety},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1886129},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GHVWXBYJ/Goldstein and Hawthorne - 2021 - Counterfactual Contamination.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Goodman,
-  title = {Epistemology {{Normalized}}},
-  author = {Goodman, Jeremy and Salow, Bernhard},
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZXC69YCP/Goodman and Salow - Epistemology Normalized.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZAUA4Y9B/GOOEN-4.html}
-}
-
-@article{Goodman1961,
-  title = {About},
-  author = {Goodman, Nelson},
-  year = {1961},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {LXX},
-  number = {277},
-  pages = {1--24},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/LXX.277.1},
-  abstract = {NELSON GOODMAN;  I.\textemdash ABOUT, Mind, Volume LXX, Issue 277, 1 January 1961, Pages 1\textendash 24, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXX.277.1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U9W64DUS/Goodman - 1961 - I.—ABOUT.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Goodman2016,
-  title = {Reality Is Not Structured},
-  author = {Goodman, Jeremy},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  pages = {anw002},
-  issn = {0003-2638, 1467-8284},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/anw002},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XTBWTQ7H/Goodman - 2016 - Reality is not structured.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Goodman2019,
-  title = {Agglomerative {{Algebras}}},
-  author = {Goodman, Jeremy},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {631--648},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-018-9488-8},
-  abstract = {This paper investigates a generalization of Boolean algebras which I call agglomerative algebras. It also outlines two conceptions of propositions according to which they form an agglomerative algebra but not a Boolean algebra with respect to conjunction and negation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Aboutness,Fineness of grain,Propositions,Subject matter},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2YUJEWYN/Goodman - 2019 - Agglomerative Algebras.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Goodman2020,
-  title = {Correction to: {{Agglomerative Algebras}}},
-  shorttitle = {Correction To},
-  author = {Goodman, Jeremy},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1257--1257},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-019-09523-x},
-  abstract = {The original version of the article unfortunately contained a few mistakes.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DDV7BNNH/Goodman - 2020 - Correction to Agglomerative Algebras.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Goodmana,
-  title = {Higher-{{Order Logic}} as {{Metaphysics}}},
-  booktitle = {Higher-{{Order Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Goodman, Jeremy},
-  editor = {Fritz, Peter and Nicholas, Jones},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HK37ADEU/GOOHLA-2.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Goranko2020,
-  title = {Temporal {{Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Goranko, Valentin and Rumberg, Antje},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2020},
-  edition = {Summer 2020},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {The term Temporal Logic has been broadly used to cover allapproaches to reasoning about time and temporal information, as well as their formal representation, within a logical framework, and also more narrowly to refer specifically to the modal-logic type of approach introduced around 1960 by Arthur Prior under the name Tense Logic and subsequently developed further by many logicians and computerscientists. Applications of Temporal Logic include its use as aformalism for clarifying philosophical issues about time, as aframework within which to define the semantics of temporal expressionsin natural language, as a language for encoding temporal knowledge inartificial intelligence, and as a tool for specification, formalanalysis, and verification of the executions of computer programs andsystems., Here we provide a broadly representative, yet concise and inevitablyincomplete, overview of the rich variety of temporal models and logicsintroduced and studied over the past 50 years.},
-  keywords = {artificial intelligence: logic and,Diodorus Cronus,frame problem,future contingents,identity: over time,logic: action,logic: combining,logic: free,logic: hybrid,logic: intensional,logic: modal,McTaggart; John M. E.,Ockham [Occam]; William,Prior; Arthur,temporal parts,tense and aspect,time}
-}
-
-@article{Goto2005,
-  title = {Y\=aj\~navalkya's {{Characterization}} of the {{\=Atman}} and the {{Four Kinds}} of {{Suffering}} in Early {{Buddhism}}},
-  author = {Got{\=o}, Toshifumi},
-  year = {2005},
-  journal = {Electronic Journal of Vedic Studies},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {1--15},
-  issn = {1084-7561},
-  doi = {10.11588/ejvs.2005.2.397},
-  abstract = {The paper is based on the author's article in Japanese ``Y\=aj\~navalkya no \=atm\'an- no keiy\=ogo to Buddha no shiku'', Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 44-2 (1996) pp. 887\textendash 879. This present form is a revised and enlarged version, based on discussions with Junko SAKAMOTO-GOT\=O and her articles, especially:``Das Jenseits und i\d{s}\d{t}\=a-p\=urt\'a- `Wirkung des Geopferten-und-Geschenkten' in der vedischen Religion'', Indoarisch, Iranisch und die Indogermanistik. Arbeitstagung der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft vom 2. bis 5. Oktober 1997 in Erlangen, Wiesbaden 2000, pp. 475\textendash 490, cf. also her article with the same title in Japanese in Indoshis\=o to bukky\=obunka (Indian Thoughts and Buddhist Culture). Essays in Honour of Professor Junkichi Imanishi on His Sixtieth Birthday, T\=oky\=o 1996, pp. 862\textendash 882. The manuscript was originally written in the spring of 2000 for an omnibus volume of Japanese Indology which has not yet been published till today.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2005 Toshifumi Got\=o},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7Z6QJBE4/Gotō - 2005 - Yājñavalkya’s Characterization of the Ātman and th.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Goubault-Larrecq2013,
-  title = {Non-{{Hausdorff Topology}} and {{Domain Theory}}: {{Selected Topics}} in {{Point-Set Topology}}},
-  shorttitle = {Non-{{Hausdorff Topology}} and {{Domain Theory}}},
-  author = {{Goubault-Larrecq}, Jean},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = may,
-  edition = {1st edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  isbn = {978-1-107-03413-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PXVMBPXA/Goubault-Larrecq_2013_Non-Hausdorff Topology and Domain Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Goubier2015,
-  title = {When the {{World}} Is {{Not Enough}}: {{Medieval Ways}} to {{Deal}} with the {{Lack}} of {{Referents}}},
-  shorttitle = {When the {{World}} Is {{Not Enough}}},
-  author = {Goubier, Fr{\'e}d{\'e}ric and {Perini-Santos}, Ernesto},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Logica Universalis},
-  volume = {9},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {213--235},
-  issn = {1661-8297, 1661-8300},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11787-014-0113-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03A05,Computer Science,general,Logic,Mathematics,Primary 01A35,quantifiers,Supposition theory,thirteenth century},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S9PUIBYZ/Goubier and Perini-Santos - 2015 - When the World is Not Enough Medieval Ways to Dea.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Gratzer2011,
-  title = {Lattice {{Theory}}: {{Foundation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Lattice {{Theory}}},
-  author = {Gratzer, George},
-  year = {2011},
-  publisher = {{Springer Basel}},
-  address = {{Basel}},
-  isbn = {978-3-0348-0017-4 978-3-0348-0018-1},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Griffin,
-  title = {The {{Metaphysics}} of {{Human Rights}}},
-  author = {Griffin, James},
-  journal = {On Human Rights},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {This chapter begins with a discussion of the two models of value judgement. It discusses human interest as part of the natural world. It then goes on to consider how much of the epistemic and metaphysical standing of human interests carries over to the human rights derived from them.},
-  chapter = {On Human Rights},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-171647-8},
-  langid = {american},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z4PE8WV6/Griffin - The Metaphysics of Human Rights.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Griffith2018,
-  title = {Social Construction: {{Big-G}} Grounding, Small-g Realization},
-  shorttitle = {Social Construction},
-  author = {Griffith, Aaron M.},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {175},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {241--260},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-017-0865-x},
-  abstract = {The goal of this paper is to make headway on a metaphysics of social construction. In recent work (forthcoming), I've argued that social construction should be understood in terms of metaphysical grounding. However, I agree with grounding skeptics like Wilson (Inquiry 1\textendash 45, 2014) that bare claims about what grounds what are insufficient for capturing, with fine enough grain, metaphysical dependence structures. To that end, I develop a view on which the social construction of human social kinds (e.g., race) is a kind of realization relation. Social kinds, I argue, are multiply realizable kinds. I depart from the Wilson by further arguing that an appeal to grounding is not otiose when it comes to social construction. Social construction, I claim, belongs to the ``big-G'' Grounding genus, but it is the specific ``small-g'' relation of realization at work in cases of human kind social construction.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9TWZLVBL/Griffith - 2018 - Social construction big-G grounding, small-g real.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{GriffithAaronM.2017,
-  title = {Social {{Construction}} and {{Grounding}}},
-  author = {{Griffith Aaron M.}},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  issn = {0031-8205},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12376},
-  abstract = {The aim of this paper is to bring recent work on metaphysical grounding to bear on the phenomenon of social construction. It is argued that grounding can be used to analyze social construction and that the grounding framework is helpful for articulating various claims and commitments of social constructionists, especially about social identities, e.g., gender and race. The paper also responds to a number of objections that have been (or could be) leveled against the application of grounding to social construction from Elizabeth Barnes (2014), Mari Mikkola (2015), and Jessica Wilson (2014).},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JEZ63CCS/Griffith Aaron M. - 2017 - Social Construction and Grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Gulick2001,
-  title = {Reduction, {{Emergence}} and {{Other Recent Options}} on the {{Mind}}/{{Body Problem}}: {{A Philosophic Overview}}},
-  shorttitle = {Reduction, {{Emergence}} and {{Other Recent Options}} on the {{Mind}}/{{Body Problem}}},
-  author = {van Gulick, Robert},
-  year = {2001},
-  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {9-10},
-  pages = {1--34},
-  publisher = {{Imprint Academic}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZFJWF9VS/Gulick - 2001 - Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on t.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Gungor2022,
-  title = {Counterfactuals, Hyperintensionality and {{Hurford}} Disjunctions},
-  author = {G{\"u}ng{\"o}r, H{\"u}seyin},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10988-022-09360-3},
-  abstract = {This paper investigates propositional hyperintensionality in counterfactuals. It starts with a scenario describing two children playing on a seesaw and studies the truth-value predictions for counterfactuals by four different semantic theories. The theories in question are Kit Fine's truthmaker semantics, Luis Alonso-Ovalle's alternative semantics, inquisitive semantics and Paolo Santorio's syntactic truthmaker semantics. These predictions suggest that the theories that distinguish more of a given set of intensionally equivalent sentences (Fine and Alonso-Ovalle's) fare better than those that do not (inquisitive semantics and Santorio's). Then we investigate how inquisitive semantics and Santorio can respond to these results. They can respond to them by helping themselves to considerations from Hurford disjunctions, disjunctions whose disjuncts stand in an entailment relation to one another. I argue that considerations from Hurford disjunctions are ad hoc modifications to less fine-grained theories to predict the expected results and they are not independently motivated. I conclude that the scenarios suggest a need for more fine-grained theories of sentential meaning in general.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Conditionals,Counterfactuals,Hurford disjunctions,Hyperintensionality},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NQVWRAL2/Güngör - 2022 - Counterfactuals, hyperintensionality and Hurford d.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Gunning2019,
-  title = {{{XAI}}\textemdash{{Explainable}} Artificial Intelligence},
-  author = {Gunning, David and Stefik, Mark and Choi, Jaesik and Miller, Timothy and Stumpf, Simone and Yang, Guang-Zhong},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Science Robotics},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {37},
-  pages = {eaay7120},
-  publisher = {{American Association for the Advancement of Science}},
-  doi = {10.1126/scirobotics.aay7120},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DMRIRTQ5/Gunning et al. - 2019 - XAI—Explainable artificial intelligence.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Guttenplan1994,
-  title = {A {{Companion}} to the {{Philosophy}} of {{Mind}}},
-  author = {Guttenplan, Samuel D.},
-  year = {1994},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge: Blackwell}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HFRKBPMP/Guttenplan - 1994 - A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hacker-Wright2015,
-  title = {Skill, {{Practical Wisdom}}, and {{Ethical Naturalism}}},
-  author = {{Hacker-Wright}, John},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
-  pages = {1--11},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AZ6F47XR/2015 - Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism - Hacker-Wright.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K9U29UL4/2015 - Skill, Practical Wisdom, and Ethical Naturalism - Hacker-Wright.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hacking1999,
-  title = {The {{Social Construction}} of {{What}}?},
-  author = {Hacking, Ian},
-  year = {1999},
-  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Haidt2001,
-  title = {The {{Emotional Dog}} and {{Its Rational Tail}}: {{A Social Intuitionist Approach}} to {{Moral Judgement}}},
-  author = {Haidt, Jonathan},
-  year = {2001},
-  journal = {Psychological review},
-  volume = {108},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {814--834},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5ABTAEVZ/2001 - The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgement - Haidt.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HQTYBHSY/2001 - The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgement - Haidt.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hakli2011,
-  title = {Does the Deduction Theorem Fail for Modal Logic?},
-  author = {Hakli, Raul and Negri, Sara},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {187},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {849--867},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-011-9905-9},
-  abstract = {Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction- and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hilbert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of {$\square$}A{$\square$}A\{\textbackslash square\textbackslash,A\} from A.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5JEBRKK3/Hakli and Negri - 2011 - Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Halbach2010,
-  title = {The {{Logic Manual}}},
-  author = {Halbach, Volker},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = aug,
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  abstract = {The Logic Manual is a clear and concise introduction to logic for beginning philosophy students. It offers a complete introductory course, guiding the reader carefully through the topics in logic that are most important for the study of philosophy. It covers propositional and predicate logic with and without identity. It includes an account of the semantics of these languages including definitions of truth and satisfaction. Natural deduction is used as a proof system. Volker Halbach introduces the essential concepts through examples and informal explanations as well as through abstract definitions. The Logic Manual provides the best entry to the general abstract way of thinking about language, logic, and semantics which is characteristic of contemporary philosophy. Exercises, examples, and sample examination papers are provided on an accompanying website.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-958783-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / General,Philosophy / Logic,Philosophy / Metaphysics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/28S6BAYJ/Halbach, V. Exercise booklate 2015 with solution.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/39BVAIYU/exercises.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KIUYBXR6/Worc Syllabus.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TMH6UZU6/Natural Deduction Pack.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hale1996,
-  title = {Absolute {{Necessities}}},
-  author = {Hale, Bob},
-  year = {1996},
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {10},
-  pages = {93--117},
-  issn = {1520-8583},
-  doi = {10.2307/2216238},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MTFXUBVP/Hale - 1996 - Absolute Necessities.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hale2010,
-  title = {Modality: {{Metaphysics}}, {{Logic}}, and {{Epistemology}}},
-  editor = {Hale, Bob and Hoffmann, Aviv},
-  year = {2010},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-956581-8},
-  pmid = {16005800},
-  keywords = {B Philosophy (General)},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KPFVF247/2010 - Modality metaphysics, logic and epistemology - Unknown.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hale2017,
-  title = {A {{Companion}} to the {{Philosophy}} of {{Language}}},
-  editor = {Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin and Miller, Alexander},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = apr,
-  edition = {2nd edition},
-  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
-  address = {{Malden, MA}},
-  isbn = {978-1-118-97471-1},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Hall2000,
-  title = {Causation and the {{Price}} of {{Transitivity}}},
-  author = {Hall, Ned},
-  year = {2000},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {97},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {198--222},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2678390},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BRNWC7JD/Hall - 2000 - Causation and the Price of Transitivity.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Hall2003,
-  title = {Causation and {{Preemption}}},
-  booktitle = {Philosophy of {{Science Today}}},
-  author = {Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie Ann},
-  editor = {Clark, Peter and Hawley, Katherine},
-  year = {2003},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AMBLN99R/Hall and Paul - 2003 - Causation and Preemption.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NN69W64Q/causation-preemption (1).pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Hall2004,
-  title = {Two {{Concepts}} of {{Causation}}},
-  booktitle = {Causation and {{Counterfactuals}}},
-  author = {Hall, Ned},
-  editor = {Collins, John and Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie},
-  year = {2004},
-  pages = {225--276},
-  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TYVA2F9D/Hall - 2004 - Two Concepts of Causation.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BSZRUD63/HALTCO-4.html}
-}
-
-@article{Hall2004a,
-  title = {The {{Intrinsic Character}} of {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Hall, Ned},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics},
-  volume = {1},
-  pages = {255--300},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GL6EKFHV/Hall - 2004 - The Intrinsic Character of Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hall2006,
-  title = {Comments on {{Woodward}}, "{{Making Things Happen}}"},
-  author = {Hall, Ned},
-  editor = {Woodward, James},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences},
-  volume = {28},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {611--624},
-  publisher = {{Stazione Zoologica Anton Dohrn - Napoli}},
-  issn = {0391-9714},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HDE3DDIP/Hall - 2006 - Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hall2007,
-  title = {Structural Equations and Causation},
-  author = {Hall, N.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {132},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {109--136},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-006-9057-9},
-  abstract = {Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causal models,Causation,Counterfactuals,Defaults,Deviants,Structural equations},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NWD5JYTA/Hall - 2007 - Structural equations and causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Halmos1998,
-  title = {Logic as {{Algebra}}},
-  author = {Halmos, Paul and Givant, Steven},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = sep,
-  publisher = {{The Mathematical Association of America}},
-  address = {{Washington, D.C.}},
-  abstract = {Here is an introduction to modern logic that differs from others by treating logic from an algebraic perspective. What this means is that notions and results from logic become much easier to understand when seen from a familiar standpoint of algebra. The presentation, written in the engaging and provocative style that is the hallmark of Paul Halmos, from whose course the book is taken, is aimed at a broad audience, students, teachers and amateurs in mathematics, philosophy, computer science, linguistics and engineering; they all have to get to grips with logic at some stage. All that is needed to understand the book is some basic acquaintance with algebra.},
-  isbn = {978-0-88385-327-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SUCLSA2Z/[Paul_Halmos,_Steven_Givant]_Logic_as_algebra(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Halpern2005,
-  title = {Causes and {{Explanations}}: {{A Structural-Model Approach}}. {{Part I}}: {{Causes}}},
-  shorttitle = {Causes and {{Explanations}}},
-  author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea},
-  year = {2005},
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {56},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {843--887},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, The British Society for the Philosophy of Science]}},
-  issn = {0007-0882},
-  abstract = {We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions and resolves major difficulties in the traditional account.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NRMHKUCP/Halpern and Pearl - 2005 - Causes and Explanations A Structural-Model Approa.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Halpern2015,
-  title = {A {{Modification}} of the {{Halpern-Pearl Definition}} of {{Causality}}},
-  author = {Halpern, Joseph Y.},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = may,
-  number = {arXiv:1505.00162},
-  eprint = {1505.00162},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  institution = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1505.00162},
-  abstract = {The original Halpern-Pearl definition of causality [Halpern and Pearl, 2001] was updated in the journal version of the paper [Halpern and Pearl, 2005] to deal with some problems pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl [2003]. Here the definition is modified yet again, in a way that (a) leads to a simpler definition, (b) handles the problems pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl, and many others, (c) gives reasonable answers (that agree with those of the original and updated definition) in the standard problematic examples of causality, and (d) has lower complexity than either the original or updated definitions.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V5SCM2JS/Halpern - 2015 - A Modification of the Halpern-Pearl Definition of .pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KZKYCHF5/1505.html}
-}
-
-@article{Halpern2015a,
-  title = {Graded {{Causation}} and {{Defaults}}},
-  author = {Halpern, Joseph Y. and Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {66},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {413--457},
-  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
-  issn = {0007-0882},
-  doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt050},
-  abstract = {Recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy has shown that judgments of actual causation are often influenced by consideration of defaults, typicality, and normality. A number of philosophers and computer scientists have also suggested that an appeal to such factors can help deal with problems facing existing accounts of actual causation. This article develops a flexible formal framework for incorporating defaults, typicality, and normality into an account of actual causation. The resulting account takes actual causation to be both graded and comparative. We then show how our account would handle a number of standard cases. 1{$\quad$}Introduction 2{$\quad$}Causal Models 3{$\quad$}The HP Definition of Actual Causation 4{$\quad$}The Problem of Isomorphism 5{$\quad$}Defaults, Typicality, and Normality 6{$\quad$}Extended Causal Models 7{$\quad$}Examples {$\quad\quad$}7.1{$\quad$}Omissions {$\quad\quad$}7.2{$\quad$}Knobe effects {$\quad\quad$}7.3{$\quad$}Causes versus background conditions {$\quad\quad$}7.4{$\quad$}Bogus prevention {$\quad\quad$}7.5{$\quad$}Causal chains {$\quad\quad$}7.6{$\quad$}Legal doctrines of intervening causes {$\quad\quad$}7.7{$\quad$}Pre-emption and short circuits 8{$\quad$}Conclusion},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q5LY4U73/Halpern and Hitchcock - 2015 - Graded Causation and Defaults.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Halpern2016,
-  title = {Sufficient {{Conditions}} for {{Causality}} to {{Be Transitive}}},
-  author = {Halpern, Joseph Y.},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {83},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {213--226},
-  issn = {0031-8248, 1539-767X},
-  doi = {10.1086/684915},
-  abstract = {Natural conditions are provided that are sufficient to ensure that causality as defined by approaches that use counterfactual dependence and structural equations will be transitive.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DRE2M9KE/Halpern - 2016 - Sufficient Conditions for Causality to Be Transiti.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Halpern2016a,
-  title = {{{APPROPRIATE CAUSAL MODELS AND THE STABILITY OF CAUSATION}}},
-  author = {Halpern, Joseph Y.},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {9},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {76--102},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020315000246},
-  abstract = {Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. However, a number of authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern\textendash Pearl (HP) definition of causality (Halpern \& Pearl, 2005) gives intuitively unreasonable answers. Here it is shown that, for each of these examples, we can give two stories consistent with the description in the example, such that intuitions regarding causality are quite different for each story. By adding additional variables, we can disambiguate the stories. Moreover, in the resulting causal models, the HP definition of causality gives the intuitively correct answer. It is also shown that, by adding extra variables, a modification to the original HP definition made to deal with an example of Hopkins \& Pearl (2003) may not be necessary. Given how much can be done by adding extra variables, there might be a concern that the notion of causality is somewhat unstable. Can adding extra variables in a ``conservative'' way (i.e., maintaining all the relations between the variables in the original model) cause the answer to the question ``Is X = x a cause of Y = y?'' to alternate between ``yes'' and ``no''? It is shown that we can have such alternation infinitely often, but if we take normality into consideration, we cannot. Indeed, under appropriate normality assumptions. Adding an extra variable can change the answer from ``yes' to ``no'', but after that, it cannot change back to ``yes''.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WCVJZ2JX/Halpern - 2016 - APPROPRIATE CAUSAL MODELS AND THE STABILITY OF CAU.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MVNDESNP/5C449C6F9F7DF4224EC613F56BE53AB1.html}
-}
-
-@book{Halpern2019,
-  title = {Actual {{Causality}}},
-  author = {Halpern, Joseph Y.},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = feb,
-  edition = {Reprint edition},
-  publisher = {{The MIT Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Massachusetts}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-53713-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C8W52CPL/Halpern - 2019 - Actual Causality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Harbecke2021,
-  title = {Counterfactual Theories of Causation and the Problem of Large Causes},
-  author = {Harbecke, Jens},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {178},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1647--1668},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-020-01505-z},
-  abstract = {As is well-known, David Lewis' counterfactual theory of causation is subject to serious counterexamples in `exceptional' cases. What has not received due attention in the literature so far is that Lewis' theory fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for causation in `ordinary' cases, too. In particular, the theory suffers from the `problem of large causes'. It is argued that this problem may be fixed by imposing a minimization constraint, whilst this solution brings along substantial costs as well. In particular, a precise formulation of minimization requires defining an `essential part of an event' and/or an `essential subevent'. Although the possibility of such a definition is ultimately left open, some doubts are raised on whether the counterfactualists' resources are fit for this purpose, and whether the challenge can be met without substantially departing from Lewis' intention, which was to provide a reductive account of causation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Counterfactual causation,David Lewis,John L. Mackie,Minimization,Overdetermination,Proportionality,Theories of causation},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S8V9XSAM/Harbecke - 2021 - Counterfactual theories of causation and the probl.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hartman1976,
-  title = {Aristotle on the {{Identity}} of {{Substance}} and {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Hartman, Edwin},
-  year = {1976},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {85},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {545--561},
-  publisher = {{[Duke University Press, Philosophical Review]}},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.2307/2184278},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NX779X3U/Hartman_1976_Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Haslanger1989,
-  title = {Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics},
-  author = {Haslanger, Sally},
-  year = {1989},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {119--125},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/49.3.119},
-  abstract = {Sally Haslanger; Endurance and temporary intrinsics, Analysis, Volume 49, Issue 3, 1 June 1989, Pages 119\textendash 125, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/49.3.119},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EP55DEIL/Haslanger - 1989 - Endurance and temporary intrinsics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Haslanger1995,
-  title = {Ontology and {{Social Construction}}},
-  author = {Haslanger, Sally},
-  year = {1995},
-  journal = {Philosophical Topics},
-  volume = {23},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {95--125},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5N2HZ28K/philtopics_1995_0023_0002_0095_0126.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Haslanger2003,
-  title = {Persistence {{Through Time}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Oxford Handbook}} of {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Haslanger, Sally},
-  editor = {Loux, Michael J. and Zimmerman, Dean W.},
-  year = {2003},
-  pages = {315--354},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}
-}
-
-@book{Haslanger2003a,
-  title = {Social {{Construction}}: {{The}} ``{{Debunking}}'' {{Project}}},
-  shorttitle = {Social {{Construction}}},
-  author = {Haslanger, Sally},
-  year = {2003},
-  journal = {Resisting Reality},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {In his book The Social Construction of What?, Ian Hacking offers a schema for understanding different social constructionist claims along with a framework for distinguishing kinds or degrees of constructionist projects. Hacking's efforts are useful, but his account leaves many of the philosophical aspects of social construction projects obscure, as are the connections, if any, with more mainstream analytic philosophy projects. This chapter aims to argue that although Hacking's approach to social construction is apt for some of those working on such projects, it does not adequately capture what's at issue for an important range of social constructionists, particularly many of us working on gender and race. Moreover, a different way of understanding social construction reveals interesting connections and conflicts with mainstream analytic projects.},
-  chapter = {Resisting Reality},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-998005-5},
-  langid = {american},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2XLZGEX5/Haslanger - Social Construction The “Debunking” Project.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Haslanger2011,
-  title = {Ideology, {{Generics}}, and {{Common Ground}}},
-  booktitle = {Feminist {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Haslanger, Sally},
-  editor = {Witt, Charlotte},
-  year = {2011},
-  pages = {179--207},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.},
-  isbn = {978-90-481-3782-4 978-90-481-3783-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Gender Studies,general,Metaphysics,Philosophy},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/J3KV35JM/GenericHaslanger.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Haslanger2012,
-  title = {Resisting {{Reality}}: {{Social Construction}} and {{Social Critique}}},
-  shorttitle = {Resisting {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Haslanger, Sally},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = oct,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-989263-1},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K7TSUCT9/[Sally_Haslanger]_Resisting_Reality_Social_Constr(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Haverkamp2012,
-  title = {A {{Note}} on {{Comparative Probability}}},
-  author = {Haverkamp, Nick and Schulz, Moritz},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {76},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {395--402},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-011-9307-x},
-  abstract = {A possible event always seems to be more probable than an impossible event. Although this constraint, usually alluded to as regularity, is prima facie very attractive, it cannot hold for standard probabilities. Moreover, in a recent paper Timothy Williamson has challenged even the idea that regularity can be integrated into a comparative conception of probability by showing that the standard comparative axioms conflict with certain cases if regularity is assumed. In this note, we suggest that there is a natural weakening of the standard comparative axioms. It is shown that these axioms are consistent both with the regularity condition and with the essential feature of Williamson's example.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Comparative Probability,Epistemic Norm,Fair Coin,Probability Relation,Standard Probability},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZH44NIDB/Haverkamp and Schulz - 2012 - A Note on Comparative Probability.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hawke2018,
-  title = {Theories of {{Aboutness}}},
-  author = {Hawke, Peter},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {96},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {697--723},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048402.2017.1388826},
-  abstract = {Our topic is the theory of topics (that is, the theory of subject matter). My goal is to clarify and evaluate three competing traditions: what I call the way-based approach, the atom-based approach, and the subject-predicate approach. I develop (defeasible) criteria for adequacy using robust linguistic intuitions that feature prominently in the literature. Then I evaluate the extent to which various existing theories satisfy these constraints. I conclude that recent theories due to Parry, Perry, Lewis, and Yablo do not meet the constraints in total. I then introduce the issue-based theory\textemdash a novel and natural entry in the atom-based tradition that meets our constraints. In a coda, I categorize a recent theory from Fine as atom-based, and contrast it to the issue-based theory, concluding that they are evenly matched, relative to our main criteria of adequacy. I offer tentative reasons to nevertheless favour the issue-based theory.},
-  keywords = {aboutness,hyperintensionality,subject matter,topic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HPIBT4UM/Hawke - 2018 - Theories of Aboutness.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hawley2003,
-  title = {Success and {{Knowledge-How}}},
-  author = {Hawley, Katherine},
-  year = {2003},
-  journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {19---31},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BRMXXWZL/2003 - Success and Knowledge-How - Hawley.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TE85KMF9/2003 - Success and Knowledge-How - Hawley.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hawley2018,
-  title = {Social {{Science}} as a {{Guide}} to {{Social Metaphysics}}?},
-  author = {Hawley, Katherine},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {187--198},
-  issn = {1572-8587},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10838-017-9389-5},
-  abstract = {If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach the metaphysics of the social world? What role can the social sciences play in metaphysical investigation? In the light of these questions, this paper examines three possible approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, conceptual analysis, and Haslanger-inspired ameliorative projects.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SPGV72X6/Hawley - 2018 - Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hawthorne2001,
-  title = {Causal {{Structuralism}}},
-  author = {Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {35},
-  pages = {361--378},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.16},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2001},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5TYKRZ5J/Hawthorne - 2001 - Causal Structuralism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hawthorne2006,
-  title = {Epistemicism and {{Semantic Plasticity}}},
-  author = {Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics},
-  volume = {2},
-  pages = {289},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/244ESJAJ/Metaphysical_Essays_----_(Pg_196--221).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hawthorne2007,
-  title = {Craziness and {{Metasemantics}}},
-  author = {Hawthorne, John},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {116},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {427--440},
-  issn = {0031-8108, 1558-1470},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-2007-004},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5WCE4V42/Hawthorne - 2007 - Craziness and Metasemantics.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hawthorne2012,
-  title = {The {{Reference Book}}},
-  author = {Hawthorne, John and Manley, David},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = mar,
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  abstract = {John Hawthorne and David Manley present an original treatment of the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. In Part I, they argue against the idea that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. Part II challenges the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other\textemdash a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in linguistics and philosophical semantics, Hawthorne and Manley explore a more unified account of all four types of expression according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. On the preferred framework put forward in The Reference Book, all four types of expression involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference\textemdash a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what Hawthorne and Manley call a 'singular restriction' on the existentially quantified domain. The book concludes by drawing out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-969367-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / General,Philosophy / General,Philosophy / Language,Philosophy / Mind \& Body},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4QMFEZKT/[John_Hawthorne,_David_Manley]_The_Reference_Book(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hayaki,
-  title = {Contingent {{Objects}} and the {{Barcan Formula}}},
-  author = {Hayaki, Reina},
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {64},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {75--83},
-  issn = {0165-0106, 1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-005-0294-7},
-  abstract = {It has been argued by Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta, and independently by Timothy Williamson, that the best quantified modal logic is one that validates both the Barcan Formula and its converse. This requires that domains be fixed across all possible worlds. All objects exist necessarily; some \textendash{} those we would usually consider contingent \textendash{} are concrete at some worlds and non-concrete (but still existent) at others. Linsky and Zalta refer to such objects as `contingently non-concrete'. I defend the standard usage of the word `exists', and the view that many objects exist only contingently. I argue that the Linsky/Zalta analysis, and to a lesser extent Williamson's, suffers not only from a peculiar ontology but also from two related formal difficulties. Their analysis gives either counter-intuitive or ad hoc results about essences, and it fails to accommodate contingently existing abstracta.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DRA22TZT/Hayaki - Contingent Objects and the Barcan Formula.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Heim1990,
-  title = {E-{{Type}} Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora},
-  author = {Heim, Irene},
-  year = {1990},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {137--177},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00630732},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HA4HAQ2M/Heim - 1990 - E-Type pronouns and donkey anaphora.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Heller2016,
-  title = {Category {{Free Category Theory}} and {{Its Philosophical Implications}}},
-  author = {Heller, Michael},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {arXiv:1602.01759 [math]},
-  eprint = {1602.01759},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {math},
-  abstract = {There exists a dispute in philosophy, going back at least to Leibniz, whether is it possible to view the world as a network of relations and relations between relations with the role of objects, between which these relations hold, entirely eliminated. Category theory seems to be the correct mathematical theory for clarifying conceptual possibilities in this respect. In this theory, objects acquire their identity either by definition, when in defining category we postulate the existence of objects, or formally by the existence of identity morphisms. We show that it is perfectly possible to get rid of the identity of objects by definition, but the formal identity of objects remains as an essential element of the theory. This can be achieved by defining category exclusively in terms of morphisms and identity morphisms (objectless, or object free, category) and, analogously, by defining category theory entirely in terms of functors and identity functors (categoryless, or category free, category theory). With objects and categories eliminated, we focus on the "philosophy of arrows" and the roles various identities play in it (identities as such, identities up to isomorphism, identities up to natural isomorphism...). This perspective elucides a contrast between "set ontology" and "categorical ontology".},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {18A18-01; 03A05,Mathematics - Category Theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E2S467DV/Heller - 2016 - Category Free Category Theory and Its Philosophica.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Henninger1989,
-  title = {Relations: {{Medieval}} Theories 1250-1325},
-  shorttitle = {Relations},
-  author = {Henninger, Mark G.},
-  year = {1989},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-824444-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  lccn = {B721, B738.R44},
-  keywords = {Medieval philosophy,Medieval philosophy N,Medieval Y,Philosophy,Relation (Philosophy) History Y},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4MSKLH3V/Scotus.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CCTY76NM/Introduction.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FWE9KJ2A/Ockham.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Herden2000,
-  title = {Useful Topologies and Separable Systems},
-  author = {Herden, Gerhard and Pallack, Andreas},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Applied General Topology},
-  volume = {1},
-  doi = {10.4995/agt.2000.3024},
-  abstract = {p{$>$}Let X be an arbitrary set. A topology t on X is said to be useful if every continuous linear preorder on X is representable by a continuous real valued order preserving function. Continuous linear preorders on X are induced by certain families of open subsets of X that are called (linear) separable systems on X. Therefore, in a first step useful topologies on X will be characterized by means of (linear) separable systems on X. Then, in a second step particular topologies on X are studied that do not allow the construction of (linear) separable systems on X that correspond to non representable continuous linear preorders. In this way generalizations of the Eilenberg Debreu theorems which state that second countable or separable and connected topologies on X are useful and of the theorem of Est\'evez and Herv\'es which states that a metrizable topology on X is useful, if and only if it is second countable can be proved.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AETBKUUR/Herden_Pallack_2000_Useful topologies and separable systems.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hesslow1981,
-  title = {The {{Transitivity}} of {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Hesslow, Germund},
-  year = {1981},
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {41},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {130--133},
-  publisher = {{[Analysis Committee, Oxford University Press]}},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.2307/3328069}
-}
-
-@article{Hickman,
-  title = {({{Implicit}}) {{Knowledge}}, Reasons, and Semantic Understanding},
-  author = {Hickman, Natalia Waights},
-  journal = {Mind \& Language},
-  volume = {n/a},
-  number = {n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0017},
-  doi = {10.1111/mila.12286},
-  abstract = {This paper exploits recent work on the normative and constitutive roles of knowledge in practical rationality, to put pressure on the idea that speakers could communicate without exploiting linguistic knowledge. I defend cognitivism about meaning, the view that speakers have rationally accessible (i.e., implicit rather than tacit) knowledge of semantic facts and principles, and that this knowledge is constitutive of their linguistic competence.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2020 The Author. Mind \& Language published by John Wiley \& Sons Ltd.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {knowledge norm,knowledge view of reasons,rational integration criterion,rationality of language,semantic cognitivism,semantic understanding},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12286},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AYBBFNI5/Hickman - (Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic unders.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hieronymi2011,
-  title = {{{XIV}}\textemdash{{Reasons}} for {{Action}}},
-  author = {Hieronymi, Pamela},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  volume = {111},
-  number = {3\_pt\_3},
-  pages = {407--427},
-  issn = {0066-7374},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00316.x},
-  abstract = {Donald Davidson opens `Actions, Reasons, and Causes' by asking, `What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?' His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of the explanation of action, one that, though minimal and formal, preserves the proper role for the agent's own reasons for acting.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K29WMG24/Hieronymi - 2011 - XIV—Reasons for Action.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Himmelreich2021,
-  title = {What {{Killed Your Plant}}? {{Profligate Omissions}} and {{Weak Centering}}},
-  shorttitle = {What {{Killed Your Plant}}?},
-  author = {Himmelreich, Johannes},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-021-00422-9},
-  abstract = {This paper is on the problem of profligate omissions. The problem is that counterfactual definitions of causation identify as a cause anything that could have prevented an effect but that did not actually occur, which is a highly counterintuitive result. Many solutions of this problem appeal to normative, epistemic, pragmatic, or metaphysical considerations. These existing solutions are in some sense substantive. In contrast, this paper concentrates on the semantics of counterfactuals. I propose to replace Strong Centering with Weak Centering. This allows that the actual world is not the only world that is closest to the actual world. As a result, some counterfactuals that would otherwise have been true, turn out to be false. When these counterfactuals concern causation, fewer causal claims are true. In addition to describing steps towards solving the problem of profligate omissions, the proposal captures an abstraction that is shared by many of the existing solutions: depending on how the distance ordering underlying the Weak Centering condition is constructed and interpreted, some of these existing solutions can be recovered.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TR627F3A/Himmelreich - 2021 - What Killed Your Plant Profligate Omissions and W.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hinchliff1996,
-  title = {The {{Puzzle}} of {{Change}}},
-  author = {Hinchliff, Mark},
-  year = {1996},
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {10},
-  pages = {119--136},
-  issn = {1520-8583},
-  doi = {10.2307/2216239}
-}
-
-@book{Hindley2008,
-  title = {Basic {{Simple Type Theory}}},
-  author = {Hindley, J. Roger},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {1 edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, U.K.}},
-  abstract = {Type theory is one of the most important tools in the design of higher-level programming languages, such as ML. This book introduces and teaches its techniques by focusing on one particularly neat system and studying it in detail. In this way, all the key ideas are covered without getting involved in the complications of more advanced systems, but concentrating rather on the principles that make the theory work in practice. This book takes a type-assignment approach to type theory, and the system considered is the simplest polymorphic one. The author covers all the basic ideas, including the system's relation to propositional logic, and gives a careful treatment of the type-checking algorithm which lies at the heart of every such system. Also featured are two other interesting algorithms that have been buried in inaccessible technical literature. The mathematical presentation is rigorous but clear, making the book at a level which can be used as an introduction to type theory for computer scientists.},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-05422-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FVNWP5GQ/Hindley - 2008 - Basic Simple Type Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hindley2008a,
-  title = {Lambda-{{Calculus}} and {{Combinators}}: {{An Introduction}}},
-  shorttitle = {Lambda-{{Calculus}} and {{Combinators}}},
-  author = {Hindley, Jonathan P. Seldin J. Roger},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {2 edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, UK ; New York}},
-  abstract = {Combinatory logic and lambda-calculus, originally devised in the 1920s, have since developed into linguistic tools, especially useful in programming languages. The authors' previous book served as the main reference for introductory courses on lambda-calculus for over 20 years: this version is thoroughly revised and offers an account of the subject with the same authoritative exposition. The grammar and basic properties of both combinatory logic and lambda-calculus are discussed, followed by an introduction to type-theory. Typed and untyped versions of the systems, and their differences, are covered. Lambda-calculus models, which lie behind much of the semantics of programming languages, are also explained in depth. The treatment is as non-technical as possible, with the main ideas emphasized and illustrated by examples. Many exercises are included, from routine to advanced, with solutions to most at the end of the book.},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-89885-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KZYFTM3Z/Hindley - 2008 - Lambda-Calculus and Combinators An Introduction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hindriks2014,
-  title = {Normativity in {{Action}}: {{How}} to {{Explain}} the {{Knobe Effect}} and Its {{Relatives}}},
-  shorttitle = {Normativity in {{Action}}},
-  author = {Hindriks, Frank},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Mind \& Language},
-  volume = {29},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {51--72},
-  issn = {1468-0017},
-  doi = {10.1111/mila.12041},
-  abstract = {Intuitions about intentional action have turned out to be sensitive to normative factors: most people say that an indifferent agent brings about an effect of her action intentionally when it is harmful, but unintentionally when it is beneficial. Joshua Knobe explains this asymmetry, which is known as `the Knobe effect', in terms of the moral valence of the effect, arguing that this explanation generalizes to other asymmetries concerning notions as diverse as deciding and being free. I present an alternative explanation of the Knobe effect in terms of normative reasons. This explanation generalizes to other folk psychological notions such as deciding, but not to such notions as being free. I go on to argue, against Knobe, that offering a unified explanation of all the asymmetries he discusses is in fact undesirable.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12041},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5CLWQZXM/Hindriks - 2014 - Normativity in Action How to Explain the Knobe Ef.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PXWHMI9G/mila.html}
-}
-
-@article{Hirsch2002,
-  title = {Quantifier {{Variance}} and {{Realism}}},
-  author = {Hirsch, Eli},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {51--73},
-  issn = {1758-2237},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1758-2237.2002.tb00061.x},
-  copyright = {2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QG3RQJKL/Hirsch - 2002 - Quantifier Variance and Realism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hirsch2013,
-  title = {The {{Metaphysically Best Language}}},
-  author = {Hirsch, Eli},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {87},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {709--716},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12070},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2013 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5YDQS9G7/Hirsch - 2013 - The Metaphysically Best Language.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Hitchcock2007,
-  title = {What's {{Wrong}} with {{Neuron Diagrams}}?},
-  booktitle = {Causation and {{Explanation}}},
-  author = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  editor = {Campbell, J. K. and O'Rourke, M. and Silverstein, H. S.},
-  year = {2007},
-  edition = {1st Edition},
-  pages = {69--92},
-  publisher = {{A Bradford Book}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R5C4KW9M/Hitchcock - 2007 - What's Wrong with Neuron Diagrams.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HRPNDNL4/HITWW.html}
-}
-
-@article{Hitchcock2011,
-  title = {Trumping and Contrastive Causation},
-  author = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {181},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {227--240},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-010-9799-y},
-  abstract = {Jonathan Schaffer introduced a new type of causal structure called `trumping'. According to Schaffer, trumping is a species of causal preemption. Both Schaffer and I have argued that causation has a contrastive structure. In this paper, I analyze the structure of trumping cases from the perspective of contrastive causation, and argue that the case is much more complex than it first appears. Nonetheless, there is little reason to regard trumping as a species of causal preemption.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causation,Contrastive causation,Overdetermination,Preemption,Schaffer (Jonathan),Trumping},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FJB4B64R/Hitchcock - 2011 - Trumping and contrastive causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hitchcock2012,
-  title = {Theories of Causation and the Causal Exclusion Argument},
-  author = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  year = {2012},
-  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
-  volume = {19},
-  number = {5-6},
-  pages = {40--56},
-  issn = {13558250},
-  abstract = {(2012) Hitchcock. Journal of Consciousness Studies. There are a wide variety of theories of causation available in the philosophical literature. For the philosopher working in philosophy of mind, w...},
-  langid = {british},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DGCCD987/05f703cd-12da-3498-892e-4799eb7cbc23.html}
-}
-
-@article{Hitchcock2012a,
-  title = {Events and Times: A Case Study in Means-Ends Metaphysics},
-  shorttitle = {Events and Times},
-  author = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {160},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {79--96},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-012-9909-4},
-  abstract = {There is a tradition, tracing back to Kant, of recasting metaphysical questions as questions about the utility of a conceptual scheme, linguistic framework, or methodological rule for achieving some particular end. Following in this tradition, I propose a `means-ends metaphysics', in which one rigorously demonstrates the suitability of some conceptual framework for achieving a specified goal. I illustrate this approach using a debate about the nature of events. Specifically, the question is whether the time at which an event occurs is an essential property of that event. I argue that this question is naturally transformed into a question about the methodology of causal modeling. In this new framework, the question concerns what kind of variables to use to represent the effects of potential interventions on a system. This question has a demonstrably correct answer, which sheds new light on the original question.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Carnap,Causal models,Events,Kant,Means-ends epistemology,Metametaphysics,Metaphysics,Popper,Time},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3TVJHZ7D/Hitchcock - 2012 - Events and times a case study in means-ends metap.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hitchcock2016,
-  title = {Conditioning, Intervening, and Decision},
-  author = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {193},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {1157--1176},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0710-8},
-  abstract = {Clark Glymour, together with his students Peter Spirtes and Richard Scheines, did pioneering work on graphical causal models (e.g. Spirtes et al., in Causation, prediction, and search, 2000). One of the central advances provided by these models is the ability to simply represent the effects of interventions. In an elegant paper (Meek and Glymour, in Br J Philos Sci 45: 1001\textendash 1021, 1994), Glymour and his student Christopher Meek applied these methods to problems in decision theory. One of the morals they drew was that causal decision theory should be understood in terms of interventions. I revisit their proposal, and extend the analysis by showing how graphical causal models might be used to address decision problems that arise in ``exotic'' situations, such as those involving crystal balls or time travelers.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causal decision theory,Causal models,Decision theory,Glymour; Clark,Meek; Christopher},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5T6K9XNW/Hitchcock - 2016 - Conditioning, intervening, and decision.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Hitchcock2017,
-  title = {Actual {{Causation}}: {{What}}'s the {{Use}}?},
-  shorttitle = {Actual {{Causation}}},
-  booktitle = {Making a {{Difference}}: {{Essays}} on the {{Philosophy}} of {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Hitchcock, Christopher},
-  editor = {Beebee, Helen and Hitchcock, Christopher and Price, Huw},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jun,
-  pages = {0},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0007},
-  abstract = {This chapter connects two themes in the work of Peter Menzies: (1) the agency theory of causation; and (2) the analysis of actual causation in terms of structural equation models together with considerations of normality. According to the latter type of analysis, actual causation involves certain kinds of path-specific effects. What is the practical benefit of knowing about such effects? The chapter argues that such knowledge is not necessary for one-shot decisions, but is crucial for plans that involve multiple steps. Such plans require that we know how our interventions will work in conjunction with future interventions that are feasible, expected, and desirable. This explains both the focus on path-specific effects, and the sensitivity of actual causation to considerations of normality.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-874691-1},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HJJRM8T9/Hitchcock - 2017 - Actual Causation What’s the Use.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hock2002,
-  title = {The {{Y\=aj\~navalkya Cycle}} in the {{B{\textsubring r}had \=Ara\d{n}yaka Upani\d{s}ad}}},
-  author = {Hock, Hans Henrich},
-  year = {2002},
-  journal = {Journal of the American Oriental Society},
-  volume = {122},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {278--286},
-  publisher = {{American Oriental Society}},
-  issn = {0003-0279},
-  doi = {10.2307/3087621},
-  abstract = {In a recent paper, Brereton (1997) presents a detailed and persuasive analysis of BAU 3, Y\=aj\~navalkya's disputations at the court of King Janaka, as a ring composition, an extensive expansion on a simple story (\'Satapatha Br\=ahma\d{n}a 11.6.3) which serves as its "frame." His argument for this frame is based on robust evidence and, as he acknowledges, has been anticipated by other scholars. The evidence for ring composition is, as he admits, more subtle, but is persuasive nevertheless. I present evidence that Brereton's passage forms part of a much larger text (BAU 2.1-4.5), which is even more clearly a ring composition. This larger composition in turn may constitute a later expansion of Brereton's text, and recognizing this textual layering may make it possible to shed some light on a major difference in interpreting the concluding verses of BAU 3.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Biology,Hinduism ; History,Hinduism ; Religion,Historical methodology,Historiography ; Religion,Language,Music ; Linguistics,Neuroscience,Orthographies ; Biological sciences,Performing arts,Practical theology ; Religion,Religion,Spiritual belief systems,Systematic theology ; Arts,Systematic theology ; Religion,Theology},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LA2KS9X5/Hock - 2002 - The Yājñavalkya Cycle in the Br̥had Āraṇyaka Upani.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hodges2008,
-  title = {Model {{Theory}}},
-  author = {Hodges, Wilfrid},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {1 edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  abstract = {Professor Hodges emphasizes definability and methods of construction, and introduces the reader to advanced topics such as stability. He also provides the reader with much historical information and a full bibliography, enhancing the book's use as a refe},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-06636-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DXXBSFIK/Hodges - 2008 - Model Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hofweber2014,
-  title = {Rayo's {{The Construction}} of {{Logical Space}}},
-  author = {Hofweber, Thomas},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {442--454},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CJI5HUUL/2014 - Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space - Hofweber.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SAW8BJRQ/2014 - Rayo’s The Construction of Logical Space - Hofweber.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Holliday2014,
-  title = {Partiality and {{Adjointness}} in {{Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Holliday, Wesley Halcrow},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Advances in Modal Logic},
-  volume = {10},
-  abstract = {Following a proposal of Humberstone, this paper studies a semantics for modal logic based on partial ``possibilities'' rather than total ``worlds.'' There are a number of reasons, philosophical and mathematical, to find this alternative semantics attractive. Here we focus on the construction of possibility models with a finitary flavor. Our main completeness result shows that for a number of standard modal logics, we can build a canonical possibility model, wherein every logically consistent formula is satisfied, by simply taking each individual finite formula (modulo equivalence) to be a possibility, rather than each infinite maximally consistent set of formulas as in the usual canonical world models. Constructing these locally finite canonical models involves solving a problem in general modal logic of independent interest, related to the study of adjoint pairs of modal operators: for a given modal logic L, can we find for every formula {$\varphi$} a formula f({$\varphi$}) such that for every formula {$\psi$}, {$\varphi$} \textrightarrow{} []{$\psi$} is provable in L if and only if f({$\varphi$}) \textrightarrow{} {$\psi$} is provable in L? We answer this question for a number of standard modal logics, using model-theoretic arguments with world semantics. This second main result allows us to build for each logic a canonical possibility model out of the lattice of formulas related by provable implication in the logic.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JYXLTLRD/eScholarship UC item 9pm9t4vp.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Holliday2015,
-  title = {Possibility {{Frames}} and {{Forcing}} for {{Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Holliday, Wesley Halcrow},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = dec,
-  abstract = {New version: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0tm6b30q},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DNWIN2A2/Holliday - 2015 - Possibility Frames and Forcing for Modal Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Holliday2016,
-  title = {Possibility {{Frames}} and {{Forcing}} for {{Modal Logic}} ({{June}} 2016)},
-  author = {Holliday, Wesley Halcrow},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {eScholarship},
-  abstract = {Possibility Frames and Forcing for Modal Logic  Wesley H. Holliday Department of Philosophy \& Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science University of California, Berkeley Version of June 20, 2016 First version Dec. 2015 \textdagger{} Abstract This paper develops the model theory of normal modal logics based on partial ``possibilities'' instead of total ``worlds,'' following Humberstone [1981] instead of Kripke [1963]. Possibility semantics can be seen as extending to modal logic the semantics for classical logic used in weak forcing in set theory, or as semanticizing a negative translation of classical modal logic into intuitionistic modal logic. Thus, possibility frames are based on posets with accessibility relations, like intuitionistic modal frames, but with the constraint that the interpretation of every formula is a regular open set in the Alexandrov topology on the poset. The standard world frames for modal logic are the special case of possibility frames wherein the poset is discrete. The analogues of classical Kripke frames, i.e., full world frames, are full possibility frames, in which propositional variables may be interpreted as any regular open sets. We develop the beginnings of duality theory, definability/correspondence theory, and complete- ness theory for possibility frames. The duality theory, relating possibility frames to Boolean algebras with operators (BAOs), shows the way in which full possibility frames are a generalization of Kripke frames. Whereas Thomason [1975a] established a duality between the category of Kripke frames with p-morphisms and the category of complete (C), atomic (A), and completely additive (V) BAOs with com- plete BAO-homomorphisms (these categories being dually equivalent), we establish a duality between the category of full possibility frames with possibility morphisms and the category of CV-BAOs, i.e., allow- ing non-atomic BAOs, with complete BAO-homomorphisms (the latter category being dually equivalent to a reflective subcategory of the former). This parallels the connection between forcing posets and Boolean-valued models in set theory, but now with accessibility relations and modal operators involved. Generalizing further, we introduce a class of principal possibility frames that capture the generality of V-BAOs. If we do not require a full or principal frame, then every BAO has an equivalent possibility frame, whose possibilities are proper filters in the BAO. With this filter representation, which does not  For helpful comments or discussion, I wish to give special thanks to Johan van Benthem, Guram Bezhanishvili, Nick Bezhanishvili, Matthew Harrison-Trainor, and Tadeusz Litak. I also wish to thank Ivano Ciardelli, Josh Dever, Davide Grossi, Lloyd Humberstone, Thomas Icard, Hans Kamp, Larry Moss, Lawrence Valby, Yanjing Wang, and Dag Westerst\aa hl, as well as the participants in my Fall 2014 or Spring 2015 graduate seminars at UC Berkeley: Russell Buehler, Sophia Dandelet, Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Alex Kocurek, Alex Kruckman, James Moody, James Walsh, and Kentaro Yamamoto. I am also thankful for feedback I received when presenting some of this material at the following venues: the Modal Logic Workshop on Consistency and Structure at Carnegie Mellon University in April 2014; my course at the 3rd East-Asian School on Logic, Language and Computation (EASSLLC) at Tsinghua University in July 2014; the Advances in Modal Logic conference at the University of Groningen in August 2014 (see Holliday 2014); the Workshop on the Future of Logic in honor of Johan van Benthem in Amsterdam in September 2014; the Hans Kamp Seminar in Logic and Language at the University of Texas at Austin in April 2015; the 4th CSLI Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Intelligent Interaction at Stanford University in May 2015; and the New Mexico State University Mathematics Colloquium in November 2015. Finally, I wish to gratefully acknowledge an HRF grant from UC Berkeley that allowed me to complete this work in Fall 2015. \textdagger{} The December 2015 version [Holliday, 2015] is available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5462j5b6. The main updates in the June 2016 version are the new version of Theorem 5.46, as well as its application in Theorem 7.20, plus added bibliographic information that has become available since December 2015.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/87RHA9J8/eScholarship UC item 9v11r0dq.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Holliday2016a,
-  title = {Complete {{Additivity}} and {{Modal Incompleteness}}},
-  author = {Holliday, Wesley Halcrow and Litak, Tadeusz},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {eScholarship},
-  abstract = {In this paper, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story weaves together a paper of van Benthem [1979], ``Syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness theorems,'' and a longstanding open question: whether every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal algebras, or as we call them, V-BAOs. Using a first-order reformulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in van Benthem's paper resolves the open question in the negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to V-BAOs, namely the provability logic GLB [Japaridze, 1988, Boolos, 1993]. We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is V-complete. After these results, we generalize the famed Blok Dichotomy [Blok, 1978] to degrees of V-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem's theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WP8GW9TM/eScholarship UC item 8pp4d94t.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Holliday2016b,
-  title = {On the {{Modal Logic}} of {{Subset}} and {{Superset}}: {{Tense Logic}} over {{Medvedev Frames}}},
-  shorttitle = {On the {{Modal Logic}} of {{Subset}} and {{Superset}}},
-  author = {Holliday, Wesley Halcrow},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Studia Logica. An International Journal for Symbolic Logic},
-  abstract = {1SFQSJOUPG+VMZ'PSUIDPNJOHJO4UVEJB-PHJDB Wesley H. Holliday On the Modal Logic of Subset and Superset: Tense Logic over Medvedev Frames Abstract. Viewing the language of modal logic as a language for describing directed graphs, a natural type of directed graph to study modally is one where the nodes are sets and the edge relation is the subset or superset relation. A well-known example from the literature on intuitionistic logic is the class of Medvedev frames hW, Ri where W is the set of nonempty subsets of some nonempty finite set S, and xRy i{$\carriagereturn$} x \ding{117} y, or more liberally, where hW, Ri is isomorphic as a directed graph to h\vphantom\{\}(S) \textbackslash{} \{;\}, \ding{117}i. Prucnal [32] proved that the modal logic of Medvedev frames is not finitely axiomatizable. Here we continue the study of Medvedev frames with extended modal languages. Our results concern definability. We show that the class of Medvedev frames is definable by a formula in the language of tense logic, i.e., with a converse modality for quantifying over supersets in Medvedev frames, extended with any one of the following standard devices: nominals (for naming nodes), a di{$\carriagereturn$}erence modality (for quantifying over those y such that x 6 = y), or a complement modality (for quantifying over those y such that x 6\ding{117} y). It follows that either the logic of Medvedev frames in one of these tense languages is finitely axiomatizable\textemdash{} which would answer the open question of whether Medvedev's [31] ``logic of finite problems'' is decidable\textemdash or else the minimal logics in these languages extended with our defining formulas are the beginnings of infinite sequences of frame-incomplete logics. Keywords: Medvedev frames, modal logic, definability, nominal tense logic, di{$\carriagereturn$}erence modality, complement modality, axiomatizability, Kripke frame incompleteness Introduction Modal logics have been found to capture properties of many important math- ematical concepts\textemdash for example, the modal logic of topological closure [5], the modal logic of arithmetic provability [9], the modal logic of set-theoretic forcing [25], and more. In this paper, we are interested in modal logics for capturing properties of something very basic: the subset and superset relations between the nonempty subsets of a finite set.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FEFY6DXM/eScholarship UC item 0379725f.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Holliday2017,
-  title = {A {{Note}} on {{Algebraic Semantics}} for {{S5}} with {{Propositional Quantifiers}}},
-  author = {Holliday, Wesley Halcrow},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  abstract = {In two of the earliest papers on extending modal logic with propositional quantifiers, R. A. Bull and K. Fine studied a modal logic S5{$\Pi$} extending S5 with axioms and rules for propositional quantification. Surprisingly, there seems to have been no proof in the literature of the completeness of S5{$\Pi$} with respect to its most natural algebraic semantics, with propositional quantifiers interpreted by meets and joins over all elements in a complete Boolean algebra. In this note, we give such a proof. This result raises the question: for which normal modal logics L can one axiomatize the quantified propositional modal logic determined by the complete modal algebras for L?},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/29H6PSQC/Holliday - 2017 - A Note on Algebraic Semantics for S5 with Proposit.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Hooker2000,
-  title = {Moral Particularism: {{Wrong}} and Bad},
-  booktitle = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  author = {Hooker, Brad},
-  editor = {Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2000},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3XKUVMAH/2000 - Moral particularism wrong and bad - Hooker.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5EH79LCD/2000 - Moral particularism wrong and bad - Hooker.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hooker2000a,
-  title = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  editor = {Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2000},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9MFJ34JS/2000 - Moral Particularism - Unknown.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hooker2002,
-  title = {The {{Collapse}} of {{Virtue Ethics}}},
-  author = {Hooker, Brad},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Utilitas},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {01},
-  pages = {22},
-  issn = {0953-8208, 1741-6183},
-  doi = {10.1017/S095382080000337X},
-  abstract = {Virtue ethics is normally taken to be an alternative to consequentialist and Kantian moral theories. This paper discusses a particularly interesting version of virtue ethics\textendash Rosalind Hursthouse's. The paper argues that her version is inadequate in ways that suggest revision in the direction of rule-consequentialism.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EA5U6U3S/S095382080000337Xa.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Hooker2008,
-  title = {Moral Particularism and the Real World},
-  booktitle = {Challenging {{Moral Particularism}}},
-  author = {Hooker, Brad},
-  editor = {Lance, Mark N and Potr{\v c}, Matja{\v z} and Strahovnik, Vojko},
-  year = {2008},
-  pages = {12--30},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7WXMKHXQ/2008 - Moral particularism and the real world - Hooker.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PXHBRME8/2008 - Moral particularism and the real world - Hooker.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hornischer2020,
-  title = {Logics of {{Synonymy}}},
-  author = {Hornischer, Levin},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {767--805},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-019-09537-5},
-  abstract = {We investigate synonymy in the strong sense of content identity (and not just meaning similarity). This notion is central in the philosophy of language and in applications of logic. We motivate, uniformly axiomatize, and characterize several ``benchmark'' notions of synonymy in the messy class of all possible notions of synonymy. This class is divided by two intuitive principles that are governed by a no-go result. We use the notion of a scenario to get a logic of synonymy (SF) which is the canonical representative of one division. In the other division, the so-called conceptivist logics, we find, e.g., the well-known system of analytic containment (AC). We axiomatize four logics of synonymy extending AC, relate them semantically and proof-theoretically to SF, and characterize them in terms of weak/strong subject matter preservation and weak/strong logical equivalence. This yields ways out of the no-go result and novel arguments\textemdash independent of a particular semantic framework\textemdash for each notion of synonymy discussed (using, e.g., Hurford disjunctions or homotopy theory). This points to pluralism about meaning and a certain non-compositionality of truth in logic programs and neural networks. And it unveils an impossibility for synonymy: if it is to preserve subject matter, then either conjunction and disjunction lose an essential property or a very weak absorption law is violated.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Conceptivism,Content identity,Hyperintensionality,Neural networks,Synonymy,Truthmaker semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S28PIFMA/Hornischer - 2020 - Logics of Synonymy.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Horowitz1998,
-  title = {Philosophical {{Intuitions}} and {{Psychological Theory}}},
-  author = {Horowitz, Tamara},
-  year = {1998},
-  journal = {Ethics},
-  volume = {108},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {367--385},
-  issn = {0014-1704},
-  doi = {10.1086/233809},
-  abstract = {To what extent can philosophical thought experiments reveal norms? Some ethicists have argued that certain thought experiments reveal that people draw a morally significant distinction between "doing" and "allowing". I examine one such thought experiment in detail and argue that the intuitions it elicits can be explained by "prospect theory", a psychological theory about the way people reason. The extent to which such alternative explanations of the results of thought experiments in philosophy are generally available is an empirical question.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CQQUEBT4/1998 - Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory - Horowitz.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/J3R3Y5T3/1998 - Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory - Horowitz.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Horvath2016,
-  title = {Conceptual Analysis and Natural Kinds: The Case of Knowledge},
-  shorttitle = {Conceptual Analysis and Natural Kinds},
-  author = {Horvath, Joachim},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {193},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {167--184},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0751-z},
-  abstract = {There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith's argument from the causal\textendash explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the method of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. A natural motivation for this argument is the following seemingly plausible principle: if knowledge is a natural kind, then the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept. Since this principle lacks adequate support, the crucial semantic claim that the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept must be defended in some more direct way. However, there are two striking epistemic disanalogies between the concept of knowledge and paradigmatic natural kind concepts that militate against this semantic claim. Conceptual analyses of knowledge are not affected by total error, and the proponents of such analyses are not subject to a priori conceptual obliviousness. I conclude that the argument from natural kindhood does not succeed in undermining the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C7ZQY33V/Horvath - 2016 - Conceptual analysis and natural kinds the case of.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Horvath2018,
-  title = {Philosophical {{Analysis}}: {{The Concept Grounding View}}},
-  shorttitle = {Philosophical {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Horvath, Joachim},
-  year = {2018},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {97},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {724--750},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12378},
-  abstract = {Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.12378},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BNS2L5X2/Horvath - 2018 - Philosophical Analysis The Concept Grounding View.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Hovda2008,
-  title = {What Is {{Classical Mereology}}?},
-  author = {Hovda, Paul},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {38},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {55--82},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-008-9092-4},
-  abstract = {Classical mereology is a formal theory of the part-whole relation, essentially involving a notion of mereological fusion, or sum. There are various different definitions of fusion in the literature, and various axiomatizations for classical mereology. Though the equivalence of the definitions of fusion is provable from axiom sets, the definitions are not logically equivalent, and, hence, are not inter-changeable when laying down the axioms. We examine the relations between the main definitions of fusion and correct some technical errors in prominent discussions of the axiomatization of mereology. We show the equivalence of four different ways to axiomatize classical mereology, using three different notions of fusion. We also clarify the connection between classical mereology and complete Boolean algebra by giving two ``neutral'' axiom sets which can be supplemented by one or the other of two simple axioms to yield the full theories; one of these uses a notion of ``strong complement'' that helps explicate the connections between the theories.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Boolean algebra,Classical mereology,Fusion,Logic,Mereological fusion,Mereological sum,Mereology,Part,Part-whole relation},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I42W59XT/Hovda - 2008 - What is Classical Mereology.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hughes1996,
-  title = {A {{New Introduction}} to {{Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, Max},
-  year = {1996},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2RJRXWS9/Hughes and Cresswell - 1996 - A New Introduction to Modal Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Humberstone,
-  title = {From Worlds to Possibilities},
-  author = {Humberstone, I. L.},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {313--339},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00293423},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A8S68UAW/Humberstone - From worlds to possibilities.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Humberstone1981,
-  title = {From {{Worlds}} to {{Possibilities}}},
-  author = {Humberstone, I. L.},
-  year = {1981},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {313--339},
-  issn = {0022-3611},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B99D94KY/Humberstone - 1981 - From Worlds to Possibilities.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Hursthouse1999,
-  title = {On {{Virtue Ethics}}},
-  author = {Hursthouse, Rosalind},
-  year = {1999},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GA99S63J/1999 - On Virtue Ethics - Hursthouse.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GM5MBTXW/1999 - On Virtue Ethics - Hursthouse.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Huttemann2020,
-  title = {Processes, Pre-Emption and Further Problems},
-  author = {H{\"u}ttemann, Andreas},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {197},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {1487--1509},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02058-9},
-  abstract = {In this paper I will argue that what makes our ordinary judgements about token causation (`actual causation') true can be explicated in terms of interferences into quasi-inertial processes. These interferences and quasi-inertial processes can in turn be fully explicated in scientific terms. In this sense the account presented here is reductive. I will furthermore argue that this version of a process-theory of causation can deal with the traditional problems that process theories have to face, such as the problem of misconnection and the problem of disconnection (Dowe in The Oxford handbook of causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) as well as with a problem concerning the mis-classification of pre-emption cases (Paul and Hall in Causation: a user's guide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013).},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causation,Pre-emption,Process theory of causation},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L7BBIMM4/Hüttemann - 2020 - Processes, pre-emption and further problems.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Isaac2020,
-  title = {An Argument for Entity Grounding},
-  author = {Isaac, Wilhelm},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {80},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {500--507},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/anz065},
-  abstract = {In this paper, I give an argument for the view that non-fact entities \textendash{} such as physical objects, abstract objects, events and so on \textendash{} can ground other entities. Roughly put, the argument is as follows: those who accept this view can provide a more plausible account of the grounds of identity facts than those who deny this view.}
-}
-
-@article{Iseminger1980,
-  title = {Is {{Relevance Necessary}} for {{Validity}}?},
-  author = {Iseminger, Gary},
-  year = {1980},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {89},
-  number = {354},
-  pages = {196--213},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, Mind Association]}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/G3JJQ6YU/Iseminger - 1980 - Is Relevance Necessary for Validity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Issar2020,
-  title = {Listening to {{Black}} Lives Matter: Racial Capitalism and the Critique of Neoliberalism},
-  shorttitle = {Listening to {{Black}} Lives Matter},
-  author = {Issar, Siddhant},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Contemporary Political Theory},
-  issn = {1476-9336},
-  doi = {10.1057/s41296-020-00399-0},
-  abstract = {This article explores left critiques of neoliberalism in light of the Black Lives Matter movement's (BLM) recourse to the notion of `racial capitalism' in their analyses of anti-Black oppression. Taking~a cue from BLM, I argue for a critical theory of racial capitalism that historicizes neoliberalism within a longue dur\'ee framework, surfacing racialized continuities in capitalism's violence. I begin by revealing how neo-Marxist and neo-Foucaultian approaches to neoliberalism, particularly that of David Harvey and Wendy Brown, respectively, partition race from the workings of contemporary capitalism. Such analyses obscure neoliberalism's differential impact on non-white racialized populations, while simultaneously casting anti-racist struggles as divisive. In contrast, I then trace how the Movement for Black Lives policy platform invokes Cedric Robinson's work on racial capitalism, investigating the utility of this framework for the movement's demands. Building on BLM's turn to the concept of racial capitalism, I finally offer an outline of a critical theory of racial capitalism to better theorize neoliberalism. By historicizing neoliberalism within racial capitalism's historical arc, such a theory unravels the qualitatively different mechanisms through which racialized populations are pressed into circuits of capital accumulation. It also paves the way to move past the entrenched class-versus-identity debate on the American left.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UML5ME9M/Issar - 2020 - Listening to Black lives matter racial capitalism.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Jackson1998,
-  title = {From {{Metaphysics}} to {{Ethics}}: {{A Defence}} of {{Conceptual Analysis}}},
-  shorttitle = {From {{Metaphysics}} to {{Ethics}}},
-  author = {Jackson, Frank},
-  year = {1998},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}
-}
-
-@book{Jackson2004,
-  title = {Lewisian {{Themes}}: {{The Philosophy}} of {{David K}}. {{Lewis}}},
-  shorttitle = {Lewisian {{Themes}}},
-  author = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = oct,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WAB2Q697/Jackson and Priest - 2004 - Lewisian Themes The Philosophy of David K. Lewis.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Jacobs2001,
-  title = {Categorical {{Logic}} and {{Type Theory}}: {{Volume}} 141},
-  shorttitle = {Categorical {{Logic}} and {{Type Theory}}},
-  author = {Jacobs, B.},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = oct,
-  edition = {Reprint edition},
-  publisher = {{Elsevier Science}},
-  address = {{Amsterdam}},
-  abstract = {This book is an attempt to give a systematic presentation of both logic and type theory from a categorical perspective, using the unifying concept of fibred category. Its intended audience consists of logicians, type theorists, category theorists and (theoretical) computer scientists.},
-  isbn = {978-0-444-50853-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZM6HMEYS/Jacobs - 2001 - Categorical Logic and Type Theory Volume 141.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Jago2013,
-  title = {Recent {{Work}} in {{Relevant Logic}}},
-  author = {Jago, Mark},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {73},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {526--541},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/ant043},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7VFTG2T3/JAGRWI.1.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HEBT7ALF/Jago - 2013 - Recent Work in Relevant Logic.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9CZI66HV/171635.html}
-}
-
-@article{Jago2017,
-  title = {Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions},
-  author = {Jago, Mark},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Argumenta},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {2},
-  publisher = {{Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy}},
-  issn = {2465-2334},
-  doi = {10.23811/47.arg2017.jag},
-  abstract = {Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VVSWNWFM/Jago - 2017 - Propositions as truthmaker conditions.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Jansana2009,
-  title = {A {{General Algebraic Semantics}} for {{Sentential Logics}}},
-  author = {Jansana, Josep M. Font {and} Ramon},
-  year = {2009},
-  edition = {Second},
-  publisher = {{Richard A. Shore}},
-  address = {{Ithaca NY}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y4XPS4KT/[Josep_M._Font,_Ramon_Jansana]_A_General_Algebraic(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Jech2014,
-  title = {Set {{Theory}}: {{The Third Millennium Edition}}, Revised and Expanded},
-  shorttitle = {Set {{Theory}}},
-  author = {Jech, Thomas},
-  year = {2014},
-  edition = {3rd edition},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  abstract = {International reprint edition of ISBN-13: 978-3642078996. 3rd Edition. Paperback. Published in China. Contents in ENGLISH and totally same as US Edition.},
-  isbn = {978-3-529-44085-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B4C8BVQC/Jech - 2014 - Set Theory The Third Millennium Edition, revised .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Jenkins2011,
-  title = {Is {{Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive}}?},
-  author = {Jenkins, C. S.},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Monist},
-  volume = {94},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {267--276},
-  issn = {0026-9662},
-  doi = {10.5840/monist201194213},
-  abstract = {C.S. Jenkins; Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?, The Monist, Volume 94, Issue 2, 1 April 2011, Pages 267\textendash 276, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist201194213},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Jenkins2016,
-  title = {Amelioration and {{Inclusion}}: {{Gender Identity}} and the {{Concept}} of '{{Woman}}'},
-  shorttitle = {Amelioration and {{Inclusion}}},
-  author = {Jenkins, Katharine},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Ethics},
-  volume = {126},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {394--421},
-  issn = {0014-1704, 1539-297X},
-  doi = {10.1086/683535},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CSN8FHHZ/Jenkins - 2016 - Amelioration and Inclusion Gender Identity and th.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Jenny2018,
-  title = {Counterpossibles in {{Science}}: {{The Case}} of {{Relative Computability}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterpossibles in {{Science}}},
-  author = {Jenny, Matthias},
-  year = {2018},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {52},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {530--560},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12177},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8JSXGU6B/Jenny - 2018 - Counterpossibles in Science The Case of Relative .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Jinming2007,
-  title = {I-Fuzzy {{Alexandrov}} Topologies and Specialization Orders},
-  author = {Jinming, Fang},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Fuzzy Sets and Systems},
-  series = {Theme: {{Mathematics}}},
-  volume = {158},
-  number = {21},
-  pages = {2359--2374},
-  issn = {0165-0114},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.fss.2007.05.001},
-  abstract = {The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationships between certain generalized topological structures and fuzzy order structures on a universe set X. In details, a fuzzy preordered relation induces an I-fuzzy Alexandrov topology; and an I-fuzzy topology induces a fuzzy preordered relation, which turns out to be a specialization order in I-fuzzy setting. In addition, the Representation Theorem of fuzzy preorders by I-fuzzy topologies is obtained. These results coincide with the conclusions obtained in literature in the version of two-valued logic.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {-fuzzy topology,Alexandrov topology,Fuzzy preorder,Specialization order,Triangular norm},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U7G3QCI9/S0165011407002175.html}
-}
-
-@article{Johansson2018,
-  title = {Learning {{Representations}} for {{Counterfactual Inference}}},
-  author = {Johansson, Fredrik D. and Shalit, Uri and Sontag, David},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {arXiv:1605.03661 [cs, stat]},
-  eprint = {1605.03661},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  abstract = {Observational studies are rising in importance due to the widespread accumulation of data in fields such as healthcare, education, employment and ecology. We consider the task of answering counterfactual questions such as, "Would this patient have lower blood sugar had she received a different medication?". We propose a new algorithmic framework for counterfactual inference which brings together ideas from domain adaptation and representation learning. In addition to a theoretical justification, we perform an empirical comparison with previous approaches to causal inference from observational data. Our deep learning algorithm significantly outperforms the previous state-of-the-art.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S7E9FNEI/Johansson et al. - 2018 - Learning Representations for Counterfactual Infere.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FB47BSVA/1605.html}
-}
-
-@article{Johnston2004,
-  title = {The {{Obscure Object}} of {{Hallucination}}},
-  author = {Johnston, Mark},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {120},
-  number = {1-3},
-  pages = {113--183},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033753.64202.21},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {disjunctivism,Epistemology,hallucination,Logic,Philosophy,Philosophy of Mind,Philosophy of Religion},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6XIVGRZS/Johnston - 2004 - The Obscure Object of Hallucination.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YL8Z64Y4/10.1023BPHIL.0000033753.64202.html;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z79Q6J87/10.1023BPHIL.0000033753.64202.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Jones2015,
-  title = {Object as Determinable},
-  booktitle = {Reality {{Making}}},
-  author = {Jones, Nicholas K},
-  year = {2015},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AJARCVVM/2015 - Object as determinable - Jones.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MCKJ2N8J/2015 - Object as determinable - Jones.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kahle2007,
-  title = {Edwin {{D}}. {{Mares}}, {{Relevant Logic}}\textemdash{{A Philosophical Interpretation}}},
-  author = {Kahle, Reinhard},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Studia Logica},
-  volume = {85},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {419--424},
-  issn = {1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11225-007-9041-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U6F79DY8/Kahle - 2007 - Edwin D. Mares, Relevant Logic—A Philosophical Int.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kahneman1979,
-  title = {Prospect {{Theory}}: {{An Analysis}} of {{Decision}} under {{Risk}}},
-  author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos},
-  year = {1979},
-  journal = {Econometrica},
-  volume = {47},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {263--291},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8LEJVRN8/1979 - Prospect Theory An Analysis of Decision under Risk - Kahneman, Tversky.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IY7UAM37/1979 - Prospect Theory An Analysis of Decision under Risk - Kahneman, Tversky.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kaiserman2016,
-  title = {Causal {{Contribution}}},
-  author = {Kaiserman, Alex},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  volume = {116},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {387--394},
-  issn = {0066-7374},
-  doi = {10.1093/arisoc/aow013},
-  abstract = {Are there `degrees of causation'? Yes and no: causation is not a scalar relation, but different causes can contribute to a causing of an effect to different extents. In this paper, I motivate a probabilistic analysis of an event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect and explore some of its consequences.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KE4F5JU9/2693833.html}
-}
-
-@article{Kaiserman2017,
-  title = {Necessary {{Connections}} in {{Context}}},
-  author = {Kaiserman, Alex},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {82},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {45--64},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-016-9805-y},
-  abstract = {This paper combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer's semantics of modality. On the resulting view, causal claims quantify over restricted domains of possible worlds determined by two contextually determined parameters. I argue that this view can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of the way we use and evaluate causal language, including the difference between causing an effect and being a cause of it, the sensitivity of causal judgements to normative facts, and the semantics of causal disagreements.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R7ZFIEA9/Kaiserman - 2017 - Necessary Connections in Context.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Karimi2020,
-  title = {Algorithmic {{Recourse}}: From {{Counterfactual Explanations}} to {{Interventions}}},
-  shorttitle = {Algorithmic {{Recourse}}},
-  author = {Karimi, Amir-Hossein and Sch{\"o}lkopf, Bernhard and Valera, Isabel},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = oct,
-  number = {arXiv:2002.06278},
-  eprint = {2002.06278},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2002.06278},
-  abstract = {As machine learning is increasingly used to inform consequential decision-making (e.g., pre-trial bail and loan approval), it becomes important to explain how the system arrived at its decision, and also suggest actions to achieve a favorable decision. Counterfactual explanations -- "how the world would have (had) to be different for a desirable outcome to occur" -- aim to satisfy these criteria. Existing works have primarily focused on designing algorithms to obtain counterfactual explanations for a wide range of settings. However, one of the main objectives of "explanations as a means to help a data-subject act rather than merely understand" has been overlooked. In layman's terms, counterfactual explanations inform an individual where they need to get to, but not how to get there. In this work, we rely on causal reasoning to caution against the use of counterfactual explanations as a recommendable set of actions for recourse. Instead, we propose a shift of paradigm from recourse via nearest counterfactual explanations to recourse through minimal interventions, moving the focus from explanations to recommendations. Finally, we provide the reader with an extensive discussion on how to realistically achieve recourse beyond structural interventions.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/L5XPZ4NJ/Karimi et al. - 2020 - Algorithmic Recourse from Counterfactual Explanat.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S5FPEWDB/2002.html}
-}
-
-@article{Kearns2011,
-  title = {Can a {{Thing}} Be {{Part}} of {{Itself}}?},
-  author = {Kearns, Stephen},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {87--93},
-  issn = {0003-0481},
-  doi = {10.2307/23025076}
-}
-
-@article{Kearns2012,
-  title = {Semantic {{Sovereignty}}},
-  author = {Kearns, Stephen and Magidor, Ofra},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {85},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {322--350},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00624.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K3XMIXVD/Kearns and Magidor - 2012 - Semantic Sovereignty.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Kelley2001,
-  title = {General {{Topology}}},
-  author = {Kelley, John L.},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = may,
-  publisher = {{Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg}},
-  address = {{New York Berlin Heidelberg}},
-  isbn = {978-3-540-90125-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6DUZUWZQ/Kelley - 2001 - General Topology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Khoo2016,
-  title = {Backtracking {{Counterfactuals Revisited}}},
-  author = {Khoo, Justin},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  pages = {fzw005},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzw005},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7QHP2QDB/fzw005.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Khoo2021,
-  title = {Disjunctive Antecedent Conditionals},
-  author = {Khoo, Justin},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {8},
-  pages = {7401--7430},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1877-6},
-  abstract = {Disjunctive antecedent conditionals (DACs)\textemdash conditionals of the form if A or B, C\textemdash sometimes seem to entail both of their simplifications (if A, C; if B, C) and sometimes seem not to. I argue that this behavior reveals a genuine ambiguity in DACs. Along the way, I discuss a new observation about the role of focal stress in distinguishing the two interpretations of DACs. I propose a new theory, according to which the surface form of a DAC underdetermines its logical form: on one possible logical form, if A or B, C does entail both of its simplifications, while on the other, it does not.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Conditionals,Disjunction,Philosophy of language,Pragmatics,Probability,Semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IAMWQUJ6/Khoo - 2021 - Disjunctive antecedent conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kim1984,
-  title = {Concepts of {{Supervenience}}},
-  author = {Kim, Jaegwon},
-  year = {1984},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {153--176},
-  issn = {0031-8205},
-  doi = {10.2307/2107423},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MJ9AWVP7/Kim - 1984 - Concepts of Supervenience.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Kim1993,
-  title = {Supervenience and {{Mind}}},
-  author = {Kim, Jaegwon},
-  year = {1993},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GFAFTXTV/Kim - 1993 - Supervenience and Mind.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{King1991,
-  title = {Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects},
-  author = {King, Jeffrey C.},
-  year = {1991},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {239--265},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00372355},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Arbitrary Object,Instantial Term},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CAB54B5V/King - 1991 - Instantial terms, anaphora and arbitrary objects.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{King1998,
-  title = {What {{Is}} a {{Philosophical Analysis}}?},
-  author = {King, Jeffrey C.},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {90},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {155--179},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1023/A:1004254128428},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SZADY6BJ/King - 1998 - What Is a Philosophical Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{King2007,
-  title = {The {{Nature}} and {{Structure}} of {{Content}}},
-  author = {King, Jeffrey C.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {1 edition},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford ; New York}},
-  abstract = {Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the proposition that Glenn loves Tracy has Glenn, the loving relation, and Tracy as constituents. What is it, then, that binds these constituents together and imposes structure on them? And if the proposition that Glenn loves Tracy is distinct from the proposition that Tracy loves Glenn yet both have the same constituents, what is about the way these constituents are structured or bound together that makes them two different propositions?In The Nature and Structure of Content, Jeffrey C. King formulates a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and provides fresh answers to the above questions. In addition to explaining what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them, King deals with some of the standard objections to accounts of propositions: he shows that there is no mystery about what propositions are; that given certain minimal assumptions, it follows that they exist; and that on his approach, we can see how and why propositions manage to have truth conditions and represent the world as being a certain way. The Nature and Structure of Content also contains a detailed account of the nature of tense and modality, and provides a solution to the paradox of analysis.Scholars and students working in the philosophy of mind and language will find this book rewarding reading.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-922606-1},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{King2007a,
-  title = {The {{Nature}} and {{Structure}} of {{Content}}},
-  author = {King, Jeffrey C.},
-  year = {2007},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JWLHL4T5/King - 2007 - The Nature and Structure of Content.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Kipf2018,
-  title = {Neural {{Relational Inference}} for {{Interacting Systems}}},
-  author = {Kipf, Thomas and Fetaya, Ethan and Wang, Kuan-Chieh and Welling, Max and Zemel, Richard},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jun,
-  number = {arXiv:1802.04687},
-  eprint = {1802.04687},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1802.04687},
-  abstract = {Interacting systems are prevalent in nature, from dynamical systems in physics to complex societal dynamics. The interplay of components can give rise to complex behavior, which can often be explained using a simple model of the system's constituent parts. In this work, we introduce the neural relational inference (NRI) model: an unsupervised model that learns to infer interactions while simultaneously learning the dynamics purely from observational data. Our model takes the form of a variational auto-encoder, in which the latent code represents the underlying interaction graph and the reconstruction is based on graph neural networks. In experiments on simulated physical systems, we show that our NRI model can accurately recover ground-truth interactions in an unsupervised manner. We further demonstrate that we can find an interpretable structure and predict complex dynamics in real motion capture and sports tracking data.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q6HN796P/Kipf et al. - 2018 - Neural Relational Inference for Interacting System.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U9EZRZ3X/1802.html}
-}
-
-@book{Kleinschmidt2014,
-  title = {Mereology and {{Location}}},
-  author = {Kleinschmidt, Shieva},
-  year = {2014},
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YTAZK5YZ/[Shieva_Kleinschmidt]_Mereology_and_Location(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Klement2010,
-  title = {{{THE FUNCTIONS OF RUSSELL}}'{{S NO CLASS THEORY}}},
-  author = {Klement, Kevin C.},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {3},
-  number = {04},
-  pages = {633--664},
-  issn = {1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020310000225},
-  abstract = {Certain commentators on Russell's ``no class'' theory, in which apparent reference to classes or sets is eliminated using higher-order quantification, including W. V. Quine and (recently) Scott Soames, have doubted its success, noting the obscurity of Russell's understanding of so-called ``propositional functions.'' These critics allege that realist readings of propositional functions fail to avoid commitment to classes or sets (or something equally problematic), and that nominalist readings fail to meet the demands placed on classes by mathematics. I show that Russell did thoroughly explore these issues, and had good reasons for rejecting accounts of propositional functions as extralinguistic entities. I argue in favor of a reading taking propositional functions to be nothing over and above open formulas which addresses many such worries, and in particular, does not interpret Russell as reducing classes to language.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4PBV2YW4/Klement - 2010 - THE FUNCTIONS OF RUSSELL’S NO CLASS THEORY.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kment2006,
-  title = {Counterfactuals and {{Explanation}}},
-  author = {Kment, Boris},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {115},
-  number = {458},
-  pages = {261--310},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl261},
-  abstract = {On the received view, counterfactuals are analysed using the concept of closeness between possible worlds: the counterfactual `If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q' is true at a world w just in case q is true at all the possible p-worlds closest to w. The degree of closeness between two worlds is usually thought to be determined by weighting different respects of similarity between them. The question I consider in the paper is which weights attach to different respects of similarity. I start by considering Lewis's answer to the question and argue against it by presenting several counterexamples. I use the same examples to motivate a general principle about closeness: if a fact obtains in both of two worlds, then this similarity is relevant to the closeness between them if and only if the fact has the same explanation in the two worlds. I use this principle and some ideas of Lewis's to formulate a general account of counterfactuals, and I argue that this account can explain the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. The paper concludes with a discussion of some examples that cannot be accommodated by the present version of the account and therefore necessitate further work on the details.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ELJ55WER/Kment - 2006 - Counterfactuals and Explanation.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XTHPAX7C/955218.html}
-}
-
-@book{Kment2014,
-  title = {Modality and {{Explanatory Reasoning}}},
-  author = {Kment, Boris},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = nov,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {Since the ground-breaking work of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others in the 1960s and 70s, one dominant interest of analytic philosophers has been in modal truths, which concerns the questions of what is possible and what is necessary. However, there is considerable controversy over the source and nature of necessity. In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment takes a novel approach to the study of modality that places special emphasis on understanding the origin of modal notions in everyday thought. Kment argues that the concepts of necessity and possibility originate in a common type of thought experiment--counterfactual reasoning--that allows us to investigate explanatory connections. This procedure is closely related to the controlled experiments of empirical science. Necessity is defined in terms of causation and other forms of explanation such as grounding, the relation that connects metaphysically fundamental facts to non-fundamental ones. Therefore, contrary to a widespread view, explanation is more fundamental than modality. The study of modal facts is important for philosophy, not because these facts are of much metaphysical interest in their own right, but because they provide evidence about explanatory relationships. In the course of developing this position, the book offers new accounts of possible worlds, counterfactual conditionals, essential truths and their role in grounding, and a novel theory of how counterfactuals relate to causation and explanation.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-960468-5}
-}
-
-@book{Kneale1962,
-  title = {The {{Development}} of {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Kneale, William and Kneale, Martha},
-  year = {1962},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  abstract = {This book traces the development of formal logic from its origins inancient Greece to the present day. The authors first discuss the work oflogicians from Aristotle to Frege, showing how they were influenced by thephilosophical or mathematical ideas of their time. They then examinedevelopments in the present century.},
-  isbn = {0-19-824773-7},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MUIJT4B7/1962 - The Development of Logic - Kneale, Kneale.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TN77LK8A/1962 - The Development of Logic - Kneale, Kneale.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kocurek,
-  title = {Does {{Chance Undermine Would}}?},
-  author = {Kocurek, Alexander W.},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TZJKCPWE/Kocurek - Does Chance Undermine Would.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kocurek2020,
-  title = {On the {{Substitution}} of {{Identicals}} in {{Counterfactual Reasoning}}},
-  author = {Kocurek, Alexander W.},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {54},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {600--631},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12273},
-  abstract = {It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism, i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate referential opacity. But in order to explain why most substitution inferences into counterfactuals seem valid, counterpossibilists also often maintain that counterfactuals with possible antecedents are transparency-preserving. I argue that if counterpossibles can generate opacity, then so can ordinary counterfactuals with possible antecedents. Utilizing an analogy between counterfactuals and attitude ascriptions, I provide a counterpossibilist-friendly explanation for the apparent validity of substitution inferences into counterfactuals. I conclude by suggesting that the debate over counterpossibles is closely tied to questions concerning the extent to which counterfactuals are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than previously recognized.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nous.12273},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V3ULQP3I/Kocurek - 2020 - On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactua.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kocurek2021,
-  title = {Counterpossibles},
-  author = {Kocurek, Alexander W.},
-  year = {2021},
-  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {e12787},
-  issn = {1747-9991},
-  doi = {10.1111/phc3.12787},
-  abstract = {A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Counterpossibles present a puzzle for standard theories of counterfactuals, which predict that all counterpossibles are semantically vacuous. Moreover, counterpossibles play an important role in many debates within metaphysics and epistemology, including debates over grounding, causation, modality, mathematics, science, and even God. In this article, we will explore various positions on counterpossibles as well as their potential philosophical consequences.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phc3.12787},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X7E5QAP6/Kocurek - 2021 - Counterpossibles.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DGT5BGX8/phc3.html}
-}
-
-@article{Kocurek2021a,
-  title = {Counterpossibles},
-  author = {Kocurek, Alexander W.},
-  year = {2021},
-  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {e12787},
-  issn = {1747-9991},
-  doi = {10.1111/phc3.12787},
-  abstract = {A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Counterpossibles present a puzzle for standard theories of counterfactuals, which predict that all counterpossibles are semantically vacuous. Moreover, counterpossibles play an important role in many debates within metaphysics and epistemology, including debates over grounding, causation, modality, mathematics, science, and even God. In this article, we will explore various positions on counterpossibles as well as their potential philosophical consequences.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phc3.12787},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AEXHVM9P/Kocurek - 2021 - Counterpossibles.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5DNT94TC/phc3.html}
-}
-
-@article{Kominsky2015,
-  title = {Causal Superseding},
-  author = {Kominsky, Jonathan F. and Phillips, Jonathan and Gerstenberg, Tobias and Lagnado, David and Knobe, Joshua},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Cognition},
-  volume = {137},
-  pages = {196--209},
-  issn = {0010-0277},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.013},
-  abstract = {When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to other agents, a phenomenon we refer to as ``causal superseding.'' We propose and test a counterfactual reasoning model of this phenomenon in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 provide an initial demonstration of the causal superseding effect and distinguish it from previously studied effects. Experiment 3 shows that this causal superseding effect is dependent on a particular event structure, following a prediction of our counterfactual model. Experiment 4 demonstrates that causal superseding can occur with violations of non-moral norms. We propose a model of the superseding effect based on the idea of counterfactual sufficiency.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causal reasoning,Counterfactuals,Morality,Superseding},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3DF582LD/Kominsky et al. - 2015 - Causal superseding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Konidaris2018,
-  title = {From {{Skills}} to {{Symbols}}: {{Learning Symbolic Representations}} for {{Abstract High-Level Planning}}},
-  shorttitle = {From {{Skills}} to {{Symbols}}},
-  author = {Konidaris, George and Kaelbling, Leslie Pack and {Lozano-Perez}, Tomas},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
-  volume = {61},
-  pages = {215--289},
-  issn = {1076-9757},
-  doi = {10.1613/jair.5575},
-  abstract = {We consider the problem of constructing abstract representations for planning in high-dimensional, continuous environments. We assume an agent equipped with a collection of high-level actions, and construct representations provably capable of evaluating plans composed of sequences of those actions.  We first consider the deterministic planning case, and  show that the relevant computation involves set operations performed over sets of states. We define the specific collection of sets that is necessary and sufficient for planning, and use them to construct a  grounded abstract symbolic representation that is provably suitable for deterministic planning. The resulting representation can be expressed in PDDL, a canonical high-level planning domain language; we construct such a representation for the Playroom domain and solve it in milliseconds using an off-the-shelf planner.  We then consider probabilistic planning, which we show requires generalizing from sets of states to distributions over states. We identify the specific distributions required for planning, and use them to construct a grounded abstract symbolic representation that correctly estimates the expected reward and probability of success of any plan. In addition, we show that learning the relevant probability distributions corresponds to specific instances of probabilistic density estimation and probabilistic classification. We construct an agent that autonomously learns the correct abstract representation of a computer game domain, and rapidly solves it.   Finally, we apply these techniques to create a physical robot system that autonomously learns its own symbolic representation of a mobile manipulation task directly from sensorimotor data---point clouds, map locations, and joint angles---and then plans using that representation. Together, these results establish a principled link between high-level actions and abstract representations, a concrete theoretical foundation for constructing abstract representations with provable properties, and a practical mechanism for autonomously learning abstract high-level representations.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c)},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PU28HB4W/Konidaris et al. - 2018 - From Skills to Symbols Learning Symbolic Represen.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Konig2021,
-  title = {A {{Causal Perspective}} on {{Meaningful}} and {{Robust Algorithmic Recourse}}},
-  author = {K{\"o}nig, Gunnar and Freiesleben, Timo and {Grosse-Wentrup}, Moritz},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jul,
-  number = {arXiv:2107.07853},
-  eprint = {2107.07853},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2107.07853},
-  abstract = {Algorithmic recourse explanations inform stakeholders on how to act to revert unfavorable predictions. However, in general ML models do not predict well in interventional distributions. Thus, an action that changes the prediction in the desired way may not lead to an improvement of the underlying target. Such recourse is neither meaningful nor robust to model refits. Extending the work of Karimi et al. (2021), we propose meaningful algorithmic recourse (MAR) that only recommends actions that improve both prediction and target. We justify this selection constraint by highlighting the differences between model audit and meaningful, actionable recourse explanations. Additionally, we introduce a relaxation of MAR called effective algorithmic recourse (EAR), which, under certain assumptions, yields meaningful recourse by only allowing interventions on causes of the target.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UPCKZEXQ/König et al. - 2021 - A Causal Perspective on Meaningful and Robust Algo.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8BGVSY3B/2107.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Koslicki2012,
-  title = {Varieties of {{Ontological Dependence}}},
-  booktitle = {Metaphysical {{Grounding}}: {{Understanding}} the {{Structure}} of {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Koslicki, Kathrin},
-  editor = {Schnieder, Fabrice Correia {and} Benjamin},
-  year = {2012},
-  pages = {186},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QFRD47SE/[Fabrice_Correia,_Benjamin_Schnieder_(Editors)]_Me(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Koslicki2015,
-  title = {The Coarse-Grainedness of Grounding},
-  booktitle = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaphysics}}, {{Volume}} 9},
-  author = {Koslicki, Kathrin},
-  editor = {Bennett, Karen and Zimmerman, Dean W.},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = mar,
-  pages = {306--344},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0011},
-  abstract = {This chapter discusses why the grounding idiom does not perform as well as we have been led to believe in providing a plausible approach to relative fundamentality. Grounding suffers from some of same deficiencies as supervenience: most prominently, grounding also fails to be sufficiently fine-grained to do its intended explanatory work. In addition, there is doubt as to whether the phenomena collected together under the rubric of grounding are really unified by the presence of a single relation. Grounding turns out not to be helpful in capturing and illuminating what is philosophically important about the traditional substance/non-substance distinction. Although grounding performs better than supervenience in some ways, it does not solve all of the problems to which a supervenience-based approach to relative fundamentality falls prey.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-872924-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/89CDQLU7/Koslicki - 2015 - The coarse-grainedness of grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kramer2015,
-  title = {A {{Note}} on the {{Logic}} of {{Worldly Ground}}},
-  author = {Kr{\"a}mer, Stephan and Roski, Stefan},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {59--68},
-  issn = {2161-2234},
-  doi = {10.1002/tht3.158},
-  abstract = {In his 2010 paper `Grounding and Truth-Functions', Fabrice Correia has developed the first and so far only proposal for a logic of ground based on a worldly conception of facts. In this paper, we show that the logic allows the derivation of implausible grounding claims. We then generalize these results and draw some conclusions concerning the structural features of ground and its associated notion of relevance, which has so far not received the attention it deserves.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q47WL3PW/Krämer and Roski - 2015 - A Note on the Logic of Worldly Ground.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kratzer1977,
-  title = {What `{{Must}}' and `{{Can}}' Must and Can Mean},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  year = {1977},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {337--355},
-  issn = {0165-0157, 1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00353453},
-  abstract = {In this paper I offer an account of the meaning of `must' and `can' within the framework of possible worlds semantics. The paper consists of two parts: the first argues for a relative concept of modality underlying modal words like `must' and `can' in natural language. I give preliminary definitions of the meaning of these words which are formulated in terms of logical consequence and compatibility, respectively. The second part discusses one kind of insufficiency in the meaning definitions given in the first part, which arise from the `ex falso quodlibet' paradox of logical consequence. In stepwise fashion, I make an attempt to avoid most of the consequences of this paradox for the meaning definitions of `must' and `can'.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics),Computational Linguistics,Philosophy of Language,semantics,Syntax},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KNYCIQJV/Kratzer - 1977 - What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kratzer1989,
-  title = {An Investigation of the Lumps of Thought},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  year = {1989},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {607--653},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00627775},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PR2AYB3K/Kratzer - 1989 - An investigation of the lumps of thought.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kratzer1991,
-  title = {Modality},
-  shorttitle = {Modality. {{In}} von {{Stechow}}, {{A}}. and {{Wunderlich}}, {{D}}., Editors, {{Semantics}}},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  editor = {{von Stechow}, A. and Wunderlich},
-  year = {1991},
-  journal = {Semantics: An international handbook of contemporary research},
-  publisher = {{de Gruyter, Berlin}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9NE2H84G/Kratzer - 1991 - Modality. In von Stechow, A. and Wunderlich, D., e.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kratzer1998,
-  title = {Scope or {{Pseudoscope}}? {{Are}} There {{Wide-Scope Indefinites}}?},
-  shorttitle = {Scope or {{Pseudoscope}}?},
-  booktitle = {Events and {{Grammar}}},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  editor = {Rothstein, Susan},
-  year = {1998},
-  series = {Studies in {{Linguistics}} and {{Philosophy}}},
-  pages = {163--196},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  isbn = {978-94-011-3969-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Bare Plural,Choice Function,Implicit Argument,Scalar Implicature,Scope Reading},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LQWPVS7R/Kratzer - 1998 - Scope or Pseudoscope Are there Wide-Scope Indefin.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kratzer2002,
-  title = {Facts: {{Particulars}} or {{Information Units}}?},
-  shorttitle = {Facts},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Linguistics and Philosophy},
-  volume = {25},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {655--670},
-  issn = {1573-0549},
-  doi = {10.1023/A:1020807615085},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CQJBPGA6/Kratzer - 2002 - Facts Particulars or Information Units.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kratzer2002a,
-  title = {The {{Notional Category}} of {{Modality}}},
-  booktitle = {Formal {{Semantics}}},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  year = {2002},
-  pages = {289--323},
-  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd}},
-  doi = {10.1002/9780470758335.ch12},
-  abstract = {This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Expressing Modality in German Basic Notions Grades of Possibility Two Basic Kinds of Modal Reasoning The Quest for Certainty Approaching Ideals Practical Inference Conditionals Conclusion Notes},
-  chapter = {12},
-  isbn = {978-0-470-75833-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {adjectives,german,language,modalit,semantics},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9780470758335.ch12},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/J5T3AW43/Kratzer - 2002 - The Notional Category of Modality.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K9J992M4/9780470758335.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kratzer2008,
-  title = {Situations in {{Natural Language Semantics}}},
-  booktitle = {Stanford {{Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  editor = {Kratzer, Angelika},
-  year = {2008}
-}
-
-@article{Kraus2002,
-  title = {Nonmonotonic {{Reasoning}}, {{Preferential Models}} and {{Cumulative Logics}}},
-  author = {Kraus, Sarit and Lehmann, Daniel and Magidor, Menachem},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {arXiv:cs/0202021},
-  eprint = {cs/0202021},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  abstract = {Many systems that exhibit nonmonotonic behavior have been described and studied already in the literature. The general notion of nonmonotonic reasoning, though, has almost always been described only negatively, by the property it does not enjoy, i.e. monotonicity. We study here general patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning and try to isolate properties that could help us map the field of nonmonotonic reasoning by reference to positive properties. We concentrate on a number of families of nonmonotonic consequence relations, defined in the style of Gentzen. Both proof-theoretic and semantic points of view are developed in parallel. The former point of view was pioneered by D. Gabbay, while the latter has been advocated by Y. Shoham in. Five such families are defined and characterized by representation theorems, relating the two points of view. One of the families of interest, that of preferential relations, turns out to have been studied by E. Adams. The "preferential" models proposed here are a much stronger tool than Adams' probabilistic semantics. The basic language used in this paper is that of propositional logic. The extension of our results to first order predicate calculi and the study of the computational complexity of the decision problems described in this paper will be treated in another paper.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,I.2.3},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IDRIKI9T/Kraus et al. - 2002 - Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Preferential Models and Cu.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kriegel2017,
-  title = {Metaphysics and {{Conceptual Analysis}}: {{Experimental Philosophy}}'s {{Place Under}} the {{Sun}}},
-  shorttitle = {Metaphysics and {{Conceptual Analysis}}},
-  booktitle = {Experimental {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Kriegel, Uriah},
-  editor = {Rose, D.},
-  year = {2017},
-  pages = {7--46},
-  publisher = {{New York: Bloomsbury Academic}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X56JPCRW/Kriegel - 2017 - Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis Experimental .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke1959,
-  title = {A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {1959},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {24},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--14},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {0022-4812, 1943-5886},
-  doi = {10.2307/2964568},
-  abstract = {The present paper attempts to state and prove a completeness theorem for the system S5 of [1], supplemented by first-order quantifiers and the sign of equality. We assume that we possess a denumerably infinite list of individual variables a, b, c, \ldots, x, y, z, \ldots, xm, ym, zm, \ldots{} as well as a denumerably infinite list of n-adic predicate variables Pn, Qn, Rn, \ldots, Pmn, Qmn, Rmn,\ldots; if n=0, an n-adic predicate variable is often called a ``propositional variable.'' A formula Pn(x1, \ldots,xn) is an n-adic prime formula; often the superscript will be omitted if such an omission does not sacrifice clarity.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/927JJ4FH/2656899380CA2607B27A2E90DFEF7CFE.html}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke1963,
-  title = {Semantical {{Analysis}} of {{Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {1963},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mathematical Logic Quarterly},
-  volume = {9},
-  number = {5-6},
-  pages = {67--96},
-  issn = {1521-3870},
-  doi = {10.1002/malq.19630090502},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1963 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH \& Co. KGaA, Weinheim},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2H4II9KE/Kripke - 1963 - Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke1963a,
-  title = {Semantical {{Considerations}} on {{Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {1963},
-  journal = {Acta Philosophica Fennica},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {1963},
-  pages = {83--94},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4VHMCLF3/Kripke.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V3438VRG/Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic - Kripke - 1963.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kripke1965,
-  title = {Semantical {{Analysis}} of {{Modal Logic II}}. {{Non-Normal Modal Propositional Calculi}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Theory}} of {{Models}}: {{Proceedings}} of the 1963 {{International Symposium}} at {{Berkeley}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  editor = {Addison, J. W. and Tarski, A. and Henkin, L.},
-  year = {1965},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {206--20},
-  publisher = {{North Holland}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SZYHSYRA/SemConKrip.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kripke1971,
-  title = {Identity and {{Necessity}}},
-  booktitle = {Identity and {{Individuation}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  editor = {Munitz, Milton K.},
-  year = {1971},
-  pages = {135--164},
-  publisher = {{New York University Press}}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kripke1972,
-  title = {Naming and {{Necessity}}},
-  booktitle = {Semantics of {{Natural Language}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {1972},
-  pages = {253--355},
-  publisher = {{Springer, Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9},
-  abstract = {I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, anyway, such connections will be developed in the course of these talks. Furthermore, because of the use of tools involving reference and necessity in analytic philosophy today, our views on these topics really have wide-ranging implications for other problems in philosophy that traditionally might be thought far-removed, like arguments over the mind-body problem or the so-called `identity thesis'. Materialism, in this form, often now gets involved in very intricate ways in questions about what is necessary or contingent in identity of properties \textemdash{} questions like that. So, it is really very important to philosophers who may want to work in many domains to get clear about these concepts. Maybe I will say something about the mind-body problem in the course of these talks. I want to talk also at some point (I don't know if I can get it in) about substances and natural kinds.},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke1975,
-  title = {Outline of a {{Theory}} of {{Truth}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul},
-  year = {1975},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {72},
-  number = {19},
-  pages = {690},
-  issn = {0022362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2024634}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kripke1976,
-  title = {Is {{There}} a {{Problem About Substitutional Quantification}}?},
-  booktitle = {Truth and {{Meaning}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  editor = {Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John},
-  year = {1976},
-  pages = {324--419},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CM9HYE27/KripkeSQ.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kripke1976a,
-  title = {Is {{There}} a {{Problem About Substitutional Quantification}}?},
-  booktitle = {Truth and {{Meaning}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  editor = {Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John},
-  year = {1976},
-  pages = {324--419},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YCTRXHYY/KRIITA-3.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Kripke1979,
-  title = {A {{Puzzle}} about {{Belief}}},
-  booktitle = {Meaning and {{Use}}: {{Papers Presented}} at the {{Second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter April}} 1976},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  editor = {Margalit, Avishai},
-  year = {1979},
-  series = {Synthese {{Language Library}}},
-  pages = {239--283},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-1-4020-4104-4_20},
-  abstract = {In this paper I will present a puzzle about names and belief. A moral or two will be drawn about some other arguments that have occasionally been advanced in this area, but my main thesis is a simple one: that the puzzle is a puzzle. And, as a corollary, that any account of belief must ultimately come to grips with it. Any speculation as to solutions can be deferred.},
-  isbn = {978-1-4020-4104-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Definite Description,English Sentence,Modal Context,Natural Kind,Propositional Attitude}
-}
-
-@book{Kripke1980,
-  title = {Naming and {{Necessity}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {1980},
-  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JN4QTPG3/Kripke - 1980 - Naming and Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke2015,
-  title = {Quantified {{Modal Logic}} and {{Quine}}'s {{Critique}}: {{Some Further Observations}}},
-  shorttitle = {Quantified {{Modal Logic}} and {{Quine}}'s {{Critique}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  pages = {n/a-n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12127},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke2015a,
-  title = {Quantified {{Modality}} and {{Essentialism}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  pages = {n/a-n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12126},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AM6C875Q/Kripke - 2015 - Quantified Modality and Essentialism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Kripke2017,
-  title = {Quantified {{Modality}} and {{Essentialism}}},
-  author = {Kripke, Saul A.},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {51},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {221--234},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12126},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JYZR6F7E/Kripke - 2017 - Quantified Modality and Essentialism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Krishnan2020,
-  title = {Against {{Interpretability}}: A {{Critical Examination}} of the {{Interpretability Problem}} in {{Machine Learning}}},
-  shorttitle = {Against {{Interpretability}}},
-  author = {Krishnan, Maya},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Philosophy \& Technology},
-  volume = {33},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {487--502},
-  issn = {2210-5441},
-  doi = {10.1007/s13347-019-00372-9},
-  abstract = {The usefulness of machine learning algorithms has led to their widespread adoption prior to the development of a conceptual framework for making sense of them. One common response to this situation is to say that machine learning suffers from a ``black box problem.'' That is, machine learning algorithms are ``opaque'' to human users, failing to be ``interpretable'' or ``explicable'' in terms that would render categorization procedures ``understandable.'' The purpose of this paper is to challenge the widespread agreement about the existence and importance of a black box problem. The first section argues that ``interpretability'' and cognates lack precise meanings when applied to algorithms. This makes the concepts difficult to use when trying to solve the problems that have motivated the call for interpretability (etc.). Furthermore, since there is no adequate account of the concepts themselves, it is not possible to assess whether particular technical features supply formal definitions of those concepts. The second section argues that there are ways of being a responsible user of these algorithms that do not require interpretability (etc.). In many cases in which a black box problem is cited, interpretability is a means to a further end such as justification or non-discrimination. Since addressing these problems need not involve something that looks like an ``interpretation'' (etc.) of an algorithm, the focus on interpretability artificially constrains the solution space by characterizing one possible solution as the problem itself. Where possible, discussion should be reformulated in terms of the ends of interpretability.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/749K8XQJ/Krishnan - 2020 - Against Interpretability a Critical Examination o.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Krishnanundefined/ed,
-  title = {Kant's {{Critical Theory}} of the {{Best Possible World}}},
-  author = {Krishnan, Maya},
-  year = {undefined/ed},
-  journal = {Kantian Review},
-  pages = {1--25},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1369-4154, 2044-2394},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1369415420000321},
-  abstract = {In this article I argue that the Critical Kant endorses the claim that God creates the best possible world, and that this claim is best understood as committing him to the view that God creates an infinitely valuable world. Kant's understudied Critical theory of the best possible world differs significantly from his better-known quasi-Leibnizian pre-Critical account insofar as it uses an axiological rather than ontological metric for the goodness of worlds. The axiological metric introduces unique challenges for a Kantian account of the best possible world. These challenges are in turn resolved via an infinite value interpretation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {best possible world,infinity,Kant,Leibniz,theology},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/97CFMBDW/Krishnan - Kant’s Critical Theory of the Best Possible World.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Kyburg1980,
-  title = {Studies in {{Subjective Probability}}},
-  author = {Kyburg, Henry},
-  year = {1980},
-  month = mar,
-  edition = {Subsequent edition},
-  publisher = {{Krieger Pub Co}},
-  address = {{Huntington, N.Y}},
-  isbn = {978-0-88275-296-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FN3IBYA9/Studies in Subjective Probability (Henry E. Kyburg, Howard E. Smokler (editors)) (z-lib.org).djvu}
-}
-
-@incollection{Laan2004,
-  title = {Counterpossibles and {{Similarity}}},
-  booktitle = {Lewisian {{Themes}}: {{The Philosophy}} of {{David K}}. {{Lewis}}},
-  author = {Laan, David Vander},
-  editor = {Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham},
-  year = {2004},
-  pages = {258--275},
-  publisher = {{Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RSL7HS6Y/Laan - 2004 - Counterpossibles and Similarity.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8JRS94R7/LAACAS.html}
-}
-
-@article{Laboreo2005,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Natural Deduction}}},
-  author = {Laboreo, Daniel Clemente},
-  year = {2005},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q5B685SL/clemente_nat_ded.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lake2017,
-  title = {Building Machines That Learn and Think like People},
-  author = {Lake, Brenden M. and Ullman, Tomer D. and Tenenbaum, Joshua B. and Gershman, Samuel J.},
-  year = {2017/ed},
-  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
-  volume = {40},
-  pages = {e253},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {0140-525X, 1469-1825},
-  doi = {10.1017/S0140525X16001837},
-  abstract = {Recent progress in artificial intelligence has renewed interest in building systems that learn and think like people. Many advances have come from using deep neural networks trained end-to-end in tasks such as object recognition, video games, and board games, achieving performance that equals or even beats that of humans in some respects. Despite their biological inspiration and performance achievements, these systems differ from human intelligence in crucial ways. We review progress in cognitive science suggesting that truly human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both what they learn and how they learn it. Specifically, we argue that these machines should (1) build causal models of the world that support explanation and understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems; (2) ground learning in intuitive theories of physics and psychology to support and enrich the knowledge that is learned; and (3) harness compositionality and learning-to-learn to rapidly acquire and generalize knowledge to new tasks and situations. We suggest concrete challenges and promising routes toward these goals that can combine the strengths of recent neural network advances with more structured cognitive models.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JNZ5F7ZJ/Lake et al. - 2017 - Building machines that learn and think like people.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lakoff2003,
-  title = {Metaphors {{We Live By}}},
-  author = {Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = apr,
-  edition = {New edition edition},
-  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
-  address = {{Chicago}},
-  abstract = {The now-classic Metaphors We Live By changed our understanding of metaphor and its role in language and the mind. Metaphor, the authors explain, is a fundamental mechanism of mind, one that allows us to use what we know about our physical and social experience to provide understanding of countless other subjects. Because such metaphors structure our most basic understandings of our experience, they are "metaphors we live by"\&\#8212;metaphors that can shape our perceptions and actions without our ever noticing them.In this updated edition of Lakoff and Johnson's influential book, the authors supply an afterword surveying how their theory of metaphor has developed within the cognitive sciences to become central to the contemporary understanding of how we think and how we express our thoughts in language.},
-  isbn = {978-0-226-46801-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WY7AB5KN/[George_Lakoff_and_Mark_Johnson]_Metaphors_We_Live(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lance2007,
-  title = {Where the {{Laws Are}}},
-  author = {Lance, Mark N and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaethics},
-  volume = {2},
-  pages = {149--171},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SZRA48P6/2007 - Where the Laws Are - Lance, Little.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VEGUUXU8/2007 - Where the Laws Are - Lance, Little.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Laurence2003,
-  title = {Concepts and {{Conceptual Analysis}}},
-  author = {Laurence, Stephen and Margolis, Eric},
-  year = {2003},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {67},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {253--282},
-  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00290.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TEC7H7Z5/Laurence and Margolis - 2003 - Concepts and Conceptual Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ledda2019,
-  title = {Algebraic {{Analysis}} of {{Demodalised Analytic Implication}}},
-  author = {Ledda, Antonio and Paoli, Francesco and Pra Baldi, Michele},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {957--979},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-019-09502-2},
-  abstract = {The logic DAI of demodalised analytic implication has been introduced by J.M. Dunn (and independently investigated by R.D. Epstein) as a variation on a time-honoured logical system by C.I. Lewis' student W.T. Parry. The main tenet underlying this logic is that no implication can be valid unless its consequent is ``analytically contained'' in its antecedent. DAI has been investigated both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, but no study so far has focussed on DAI from the viewpoint of abstract algebraic logic. We provide several different algebraic semantics for DAI, showing their equivalence with the known semantics by Dunn and Epstein. We also show that DAI is algebraisable and we identify its equivalent quasivariety semantics. This class turns out to be a linguistic and axiomatic expansion of involutive bisemilattices, a subquasivariety of which forms the algebraic counterpart of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic (PWK). This fact sheds further light on the relationship between containment logics and logics of nonsense.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ANZFZAK5/Ledda et al. - 2019 - Algebraic Analysis of Demodalised Analytic Implica.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Leech2018,
-  title = {Essence and {{Mere Necessity}}},
-  author = {Leech, Jessica},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements},
-  volume = {82},
-  pages = {309--332},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1358-2461, 1755-3555},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1358246118000139},
-  abstract = {Recently, a debate has developed between those who claim that essence can be explained in terms of de re modality (modalists), and those who claim that de re modality can be explained in terms of essence (essentialists). The aim of this paper is to suggest that we should reassess. It is assumed that either necessity is to be accounted for in terms of essence, or that essence is to be accounted for in terms of necessity. I will argue that we should assume neither. I discuss what role these key notions \textendash{} essence and necessity \textendash{} can reasonably be thought to contribute to our understanding of the world, and argue that, given these roles, there is no good reason to think that we should give an account of one in terms of the other. I conclude: if we can adequately explain de re modality and essence at all, we should aim to do so separately.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PK6ET6RT/Leech - 2018 - Essence and Mere Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Leibowitz2011,
-  title = {Explaining {{Moral Knowledge}}},
-  author = {Leibowitz, Uri D},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {35--56},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/96PHNL8B/2011 - Explaining Moral Knowledge - Leibowitz.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CZ6SQBYI/2011 - Explaining Moral Knowledge - Leibowitz.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Leibowitz2011a,
-  title = {Scientific {{Explanation}} and {{Moral Explanation}}},
-  author = {Leibowitz, Uri D},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {3},
-  pages = {472--503},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2UGJS2KX/2011 - Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation - Leibowitz.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PNPMAPMV/2011 - Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation - Leibowitz.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Leinster2014,
-  title = {Basic {{Category Theory}}},
-  author = {Leinster, Tom},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {1 edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  abstract = {At the heart of this short introduction to category theory is the idea of a universal property, important throughout mathematics. After an introductory chapter giving the basic definitions, separate chapters explain three ways of expressing universal properties: via adjoint functors, representable functors, and limits. A final chapter ties all three together. The book is suitable for use in courses or for independent study. Assuming relatively little mathematical background, it is ideal for beginning graduate students or advanced undergraduates learning category theory for the first time. For each new categorical concept, a generous supply of examples is provided, taken from different parts of mathematics. At points where the leap in abstraction is particularly great (such as the Yoneda lemma), the reader will find careful and extensive explanations. Copious exercises are included.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5CA2BXL6/Leinster - 2014 - Basic Category Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Leitgeb,
-  title = {Abstraction {{Grounded}}. {{A Note}} on {{Abstraction}} and {{Truth}}},
-  author = {Leitgeb, Hannes},
-  journal = {Abstractionism in Mathematics (ed. by P. Ebert and M. Rossberg), Oxford University Press},
-  abstract = {In this note we argue that turning to an alleged dichotomy of good vs. bad, or acceptable vs. unacceptable abstraction principles in the literature on Neo-Fregeanism has been a mistake from the start. Instead we are going to suggest that every},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Leitgeb2008,
-  title = {Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontology},
-  author = {Leitgeb, Hannes and Ladyman, James},
-  year = {2008},
-  journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {388--396},
-  issn = {00318019},
-  doi = {10.1093/philmat/nkm039},
-  abstract = {In discussions about whether the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is compatible with structuralist ontologies of mathematics, it is usually assumed that individual objects are subject to criteria of identity which somehow account for the identity of the individuals. Much of this debate concerns structures that admit of non-trivial automorphisms. We consider cases from graph theory that violate even weak formulations of PII. We argue that (i) the identity or difference of places in a structure is not to be accounted for by anything other than the structure itself and that (ii) mathematical practice provides evidence for this view.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/94T3YY5C/2008 - Criteria of identity and structuralist ontology - Leitgeb, Ladyman.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DJL3PRDV/2008 - Criteria of identity and structuralist ontology - Leitgeb, Ladyman.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lemmon1966,
-  title = {Algebraic Semantics for Modal Logics {{I}}},
-  author = {Lemmon, E. J.},
-  year = {1966},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {31},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {46--65},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {0022-4812, 1943-5886},
-  doi = {10.2307/2270619},
-  abstract = {Modal logic received its modern impetus from the work of Lewis and Langford [10]. In recent years, however, their axiomatic approach, aided by somewhat ad hoc matrices for distinguishing different modal systems, has been supplemented by other techniques. Two of the most profound of these were, first, the algebraic methods employed by McKinsey and Tarski (see [11] and [12]) and, second, the semantic method of Kripke (see [5] and [6]); and there have been others. The aim of the present series of papers is to afford a synthesis of these methods. Thus, though new results are given, the interest lies rather in revealing interconnexions between familiar results and in providing a general framework for future research. In general, we show that semantic completeness results of the Kripke kind can be deduced from the algebraic results by means of one central theorem (Theorem 21).},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SRY9K28I/Lemmon - 1966 - Algebraic semantics for modal logics I.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Leuenberger2014,
-  title = {Grounding and {{Necessity}}},
-  author = {Leuenberger, Stephan},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {151--174},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2013.855654},
-  abstract = {The elucidations and regimentations of grounding offered in the literature standardly take it to be a necessary connection. In particular, authors often assert, or at least assume, that if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter; and moreover, that grounding is an internal relation, in the sense of being necessitated by the existence of the relata. In this article, I challenge the necessitarian orthodoxy about grounding by offering two prima facie counterexamples. First, some physical facts may ground a certain phenomenal fact without necessitating it; and they may co-exist with the latter without grounding it. Second, some instantiations of categorical properties may ground the instantiation of a dispositional one without necessitating it; and they may co-exist without grounding it. After arguing that these may be genuine counterexamples, I ask whether there are modal constraints on grounding that are not threatened by them. I propose two: that grounding supervenes on what facts there are, and that every grounded fact supervenes on what grounds there are. Finally, I attempt to provide a rigorous formulation of the latter supervenience claim and discuss some technical questions that arise if we allow descending grounding chains of transfinite length.},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855654},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LGIJCJN4/Leuenberger - 2014 - Grounding and Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Leuenberger2020,
-  title = {The Fundamental: {{Ungrounded}} or All-Grounding?},
-  shorttitle = {The Fundamental},
-  author = {Leuenberger, Stephan},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {177},
-  number = {9},
-  pages = {2647--2669},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-019-01332-x},
-  abstract = {Fundamentality plays a pivotal role in discussions of ontology, supervenience, and possibility, and other key topics in metaphysics. However,~there are two different ways of characterising the fundamental: as that which is not grounded, and as that which is the ground of everything else. I show that whether these two characterisations pick out the same property turns on a principle\textemdash which I call ``Dichotomy''\textemdash that is of independent interest in the theory of ground: that everything is either fully grounded or not even partially grounded. I then argue that Dichotomy fails: some facts have partial grounds that cannot be complemented to a full ground. Rejecting Dichotomy opens the door to recognising a bifurcation in our notion of fundamentality. I sketch some of the far-reaching metaphysical consequences this might have, with reference to big-picture views such as Humeanism. Since Dichotomy is entailed by the standard account of partial ground, according to which partial grounds are subpluralities of full grounds, a non-standard account is needed. In a technical ``Appendix'', I show that truthmaker semantics furnishes such an account, and identify a semantic condition that corresponds to Dichotomy.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RMJG2G26/Leuenberger - 2020 - The fundamental Ungrounded or all-grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Levinstein2020,
-  title = {Cheating {{Death}} in {{Damascus}}},
-  author = {Levinstein, Benjamin A. and Soares, Nate},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {117},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {237--266},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil2020117516},
-  abstract = {Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT) are the leading contenders as theories of rational action, but both face counterexamples. We present some new counterexamples, including one in which the optimal action is causally dominated. We also present a novel decision theory, Functional Decision Theory (FDT), which simultaneously solves both sets of counterexamples. Instead of considering which physical action of theirs would give rise to the best outcomes, FDT agents consider which output of their decision function would give rise to the best outcome. This theory relies on a notion of subjunctive dependence, where multiple implementations of the same mathematical function are considered (even counterfactually) to have identical results for logical rather than causal reasons. Taking these subjunctive dependencies into account allows FDT agents to outperform CDT and EDT agents in, for example, the presence of accurate predictors.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KDNIJ8SJ/Levinstein et al. - 2020 - Cheating Death in Damascus.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S6ECZB8U/jphil_2020_0117_0005_0237_0266.html}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis,
-  title = {Radical Interpretation},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {3-4},
-  pages = {331--344},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00484599},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/67MR54MN/Lewis - Radical interpretation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1912,
-  title = {Implication and the {{Algebra}} of {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1912},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {XXI},
-  number = {84},
-  pages = {522--531},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/XXI.84.522},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/42PCJPSR/Mind-1912-LEWIS-522-31.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1913,
-  title = {A {{New Algebra}} of {{Implications}} and {{Some Consequences}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1913},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {16},
-  pages = {428--438},
-  issn = {0160-9335},
-  doi = {10.2307/2012900},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V6NFITYX/Lewis - 1913 - A New Algebra of Implications and Some Consequence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1913a,
-  title = {Interesting {{Theorems}} in {{Symbolic Logic}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1913},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {9},
-  pages = {239--242},
-  issn = {0160-9335},
-  doi = {10.2307/2012471},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UFU73VJ6/Lewis - 1913 - Interesting Theorems in Symbolic Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1914,
-  title = {The {{Calculus}} of {{Strict Implication}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1914},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  series = {New {{Series}}},
-  volume = {23},
-  number = {90},
-  pages = {240--247},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1914 Oxford University Press},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QYGBFVVQ/Lewis - 1914 - The Calculus of Strict Implication.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1914a,
-  title = {The {{Matrix Algebra}} for {{Implications}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1914},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {22},
-  pages = {589--600},
-  issn = {0160-9335},
-  doi = {10.2307/2012652},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/558BFSAX/Lewis - 1914 - The Matrix Algebra for Implications.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1917,
-  title = {The {{Issues Concerning Material Implication}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1917},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {13},
-  pages = {350--356},
-  issn = {0160-9335},
-  doi = {10.2307/2940255},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8T4UIQUY/Lewis - 1917 - The Issues Concerning Material Implication.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1920,
-  title = {Strict {{Implication}}\textendash{{An Emendation}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1920},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {300--302},
-  issn = {0160-9335},
-  doi = {10.2307/2940598},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2GGSHEW4/Lewis - 1920 - Strict Implication--An Emendation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1921,
-  title = {The {{Structure}} of {{Logic}} and Its {{Relation}} to {{Other Systems}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1921},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {18},
-  number = {19},
-  pages = {505--516},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2939309},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LS9GHKNV/Lewis - 1921 - The Structure of Logic and its Relation to Other S.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lewis1932,
-  title = {Symbolic {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I. and Langford, C. H.},
-  year = {1932},
-  publisher = {{Century Company}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D67F23U3/1932 - Symbolic Logic - Lewis, Langford.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JREHRU6B/1932 - Symbolic Logic - Lewis, Langford.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1932a,
-  title = {Alternative {{Systems}} of {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Lewis, C. I.},
-  year = {1932},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {The Monist},
-  volume = {42},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {481--507},
-  issn = {0026-9662},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1932 Oxford University Press}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1968,
-  title = {Counterpart {{Theory}} and {{Quantified Modal Logic}}:},
-  shorttitle = {Counterpart {{Theory}} and {{Quantified Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David K.},
-  year = {1968},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {65},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {113--126},
-  issn = {0022362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2024555},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2IXDLFD5/jphil_1968_0065_0005_0113_0126.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1970,
-  title = {How to {{Define Theoretical Terms}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1970},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {67},
-  number = {13},
-  pages = {427--446},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy Inc}},
-  doi = {10.2307/2023861},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PLN84FAG/Lewis - 1970 - How to Define Theoretical Terms.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lewis1973,
-  title = {Counterfactuals},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1973},
-  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
-  address = {{Harvard}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E8BFKC22/Lewis - 1973 - Counterfactuals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1973a,
-  title = {Causation},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1973},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {70},
-  number = {17},
-  pages = {556--567},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2025310},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WTE3FZ8G/Lewis - 1973 - Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1976,
-  title = {The {{Paradoxes}} of {{Time Travel}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1976},
-  journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {145--152},
-  issn = {0003-0481},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DN5RXM3A/20009616.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1979,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Dependence}} and {{Time}}'s {{Arrow}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1979},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {455--476},
-  publisher = {{Wiley}},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2215339},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/H2EWAPY2/Lewis - 1979 - Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1981,
-  title = {Causal Decision Theory},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1981},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {59},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {5--30},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048408112340011},
-  abstract = {Newcomb's problem and similar cases show the need to incorporate causal distinctions into the theory of rational decision; the usual noncausal decision theory, though simpler, does not always give the right answers. I give my own version of causal decision theory, compare it with versions offered by several other authors, and suggest that the versions have more in common than meets the eye.},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408112340011},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AF4MUVL6/00048408112340011.html}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1982,
-  title = {Logic for {{Equivocators}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1982},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {16},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {431--441},
-  publisher = {{Wiley}},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2216219},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6ZV4UYE6/Lewis - 1982 - Logic for Equivocators.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1983,
-  title = {New Work for a Theory of Universals},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1983},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {343--377},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048408312341131},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y2MJYJV3/Lewis - 1983 - New work for a theory of universals.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lewis1983a,
-  title = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  shorttitle = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1983},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {1st edition},
-  volume = {1},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-503204-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BHCZAJA4/Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Papers Volume I.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lewis1986,
-  title = {On the {{Plurality}} of {{Worlds}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David K.},
-  year = {1986},
-  publisher = {{Blackwell Publishers}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AMD9KB3A/[David_Lewis]_On_the_Plurality_of_Worlds(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lewis1986a,
-  title = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  shorttitle = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1986},
-  edition = {1st Edition},
-  volume = {2},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-503646-6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JP85PGVW/Philosophical Papers Vol. 2 (Lewis, David) (z-lib.org) (1).pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q7SBQLTR/Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers Vol. II.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QNDHMVQQ/LEWPPV-2.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Lewis1986b,
-  title = {Events},
-  booktitle = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1986},
-  edition = {1st Edition},
-  volume = {2},
-  pages = {241--269},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UTWMZ96J/Lewis - 1986 - Events.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/69D5MKT9/LEWE.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Lewis1986c,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Dependence}} and {{Time}}'s {{Arrow}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterfactual {{Dependence}} and {{Time}}?},
-  booktitle = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1986},
-  volume = {2},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SZRN2KWC/Lewis - 1986 - Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P2N67NX3/LEWCDA-3.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Lewis1986d,
-  title = {Postscripts to `{{Causation}}'},
-  booktitle = {Philosophical {{Papers}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  editor = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1986},
-  volume = {2},
-  pages = {172--213},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-503646-6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RFTDL8C6/Lewis - 1986 - Postscripts to `Causation'.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UG33DH9R/LEWPTC.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Lewis1987,
-  title = {Prisoners' {{Dilemma Is}} a {{Newcomb Problem}}},
-  booktitle = {Philosophical {{Papers Volume II}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1987},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  doi = {10.1093/0195036468.003.0011},
-  abstract = {This paper argues that, considered as puzzles about rationality, the Prisoners' Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem are essentially one and the same problem.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-503646-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {decision theory,Newcomb's problem,Prisoners’ Dilemma,rationality},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4BJ23A5B/Lewis - 1987 - Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1988,
-  title = {Statements {{Partly About Observation}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1988},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Philosophical Papers},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--31},
-  issn = {0556-8641},
-  doi = {10.1080/05568648809506282},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C6WG5EUM/Lewis - 1988 - Statements Partly About Observation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1988a,
-  title = {Relevant Implication},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1988},
-  journal = {Theoria},
-  volume = {54},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {161--174},
-  issn = {1755-2567},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1755-2567.1988.tb00716.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WTG65SZH/Lewis - 1988 - Relevant implication.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis1994,
-  title = {Symposium: {{Chance}} and {{CredenceHumean Supervenience Debugged}}},
-  shorttitle = {Symposium},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {1994},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {103},
-  number = {412},
-  pages = {473--490},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/103.412.473},
-  abstract = {DAVID LEWIS; Symposium: Chance and CredenceHumean Supervenience Debugged, Mind, Volume 103, Issue 412, 1 October 1994, Pages 473\textendash 490, https://doi.org/10.1093/m},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EJS57AUF/Lewis - 1994 - Symposium Chance and CredenceHumean Supervenience.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Lewis1994a,
-  title = {Reduction of {{Mind}}},
-  booktitle = {Companion to the {{Philosophy}} of {{Mind}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  editor = {Guttenplan, Samuel},
-  year = {1994},
-  pages = {412--431},
-  publisher = {{Blackwell}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7J2XR33W/Lewis - 1994 - Reduction of Mind.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis2000,
-  title = {Causation as {{Influence}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {2000},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {97},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {182--197},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2678389},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AF6YKT3E/Lewis - 2000 - Causation as Influence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lewis2002,
-  title = {Tensing the {{Copula}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {111},
-  number = {441},
-  pages = {1--14},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/111.441.1},
-  abstract = {A solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things should meet three conditions. It should not replace monadic intrinsic properties by relations. It should not replace the having simpliciter of properties by standing in some relation to them (unless having them simpliciter always means standing in some relation to them, which is refuted by Bradley's regress). It should not rely on an unexplained notion of having an intrinsic property at a time. Johnston's solution satisfies the first condition at the expense of the second. Haslanger's solution satisfies the first and second at the expense of the third.},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@incollection{Lewis2009,
-  title = {Ramseyan {{Humility}}},
-  booktitle = {Conceptual {{Analysis}} and {{Philosophical Naturalism}}},
-  author = {Lewis, David},
-  editor = {{Braddon-Mitchell}, David and Nola, Robert},
-  year = {2009},
-  pages = {203--222},
-  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9VTWWGG9/Ramseyan_Humility.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Li2018,
-  title = {Learning {{Deep Generative Models}} of {{Graphs}}},
-  author = {Li, Yujia and Vinyals, Oriol and Dyer, Chris and Pascanu, Razvan and Battaglia, Peter},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = mar,
-  number = {arXiv:1803.03324},
-  eprint = {1803.03324},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1803.03324},
-  abstract = {Graphs are fundamental data structures which concisely capture the relational structure in many important real-world domains, such as knowledge graphs, physical and social interactions, language, and chemistry. Here we introduce a powerful new approach for learning generative models over graphs, which can capture both their structure and attributes. Our approach uses graph neural networks to express probabilistic dependencies among a graph's nodes and edges, and can, in principle, learn distributions over any arbitrary graph. In a series of experiments our results show that once trained, our models can generate good quality samples of both synthetic graphs as well as real molecular graphs, both unconditionally and conditioned on data. Compared to baselines that do not use graph-structured representations, our models often perform far better. We also explore key challenges of learning generative models of graphs, such as how to handle symmetries and ordering of elements during the graph generation process, and offer possible solutions. Our work is the first and most general approach for learning generative models over arbitrary graphs, and opens new directions for moving away from restrictions of vector- and sequence-like knowledge representations, toward more expressive and flexible relational data structures.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QLJFMJWN/Li et al. - 2018 - Learning Deep Generative Models of Graphs.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5CPMKMBA/1803.html}
-}
-
-@article{Linnebo2012,
-  title = {Hierarchies {{Ontological}} and {{Ideological}}},
-  author = {Linnebo, {\O}ystein and Rayo, Agust{\'i}n},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {121},
-  number = {482},
-  pages = {269--308},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzs050},
-  abstract = {G\"odel claimed that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is `what becomes of the theory of types if certain superfluous restrictions are removed'. The aim of this paper is to develop a clearer understanding of G\"odel's remark, and of the surrounding philosophical terrain. In connection with this, we discuss some technical issues concerning infinitary type theories and the programme of developing the semantics for higher-order languages in other higher-order languages.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I4XJHIXF/Linnebo and Rayo - 2012 - Hierarchies Ontological and Ideological.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Linnebo2014,
-  title = {`{{Just}} Is'-{{Statements}} as {{Generalized Identities}}},
-  author = {{ystein Linnebo}, {\O}},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {466--482},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TLL4FJF4/2014 - ‘Just is’-Statements as Generalized Identities - Linnebo.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Linnebo2016,
-  title = {Plurals and Modals},
-  author = {Linnebo, {\O}ystein},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {46},
-  number = {4-5},
-  pages = {654--676},
-  issn = {0045-5091},
-  doi = {10.1080/00455091.2015.1132975},
-  abstract = {Consider one of several things. Is the one thing necessarily one of the several? This key question in the modal logic of plurals is clarified. Some defenses of an affirmative answer are developed and compared. Various remarks are made about the broader philosophical significance of the question.},
-  keywords = {extensionality,modality,Plural logic,set theory,Timothy Williamson},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NQ8HRP9S/Linnebo - 2016 - Plurals and modals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Litland2013,
-  title = {On {{Some Counterexamples}} to the {{Transitivity}} of {{Grounding}}},
-  author = {Litland, Jon},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {1},
-  issn = {1526-0569},
-  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1453},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YGV7I3C7/On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Litland2015,
-  title = {Grounding, {{Explanation}}, and the {{Limit}} of {{Internality}}},
-  author = {Litland, Jon Erling},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {124},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {481--532},
-  issn = {0031-8108, 1558-1470},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-3147011},
-  abstract = {Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses the notion of a ``completely satisfactory explanation'' to shed light on the logic of ground in the presence of self-reference. This allows us to develop a satisfactory logic of ground and recover a sense in which grounding is still an internal relation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {completely satisfactory explanation,entailment,Grounding,internal relation,logic of ground,self-reference},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DRMM53WM/Litland - 2015 - Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internali.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Litland2016,
-  title = {Pure {{Logic}} of {{Many-Many Ground}}},
-  author = {Litland, Jon Erling},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  pages = {1--47},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-015-9386-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Grounding,Logic,Many-many grounding,Metaphysics,Soundness and completeness,Structuralism},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/52KTUJHL/Litland - 2016 - Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Litland2018,
-  title = {Could the Grounds's Grounding the Grounded Ground the Grounded?},
-  author = {Litland, Jon Erling},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {78},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {56--65},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/anx116},
-  abstract = {Abstract.  Could {$\varphi$}'s partially grounding {$\psi$} itself be a partial ground for {$\psi$}? I show that it follows from commonly accepted principles in the logic of ground tha},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P4NBUIJG/Litland - 2018 - Could the grounds’s grounding the grounded ground .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Litland2018a,
-  title = {Pure {{Logic}} of {{Iterated Full Ground}}},
-  author = {Litland, Jon Erling},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {411--435},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020317000211},
-  abstract = {This article develops the Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground (plifg), a logic of ground that can deal with claims of the form ``{$\phi$} grounds that ({$\psi$} grounds \texttheta )''\textemdash what we call iterated grounding claims. The core idea is that some truths {$\Gamma$} ground a truth {$\phi$} when there is an explanatory argument (of a certain sort) from premisses {$\Gamma$} to conclusion {$\phi$}. By developing a deductive system that distinguishes between explanatory and nonexplanatory arguments we can give introduction rules for operators for factive and nonfactive full ground, as well as for a propositional ``identity'' connective. Elimination rules are then found by using a proof-theoretic inversion principle.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03A05,03F99,explanation,ground,inversion principle,iterated ground,logic of ground,natural deduction},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P2DSZ7DA/Litland - 2018 - PURE LOGIC OF ITERATED FULL GROUND.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Littlejohnforthcoming,
-  title = {Evidence and Its {{Limits}}},
-  booktitle = {Normativity: {{Epistemic}} and {{Practical}}},
-  author = {Littlejohn, Clayton},
-  editor = {Whiting, Conor McHugh Jonathan Way {and} Daniel},
-  year = {forthcoming},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C5ITATXW/Evidence_and_its_Limits.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lo2018,
-  title = {Mathematical {{Foundations}} of {{Probability Theory}}},
-  author = {Lo, Gane Samb},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {arXiv:1808.01713 [math]},
-  eprint = {1808.01713},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {math},
-  abstract = {In the footsteps of the book \textbackslash textit\{Measure Theory and Integration By and For the Learner\} of our series in Probability Theory and Statistics, we intended to devote a special volume of the very probabilistic aspects of the first cited theory. The book might have assigned the title : From Measure Theory and Integration to Probability Theory. The fundamental aspects of Probability Theory, as described by the keywords and phrases below, are presented, not from experiences as in the book \textbackslash textit\{A Course on Elementary Probability Theory\}, but from a pure mathematical view based on Measure Theory. Such an approach places Probability Theory in its natural frame of Functional Analysis and constitutes a firm preparation to the study of Random Analysis and Stochastic processes. At the same time, it offers a solid basis towards Mathematical Statistics Theory. The book will be continuously updated and improved on a yearly basis.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Mathematics - Probability},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/G6BHBWWK/Lo_2018_Mathematical Foundations of Probability Theory.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZA464KAQ/1808.html}
-}
-
-@article{Loets,
-  title = {Qua {{Objects}} and {{Their Limits}}},
-  author = {Loets, Annina J.},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzaa024},
-  abstract = {Abstract.  It is both a matter of everyday experience and a tenet of sociological theory that people often occupy a range of social roles and identities, some o},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DJ2PKMLZ/Loets - Qua Objects and Their Limits.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Loew2019,
-  title = {Causes {{As Difference-Makers For Processes}}},
-  author = {Loew, Christian},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {98},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {89--106},
-  issn = {00318205},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12424},
-  abstract = {It is natural to think of causes as difference-makers. What exact difference causes make, however, is an open question. In this paper, I argue that the right way of understanding difference-making is in terms of causal processes: causes make a difference to a causal process that leads to the effect. I will show that this way of understanding difference-making nicely captures the distinction between causing an outcome and helping determine how the outcome happens and, thus, explains why causation is not transitive. Moreover, the theory handles tricky cases that are problematic for competing accounts of difference-making.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/USDV3WRK/Loew - 2019 - Causes As Difference-Makers For Processes.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Loewer1996,
-  title = {Humean {{Supervenience}}},
-  author = {Loewer, Barry},
-  year = {1996},
-  journal = {Philosophical Topics},
-  volume = {24},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {101--127},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5VVL8AFK/philtopics_1996_0024_0001_0101_0128.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Loewer2004,
-  title = {David {{Lewis}}'s {{Humean Theory}} of {{Objective Chance}}},
-  author = {Loewer, Barry},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {71},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1115--1125},
-  issn = {0031-8248},
-  doi = {10.1086/428015},
-  abstract = {The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual ``interpretations of probability'' give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper ``A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance'' he described a framework for representing single case objective chances, showed how they are connected to subjective credences, and sketched a novel account what they are within his Humean account of scientific laws. Here I will describe these contributions and add a little to them.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/766EDPXW/428015.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7CH2K8RY/Loewer - 2004 - David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Loewer2007,
-  title = {Mental {{Causation}}, or {{Something Near Enough}}},
-  booktitle = {Contemporary {{Debates}} in {{Philosophy}} of {{Mind}}},
-  author = {Loewer, Barry M.},
-  editor = {McLaughlin, Brian P. and Cohen, Jonathan D.},
-  year = {2007},
-  pages = {243--64},
-  publisher = {{Blackwell}}
-}
-
-@book{Loux2003,
-  title = {The {{Oxford Handbook}} of {{Metaphysics}}},
-  editor = {Loux, Michael J. and Zimmerman, Dean W.},
-  year = {2003},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6WUVSPCV/2003 - The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics - Unknown.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Lovett2020,
-  title = {The Logic of Ground},
-  author = {Lovett, Adam},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {13--49},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-019-09511-1},
-  abstract = {I explore the logic of ground. I first develop a logic of weak ground. This logic strengthens the logic of weak ground presented by Fine in his `Guide to Ground.' This logic, I argue, generates many plausible principles which Fine's system leaves out. I then derive from this a logic of strict ground. I argue that there is a strong abductive case for adopting this logic. It's elegant, parsimonious and explanatorily powerful. Yet, so I suggest, adopting it has important consequences. First, it means we should think of ground as a type of identity. Second, it means we should reject much of Fine's logic of strict ground. I also show how the logic I develop connects to other systems in the literature. It is definitionally equivalent both to Angell's logic of analytic containment and to Correia's system G.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7D46R5Y2/Lovett - 2020 - The logic of ground.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Lowe2009,
-  title = {More {{Kinds}} of {{Being}}: {{A Further Study}} of {{Individuation}}, {{Identity}}, and the {{Logic}} of {{Sortal Terms}}},
-  shorttitle = {More {{Kinds}} of {{Being}}},
-  author = {Lowe, E. J.},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = nov,
-  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
-  abstract = {Taking into account significant developments in the metaphysical thinking of E. J. Lowe over the past 20 years, More Kinds of Being:A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms presents a thorough reworking and expansion of the 1989 edition of Kinds of Being. Brings many of the original ideas and arguments put forth in Kinds of Being thoroughly up to date in light of new developments Features a thorough reworking and expansion of the earlier work, rather than just a new edition Reflects the author's conversion to what he calls 'the four-category ontology,' a metaphysical system that takes its inspiration from Aristotle Provides a unified discussion of individuation and identity that should prove to be essential reading for philosophers working in metaphysics.},
-  isbn = {978-1-4443-1505-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / General,Philosophy / Metaphysics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XPXVV57V/[E._J._Lowe]_More_Kinds_of_Being_A_Further_Study_(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ludlow2001,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Austerity}} and the {{Problems}} of {{Temporal}} and {{Modal Anaphora}}},
-  author = {Ludlow, Peter},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {35},
-  pages = {211--227},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.11},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2001},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DTBA8G5B/Ludlow - 2001 - Metaphysical Austerity and the Problems of Tempora.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ludwig1998,
-  title = {Semantics for {{Opaque Contexts}}},
-  author = {Ludwig, Kirk and Ray, Greg},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {S12},
-  pages = {141--166},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.6},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1998},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SSLBU4ZZ/Ludwig and Ray - 1998 - Semantics for Opaque Contexts.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6BXZ4CA7/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@article{MacFarlane2003,
-  title = {Future {{Contingents}} and {{Relative Truth}}},
-  author = {MacFarlane, John},
-  year = {2003},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {53},
-  number = {212},
-  pages = {321--336},
-  issn = {1467-9213},
-  doi = {10.1111/1467-9213.00315},
-  abstract = {If it is not now determined whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, can an assertion that there will be one be true? The problem has persisted because there are compelling arguments on both sides. If there are objectively possible futures which would make the prediction true and others which would make it false, symmetry considerations seem to forbid counting it either true or false. Yet if we think about how we would assess the prediction tomorrow, when a sea battle is raging (or not), it seems we must assign the utterance a definite truth-value. I argue that both arguments must be given their due, and that this requires relativizing utterance-truth to a context of assessment. I show how this relativization can be handled in a rigorous formal semantics, and I argue that we can make coherent sense of assertion without assuming that utterances have their truth-values absolutely.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9213.00315},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/URH9RXQ4/MacFarlane - 2003 - Future Contingents and Relative Truth.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q6SFS2I9/1467-9213.html}
-}
-
-@book{MacFarlane2014,
-  title = {Assessment {{Sensitivity}}: {{Relative Truth}} and {{Its Applications}}},
-  shorttitle = {Assessment {{Sensitivity}}},
-  author = {MacFarlane, John},
-  year = {2014},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {John MacFarlane debates how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative, and how we might use this idea to give satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis. Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on relativism about truth, going back to Plato's Theaetetus, this literature (both pro and con) has tended to focus on refutations of the doctrine, or refutations of these refutations, at the expense of saying clearly what the doctrine is. In contrast, Assessment Sensitivity begins with a clear account of what it is to be a relativist about truth, and uses this view to give satisfying accounts of what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do. The book seeks to provide a richer framework for the description of linguistic practices than standard truth-conditional semantics affords: one that allows not just standard contextual sensitivity (sensitivity to features of the context in which an expression is used), but assessment sensitivity (sensitivity to features of the context from which a use of an expression is assessed). The Context and Content series is a forum for outstanding original research at the intersection of philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. The general editor is Francois Recanati (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris).},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-968275-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Ethics \& Moral Philosophy,Philosophy / Mind \& Body}
-}
-
-@article{Maclure2021,
-  title = {{{AI}}, {{Explainability}} and {{Public Reason}}: {{The Argument}} from the {{Limitations}} of the {{Human Mind}}},
-  shorttitle = {{{AI}}, {{Explainability}} and {{Public Reason}}},
-  author = {Maclure, Jocelyn},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Minds and Machines},
-  volume = {31},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {421--438},
-  issn = {1572-8641},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11023-021-09570-x},
-  abstract = {Machine learning-based AI algorithms lack transparency. In this article, I offer an interpretation of AI's explainability problem and highlight its ethical saliency. I try to make the case for the legal enforcement of a strong explainability requirement: human organizations which decide to automate decision-making should be legally obliged to demonstrate the capacity to explain and justify the algorithmic decisions that have an impact on the wellbeing, rights, and opportunities of those affected by the decisions. This legal duty can be derived from the demands of Rawlsian public reason. In the second part of the paper, I try to show that the argument from the limitations of human cognition fails to get AI off the hook of public reason. Against a growing trend in AI ethics, my main argument is that the analogy between human minds and artificial neural networks fails because it suffers from an atomistic bias which makes it blind to the social and institutional dimension of human reasoning processes. I suggest that developing interpretive AI algorithms is not the only possible answer to the explainability problem; social and institutional answers are also available and in many cases more trustworthy than techno-scientific ones.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FAFKWDBZ/Maclure - 2021 - AI, Explainability and Public Reason The Argument.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Magidor2015,
-  title = {Endurantism vs. {{Perdurantism}}?: {{A Debate Reconsidered}}},
-  shorttitle = {Endurantism vs. {{Perdurantism}}?},
-  author = {Magidor, Ofra},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  pages = {n/a-n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12100},
-  abstract = {One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most (if not all) of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists (/perdurantists) allegedly have some trouble addressing, and to which perdurantism (/endurantism) apparently has a straightforward response. I argue, however, that in each case, there are versions of endurantism (/perdurantism) that can offer precisely the same (or at least a highly analogous) response to the challenge, and thus the ability to provide this particular solution does not directly tell in favour of one the two views. In \textsection 1, I elaborate two views which will be particularly prominent in the discussion: liberal endurantism and restrictive perdurantism. In \textsection 2\textendash 6 I discuss in turn the central pro-perdurantism arguments: the argument from anthropocentricism, the argument from vagueness, the argument from recombination, the argument from temporary intrinsics, and the argument from coincidence. In \textsection 7\textendash 8, I discuss the main pro-endurantism arguments: the arguments from motion, and the argument from permanent coincidence. Finally, in \textsection 9, I discuss what conclusion can be drawn from this discussion.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IC35S5D3/Magidor - 2015 - Endurantism vs. Perdurantism A Debate Reconsider.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mahbooba2021,
-  title = {Explainable {{Artificial Intelligence}} ({{XAI}}) to {{Enhance Trust Management}} in {{Intrusion Detection Systems Using Decision Tree Model}}},
-  author = {Mahbooba, Basim and Timilsina, Mohan and Sahal, Radhya and Serrano, Martin},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Complexity},
-  volume = {2021},
-  pages = {e6634811},
-  publisher = {{Hindawi}},
-  issn = {1076-2787},
-  doi = {10.1155/2021/6634811},
-  abstract = {Despite the growing popularity of machine learning models in the cyber-security applications (e.g., an intrusion detection system (IDS)), most of these models are perceived as a black-box. The eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) has become increasingly important to interpret the machine learning models to enhance trust management by allowing human experts to understand the underlying data evidence and causal reasoning. According to IDS, the critical role of trust management is to understand the impact of the malicious data to detect any intrusion in the system. The previous studies focused more on the accuracy of the various classification algorithms for trust in IDS. They do not often provide insights into their behavior and reasoning provided by the sophisticated algorithm. Therefore, in this paper, we have addressed XAI concept to enhance trust management by exploring the decision tree model in the area of IDS. We use simple decision tree algorithms that can be easily read and even resemble a human approach to decision-making by splitting the choice into many small subchoices for IDS. We experimented with this approach by extracting rules in a widely used KDD benchmark dataset. We also compared the accuracy of the decision tree approach with the other state-of-the-art algorithms.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5496TRAV/Mahbooba et al. - 2021 - Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) to Enhan.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4ANCHHC3/6634811.html}
-}
-
-@misc{Mallah2017,
-  title = {The {{Landscape}} of {{AI Safety}} and {{Beneficence Research}}},
-  author = {Mallah, Richard},
-  year = {2017},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7ALMRNNK/ResearchLandscapeExtended.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Mallon2003,
-  title = {Social {{Construction}}, {{Social Roles}}, and {{Stability}}},
-  booktitle = {Socializing {{Metaphysics}} : {{The Nature}} of {{Social Reality}}},
-  author = {Mallon, Ron},
-  editor = {Schmitt, F.},
-  year = {2003},
-  pages = {327--54},
-  publisher = {{Rowman \& Littlefield, 65-91}}
-}
-
-@article{Mallon2004,
-  title = {Passing, {{Traveling}} and {{Reality}}: {{Social Constructionism}} and the {{Metaphysics}} of {{Race}}},
-  shorttitle = {Passing, {{Traveling}} and {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Mallon, Ron},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {38},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {644--673},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00487.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00487.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GQPAJIJW/Mallon - 2004 - Passing, Traveling and Reality Social Constructio.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mallon2007,
-  title = {Human {{Categories Beyond Non-essentialism}}},
-  author = {Mallon, Ron},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
-  volume = {15},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {146--168},
-  issn = {1467-9760},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00260.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00260.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ICGWW4EH/Mallon - 2007 - Human Categories Beyond Non-essentialism.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Mallon2016,
-  title = {The {{Construction}} of {{Human Kinds}}},
-  author = {Mallon, Ron},
-  year = {2016},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press UK}}
-}
-
-@article{Mallon2017,
-  title = {Social {{Construction}} and {{Achieving Reference1}}},
-  author = {Mallon, Ron},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {51},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {113--131},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12107},
-  abstract = {One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like ``race'' (and racial terms) and ``sex'' (and sexual terms) and ``homosexuality'' and ``perversion'' actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from clear that these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists' suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal-historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists' appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nous.12107},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8FLSLHP9/Mallon - 2017 - Social Construction and Achieving Reference1.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Mao2022,
-  title = {The {{Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner}}: {{Interpreting Scenes}}, {{Words}}, and {{Sentences From Natural Supervision}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner}}},
-  booktitle = {International {{Conference}} on {{Learning Representations}}},
-  author = {Mao, Jiayuan and Gan, Chuang and Kohli, Pushmeet and Tenenbaum, Joshua B. and Wu, Jiajun},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = feb,
-  abstract = {We propose the Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner (NS-CL), a model that learns visual concepts, words, and semantic parsing of sentences without explicit supervision on any of them.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3PZ35ISL/Mao et al. - 2022 - The Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner Interpreting S.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M5KGA5EF/forum.html}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1950,
-  title = {The {{Elimination}} of {{Contextually Defined Predicates}} in a {{Modal System}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1950},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {15},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {92},
-  issn = {0022-4812},
-  doi = {10.2307/2266968},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1950 Association for Symbolic Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BUSEWG8Q/Marcus - 1950 - The Elimination of Contextually Defined Predicates.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1960,
-  title = {Extensionality},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1960},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  series = {New {{Series}}},
-  volume = {69},
-  number = {273},
-  pages = {55--62},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1960 Oxford University Press},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PY9X74TF/Marcus - 1960 - Extensionality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1961,
-  title = {Modalities and Intensional Languages},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1961},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {303--322},
-  issn = {00397857},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00486629},
-  abstract = {The subject of this paper is the foundations of modal logic. By foundations, we generally mean the underlying assumptions, the underpinnings. There is a normative sense in which it has been claimed that modal logic is without foundation. Professor Quine, in Word and Object, suggests that it was conceived in sin: the sin of confusing use and mention. The original transgressors were Russell and Whitehead. Lewis followed suit and constructed a logic in which an operator corresponding to 'necessarily' operates on sentences whereas 'is necessary' ought to be viewed as a predicate of sentences. As Professor Quine reconstructs the history of the enterprise, I the operational use of modalities promised only one advantage: the possibility of quantifying into modal contexts. This several of us z were enticed into doing. But the evils of the sentential calculus were found out in the functional calculus, and with it - to quote again from Word and Object - 'the varied sorrows of modality transpose'. I do not intend to claim that modal logic is wholly without sorrows, but only that they are not those which Professor Quine describes. I do claim that modal logic is worthy of defense, for it is useful in connection with many interesting and important questions such as the analysis of causation, entailment, obligation and belief statements, to name only a few. If we insist on equating formal logic with strongly extensional functional calculi then Strawson a is correct in saying that 'the analytical equipment (of the formal logician) is inadequate for the dissection of most ordinary types of empirical statement.'},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B2AHTPKM/1961 - Modalities and intensional languages - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1962,
-  title = {Discussion on the Paper of {{Ruth B}}. {{Marcus}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1962},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {2-3},
-  pages = {132--143},
-  issn = {00397857},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00881990},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CUB798I6/1962 - Discussion on the paper of Ruth B. Marcus - Marcus.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GD69KAPN/1962 - Discussion on the paper of Ruth B. Marcus - Marcus.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1962a,
-  title = {Interpreting Quantification},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1962},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {1-4},
-  pages = {252--259},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/00201746208601353},
-  abstract = {Alternative readings of quantification are considered. The absence of an unequivocal translation into ordinary speech is noted. Some examples are cited which, in the opinion of the author, are a result of equivocal readings of quantification, or unnecessarily restrictive readings which obscure its primary function.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8Z2UI6MR/Marcus - 1962 - Interpreting quantification.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1967,
-  title = {Essentialism in {{Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1967},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {91--96},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2214714},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1967 Wiley},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SXMK7E3P/Marcus - 1967 - Essentialism in Modal Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1971,
-  title = {Essential {{Attribution}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1971},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {7},
-  pages = {187--202},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2024901},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1971 Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DTWG3VVB/Marcus - 1971 - Essential Attribution.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1972,
-  title = {Quantification and {{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1972},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {6},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {240--250},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2214772},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1972 Wiley},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q7CRG3XN/Marcus - 1972 - Quantification and Ontology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1975,
-  title = {Dispensing with {{Possibilia}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1975},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association},
-  volume = {49},
-  pages = {39--51},
-  issn = {0065-972X},
-  doi = {10.2307/3129990},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1975 American Philosophical Association},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KGLIZ3CM/Marcus - 1975 - Dispensing with Possibilia.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1978,
-  title = {Nominalism and the {{Substitutional Quantifier}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1978},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {The Monist},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {351--362},
-  issn = {0026-9662, 2153-3601},
-  doi = {10.5840/monist197861331},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 1978, THE MONIST, La Salle, Illinois 61301.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HAA4QKQV/Marcus - 1978 - Nominalism and the Substitutional Quantifier.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1985,
-  title = {Possibilia and {{Possible Worlds}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1985},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
-  volume = {25},
-  issn = {0165-9227},
-  abstract = {Four questions are raised about the semantics of Quantified Modal Logic (QML). Does QML admit possible objects, i.e. possibilia? Is it plausible to admit them? Can sense be made of such objects? Is QML committed to the existence of possibilia? The conclusions are that QML, generalized as in Kripke, would seem to accommodate possibilia, but they are rejected on philosophical and semantical grounds. Things must be encounterable, directly nameable and a part of the actual order before they may plausibly enter into the identity relation. QML is not committed to possibilia in that the range of variables may be restricted to actual objects. Support of the conclusions requires some discussion of substitution puzzles; also, the semantical distinction between proper names which are directly referring, and descriptions even where the latter are "rigid designators". Views of W.V. Quine, B. Russell, K. Donnellan, D. Kaplan as well as S. Kripke are invoked or evaluated in conjunction with these issues.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EN2LXKPJ/MARCUS - 1985 - Possibilia and Possible Worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marcus1990,
-  title = {Some {{Revisionary Proposals About Belief}} and {{Believing}}.},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1990},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  abstract = {A departure is proposed from those language oriented accounts of "x believes that P" where P is taken as a sentence (e.g., Davidson, J Fodor) or a quasi-linguistic proposition (e.g., Frege et al.). Believing is here viewed as relating an agent and an actual or non-actual state-of-affairs, P, where under local internal and external circumstances an agent is disposed to act as if P obtains. Although speech acts such as first person belief reports are often markers of believing, they are shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient conditions. The position therefore accommodates beliefs of non-language users. A further revisionary proposal recommends that belief avowals should be retroactively revised where P is impossible, analogous to retroactive revising of knowledge avowals where P does not obtain.},
-  keywords = {belief,epistemology,language}
-}
-
-@book{Marcus1993,
-  title = {Modalities: {{Philosophical Essays}}},
-  shorttitle = {Modalities},
-  author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan},
-  year = {1993},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press, USA}},
-  abstract = {Based on her earlier ground-breaking axiomatization of quantified modal logic, the papers collected here by the distinguished philosopher Ruth Barcan Marcus cover much ground in the development of her thought, spanning from 1961 to 1990. The first essay here introduces themes initially viewed as iconoclastic, such as the necessity of identity, the directly referential role of proper names as "tags", the Barcan Formula about the interplay of possibility and existence, and alternative interpretations of quantification. Marcus also addresses the putative puzzles about substitutivity and about essentialism. The collection also includes influential essays on moral conflict, on belief and rationality, and on some historical figures. Many of her views have been incorporated into current theories, while others remain part of a continuing debate.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-802396-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Mathematics / Logic,Philosophy / Language,Philosophy / Metaphysics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SHNHTH75/1993 - Modalities Philosophical Essays - Barcan.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Marcus2003,
-  title = {The {{Algebraic Mind}}: {{Integrating Connectionism}} and {{Cognitive Science}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Algebraic Mind}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Gary F.},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {1st Edition},
-  publisher = {{Bradford Books}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass London}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-63268-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RPVWSIAF/Marcus - 2003 - The Algebraic Mind Integrating Connectionism and .pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Marcus2018,
-  title = {Deep {{Learning}}: {{A Critical Appraisal}}},
-  shorttitle = {Deep {{Learning}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Gary},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jan,
-  number = {arXiv:1801.00631},
-  eprint = {1801.00631},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  abstract = {Although deep learning has historical roots going back decades, neither the term "deep learning" nor the approach was popular just over five years ago, when the field was reignited by papers such as Krizhevsky, Sutskever and Hinton's now classic (2012) deep network model of Imagenet. What has the field discovered in the five subsequent years? Against a background of considerable progress in areas such as speech recognition, image recognition, and game playing, and considerable enthusiasm in the popular press, I present ten concerns for deep learning, and suggest that deep learning must be supplemented by other techniques if we are to reach artificial general intelligence.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {97R40,Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning,I.2.0,I.2.6,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4S59T2J5/Marcus - 2018 - Deep Learning A Critical Appraisal.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HQISMZGH/1801.html}
-}
-
-@misc{Marcus2018a,
-  title = {Innateness, {{AlphaZero}}, and {{Artificial Intelligence}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Gary},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jan,
-  number = {arXiv:1801.05667},
-  eprint = {1801.05667},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  abstract = {The concept of innateness is rarely discussed in the context of artificial intelligence. When it is discussed, or hinted at, it is often the context of trying to reduce the amount of innate machinery in a given system. In this paper, I consider as a test case a recent series of papers by Silver et al (Silver et al., 2017a) on AlphaGo and its successors that have been presented as an argument that a "even in the most challenging of domains: it is possible to train to superhuman level, without human examples or guidance", "starting tabula rasa." I argue that these claims are overstated, for multiple reasons. I close by arguing that artificial intelligence needs greater attention to innateness, and I point to some proposals about what that innateness might look like.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {97R40,Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,I.2.0,I.2.6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/H2V5U88G/Marcus - 2018 - Innateness, AlphaZero, and Artificial Intelligence.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5QXYKV6E/1801.html}
-}
-
-@misc{Marcus2020,
-  title = {The {{Next Decade}} in {{AI}}: {{Four Steps Towards Robust Artificial Intelligence}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Next Decade}} in {{AI}}},
-  author = {Marcus, Gary},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = feb,
-  number = {arXiv:2002.06177},
-  eprint = {2002.06177},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2002.06177},
-  abstract = {Recent research in artificial intelligence and machine learning has largely emphasized general-purpose learning and ever-larger training sets and more and more compute. In contrast, I propose a hybrid, knowledge-driven, reasoning-based approach, centered around cognitive models, that could provide the substrate for a richer, more robust AI than is currently possible.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning,I.2,I.2.6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E98NHKDX/Marcus - 2020 - The Next Decade in AI Four Steps Towards Robust A.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZFHRL86P/2002.html}
-}
-
-@article{Mares1995,
-  title = {A Relevant Theory of Conditionals},
-  author = {Mares, Edwin D. and Fuhrmann, Andr{\'e}},
-  year = {1995},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {24},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {645--665},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF01306969},
-  abstract = {In this paper we set out a semantics for relevant (counterfactual) conditionals. We combine the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logic with a semantics for conditionals based on selection functions. The resulting models characterize a family of conditional logics free from fallacies of relevance, in particular counternecessities and conditionals with necessary consequents receive a non-trivial treatment.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AKB9Q7GQ/Mares and Fuhrmann - 1995 - A relevant theory of conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Mares2007,
-  title = {Relevant {{Logic}}: {{A Philosophical Interpretation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Relevant {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Mares, Edwin D.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {1st edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-03925-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Documents/Philosophy/Papers/ModalSemantics/Quotes/Mares2007 - Extracted Annotations (15012022, 085011).md;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VPBKHQDV/Mares - 2007 - Relevant Logic A Philosophical Interpretation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mares2009,
-  title = {General Information in Relevant Logic},
-  author = {Mares, Edwin D.},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {167},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {343--362},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-008-9412-9},
-  abstract = {This paper sets out a philosophical interpretation of the model theory of Mares and Goldblatt (The Journal of Symbolic Logic 71, 2006). This interpretation distinguishes between truth conditions and information conditions. Whereas the usual Tarskian truth condition holds for universally quantified statements, their information condition is quite different. The information condition utilizes general propositions. The present paper gives a philosophical explanation of general propositions and argues that these are needed to give an adequate theory of general information.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A5F8F9K4/Mares - 2009 - General information in relevant logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Margolis2007,
-  title = {The {{Ontology}} of {{Concepts}}\textemdash{{Abstract Objects}} or {{Mental Representations}}? 1},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Ontology}} of {{Concepts}}\textemdash{{Abstract Objects}} or {{Mental Representations}}?},
-  author = {Margolis, Eric and Laurence, Stephen},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {41},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {561--593},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00663.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VNV5S3CF/Margolis and Laurence - 2007 - The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Menta.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Markosian2004,
-  title = {A {{Defence}} of {{Presentism}}},
-  author = {Markosian, Ned},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {47--82},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CING7KED/Presentism.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Markosian2016,
-  title = {Time},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Markosian, Ned and Sullivan, Meghan and Emery, Nina},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2016},
-  edition = {Fall 2016},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {Discussions of the nature of time, and of various issues related to time, have always featured prominently in philosophy, but they have been especially important since the beginning of the 20th Century. This article contains a brief overview of some of the main topics in the philosophy of time \textemdash{} Fatalism; Reductionism and Platonism with respect to time; the topology of time; McTaggart's arguments; The A Theory and The B Theory; Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory; time travel; and the 3D/4D controversy \textemdash{} together with some suggestions for further reading on each topic, and a bibliography., Note: This entry does not discuss the consciousness, perception,experience, or phenomenology of time. An historical overview andgeneral presentation of the various views is available in the entryon temporal consciousness. Further coverage can be found in the SEP entry on the experience and perception of time. For those interested specifically in phenomenological views,see the entries on Husserl (Section 6), and Heidegger (Section 2: Being and Time).},
-  keywords = {Arthur,causation: backward,consciousness: temporal,Edmund,fatalism,future contingents: medieval theories of,Heidegger,Husserl,indexicals,logic: temporal,Martin,Prior,propositions: singular,space and time: being and becoming in modern physics,temporal parts,time travel,time travel: and modern physics,time: the experience and perception of,time: thermodynamic asymmetry in,Zeno of Elea: Zeno's paradoxes}
-}
-
-@article{Markowsky1976,
-  title = {Chain-Complete Posets and Directed Sets with Applications},
-  author = {Markowsky, George},
-  year = {1976},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Algebra Universalis},
-  volume = {6},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {53--68},
-  issn = {0002-5270, 1420-8911},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF02485815},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5XBPCZKN/Markowsky - 1976 - Chain-complete posets and directed sets with appli.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marletto,
-  title = {Beyond Initial Conditions and Laws of Motion: {{Constructor Theory}} of {{Information}} and {{Life}}},
-  shorttitle = {Beyond Initial Conditions and Laws of Motion},
-  author = {Marletto, Chiara},
-  year = {Draft},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MMIGP7UR/CUP-CTL.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Marletto2015,
-  title = {Constructor {{Theory}} of {{Probability}}},
-  author = {Marletto, Chiara},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {arXiv:1507.03287 [quant-ph]},
-  eprint = {1507.03287},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {quant-ph},
-  abstract = {Unitary quantum theory has no Born Rule nor any stochastic dynamics - hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and apparent stochastic behaviour of quantum measurements. In this paper I reformulate this problem in the constructor theory of information, where (unitary) quantum systems are special cases of superinformation media - certain physical systems whose laws obey deterministic constructor-theoretic principles. I explain how unpredictability necessarily arises under such laws and is compatible with determinism, thus distinguishing it from randomness. I also show when unpredictability can result in apparent stochastic behaviour. To this end, I model the unpredictable physical processes in superinformation media as games of pure chance, whose player obeys non-probabilistic axioms of rationality; I then prove sufficient conditions for a theory permitting superinformation to inform the player's decisions as if it were a stochastic theory. This generalises the decision-theoretic arguments of Deutsch (1999) and Wallace (2003, 2007, 2012) showing that unitary quantum theory (with no Born Rule) informs the player's decisions as if the Born Rule held. Constructor theory reveals how some assumptions, construed in those arguments as decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties of superinformation media.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Quantum Physics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XLC2E9RN/Marletto - 2015 - Constructor Theory of Probability.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Martin2016,
-  title = {The {{Invention}} of {{Relations}}: {{Early Twelfth-Century Discussions}} of {{Aristotle}}'s {{Account}} of {{Relatives}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Invention}} of {{Relations}}},
-  author = {Martin, Christopher J.},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {1--21},
-  issn = {0960-8788},
-  doi = {10.1080/09608788.2015.1116431},
-  abstract = {Aristotle's discussion of relatives in the Categories presented its eleventh- and twelfth-century readers with many puzzles. Their attempt to solve these puzzles and to develop a coherent account of the category led around the beginning of the twelfth century to the invention of relations as items which stand to relatives as qualities stand to qualified substances. In this paper, I first discuss the details of Aristotle's accounts of relatives and the related category of `situation' and Boethius' commentary on them. I then examine some of the earliest mediaeval commentaries on the Categories showing how the notion of relation, and in particular of individual relations, was developed. I conclude by showing how Peter Abaelard's treatment of relations in his Dialectica was part of an ongoing and sophisticated debate over the nature of relations.}
-}
-
-@incollection{Martinich2011,
-  title = {Empiricism, {{Semantics}}, and {{Ontology}}},
-  booktitle = {Analytic {{Philosophy}}: {{An Anthology}}},
-  author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
-  editor = {Martinich, A. P. and Sosa, David},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {2nd Edition},
-  pages = {425--435},
-  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
-  address = {{Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA}},
-  abstract = {Featuring updates and the inclusion of nine new chapters, Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology, 2nd Edition offers a comprehensive and authoritative collection of the most influential readings in analytic philosophy written over the past hundred years. Features broad coverage of analytic philosophy, including such topics as ethics, methodology, and freedom and personal identity Focuses on   classic or seminal articles that were especially influential or significant New articles in this edition include Proof of an External World by G. E. Moore, Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge by John McDowell, Sensations and Brain Processes by J. J. C. Smart, selections from Sense and Sensibilia by J. L. Austin, Other Bodies by Tyler Burge, Individualism and Supervenience by Jerry Fodor, Responsibility and Avoidability by Roderick Chisholm, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility by Harry Frankfurt, and Personal Identity by Derek Parfit Offers diverse approaches to analytic philosophy by including readings from Austin, Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson},
-  isbn = {978-1-4443-3570-5},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Matilal2017,
-  title = {Logic, {{Language}} and {{Reality}}: {{Indian Philosophy}} and {{Contemporary Issues}}},
-  shorttitle = {Logic, {{Language}} and {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Matilal, Bimal Krishna},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {3rd edition},
-  publisher = {{Motilal Banarsidass}},
-  address = {{Delhi}},
-  abstract = {The book is meant for philosophers along with those interested in Sanskrit, Indian Studies and what may be called a global approach to the study of philosophy. The author has begun with the logical theories of ancient and medieval India. Here 'Logic' is used to mean the study of inference-patterns, rubs of debate, points of controversy, sophistical arguments, etc. Problems of inference lead to the discussion of philosophical logic. Historically, the early Nyaya in India was succeeded by what we call Navya-nyaya in the 12th-13th century A.D. Philosophers of this period were involved in the discussion of such problems as empty terms, reference failure, double negation, con-comitance, definition, classification and essences. All these issues constitute the second chapter here. Logical theories of the above kind developed in the background of a theory of knowledge. Medieval philosophers of India (of such schools as Nyaya, Buddhist, Jaina and Mimamsaka) had made extensive study of it in the third chapter. The problem of knowledge leads to the question of what is known. Chapter four deals with ontological problems. In the last chapter, the author deals with the interrelation of grammar and philosophy in India. This is a significant character of classical Indian philosophy. He has tried to give some examples to show how the insights of the grammarians were combined with the problems of the philosophy of language. The word 'philosophy' as well as the conjuring expression 'Indian philosophy' has meant different things to different people-endeavours and activities, old and new, grave and frivolous, edifying and banal, esoteric and exoteric. In this book, the author has chosen deliberately a very dominant trend of the classical (Sanskrit) philosophical literature as his subject of study. The age of the material used here demands both philological scholarship and philosophical amplification. Classical pramanasastras usually deal with the theory of knowledge, the nature of inference and language, and the related questions of ontology and semantics. Several important concepts and theories have been singled out for critical analysis and clarification in modern terms so that the results may be intelligible to modern students of both Sanskrit and philosophy. It is hoped that such attempt will kindle the enthusiasm of young scholars in the field and inspire them to proceed in this comparatively new area of research and explore into further and more interesting possibilities.},
-  isbn = {978-81-208-0008-3},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Matthies2014,
-  title = {Common Ground in {{Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder}} ({{ADHD}}) and {{Borderline Personality Disorder}} ({{BPD}})\textendash Review of Recent Findings},
-  author = {Matthies, Swantje D. and Philipsen, Alexandra},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {3},
-  issn = {2051-6673},
-  doi = {10.1186/2051-6673-1-3},
-  abstract = {Considerable overlap in diagnostic criteria and shared psychopathologic symptoms in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD) have stimulated research activities in this field. Longitudinal studies have shown that BPD is frequently diagnosed in adult patients who had been diagnosed with ADHD in childhood. The question of whether ADHD and BPD randomly co-occur as comorbidities, have similar origins or share common pathological mechanisms remains unresolved. Some authors suggest that ADHD contributes to the development of BPD via various mechanisms, and therefore consider it a risk factor for later BPD development.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E85VQ2YK/Matthies and Philipsen - 2014 - Common ground in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity D.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Maurin2019,
-  title = {Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation: It's Complicated},
-  shorttitle = {Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation},
-  author = {Maurin, Anna-Sofia},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {176},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1573--1594},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-018-1080-0},
-  abstract = {Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding `inherits' its properties from (metaphysical) explanation (and that, therefore, contemplating the nature of explanation informs us about the nature of grounding) or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important\textemdash possibly an indispensable\textemdash role in metaphysical explanation (and that, therefore, that there are these explanations justifies positing grounding). Or both. I argue that saying that grounding `inherits' its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature (if so-called `unionism' is true), but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore to be `separatists' and view grounding and explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation (if any) does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NRICISF7/Maurin - 2019 - Grounding and metaphysical explanation it’s compl.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McDaniel2002,
-  title = {Phil {{Dowe}}, {{Physical Causation}}},
-  author = {McDaniel, Kris},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {56},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {258--263},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1023/A:1015668905028},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RI43FYT9/McDaniel - 2002 - Phil Dowe, Physical Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McDonnell2016,
-  title = {Events and Their Counterparts},
-  author = {McDonnell, Neil},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {173},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {1291--1308},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-015-0547-5},
-  abstract = {This paper argues that a counterpart-theoretic treatment of events, combined with a counterfactual theory of causation (call this combination CCT), can help resolve three puzzles from the causation literature. First, CCT traces the apparent contextual shifts in our causal attributions to shifts in the counterpart relation which obtains in those contexts. Second, being sensitive to shifts in the counterpart relation can help diagnose what goes wrong in certain prominent examples where the transitivity of causation appears to fail. Third, CCT can help us resurrect the much-maligned fragility response to the problems of late pre-emption by understanding fragility in counterpart-theoretic terms. Some reasons to prefer this CCT approach to rivals are discussed.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Contextualism,Counterparts,Events,Pre-emption,Transitivity},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JLQ869ID/McDonnell - 2016 - Events and their counterparts.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McDowell1979,
-  title = {Virtue and {{Reason}}},
-  author = {McDowell, John},
-  year = {1979},
-  journal = {The Monist},
-  volume = {62},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {331--350},
-  abstract = {Virtue, in contrast to 'art' (the greek conception), is defined by its end; it seeks good for its own sake. the good is any object of rational preference, containing within itself the reason for that same preference: a good theory, say, economical, well supported by observation; or some practical good, say, the relief of suffering. to the explaining of such preference rationality is essential, (though we need reflection and redescription as part of it). i do or believe some one thing because i believe another: the one must be a reason for the other or at least\textendash further to bee explained\textendash have seemed so to me.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DE49MF5F/1979 - Virtue and Reason - McDowell.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/REKGCYWM/1979 - Virtue and Reason - McDowell.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{McKeever2006,
-  title = {Principled {{Ethics}}: {{Generalism}} as a {{Regulative Ideal}}},
-  author = {McKeever, Sean and Ridge, Michael},
-  year = {2006},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VJVF2GRW/2006 - Principled Ethics Generalism as a Regulative Ideal - McKeever, Ridge.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X5NLTLIX/2006 - Principled Ethics Generalism as a Regulative Ideal - McKeever, Ridge.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McKinsey1934,
-  title = {A Reduction in Number of the Postulates for {{C}}. {{I}}. {{Lewis}}' System of Strict Implication},
-  author = {McKinsey, J. C. C.},
-  year = {1934},
-  journal = {Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {425--428},
-  issn = {0002-9904},
-  doi = {10.1090/S0002-9904-1934-05881-6}
-}
-
-@article{McKinsey1940,
-  title = {Review: {{Frederic B}}. {{Fitch}}, {{Note}} on {{Modal Functions}}},
-  author = {McKinsey, J. C. C.},
-  year = {1940},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {31},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AWVAWXRA/1940 - Review Frederic B. Fitch, Note on Modal Functions - McKinsey.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z825EIGA/1940 - Review Frederic B. Fitch, Note on Modal Functions - McKinsey.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McKinsey1945,
-  title = {On the Syntactical Construction of Systems of Modal Logic},
-  author = {McKinsey, J. C. C.},
-  year = {1945},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {103},
-  pages = {83--94},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EEW3SKC9/1945 - On the syntactical construction of systems of modal logic - McKinsey.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RG8AFJXD/1945 - On the syntactical construction of systems of modal logic - McKinsey.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McLoone2021,
-  title = {Calculus and Counterpossibles in Science},
-  author = {McLoone, Brian},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {12},
-  pages = {12153--12174},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02855-1},
-  abstract = {A mathematical model in science can be formulated as a counterfactual conditional, with the model's assumptions in the antecedent and its predictions in the consequent. Interestingly, some of these models appear to have assumptions that are metaphysically impossible. Consider models in ecology that use differential equations to track the dynamics of some population of organisms. For the math to work, the model must assume that population size is a continuous quantity, despite that many organisms (e.g., rabbits) are necessarily discrete. This means our counterfactual representation of the model can have an impossible antecedent, giving us a counterpossible. Analogous counterpossibles arise in other sciences, as we'll see. According to a prominent view in counterfactual semantics, the vacuity thesis, all counterpossibles are vacuously true, that is, true merely because their antecedents are necessarily false. But some counterpossible formulations of differential equation models in science are not all vacuously true\textemdash some are non-vacuously true, and some are false. I go on to show how an alternative semantics, one that employs impossible worlds, can deliver this judgment.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UNUGV6DZ/McLoone - 2021 - Calculus and counterpossibles in science.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{McMichael1983,
-  title = {A {{Problem For Actualism About Possible Worlds}}},
-  author = {McMichael, Alan},
-  year = {1983},
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {92},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {49--66},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5JU95IEE/1983 - A Problem For Actualism About Possible Worlds - McMichael.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6ACHQ83M/1983 - A Problem For Actualism About Possible Worlds - McMichael.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mctaggart1908,
-  title = {The {{Unreality}} of {{Time}}},
-  author = {Mctaggart, J. Ellis},
-  year = {1908},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {XVII},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {457--474},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/XVII.4.457},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HU9HJING/Mind-1908-MCTAGGART-457-74.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Melchior2021,
-  title = {Sensitivity, Safety, and Impossible Worlds},
-  author = {Melchior, Guido},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {178},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {713--729},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-020-01453-8},
-  abstract = {Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:535\textendash 572, 1997), on which we also consider impossible worlds. Nolan's account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S's belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MGSGINMB/Melchior - 2021 - Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Melia1992,
-  title = {Against {{Modalism}}},
-  author = {Melia, Joseph},
-  year = {1992},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {35--56},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00354468},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Philosophy,Philosophy of Mind,Philosophy of Religion},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3DSG623F/Melia - 1992 - Against Modalism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Melia2000a,
-  title = {Weaseling {{Away}} the {{Indispensability Argument}}},
-  author = {Melia, Joseph},
-  year = {2000},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {109},
-  number = {435},
-  pages = {455--479},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.2307/2659925},
-  abstract = {According to the indispensability argument, the fact that we quantify over numbers, sets and functions in our best scientific theories gives us reason for believing that such objects exist. I examine a strategy to dispense with such quantification by simply replacing any given platonistic theory by the set of sentences in the nominalist vocabulary it logically entails. I argue that, as a strategy, this response fails: for there is no guarantee that the nominalist content of the platonistic theory is exhausted by this set of sentences. Indeed, there are platonistic theories that have consequences for the nominalist world that go beyond the set of sentences in the nominalist language such theories entail. However, I argue that what such theories show is that mathematics can enable us to express possibilities about the concrete world that may not be expressible in nominalistically acceptable language. While I grant that this may make quantification over abstracta indispensable, I deny that such indispensability is a reason for accepting them into our ontology. I urge that the nominalist should be allowed to quantify over abstracta whilst denying their existence and I explain how this apparently contradictory practice (a practice I call "weaseling") is in fact coherent, unproblematic and rational. Finally, I examine the view that platonistic theories are simpler or more attractive than their nominalistic reformulations, and thus that abstracta ought to be accepted into our ontology for the-same sorts of reasons as other theoretical objects. I argue that, at least in the case of numbers, functions and sets, such arguments misunderstand the kind of simplicity and attractiveness we seek.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HSJSXB93/Melia - 2000 - Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Mendelson2012,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Topology}}: {{Third Edition}}},
-  shorttitle = {Introduction to {{Topology}}},
-  author = {Mendelson, Bert},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = apr,
-  edition = {Third edition},
-  publisher = {{Dover Publications}},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Mendelson2015,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Mathematical Logic}}},
-  author = {Mendelson, Elliott},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jul,
-  edition = {Sixth Edition},
-  publisher = {{Chapman and Hall/CRC}},
-  address = {{Boca Raton}},
-  abstract = {The new edition of this classic textbook, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Sixth Edition explores the principal topics of mathematical logic. It covers propositional logic, first-order logic, first-order number theory, axiomatic set theory, and the theory of computability. The text also discusses the major results of G\"odel, Church, Kleene, Rosser, and Turing. The sixth edition incorporates recent work on G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem as well as restoring an appendix on consistency proofs for first-order arithmetic. This appendix last appeared in the first edition. It is offered in the new edition for historical considerations. The text also offers historical perspectives and many new exercises of varying difficulty, which motivate and lead students to an in-depth, practical understanding of the material.},
-  isbn = {978-1-4822-3772-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/H49PMLGS/Mendelson - 2015 - Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Sixth Edition.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PU29LQIP/[Mendelson,_Elliott]_Introduction_to_Mathematical_(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Menon2008,
-  title = {Continuity in {{Partially Ordered Sets}}},
-  author = {Menon, Venu G.},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences},
-  volume = {2008},
-  pages = {e321761},
-  publisher = {{Hindawi}},
-  issn = {0161-1712},
-  doi = {10.1155/2008/321761},
-  abstract = {The notion of a continuous domain is generalized to include posets which are not dcpos and in which the set of elements way below an element is not necessarily directed. We show that several of the pleasing algebraic and topological properties of domains carry over to this setting.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/93REC7MX/Menon_2008_Continuity in Partially Ordered Sets.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SF76SNWP/321761.html}
-}
-
-@article{Menzel2014,
-  title = {{Wide Sets, ZFCU, and the Iterative Conception:}},
-  shorttitle = {{Wide Sets, ZFCU, and the Iterative Conception}},
-  author = {Menzel, Christopher},
-  editor = {Smylie, John},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {111},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {57--83},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil201411124},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U6CE8RTD/jphil_2014_0111_0002_0057_0083.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Menzies2006,
-  title = {Review of {{Making Things Happen}}: {{A Theory}} of {{Causal Explanation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Review of {{Making Things Happen}}},
-  author = {Menzies, Peter},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {115},
-  number = {459},
-  pages = {821--826},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, Mind Association]}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  collaborator = {Woodward, James},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CJYUIZEZ/MenziesMTH.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Merlo2020,
-  title = {Disjunction and the {{Logic}} of {{Grounding}}},
-  author = {Merlo, Giovanni},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-019-00208-0},
-  abstract = {Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it's not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JLGA8WLS/Merlo - 2020 - Disjunction and the Logic of Grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Meyer1978,
-  title = {Why {{I Am Not}} a {{Relevantist}}},
-  author = {Meyer, Robert K.},
-  year = {1978},
-  publisher = {{Australian National University}},
-  googlebooks = {\_obwtgAACAAJ},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Millar2002,
-  title = {Reason and {{Nature}}: {{Essays}} in the {{Theory}} of {{Rationality}}},
-  shorttitle = {Reason and {{Nature}}},
-  author = {Millar, Professor of Philosophy Alan},
-  year = {2002},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  abstract = {The essays in this volume investigate the norms of reason--the standards which contribute to determining whether beliefs, inferences, and actions are rational. Nine philosophers and two psychologists discuss what kinds of things these norms are, how they can be situated within the naturalworld, and what role they play in the psychological explanation of belief and action. Current work in the theory of rationality is subject to very diverse influences ranging from experimental and theoretical psychology, through philosophy of logic and language, to metaethics and the theory ofpractical reasoning; this range is well represented here.},
-  googlebooks = {gnZAcpdvSL0C},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-925683-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Epistemology,Philosophy / Movements / Humanism},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4JNEKZ9Y/Millar - 2002 - Reason and Nature Essays in the Theory of Rationa.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Miller2019,
-  title = {Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: {{Insights}} from the Social Sciences},
-  shorttitle = {Explanation in Artificial Intelligence},
-  author = {Miller, Tim},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
-  volume = {267},
-  pages = {1--38},
-  issn = {0004-3702},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.007},
-  abstract = {There has been a recent resurgence in the area of explainable artificial intelligence as researchers and practitioners seek to provide more transparency to their algorithms. Much of this research is focused on explicitly explaining decisions or actions to a human observer, and it should not be controversial to say that looking at how humans explain to each other can serve as a useful starting point for explanation in artificial intelligence. However, it is fair to say that most work in explainable artificial intelligence uses only the researchers' intuition of what constitutes a `good' explanation. There exist vast and valuable bodies of research in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science of how people define, generate, select, evaluate, and present explanations, which argues that people employ certain cognitive biases and social expectations to the explanation process. This paper argues that the field of explainable artificial intelligence can build on this existing research, and reviews relevant papers from philosophy, cognitive psychology/science, and social psychology, which study these topics. It draws out some important findings, and discusses ways that these can be infused with work on explainable artificial intelligence.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Explainability,Explainable AI,Explanation,Interpretability,Transparency},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FZRX5EJB/Miller - 2019 - Explanation in artificial intelligence Insights f.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mirimanoff1917,
-  title = {Les {{Antinomies}} de {{Russell}} et de {{Burali-Forti}} et Le {{Probl\`eme Fondamental}} de Lat {{Th\'eorie}} Des {{Ensembles}}},
-  author = {Mirimanoff, D.},
-  year = {1917},
-  journal = {L'Enseignement Math\'ematique},
-  volume = {19},
-  number = {fr},
-  issn = {0013-8584},
-  doi = {10.5169/seals-17315},
-  keywords = {Mathematics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IJ6JR76M/ens-001_1917_19_1_a_003_d.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mobasher2000,
-  title = {A Duality Theory for Bilattices},
-  author = {Mobasher, B. and Pigozzi, D. and Slutzki, G. and Voutsadakis, G.},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {algebra universalis},
-  volume = {43},
-  number = {2-3},
-  pages = {109--125},
-  issn = {0002-5240, 1420-8911},
-  doi = {10.1007/s000120050149},
-  abstract = {. Recent studies of the algebraic properties of bilattices have provided insight into their internal strucutres, and have led to practical results, especially in reducing the computational complexity of bilattice-based multi-valued logic programs. In this paper the representation theorem for interlaced bilattices without negation found in [19] and extended to arbitrary interlaced bilattices without negation in [2] is presented. A natural equivalence is then established between the category of interlaced bilattices and the cartesian square of the category of bounded lattices. As a consequence a dual natural equivalence is obtained between the category of distributive bilattices and the coproduct of the category of bounded Priestley spaces with itself. Some applications of these equivalences are given. The subdirectly irreducible interlaced bilattices are characterized in terms of subdirectly irreducible lattices. A known characterization of the join-irreducible elements of the "knowledge" lattice of an interlaced bilattice is used to establish a natural equivalence between the category of finite, distributive bilattices and the category of posets of the form P{$\oplus\perp$}QP{$\oplus\perp$}Q \{\textbackslash bf P\} \textbackslash oplus\_\textbackslash perp \{\textbackslash bf Q\} .},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZP963CR5/Mobasher et al. - 2000 - A duality theory for bilattices.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Moravcik2017,
-  title = {{{DeepStack}}: {{Expert-level}} Artificial Intelligence in Heads-up No-Limit Poker},
-  shorttitle = {{{DeepStack}}},
-  author = {Morav{\v c}{\'i}k, Matej and Schmid, Martin and Burch, Neil and Lis{\'y}, Viliam and Morrill, Dustin and Bard, Nolan and Davis, Trevor and Waugh, Kevin and Johanson, Michael and Bowling, Michael},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Science},
-  volume = {356},
-  number = {6337},
-  pages = {508--513},
-  publisher = {{American Association for the Advancement of Science}},
-  doi = {10.1126/science.aam6960},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KBEX68H3/Moravčík et al. - 2017 - DeepStack Expert-level artificial intelligence in.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mosquera2014,
-  title = {Early Experience, Structural Dissociation, and Emotional Dysregulation in Borderline Personality Disorder: {{The}} Role of Insecure and Disorganized Attachment},
-  shorttitle = {Early Experience, Structural Dissociation, and Emotional Dysregulation in Borderline Personality Disorder},
-  author = {Mosquera, Dolores and Gonzalez, Anabel and Leeds, Andrew M.},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {15},
-  issn = {2051-6673},
-  doi = {10.1186/2051-6673-1-15},
-  abstract = {Persistent problems in emotional regulation and interpersonal relationships in borderline patients can be understood as developing from difficulties in early dyadic regulation with primary caregivers. Early attachment patterns are a relevant causal factor in the development of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD).},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CBI8H3TP/Mosquera et al. - 2014 - Early experience, structural dissociation, and emo.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Moss2015,
-  title = {On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary},
-  author = {Moss, Sarah},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Semantics and Pragmatics},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {5-1-81},
-  issn = {1937-8912},
-  doi = {10.3765/sp.8.5},
-  abstract = {This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility and necessity modals and indicative conditionals. The semantics I defend constitutes an alternative to standard truth conditional theories, as it assigns sets of probability measures rather than sets of worlds as sentential semantic values. I argue that what my theory lacks in conservatism, it makes up for in strength \textemdash{} namely, the theory accounts for a host of distinctive and suggestive linguistic data collected and explored in this paper. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.8.5 BibTeX info},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2015 Sarah Moss},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {assertion,constructive dilemma,context sensitivity,dynamic semantics,epistemic modals,indicative conditionals,logical constants,modus ponens},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UHCFJVLG/Moss - 2015 - On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocab.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Mulligan1984,
-  title = {Truth-{{Makers}}},
-  author = {Mulligan, Kevin and Simons, Peter and Smith, Barry},
-  year = {1984},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {44},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {287--321},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VR49PDI5/2107686.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Muskens2007,
-  title = {Higher {{Order Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Muskens, Reinhard},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Handbook of Modal Logic},
-  pages = {621--653},
-  abstract = {A logic is called higher order if it allows for quantification (and possibly abstraction) over higher order objects, such as functions of individuals, relations between individuals, functions of functions, relations between functions, etc. Higher order logic (often also called type theory or the Theory of Types) began with Frege, was formalized in Russell [46] and Whitehead and Russell [52] early in the previous century, and received its canonical formulation in Church [14]. While classical type theory has since long been overshadowed by set theory as a foundation of mathematics, recent decades have shown remarkable comebacks in the fields of mechanized reasoning (see, e.g., Benzm\"uller et al. [9] and references therein) and linguistics. Since the late 1960's philosophers and logicians, for various reasons which we will dwell upon, have started to combine higher order logic with modal operators (Montague [35, 37, 38], Bressan [11], Gallin [22], Fitting [19]). This combination results in higher order modal logic, the subject of this chapter. The chapter will be set up as follows. In the next section we will look at possible motivations behind the idea of combining modality and higher order logic. Then, in section 3, Richard Montague's system of `Intensional Logic', by far the most influential of higher order modal logics to date, will be discussed. This logic will be shown to have some limitations. One of these is that, despite its name, the logic is not fully intensional, as it validates the axiom of Extensionality. This leads to a series of well-known problems centering around `logical omniscience'. Another limitation is that the logic is not Church-Rosser (it matters in which order {$\lambda$}-conversions are carried out). These limitations can be overcome and the remaining sections of the chapter will contain an exposition of a modal type theory that is intensional in two ways: in the sense of being a modal logic and in the sense that Extensionality does not hold. The logic in itself is not strong enough to make the usual rules of {$\lambda$}-conversion derivable, but these rules can consistently be added as an axiomatic extension and in that case the Church-Rosser property will hold (as an alternative, the rules can be hard-wired into the theory, in which case the theory is also Church-Rosser). Section 4 will introduce the basic syntax and semantics of this logic, section 5 will give a tableau calculus, and section 6 provides some elementary model theory in the form of a model existence theorem and its usual corollaries, such as generalized completeness. We conclude with a conclusion.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K23DCEUQ/2007 - Higher Order Modal Logic - Muskens.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RATCN29M/2007 - Higher Order Modal Logic - Muskens.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Myers1971,
-  title = {Moore's {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Myers, C. Mason},
-  year = {1971},
-  journal = {Metaphilosophy},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {295--308},
-  issn = {1467-9973},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9973.1971.tb00330.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1971.tb00330.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ST7NCUTQ/Myers - 1971 - Moore's Paradox of Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Nebel2019,
-  title = {Normative {{Reasons}} as {{Reasons Why We Ought}}},
-  author = {Nebel, Jacob M},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {128},
-  number = {510},
-  pages = {459--484},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzy013},
-  abstract = {I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some ways of understanding ought so that the principle is compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why the principle should be expected to fail.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PHYWJMAY/Nebel - 2019 - Normative Reasons as Reasons Why We Ought.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Nelson2008,
-  title = {Frege and the {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Nelson, Michael},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {137},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {159--181},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-005-4540-2},
-  abstract = {In an unpublished manuscript of 1914 titled `Logic in mathematics', Gottlob Frege offered a rich account of the paradox of analysis. I argue that Frege there claims that the explicandum and explicans of a successful analysis express the same sense and that he furthermore appreciated that this requires that one cannot conclude that two sentences differ in sense simply because it is possible for a (minimally) competent speaker to accept one without accepting the other. I claim that this is shown by Frege's suggestive remarks about a cloudy grasp of a sense. I then argue that this fact calls into question a key assumption behind Frege's master argument for the sense/reference distinction.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M47C3L5C/Nelson - 2008 - Frege and the Paradox of Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Noe2005,
-  title = {Against Intellectualism},
-  author = {No{\"e}, Alva},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {65},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {278--290},
-  issn = {0003-2638, 1467-8284},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/65.4.278},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Nolan1997,
-  title = {Impossible {{Worlds}}: {{A Modest Approach}}},
-  shorttitle = {Impossible {{Worlds}}},
-  author = {Nolan, Daniel},
-  year = {1997},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {38},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {535--572},
-  publisher = {{University of Notre Dame}},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1039540769},
-  abstract = {Reasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an account of reasoning with impossible worlds, by treating such reasoning as reasoning employing counterpossible conditionals, and provides a semantics for the proposed treatment.},
-  langid = {english},
-  mrnumber = {MR1648852},
-  zmnumber = {0916.03013},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ECJNBEPX/Nolan - 1997 - Impossible Worlds A Modest Approach.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Nolan2009,
-  title = {Platitudes and {{Metaphysics}}},
-  booktitle = {Conceptual {{Analysis}} and {{Philosophical Naturalism}}},
-  author = {Nolan, Daniel},
-  editor = {{Braddon-Mitchell}, David and Nola, Robert},
-  year = {2009},
-  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WDY2YESR/Nolan - 2009 - Platitudes and Metaphysics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Nolan2011,
-  title = {{Categories and Ontological Dependence:}},
-  shorttitle = {{Categories and Ontological Dependence}},
-  author = {Nolan, Daniel},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {Monist},
-  volume = {94},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {277--301},
-  issn = {0026-9662},
-  doi = {10.5840/monist201194214},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q8AN2Y4E/277.full.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Noordhof1999,
-  title = {Probabilistic {{Causation}}, {{Preemption}} and {{Counterfactuals}}},
-  author = {Noordhof, Paul},
-  year = {1999},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {108},
-  number = {429},
-  pages = {95--125},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, Mind Association]}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  abstract = {Counterfactual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts and anti-catalysts, and show how my account needs to be adjusted to deliver the right verdicts in these cases. The net result is a particular conception of a cause that I try to spell out in the closing section of the paper. In that section, I also briefly discuss causal asymmetry and the purpose behind providing a counterfactual theory of causation.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EJ375YN6/Noordhof - 1999 - Probabilistic Causation, Preemption and Counterfac.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Norman1989,
-  title = {Directions in {{Relevant Logic}}},
-  editor = {Norman, J. and Sylvan, R.},
-  year = {1989},
-  series = {Reason and {{Argument}}},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-1005-8},
-  abstract = {Relevance logics came of age with the one and only International Conference on relevant logics in 1974. They did not however become accepted, or easy to promulgate. In March 1981 we received most of the typescript of IN MEMORIAM: ALAN ROSS ANDERSON Proceedings of the International Conference of Relevant Logic from the original editors, Kenneth W. Collier, Ann Gasper and Robert G. Wolf of Southern Illinois University. 1 They had, most unfortunately, failed to find a publisher - not, it appears, because of overall lack of merit of the essays, but because of the expense of producing the collection, lack of institutional subsidization, and doubts of publishers as to whether an expensive collection of essays on such an esoteric, not to say deviant, subject would sell. We thought that the collection of essays was still (even after more than six years in the publishing trade limbo) well worth publishing, that the subject would remain undeservedly esoteric in North America while work on it could not find publishers (it is not so esoteric in academic circles in Continental Europe, Latin America and the Antipodes) and, quite important, that we could get the collection published, and furthermore, by resorting to local means, published comparatively cheaply. It is indeed no ordinary collection. It contains work by pioneers of the main types of broadly relevant systems, and by several of the most innovative non-classical logicians of the present flourishing logical period. We have slowly re-edited and reorganised the collection and made it camera-ready.},
-  isbn = {978-0-7923-0386-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QCMTU4GS/Norman and Sylvan - 1989 - Directions in Relevant Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{North2009,
-  title = {{The ``Structure'' of Physics: A Case Study}},
-  shorttitle = {{The ``Structure'' of Physics}},
-  author = {North, Jill},
-  editor = {Smylie, John},
-  year = {2009},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {106},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {57--88},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil2009106213},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5ESTJYAY/jphil_2009_0106_0002_0057_0088.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{North2012,
-  type = {Preprint},
-  title = {The {{Structure}} of a {{Quantum World}}},
-  author = {North, Jill},
-  year = {2012},
-  abstract = {I argue that the fundamental space of a quantum mechanical world is the wavefunction's space. I argue for this using some very general principles that guide our inferences to the fundamental nature of a world, for any fundamental physical theory. I suggest that ordinary three-dimensional space exists in such a world, but is non-fundamental; it emerges from the fundamental space of the wavefunction.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XUC7X5C9/North - 2012 - The Structure of a Quantum World.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Northcott2021,
-  title = {Pre-Emption Cases May Support, Not Undermine, the Counterfactual Theory of Causation},
-  author = {Northcott, Robert},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {537--555},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02038-z},
-  abstract = {Pre-emption cases have been taken by almost everyone to imply the unviability of the simple counterfactual theory of causation. Yet there is ample motivation from scientific practice to endorse a simple version of the theory if we can. There is a way in which a simple counterfactual theory, at least if understood contrastively, can be supported even while acknowledging that intuition goes firmly against it in pre-emption cases\textemdash or rather, only in some of those cases. For I present several new pre-emption cases in which causal intuition does not go against the counterfactual theory, a fact that has been verified experimentally. I suggest an account of framing effects that can square the circle. Crucially, this account offers hope of theoretical salvation\textemdash but only to the counterfactual theory of causation, not to others. Again, there is (admittedly only preliminary) experimental support for this account.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causation,Counterfactuals,Error theory,Experiments,Pre-emption,Psychology},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IG5DTJ2N/Northcott - 2021 - Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Norton2019,
-  title = {A Psychologistic Theory of Metaphysical Explanation},
-  author = {Norton, James and Miller, Kristie},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {196},
-  number = {7},
-  pages = {2777--2802},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-017-1566-x},
-  abstract = {Many think that sentences about what metaphysically explains what are true iff there exist grounding relations. This suggests that sceptics about grounding should be error theorists about metaphysical explanation. We think there is a better option: a theory of metaphysical explanation which offers truth conditions for claims about what metaphysically explains what that are not couched in terms of grounding relations, but are instead couched in terms of, inter alia, psychological facts. We do not argue that our account is superior to grounding-based accounts. Rather, we offer it to those already ill-disposed towards grounding.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XSEMTZWG/Norton and Miller - 2019 - A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanatio.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Nozick1969,
-  title = {Newcomb's {{Problem}} and {{Two Principles}} of {{Choice}}},
-  booktitle = {Essays in {{Honor}} of {{Carl G}}. {{Hempel}}: {{A Tribute}} on the {{Occasion}} of His {{Sixty-Fifth Birthday}}},
-  author = {Nozick, Robert},
-  editor = {Rescher, Nicholas},
-  year = {1969},
-  series = {Synthese {{Library}}},
-  pages = {114--146},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-1466-2_7},
-  abstract = {Suppose a being in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence. (One might tell a science-fiction story about a being from another planet, with an advanced technology and science, who you know to be friendly, etc.) You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction about your choices), and furthermore you know that this being has often correctly predicted the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the particular situation to be described below. One might tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being's prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct.},
-  isbn = {978-94-017-1466-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Academic Life,Conditional Probability,Expected Utility,None None,Professional Athlete},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7FUZ7STU/Nozick - 1969 - Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Nussbaum2000,
-  title = {Why {{Practice}} Needs {{Ethical Theory}}: {{Particularism}}, {{Principle}}, and {{Bad Behaviour}}},
-  booktitle = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  author = {Nussbaum, Martha},
-  editor = {Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2000},
-  pages = {227---55},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DYKGLJN6/2000 - Why Practice needs Ethical Theory Particularism, Principle, and Bad Behaviour - Nussbaum.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZN4Z4NZ4/2000 - Why Practice needs Ethical Theory Particularism, Principle, and Bad Behaviour - Nussbaum.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Nutting2018,
-  title = {Constitutive Essence and Partial Grounding},
-  author = {Nutting, Eileen S. and Caplan, Ben and Tillman, Chris},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {137--161},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392895},
-  abstract = {Kit Fine and Gideon Rosen propose to define constitutive essence in terms of ground-theoretic notions and some form of consequential essence. But we think that the Fine\textendash Rosen proposal is a mistake. On the Fine\textendash Rosen proposal, constitutive essence ends up including properties that, on the central notion of essence (what Fine calls `the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity'), are necessary but not essential. This is because consequential essence is (roughly) closed under logical consequence, and the ability of logical consequence to add properties to an object's consequential essence outstrips the ability of ground-theoretic notions, as used in the Fine\textendash Rosen proposal, to take those properties out. The necessary-but-not-essential properties that, on the Fine\textendash Rosen proposal, end up in constitutive essence include the sorts of necessary-but-not-essential properties that, others have noted, end up in consequential essence.},
-  keywords = {essence,Fine,grounding,Rosen},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392895},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AGAWZQ48/Nutting et al. - 2018 - Constitutive essence and partial grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ockham,
-  title = {Commentary on the {{Sentences}}},
-  author = {Ockham, William},
-  translator = {Adams, Marilyn McCord},
-  year = {Draft},
-  journal = {Trans. by Adams, Marilyn McCord from the Lyon edition},
-  pages = {(unpublished)}
-}
-
-@article{OConaill2021,
-  title = {New Frontiers in Ground, Essence, and Modality: Introduction},
-  shorttitle = {New Frontiers in Ground, Essence, and Modality},
-  author = {{\'O} Conaill, Donnchadh and Tahko, Tuomas},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1219--1230},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02067-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3VWGACSM/Ó Conaill and Tahko - 2021 - New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality in.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ogaard2016,
-  title = {Paths to {{Triviality}}},
-  author = {{\O}gaard, Tore Fjetland},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {237--276},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-015-9374-6},
-  abstract = {This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to na\"ive truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A \textrightarrow{} (B \textrightarrow{} C){$\Vdash$}B \textrightarrow{} (A \textrightarrow{} C) trivialize na\"ive truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A \textrightarrow{} B){$\wedge$}(B \textrightarrow{} C)) \textrightarrow{} (A \textrightarrow{} C) and (A \textrightarrow{} {$\lnot$}A) \textrightarrow{} {$\lnot$}A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An overview over various ways to formulate Leibniz's law in non-classical logics and two new triviality proofs for na\"ive set theory are also provided.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5T4B4SFJ/Øgaard_2016_Paths to Triviality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ogaard2017,
-  title = {Skolem {{Functions}} in {{Non-Classical Logics}}},
-  author = {{\O}gaard, Tore Fjetland},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Australasian Journal of Logic},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {1},
-  issn = {1448-5052},
-  doi = {10.26686/ajl.v14i1.4031},
-  abstract = {This paper shows how to conservatively extend theories formulated in non-classical logics such as the Logic of Paradox, the Strong Kleene Logic and relevant logics with Skolem functions. Translations to and from the language extended by Skolem functions into the original one are presented and shown to preserve derivability. It is also shown that one may not always substitute s=f(t) and A(t, s) even though A(x,y) determines the extension of a function and f is a Skolem function for A.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2017 The Australasian Journal of Logic},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D6PT6F3I/Øgaard_2017_Skolem Functions in Non-Classical Logics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ogaard2020,
-  title = {Substitution in {{Relevance Logics}}},
-  author = {{\O}gaard, Tore Fjetland},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {655--680},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020319000467},
-  abstract = {This essay discusses rules and semantic clauses relating to Substitution\textemdash Leibniz's law in the conjunctive-implicational form                                                 s=\textperiodcentered t{$\wedge$}A(s)\textrightarrow A(t)s=\textperiodcentered t{$\wedge$}A(s)\textrightarrow A(t)s\textbackslash dot\{ = \}t \textbackslash wedge A\textbackslash left( s \textbackslash right) \textbackslash to A\textbackslash left( t \textbackslash right)                           \textemdash as these are put forward in Priest's books In Contradiction and An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. The stated rules and clauses are shown to be too weak in some cases and too strong in others. New ones are presented and shown to be correct. Justification for the various rules is probed and it is argued that Substitution ought to fail.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {03A05,03B47,03B53,03C07,03C90,03E70,identity,Leibniz’s law,possible world semantics,relevant logics,substitution,tableaux system},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9QYEWVAU/Øgaard - 2020 - Substitution in Relevance Logics.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Olivelle1992,
-  title = {The {{Samnyasa Upanisads}}: {{Hindu Scriptures}} on {{Asceticism}} and {{Renunciation}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Samnyasa Upanisads}}},
-  translator = {Olivelle, Patrick},
-  year = {1992},
-  month = feb,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-507045-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5GTYR6RF/1992 - The Samnyasa Upanisads Hindu Scriptures on Asceti.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Olivelle1998,
-  title = {The {{Early Upanishads}}: {{Annotated Text}} and {{Translation}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Early Upanishads}}},
-  author = {Olivelle, Patrick},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = sep,
-  edition = {Scholar's},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {This is the full edition of the early Upanisads, the central scriptures of Hinduism. Featuring Patrick Olivelle's acclaimed new English translation (Oxford, 1996), it also includes the complete Sanskrit text, as well as variant readings, scholarly emendations, and explanations of Olivelle's choices of particular readings. The volume also contains a concordance of the two recensions of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, and an extensive bibliography.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-512435-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BXDA7U9F/Olivelle - 1998 - The Early Upanishads Annotated Text and Translati.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Olivelle2008,
-  title = {Upanisads},
-  translator = {Olivelle, Patrick},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {Illustrated edition},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford ; New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-954025-9},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Oliver,
-  title = {Plural {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Oliver, Alex and Smiley, Timothy},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {"Plural Logic" published on by Oxford University Press.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-175586-6},
-  langid = {american},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4CEK972Z/Oliver and Smiley - Plural Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Oliver1996,
-  title = {The {{Metaphysics}} of {{Properties}}},
-  author = {Oliver, Alex},
-  year = {1996},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {105},
-  number = {417},
-  pages = {1--80},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/105.417.1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EJBHMHNL/Oliver - 1996 - The Metaphysics of Properties.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VWD4YKSH/Oliver - 1996 - The Metaphysics of Properties.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AGF3549K/1.html;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BEQV7QMV/1.html}
-}
-
-@book{Oliver2013,
-  title = {Plural {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Oliver, Alex and Smiley, Timothy},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jun,
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  abstract = {Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley provide a natural point of entry to what for most readers will be a new subject. Plural logic deals with plural terms ('Whitehead and Russell', 'Henry VIII's wives', 'the real numbers', 'the square roots of -1', 'they'), plural predicates ('surrounded the fort', 'are prime', 'are consistent', 'imply'), and plural quantification ('some things', 'any things'). Current logic is singularist: its terms stand for at most one thing. By contrast, the foundational thesis of this book is that a particular term may legitimately stand for several things at once; in other words, there is such a thing as genuinely plural denotation. The authors argue that plural phenomena need to be taken seriously and that the only viable response is to adopt a plural logic, a logic based on plural denotation. They expound a framework of ideas that includes the distinction between distributive and collective predicates, the theory of plural descriptions, multivalued functions, and lists. A formal system of plural logic is presented in three stages, before being applied to Cantorian set theory as an illustration. Technicalities have been kept to a minimum, and anyone who is familiar with the classical predicate calculus should be able to follow it. The authors' approach is an attractive blend of no-nonsense argumentative directness and open-minded liberalism, and they convey the exciting and unexpected richness of their subject. Mathematicians and linguists, as well as logicians and philosophers, will find surprises in this book.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-957042-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / General,Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / Semantics,Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / Syntax,Mathematics / History \& Philosophy,Mathematics / Logic,Mathematics / Set Theory,Philosophy / General,Philosophy / Logic,Philosophy / Movements / Analytic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7XPBDV4H/[Alex_Oliver,_Timothy_Smiley]_Plural_Logic(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{OShea2016,
-  title = {Concepts of {{Objects}} as {{Prescribing Laws}}: {{A Kantian}} and {{Pragmatist Line}} of {{Thought}}},
-  shorttitle = {Concepts of {{Objects}} as {{Prescribing Laws}}},
-  booktitle = {Robert {{Stern}} and {{Gabriele Gava}}, Eds., {{Pragmatism}}, {{Kant}}, and {{Transcendental Philosophy}} ({{London}}: {{Routledge}}): Pp. 196\textendash 216.},
-  author = {O'Shea, James},
-  year = {2016},
-  pages = {196--216}
-}
-
-@article{Paez2019,
-  title = {The {{Pragmatic Turn}} in {{Explainable Artificial Intelligence}} ({{XAI}})},
-  author = {P{\'a}ez, Andr{\'e}s},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Minds and Machines},
-  volume = {29},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {441--459},
-  issn = {1572-8641},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11023-019-09502-w},
-  abstract = {In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AA3IF7MY/Páez - 2019 - The Pragmatic Turn in Explainable Artificial Intel.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Pakin2015,
-  title = {{{THE COMPREHENSIVE LATEX SYMBOL LIST}}},
-  author = {Pakin, Scott},
-  year = {2009},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PJWINC6L/Symbols.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Parikh2018,
-  title = {Avadhuta {{Gita}}: {{The Song}} of the {{Avadhuta Translated}} By},
-  shorttitle = {Avadhuta {{Gita}}},
-  author = {Parikh, Janki},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = oct,
-  publisher = {{Independently published}},
-  abstract = {The Avadhuta Gita is a bold, audacious, blissful expression of Sage Dattatreya's direct experience of Advaitic (non-dualistic) self-realization, i.e. recognition of the Self (Atman) as God (Brahman). The sage calls himself an Avadhuta \textendash{} one who has seen the truth of the Self-as-Brahman, as a consequence of which, the world has fallen away from him. He lives in bliss and laughs in bliss, with not even a scrap to call his own! He needs nothing from this world, because he is Brahman! He is ever-eternal, unchanging, ever-blissful, abundant, supreme, Absolute Reality! Immerse yourself into this beautiful song and taste the nectar of life lived as Brahman! There is no coming back from the Avadhuta's path of freedom and bliss!},
-  isbn = {978-1-981061-48-8},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@incollection{Parry1989,
-  title = {Analytic {{Implication}}; {{Its History}}, {{Justification}} and {{Varietiess}}},
-  booktitle = {Directions in {{Relevant Logic}}},
-  author = {Parry, William T.},
-  editor = {Norman, Jean and Sylvan, Richard},
-  year = {1989},
-  series = {Reason and {{Argument}}},
-  pages = {101--118},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  address = {{Dordrecht}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-009-1005-87},
-  isbn = {978-94-009-1005-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Disjunctive Syllogism,Entailment Relation,Material Implication,Necessity Operator,Relevance Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4ZQBPZWS/Parry - 1989 - Analytic Implication\; Its History, Justification a.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Parsons1977,
-  title = {What Is the {{Iterative Conception}} of {{Set}}?},
-  booktitle = {Logic, {{Foundations}} of {{Mathematics}}, and {{Computability Theory}}},
-  author = {Parsons, Charles},
-  editor = {Butts, Robert E. and Hintikka, Jaakko},
-  year = {1977},
-  series = {The {{University}} of {{Western Ontario Series}} in {{Philosophy}} of {{Science}}},
-  number = {9},
-  pages = {335--367},
-  publisher = {{Springer Netherlands}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-94-010-1138-9_18},
-  abstract = {I intend to raise here some questions about what is nowadays called the `iterative conception of set'. Examination of the literature will show that it is not so clear as it should be what this conception is.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright 1977 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.},
-  isbn = {978-94-010-1140-2 978-94-010-1138-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {History,Logic,Philosophy of Science},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WJH2E7F3/CBO9781139171519A039.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Parsons1979,
-  title = {Referring to Nonexistent Objects},
-  author = {Parsons, Terence},
-  year = {1979},
-  journal = {Theory and Decision. An International Journal for Multidisciplinary Advances in Decision Science},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {95--110},
-  issn = {0040-5833, 1573-7187},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00126695},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TW5DC6NR/Parsons - Referring to nonexistent objects.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Partee1988,
-  title = {Possible {{Worlds}} in {{Model-Theoretic Semantics}}: {{A Linguistic Perspective}}},
-  shorttitle = {Possible {{Worlds}} in {{Model-Theoretic Semantics}}},
-  author = {Partee, Barbara H.},
-  year = {1988},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences},
-  pages = {93--123},
-  publisher = {{De Gruyter}},
-  abstract = {Possible Worlds in Model-Theoretic Semantics: A Linguistic Perspective was published in Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences on page 93.},
-  chapter = {Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences},
-  isbn = {978-3-11-086685-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KA7R8BDK/Partee - 1988 - Possible Worlds in Model-Theoretic Semantics A Li.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Paseau2007,
-  title = {Boolos on the Justification of Set Theory\textdagger},
-  author = {Paseau, Alexander},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
-  volume = {15},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {30--53},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0031-8019},
-  doi = {10.1093/philmat/nkl017},
-  abstract = {Abstract. George Boolos has argued that the iterative conception of set justifies most, but not all, the ZFC axioms, and that a second conception of set, the Fr},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IEV4UKFR/Paseau - 2007 - Boolos on the justification of set theory†.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Paseau2010,
-  title = {Resemblance Theories of Properties},
-  author = {Paseau, Alexander},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {157},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {361--382},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-010-9653-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Coextension problem,Companionship problem,Comparative resemblance predicate,Epistemology,Ethics,Imperfect community problem,Mere intersections problem,Metaphysics,Philosophy,Philosophy of Language,Philosophy of Mind,Properties,Resemblance nominalism}
-}
-
-@article{Paseau2010a,
-  title = {Defining {{Ultimate Ontological Basis}} and the {{Fundamental Layer}}},
-  author = {Paseau, Alexander},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {60},
-  number = {238},
-  pages = {169--175},
-  issn = {0031-8094, 1467-9213},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.642.x},
-  abstract = {I explain why Ross Cameron's definition of ultimate ontological basis is incorrect, and propose a different definition in terms of ontological dependence, as well as a definition of reality's fundamental layer. These new definitions cover the conceptual possibility that self-dependent entities exist. They also apply to different conceptions of the relation of ontological dependence.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8LLZVA3A/Paseau - 2010 - Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundam.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Paseau2016,
-  title = {What's the {{Point}} of {{Complete Rigour}}?},
-  author = {Paseau, A. C.},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {125},
-  number = {497},
-  pages = {177--207},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzv140},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZN7R4BCE/fzv140.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Paseau2020,
-  title = {Non-Metric {{Propositional Similarity}}},
-  author = {Paseau, A. C.},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-020-00303-7},
-  abstract = {The idea that sentences can be closer or further apart in meaning is highly intuitive. Not only that, it is also a pillar of logic, semantic theory and the philosophy of science, and follows from other commitments about similarity. The present paper proposes a novel way of comparing the `distance' between two pairs of propositions. We define `\$\$p\_1\$\$p1is closer in meaning to \$\$p\_2\$\$p2than \$\$p\_3\$\$p3is to \$\$p\_4\$\$p4' and thereby give a precise account of comparative propositional similarity facts. Notably, our definition eschews metric assumptions, which are unrealistic in most applications of interest.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UFV6I4C4/Paseau - 2020 - Non-metric Propositional Similarity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Paul2006,
-  title = {Coincidence as {{Overlap}}},
-  author = {Paul, L. A.},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {623--659},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00627.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GR9UZ86X/Paul - 2006 - Coincidence as Overlap1.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Paul2013,
-  title = {Causation: {{A User}}'s {{Guide}}},
-  shorttitle = {Causation},
-  author = {Paul, L. A. and Hall, Ned},
-  year = {2013},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  doi = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673445.001.0001},
-  abstract = {Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Many believe that the causal relation is not directly observable, but that we nevertheless can somehow detect its presence in the world, and much work in the natural and social sciences relies on our ability to detect it. Yet neither common sense, scientific investigation, nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Contemporary philosophical debates about causation are driven by opposing motivations, conflicting intuitions, and unarticulated methodological assumptions. Causation: A User's Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing landscape. The book guides the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples as landmarks. Special attention is given to counterfactual and related analyses of causation. Using a methodological principle based on the close examination of potential counterexamples, the book clarifies the central themes of the debate about causation, develops an account of the methodological rules one should follow when conducting a philosophical exploration of causation, and covers questions about causation involving omissions or absences, preemption and other species of redundant causation, and the possibility that causation is not transitive. Along the way, the authors examine several contemporary proposals for analyzing the nature of causation and assess their merits and overall methodological cogency, including proposals based on counterfactual analyses, regularities, causal modeling, contrasts, de facto accounts, and transference of conserved quantities. The book is designed to be of value both to trained specialists and those coming to the problem of causation for the first time. It provides the reader with a broad and sophisticated view of the metaphysics of the causal relation.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-967344-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {causal modeling,contrastive,counterexample,counterfactual,de facto,dependence,metaphysics of causation,ontological reduction,philosophical methodology,reduction,regularity,structural equations,transference},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LSG92HTW/Paul and Hall - 2013 - Causation A User's Guide.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Pavese2015,
-  title = {Practical {{Senses}}},
-  author = {Pavese, Carlotta},
-  year = {2015},
-  publisher = {{(under review)}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/494PMWPG/2015 - Practical Senses - Pavese.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IFNZ8TYI/2015 - Practical Senses - Pavese.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Pearce2016,
-  title = {Counteressential {{Conditionals}}},
-  author = {Pearce, Kenneth L.},
-  year = {2016},
-  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {73--81},
-  doi = {10.1002/tht3.196},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2WDC8H98/Pearce - 2016 - Counteressential Conditionals.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PYFJR3SQ/Pearce - 2016 - Counteressential Conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Pearl2000,
-  title = {Causality: {{Models}}, {{Reasoning}}, and {{Inference}}},
-  shorttitle = {Causality},
-  author = {Pearl, Judea},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = mar,
-  edition = {1st Edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {Written by one of the pre-eminent researchers in the field, this book provides a comprehensive exposition of modern analysis of causation. It shows how causality has grown from a nebulous concept into a mathematical theory with significant applications in the fields of statistics, artificial intelligence, philosophy, cognitive science, and the health and social sciences. Pearl presents a unified account of the probabilistic, manipulative, counterfactual and structural approaches to causation, and devises simple mathematical tools for analyzing the relationships between causal connections, statistical associations, actions and observations. The book will open the way for including causal analysis in the standard curriculum of statistics, artifical intelligence, business, epidemiology, social science and economics. Students in these areas will find natural models, simple identification procedures, and precise mathematical definitions of causal concepts that traditional texts have tended to evade or make unduly complicated. This book will be of interest to professionals and students in a wide variety of fields. Anyone who wishes to elucidate meaningful relationships from data, predict effects of actions and policies, assess explanations of reported events, or form theories of causal understanding and causal speech will find this book stimulating and invaluable. Professor of Computer Science at the UCLA, Judea Pearl is the winner of the 2008 Benjamin Franklin Award in Computers and Cognitive Science.},
-  googlebooks = {wnGU\_TsW3BQC},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-77362-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Epistemology,Science / Philosophy \& Social Aspects}
-}
-
-@book{Pearl2009,
-  title = {Causality: {{Models}}, {{Reasoning}} and {{Inference}}},
-  shorttitle = {Causality},
-  author = {Pearl, Judea},
-  year = {2009},
-  edition = {2nd edition},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-89560-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CD299KZH/Pearl - 2009 - Causality Models, Reasoning and Inference.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Pearl2020,
-  title = {The {{Book}} of {{Why}}: {{The New Science}} of {{Cause}} and {{Effect}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Book}} of {{Why}}},
-  author = {Pearl, Judea and Mackenzie, Dana},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {Reprint edition},
-  publisher = {{Basic Books}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-1-5416-9896-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C2W6DWRS/Pearl_Mackenzie_2020_The Book of Why.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Pendell2010,
-  title = {Pharmako {{Poeia}}: {{Plant Powers}}, {{Poisons}}, and {{Herbcraft}}},
-  shorttitle = {Pharmako/{{Poeia}}, {{Revised}} and {{Updated}}},
-  author = {Pendell, Dale},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = sep,
-  edition = {Updated edition},
-  publisher = {{North Atlantic Books}},
-  address = {{Berkeley, Calif.}},
-  abstract = {***This paperback edition has a new introduction by the author and updated content.This is the first volume of North Atlantic Books' updated paperback edition of Dale Pendell's Pharmako trilogy, an encyclopedic study of the history and uses of psychoactive plants and related synthetics first published between 1995 and 2005. The books form an interrelated suite of works that provide the reader with a unique, reliable, and often personal immersion in this medically, culturally, and spiritually fascinating subject. All three books are beautifully designed and illustrated, and are written with unparalleled authority, erudition, playfulness, and range. Pharmako/Poeia: Plant Powers, Poisons, and Herbcraft includes a new introduction by the author and as in previous editions focuses on familiar psychoactive plant-derived substances and related synthetics, ranging from the licit (tobacco, alcohol) to the illicit (cannabis, opium) and the exotic (absinthe, salvia divinorum, nitrous oxide). Each substance is explored in detail, not only with information on its history, pharmacology, preparation, and cultural and esoteric correspondences, but also the subtleties of each plant's effect on consciousness in a way that only poets can do. The whole concoction is sprinkled with abundant quotations from famous writers, creating a literary brew as intoxicating as its subject.The Pharmako series is continued in Pharmako/Dynamis (focusing on stimulants and empathogens) and Pharmako/Gnosis (which addresses psychedelics and shamanic plants).},
-  isbn = {978-1-55643-805-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2RBFD5BQ/KillingTime.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ILYSBLGJ/Poison.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IU3A5H3W/Seduction of Angels.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UEIMRICQ/Euphorica.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/US6JLZM9/Pendell - 2010 - Pharmako Poeia Plant Powers, Poisons, and Herbcra.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Peramatzis2014,
-  title = {Sameness, {{Definition}}, and {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Peramatzis, Michail},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Studia Philosophica Estonica},
-  pages = {142--167},
-  issn = {1736-5899},
-  doi = {10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.08},
-  abstract = {I formulate an apparent inconsistency between some claims Aristotle makes in his Metaphysics about the sameness and non-sameness relations which obtain between an object and its essence: while a (type of) object is not the same as its essence, an essence is thought as being the same as its essence. I discuss different ways in which one may propose to overcome this apparent inconsistency and show that they are problematic. My diagnosis of the problem is that all these putative solutions share the assumption that Aristotle is operating exclusively with the notion of strict numerical identity between an object and its essence, or between definiendum and definiens. I introduce the notion of sameness in nature which holds between an object and its essence, understood as the metaphysical counterpart to the relation of 'being defined as': two items are the same in nature just in case the answer to the 'what is it?' or 'what is its nature/essence?' question is common to both. I argue that the notions of sameness in nature and 'being defined as' need not (but may) entail strict identity. Further, they are compatible with, indeed require, the idea that an essence is prior to its essence-bearer, or that a definiens is prior to the relevant definiendum. I conclude that the twin notions of sameness in nature and 'being defined as' successfully defuse the apparent inconsistency formulated at the outset.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c)},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {definition,essence,identity,priority,sameness},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N8ZG3RHG/Peramatzis - 2014 - Sameness, Definition, and Essence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Peramatzis2020,
-  title = {Form, {{Matter}}, {{Substance}}, by {{Kathrin Koslicki}}},
-  author = {Peramatzis, Michail},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {129},
-  number = {513},
-  pages = {235--245},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzz006},
-  abstract = {Kathrin Koslicki's book Form, Matter, Substance is a clear, rigorous, and stimulating study of central issues in metaphysics discussed from the so-called `neo-A},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FFR4RNZJ/Peramatzis - 2020 - Form, Matter, Substance, by Kathrin Koslicki.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Pernu2018,
-  title = {Causal {{Overdetermination}}: {{Still Crazy After All}} These {{Years}}. {{Part I}}: {{What}} Is at {{Stake}}?},
-  shorttitle = {Causal {{Overdetermination}}},
-  author = {Pernu, Tuomas K.},
-  year = {2018},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Forum},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {231--244},
-  issn = {1467-9191},
-  doi = {10.1111/phil.12188},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phil.12188},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ABP2F3M3/phil.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Perry1989,
-  title = {Possible {{Worlds}} and {{Subject Matter}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Problem}} of the {{Essential Indexical}} and {{Other Essays}}},
-  author = {Perry, John},
-  year = {1989},
-  pages = {145--60},
-  publisher = {{CSLI Publications}},
-  address = {{Palo Alto, CA}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3TLKXP3V/Perry - 1989 - Possible Worlds and Subject Matter.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Perry1996,
-  title = {The {{Problem}} of the {{Essential Indexical}}: {{And Other Essays}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Problem}} of the {{Essential Indexical}}},
-  author = {Perry, John},
-  year = {1996},
-  month = sep,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {A collection of twelve essays by John Perry and two essays he co-authored, this book deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this". In the early essays, Perry argues that an account of these beliefs requires us to distinguish what is believed from how it is believed, and the rest of the essays discuss various aspects and implications of that distinction and issues closely related to it. Included with such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives", "The Problem of the Essential Indexical", "From Worlds to Situations", and "The Prince and the Phone Booth" are a number of important essays that have been less accessible and that discuss important aspects of Perry's views, which stem from the area of thought referred to as "Critical Referentialism" on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. In addition, postscripts have been added to a number of the essays discussing criticisms by authors such as Gareth Evans and Robert Stalnaker.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-504999-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MYFVEQ48/Perry - 1996 - The Problem of the Essential Indexical And Other .pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Pettigrew2018,
-  title = {Accuracy and the {{Laws}} of {{Credence}}},
-  author = {Pettigrew, Richard},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = oct,
-  edition = {Illustrated edition},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, United Kingdom : New York, NY}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-882246-2},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Phillips2018,
-  title = {The Psychological Representation of Modality},
-  author = {Phillips, Jonathan and Knobe, Joshua},
-  year = {2018},
-  journal = {Mind \& Language},
-  volume = {33},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {65--94},
-  issn = {1468-0017},
-  doi = {10.1111/mila.12165},
-  abstract = {A series of recent studies have explored the impact of people's judgments regarding physical law, morality, and probability. Surprisingly, such studies indicate that these three apparently unrelated types of judgments often have precisely the same impact. We argue that these findings provide evidence for a more general hypothesis about the kind of cognition people use to think about possibilities. Specifically, we suggest that this aspect of people's cognition is best understood using an idea developed within work in the formal semantics tradition, namely the notion of modality. On the view we propose, people may have separate representations for physical, moral and probabilistic considerations, but they also integrate these various considerations into a unified representation of modality.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {counterfactuals,intuitive physics,modality,morality,possibility,probability},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12165},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SBXM3RKY/mila.html}
-}
-
-@article{Pierce2020,
-  title = {Whose {{Lives Matter}}? {{The Black Lives Matter Movement}} and the {{Contested Legacy}} of {{Philosophical Humanism}}},
-  shorttitle = {Whose {{Lives Matter}}?},
-  author = {Pierce, Andrew J.},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {Journal of Social Philosophy},
-  volume = {51},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {261--282},
-  issn = {1467-9833},
-  doi = {10.1111/josp.12305},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/josp.12305},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RNMBTC4Y/Pierce - 2020 - Whose Lives Matter The Black Lives Matter Movemen.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BWEYH8X2/josp.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Pitts2001,
-  title = {Categorical Logic},
-  booktitle = {Handbook of Logic in Computer Science: {{Volume}} 5: {{Logic}} and Algebraic Methods},
-  author = {Pitts, Andrew M.},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = apr,
-  pages = {39--123},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press, Inc.}},
-  address = {{USA}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-853781-6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MNRM4U5U/Pitts - 2001 - Categorical logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Plantinga1976,
-  title = {Actualism and Possible Worlds},
-  author = {Plantinga, Alvin},
-  year = {1976},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Theoria},
-  volume = {42},
-  number = {1-3},
-  pages = {139--160},
-  issn = {1755-2567},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1755-2567.1976.tb00681.x},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6H5RIXUY/Plantinga - 1976 - Actualism and possible worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Plantinga1983,
-  title = {On {{Existentialism}}},
-  author = {Plantinga, Alvin},
-  year = {1983},
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {44},
-  pages = {1--20},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/32Z3YTU8/1983 - On Existentialism - Plantinga.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VT8JR2U7/1983 - On Existentialism - Plantinga.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Plato1996,
-  title = {The Collected Dialogues of {{Plato}}: Including the Letters},
-  shorttitle = {The Collected Dialogues of {{Plato}}},
-  author = {Plato},
-  editor = {Hamilton, Edith},
-  year = {1996},
-  series = {Bollingen Series},
-  edition = {16. print},
-  number = {71},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Princeton}},
-  isbn = {978-0-691-09718-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {OCLC: 258418468}
-}
-
-@book{Plato1997,
-  title = {Complete Works},
-  author = {Plato},
-  editor = {Cooper, John M. and Hutchinson, D. S.},
-  year = {1997},
-  publisher = {{Hackett Pub}},
-  address = {{Indianapolis, Ind}},
-  isbn = {978-0-87220-349-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  lccn = {B358 .C3 1997},
-  keywords = {Philosophy; Ancient,Socrates},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NU52TJMY/Plato et al_1997_Complete works.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Poggiolesi2016,
-  title = {On Defining the Notion of Complete and Immediate Formal Grounding},
-  author = {Poggiolesi, Francesca},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {193},
-  number = {10},
-  pages = {3147--3167},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-015-0923-x},
-  abstract = {The aim of this paper is to provide a definition of the the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding through the concepts of derivability and complexity. It will be shown that this definition yields a subtle and precise analysis of the concept of grounding in several paradigmatic cases.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MXH29I6P/Poggiolesi - 2016 - On defining the notion of complete and immediate f.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Poggiolesi2018,
-  title = {On Constructing a Logic for the Notion of Complete and Immediate Formal Grounding},
-  author = {Poggiolesi, Francesca},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {195},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {1231--1254},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-016-1265-z},
-  abstract = {In Poggiolesi (2016b) we have introduced a rigorous definition of the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding; in the present paper our aim is to construct a logic for the notion of complete and immediate formal grounding based on that definition. Our logic will have the form of a calculus of natural deduction, will be proved to be sound and complete and will allow us to have fine-grained grounding principles.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B38CNTPM/Poggiolesi - 2018 - On constructing a logic for the notion of complete.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Poggiolesi2021,
-  title = {Grounding Principles for (Relevant) Implication},
-  author = {Poggiolesi, Francesca},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {8},
-  pages = {7351--7376},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02523-z},
-  abstract = {Most of the logics of grounding that have so far been proposed contain grounding axioms, or grounding rules, for the connectives of conjunction, disjunction and negation, but little attention has been dedicated to the implication connective. The present paper aims at repairing this situation by proposing adequate grounding principles for relevant implication. Because of the interaction between negation and implication, new grounding principles concerning negation will also arise.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UN9ENS7K/Poggiolesi - 2021 - Grounding principles for (relevant) implication.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Poggiolesi2021a,
-  title = {Conceptual (and {{Hence Mathematical}}) {{Explanation}}, {{Conceptual Grounding}} and {{Proof}}},
-  author = {Poggiolesi, Francesca and Genco, Francesco},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-021-00412-x},
-  abstract = {This paper studies the notions of conceptual grounding and conceptual explanation (which includes the notion of mathematical explanation), with an aim of clarifying the links between them. On the one hand, it analyses complex examples of these two notions that bring to the fore features that are easily overlooked otherwise. On the other hand, it provides a formal framework for modeling both conceptual grounding and conceptual explanation, based on the concept of proof. Inspiration and analogies are drawn with the recent research in metaphysics on the pair metaphysical grounding\textendash metaphysical explanation, and especially with the literature in philosophy of science on the pair causality-causal explanation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PJHWBF4X/Poggiolesi and Genco - 2021 - Conceptual (and Hence Mathematical) Explanation, C.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Popper1959,
-  title = {On {{Subjunctive Conditionals}} with {{Impossible Antecedents}}},
-  author = {Popper, Karl R.},
-  year = {1959},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {LXVIII},
-  number = {272},
-  pages = {518--520},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/LXVIII.272.518},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4HHLRTA8/973026.html}
-}
-
-@article{Portmore2011,
-  title = {The {{Teleological Conception}} of {{Practical Reasons}}},
-  author = {Portmore, Douglas W.},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {120},
-  number = {477},
-  pages = {117--153},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  abstract = {It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to do, we also face a choice of which of various possible worlds to actualize. Moreover, whenever we act intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. It is only natural, then, to suppose that an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring some of these possible worlds to others, such that what she has most reason to do is to bring about the possible world which, of all those available to her, is the one that she has most reason to want to obtain. This is what is known as the `teleological conception of practical reasons'. Whether this is the correct conception of practical reasons is important not only in its own right, but also in virtue of its potential implications for what sort of moral theory we should accept. Below, I argue that the teleological conception is indeed the correct conception of practical reasons.}
-}
-
-@article{Potter1993,
-  title = {Iterative {{Set Theory}}},
-  author = {Potter, M. D.},
-  year = {1993},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {43},
-  number = {171},
-  pages = {178--193},
-  issn = {0031-8094},
-  doi = {10.2307/2220368},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1993 Oxford University Press, Scots Philosophical Association and University of St. Andrews},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3M5URYTZ/Potter - 1993 - Iterative Set Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Potter2004,
-  title = {Set {{Theory}} and {{Its Philosophy}}: {{A Critical Introduction}}},
-  shorttitle = {Set {{Theory}} and {{Its Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Potter, Michael},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = mar,
-  edition = {1 edition},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford ; New York}},
-  abstract = {Michael Potter presents a comprehensive new philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. What makes the book unique is that it interweaves a careful presentation of the technical material with a penetrating philosophical critique. Potter does not merely expound the theory dogmatically but at every stage discusses in detail the reasons that can be offered for believing it to be true. Set Theory and its Philosophy is a key text for philosophy, mathematical logic, and computer science.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-927041-5},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Poyiadzi2020,
-  title = {{{FACE}}: {{Feasible}} and {{Actionable Counterfactual Explanations}}},
-  shorttitle = {{{FACE}}},
-  booktitle = {Proceedings of the {{AAAI}}/{{ACM Conference}} on {{AI}}, {{Ethics}}, and {{Society}}},
-  author = {Poyiadzi, Rafael and Sokol, Kacper and {Santos-Rodriguez}, Raul and De Bie, Tijl and Flach, Peter},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = feb,
-  eprint = {1909.09369},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  pages = {344--350},
-  doi = {10.1145/3375627.3375850},
-  abstract = {Work in Counterfactual Explanations tends to focus on the principle of "the closest possible world" that identifies small changes leading to the desired outcome. In this paper we argue that while this approach might initially seem intuitively appealing it exhibits shortcomings not addressed in the current literature. First, a counterfactual example generated by the state-of-the-art systems is not necessarily representative of the underlying data distribution, and may therefore prescribe unachievable goals(e.g., an unsuccessful life insurance applicant with severe disability may be advised to do more sports). Secondly, the counterfactuals may not be based on a "feasible path" between the current state of the subject and the suggested one, making actionable recourse infeasible (e.g., low-skilled unsuccessful mortgage applicants may be told to double their salary, which may be hard without first increasing their skill level). These two shortcomings may render counterfactual explanations impractical and sometimes outright offensive. To address these two major flaws, first of all, we propose a new line of Counterfactual Explanations research aimed at providing actionable and feasible paths to transform a selected instance into one that meets a certain goal. Secondly, we propose FACE: an algorithmically sound way of uncovering these "feasible paths" based on the shortest path distances defined via density-weighted metrics. Our approach generates counterfactuals that are coherent with the underlying data distribution and supported by the "feasible paths" of change, which are achievable and can be tailored to the problem at hand.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZDM33SD4/Poyiadzi et al. - 2020 - FACE Feasible and Actionable Counterfactual Expla.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X3UVGIAC/1909.html}
-}
-
-@article{Priest1979,
-  title = {The Logic of Paradox},
-  author = {Priest, Graham},
-  year = {1979},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {219--241},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00258428},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/22BMK4BA/Priest - 1979 - The logic of paradox.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Priest2006,
-  title = {In {{Contradiction}}: {{A Study}} of the {{Transconsistent}}},
-  shorttitle = {In {{Contradiction}}},
-  author = {Priest, Graham},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = apr,
-  edition = {2nd edition},
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford : Oxford ; New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-926330-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Documents/Philosophy/Papers/ModalSemantics/Quotes/Priest2006 - Extracted Annotations (15012022, 090710)More generally, suppose we define a modal operator, L, thus La is a!a (P.md;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7DYQFWRR/Priest_2006_In Contradiction.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Principia1910,
-  title = {Principia {{Mathematica}}},
-  author = {Russell, Bertrand and Whitehead, Alfred North},
-  year = {1910},
-  edition = {Second},
-  volume = {1},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BC4TNWGH/1910 - Principia mathematica - Whitehead, Russell, Whitehead.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Prior1961,
-  title = {On a Family of Paradoxes.},
-  author = {Prior, A. N.},
-  year = {1961},
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {16--32},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1093956750},
-  abstract = {Project Euclid - mathematics and statistics online},
-  mrnumber = {MR0144816},
-  zmnumber = {0112.00408},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2P6AHA6A/euclid.ndjfl.1093956750.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Prior1971,
-  title = {Objects of {{Thought}}},
-  author = {Prior, A. N.},
-  editor = {Geach, P. T. and Kenny, A. J. P.},
-  year = {1971},
-  month = apr,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-824354-0}
-}
-
-@article{Psillos2011,
-  title = {Living with the Abstract: Realism and Models},
-  shorttitle = {Living with the Abstract},
-  author = {Psillos, Stathis},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {180},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {3--17},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-009-9563-3},
-  abstract = {A natural way to think of models is as abstract entities. If theories employ models to represent the world, theories traffic in abstract entities much more widely than is often assumed. This kind of thought seems to create a problem for a scientific realist approach to theories. Scientific realists claim theories should be understood literally. Do they then imply (and are they committed to) the reality of abstract entities? Or are theories simply\textemdash and incurably\textemdash false (if there are no abstract entities)? Or has the very idea of literal understanding to be abandoned? Is then fictionalism towards scientific theories inevitable? This paper argues that scientific realism can happily co-exist with models qua abstracta.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9KQ5V2FU/Psillos - 2011 - Living with the abstract realism and models.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Putnam1974,
-  title = {The {{Refutation}} of {{Conventionalism}}},
-  author = {Putnam, Hilary},
-  year = {1974},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {25--40},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2214643},
-  abstract = {Quine is working from within our ordinary conceptual scheme, not as a scientist (whether a physicist or a behaviorist). The real Quine is concerned with how well-defined the word "translation" is. [AL 1/29/2004]},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1974 Wiley},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TXIFCABV/Putnam - 1974 - The Refutation of Conventionalism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Qiu2018,
-  title = {Deontic {{STIT}} Logic, from Logical Paradox to Security Policy},
-  author = {Qiu, Lirong and Sun, Xin},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Soft Computing},
-  volume = {22},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {751--757},
-  issn = {1433-7479},
-  doi = {10.1007/s00500-017-2497-7},
-  abstract = {A deontic STIT logic is studied in this paper with the possible application of specifying security policies for intrude detection in the pervasive computing environment. Compared to the existing deontic STIT logics, an advantage of our logic is that it is capable of solving the miners paradox, a logical paradox which recently grabs attentions of logicians, philosophers, linguistists and computer scientists. A complete and sound axiomatization of our logic is developed.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/APY73WJN/Qiu and Sun - 2018 - Deontic STIT logic, from logical paradox to securi.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1936,
-  title = {Definition of Substitution},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1936},
-  journal = {Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society},
-  volume = {42},
-  number = {8},
-  pages = {561--570},
-  issn = {0002-9904},
-  doi = {10.1090/S0002-9904-1936-06361-5},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K7337WWA/1936 - Definition of substitution - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MVV7FI65/1936 - Definition of substitution - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1939,
-  title = {Designation and Existence},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1939},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {36},
-  number = {26},
-  pages = {701--709},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2017667},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QYY943JH/1939 - Designation and existence - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Quine1940,
-  title = {Mathematical {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1940},
-  volume = {18},
-  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, MA}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IVRMM87I/1940 - Mathematical Logic - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1943,
-  title = {Notes on Existence and Necessity},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1943},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {113--127},
-  issn = {0022362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2017458},
-  abstract = {One is the question of admission or exclusion of the modalities- necessity, possibility, and the rest-as operators attaching to state- ments. The other is the ontological question, "What is there?" It is my purpose here to set forth certain considerations, grounded in elementary},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DRQEF7EY/1943 - Notes on existence and necessity - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HCIKQPRX/1943 - Notes on existence and necessity - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1945,
-  title = {On the {{Logic}} of {{Quantification}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1945},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--12},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CUWDNBG5/1945 - On the Logic of Quantification - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PYTU9UK4/1945 - On the Logic of Quantification - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1946,
-  title = {Review: {{Ruth C}}. {{Barcan}}, {{A Functional Calculus}} of {{First Order Based}} on {{Strict Implication}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1946},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {96--97},
-  issn = {0022-4812},
-  doi = {10.2307/2266766},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1946 Association for Symbolic Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YCPLPXZB/Quine - 1946 - Review.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1947,
-  title = {The {{Problem}} of {{Interpreting Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1947},
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {43--48},
-  issn = {00224812},
-  doi = {10.2307/2267247},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6C2V885N/1947 - The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DUBWLQ2I/1947 - The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1948,
-  title = {On {{What There Is}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1948},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Review of Metaphysics},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {21--38},
-  issn = {0034-6632},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1948 Philosophy Education Society Inc.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/F4Q8PWC8/Quine - 1948 - On What There Is.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Quine1951,
-  title = {Mathematical {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1951},
-  volume = {18},
-  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TM6UAR5P/1951 - Mathematical Logic - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1951a,
-  title = {Two {{Dogmas}} of {{Empiricism}}},
-  shorttitle = {Main {{Trends}} in {{Recent Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1951},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {60},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {20--43},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.2307/2181906},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QLFQ7LMB/Quine - 1951 - Main Trends in Recent Philosophy Two Dogmas of Em.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1951b,
-  title = {Ontology and Ideology},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1951},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {11--15},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF02198233},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K4GT5T58/Quine - 1951 - Ontology and ideology.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Quine1953,
-  title = {Three {{Grades}} of {{Modal Involvement}}},
-  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 11th {{International Congress}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1953},
-  volume = {14},
-  pages = {65--81},
-  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
-  address = {{Amsterdam}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3LYZDHQS/1953 - Three Grades of Modal Involvement - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YP44NI5Y/1953 - Three Grades of Modal Involvement - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Quine1960,
-  title = {Word and {{Object}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1960},
-  publisher = {{The MIT Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4HC4CCXV/[W__V_Quine]_Word_and_object(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1961,
-  title = {Reply {{To Professor}}},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  year = {1961},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {323--330},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9BB6JBGF/1961 - Reply To Professor - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E2GI26T6/1961 - Reply To Professor - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Quine1963,
-  title = {On Simple Theories of a Complex World},
-  author = {Quine, Willard van Orman},
-  year = {1963},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {15},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {103--106},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00484843},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9G843XKQ/Quine - 1963 - On simple theories of a complex world.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Quine1984,
-  title = {Truth by {{Convention}}},
-  booktitle = {Philosophy of Mathematics: {{Selected}} Readings},
-  author = {Quine, W. V.},
-  editor = {Benacerraf, Paul and Putnam, Hilary},
-  year = {1984},
-  pages = {329--354},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EVITKUL9/1984 - Truth by Convention - Quine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MKFBNXK4/1984 - Truth by Convention - Quine.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Quine1986,
-  title = {Philosophy of {{Logic}}: 2nd {{Edition}}},
-  shorttitle = {Philosophy of {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Quine, Willard Van Orman},
-  year = {1986},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {2 edition},
-  publisher = {{Harvard University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  abstract = {With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar\textendash but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.},
-  isbn = {978-0-674-66563-7},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/DS2SMKAS/Quine - 1986 - Philosophy of Logic 2nd Edition.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rabin2016,
-  title = {Well {{Founding Grounding Grounding}}},
-  author = {Rabin, Gabriel Oak and Rabern, Brian},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {349--379},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-015-9376-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KV4JG9GI/RabinRabern_Well_Founding_Grounding_Grounding_preprint_JPL_2015.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Rabinforthcoming,
-  title = {Grounding {{Orthodoxy}} and the {{Layered Conception}}},
-  booktitle = {Reality and Its {{Structure}}},
-  author = {Rabin, Gabriel Oak},
-  editor = {Bliss, Ricki Leigh and Priest, Graham},
-  year = {forthcoming},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZX8RFS28/Rabin - Grounding Orthodoxy and the Layered Conception.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Railton1984,
-  title = {Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality},
-  author = {Railton, Peter},
-  year = {1984},
-  journal = {Philosophy \& Public Affairs},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {134--171},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3QKM8J36/1984 - Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality - Railton.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JSJX6H3Z/1984 - Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality - Railton.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ramsey1927,
-  title = {Symposium: {{Facts}} and {{Propositions}}},
-  shorttitle = {Symposium},
-  author = {Ramsey, F. P.},
-  year = {1927},
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes},
-  volume = {7},
-  pages = {153--206},
-  issn = {0309-7013},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KCUEJKRG/Ramsey and Moore - 1927 - Symposium Facts and Propositions.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ramsey1992,
-  title = {Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis},
-  author = {Ramsey, William},
-  year = {1992},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Topoi},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {59--70},
-  issn = {1572-8749},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00768299},
-  abstract = {In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M74A82S6/Ramsey - 1992 - Prototypes and conceptual analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Randriamahazaka2022,
-  title = {A {{Note}} on the Signed Occurrences of Propositional Variables},
-  author = {Randriamahazaka, Thomas},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {The Australasian Journal of Logic},
-  volume = {19},
-  number = {1},
-  issn = {1448-5052},
-  doi = {10.26686/ajl.v19i1.7432},
-  abstract = {This note concerns the positive and negative occurrences of propositional variables. Just like the theory of infectious truth-values provides an algebraic understanding of the position according to which identity of subject-matter between two formulas can approximated syntactically by the identity of propositional variables occurring in these formulas, we develop an algebraic understanding of the similar position which considers signed occurrence (i.e., positive or negative) instead of mere occurrence. We apply our framework to classical logic, yielding this first (to our knowledge) semantic characterisation of the logic called SCL by Hornischer (2020). Moreover, we settle two conjectures by Humberstone (2014) which use signed occurrences to study the equational logic of the power algebra of the two-valued Boolean algebra.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2022 The Australasian Journal of Logic},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BMG6XBG6/Randriamahazaka - 2022 - A Note on the signed occurrences of propositional .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rasmussen2016,
-  title = {Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds},
-  author = {Rasmussen, Mattias Skipper},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {SATS},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {145--158},
-  publisher = {{De Gruyter}},
-  issn = {1869-7577},
-  doi = {10.1515/sats-2015-0016},
-  abstract = {One well-known objection to the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals is that it delivers counterintuitive semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles (counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents). To remedy this problem, several authors have proposed extending the set of possible worlds by impossible worlds at which necessary falsehoods may be true. Linguistic ersatz theorists often construe impossible worlds as maximal, inconsistent sets of sentences in some sufficiently expressive language. However, in a recent paper, Bjerring (2014) argues that the ``extended'' Lewis-Stalnaker semantics delivers the wrong truth-values for many counterpossibles if impossible worlds are required to be maximal. To make room for non-maximal or partial impossible worlds, Bjerring considers two alternative world-ontologies: either (i) we construe impossible worlds as arbitrary (maximal or partial) inconsistent sets of sentences, or (ii) we construe them as (maximal or partial) inconsistent sets of sentences that are closed and consistent with respect to some non-classical logic. Bjerring raises an objection against (i), and suggests that we opt for (ii). In this paper, I argue, first, that Bjerring's objection against (i) conflates two different conceptions of what it means for a logic to be true at a world. Second, I argue that (ii) imposes too strong constraints on what counts as an impossible world. I conclude that linguistic ersatzists should construe impossible worlds as arbitrary (maximal or partial) inconsistent sets of sentences.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {counterfactuals,counterpossibles,impossible worlds,Lewis-Stalnaker semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HCEXULDL/Rasmussen - 2016 - Counterpossibles and the nature of impossible worl.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Raven2011,
-  title = {In {{Defence}} of {{Ground}}},
-  author = {Raven, Michael J.},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  number = {May},
-  pages = {1--15},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048402.2011.616900},
-  abstract = {I defend (metaphysical) ground against recent, unanswered objections aiming to dismiss it from serious philosophical inquiry. Interest in ground stems from its role in the venerable metaphysical project of identifying which facts hold in virtue of others. Recent work on ground focuses on regimenting it. But many reject ground itself, seeing regimentation as yet another misguided attempt to regiment a bad idea (like phlogiston or astrology). I defend ground directly against objections that it is confused, incoherent, or fruitless. This vindicates the very attempt to regiment ground. It also refocuses our attention on the genuine open questions about ground and away from the distracting, unpersuasive reasons for dismissing them},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HXLP3ZGL/2011 - In Defence of Ground - Raven.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Raven2013,
-  title = {{{IS GROUND A STRICT PARTIAL ORDER}}?},
-  author = {Raven, Michael J.},
-  year = {2013},
-  journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {50},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {193--201},
-  issn = {0003-0481}
-}
-
-@article{Rayo2002,
-  title = {Word and {{Objects}}},
-  author = {Rayo, Agustin},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {36},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {436--464},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/1468-0068.00379},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2002},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JZ5ECQ4P/Rayo - 2002 - Word and Objects.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Rayo2003,
-  title = {A {{Completeness Theorem}} for {{Unrestricted First-Order Languages}}},
-  booktitle = {Liars and {{Heaps}}},
-  author = {Rayo, Agust{\'i}n and Williamson, Timothy},
-  editor = {Beall, Jc},
-  year = {2003},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NG2YDPQU/RayoWill.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Rayo2006,
-  title = {Absolute {{Generality}}},
-  editor = {Rayo, Agust{\'i}n and Uzquiano, Gabriel},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = nov,
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  abstract = {Is it possible to quantify over absolutely all there is? Or must all of our quantifiers range over a less-than-all-inclusive domain? It has commonly been thought that the question of absolute generality is intimately connected with the set-theoretic antinomies. But the topic of absolute generality has enjoyed a surge of interest in recent years. It has become increasingly apparent that its ramifications extend well beyond the foundations of set theory. Connections include semantic indeterminacy, logical consequence, higher-order languages, and metaphysics. Rayo and Uzquiano present for the first time a collection of essays on absolute generality. These newly commissioned articles \textemdash{} written by an impressive array of international scholars \textemdash{} draw the reader into the forefront of contemporary research on the subject. The volume represents a variety of approaches to the problem, with some of the contributions arguing for the possibility of all-inclusive quantification and some of them arguing against it. An introduction by the editors draws a helpful map of the philosophical terrain.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-927643-1},
-  keywords = {\& General,Academic,Philosophy,Philosophy of Mathematics \& Logic,Professional}
-}
-
-@incollection{Rayo2006a,
-  title = {Beyond {{Plurals}}},
-  booktitle = {Absolute {{Generality}}},
-  author = {Rayo, Agustin},
-  editor = {Rayo, Agust{\'i}n and Uzquiano, Gabriel},
-  year = {2006},
-  pages = {220--54},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WJJUJ8G8/Beyond.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Rayo2013,
-  title = {The {{Construction}} of {{Logical Space}}},
-  author = {Rayo, Agust{\'i}n},
-  year = {2013},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  isbn = {9780199662623 (hbk.)},
-  keywords = {acts á language á,neo-fregeanism á stipulation á,nominalism},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y97MW8S6/Rayo - 2013 - The Construction of Logical Space.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rayo2014,
-  title = {Reply to {{Critics}}},
-  author = {Rayo, Agust{\'i}n},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {498--534},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2PJDCCYG/2014 - Reply to Critics - Rayo.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RGMHNRH4/2014 - Reply to Critics - Rayo.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rayo2015,
-  title = {Essence {{Without Fundamentality}}},
-  author = {Rayo, Agustin},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science},
-  volume = {30},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {349--363},
-  issn = {2171-679X, 0495-4548},
-  doi = {10.1387/theoria.14472},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZF2TDJD2/14472-56035-1-PB.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Raz1999,
-  title = {Explaining {{Normativity}}: {{On Rationality}} and the {{Justification}} of {{Reason}}},
-  author = {Raz, Joseph},
-  year = {1999},
-  journal = {Ratio-new Series},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {December},
-  pages = {354--379},
-  issn = {00340006},
-  doi = {10.1111/1467-9329.00099},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8QQXB7D2/1999 - Explaining Normativity On Rationality and the Justification of Reason - Raz.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZACWXF7M/1999 - Explaining Normativity On Rationality and the Justification of Reason - Raz.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Raz2000,
-  title = {The {{Truth}} in {{Particularism}}},
-  booktitle = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  author = {Raz, Joseph},
-  editor = {Hooker, Brad and Little, Margaret Olivia},
-  year = {2000},
-  pages = {48--78},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EQ4AJL2C/2000 - The Truth in Particularism - Raz.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KLHPEI4E/2000 - The Truth in Particularism - Raz.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rea1998,
-  title = {Sameness without {{Identity}}: {{An Aristotelian Solution}} to the {{Problem}} of {{Material Constitution}}},
-  shorttitle = {Sameness without {{Identity}}},
-  author = {Rea, Michael C.},
-  year = {1998},
-  journal = {Ratio-new Series},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {316--328},
-  issn = {1467-9329},
-  doi = {10.1111/1467-9329.00073},
-  abstract = {In this paper, I present an Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. The problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to their parts in different ways. (A familiar example: A lump of bronze constitutes a statue of Athena. The lump and the statue share all of the same parts, but it appears that the lump can, whereas the statue cannot, survive radical rearrangements of those parts.) I argue that if we are prepared to follow Aristotle in making a distinction between numerical sameness and identity, we can solve the problem of material constitution without recourse to co-location or contingent identity and without repudiating any of the familiar objects of common sense (such as lumps and statues) or denying that these objects have the essential properties we ordinarily think that they have.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8L8X6IPW/Rea - 1998 - Sameness without Identity an Aristotelian Solutio.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Read1989,
-  title = {Relevant {{Logic}}: {{Philosophical Examination}} of {{Inference}}},
-  shorttitle = {Relevant {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Read, Stephen},
-  year = {1989},
-  month = jan,
-  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
-  address = {{Oxford, OX, UK ; New York, NY, USA}},
-  abstract = {A logical theory should provide a general criterion of validity. "Relevant Logic" sets out to establish such a criterion, and to describe the philosophical basis and the formal theory of logical argument. The notion of relevance required for this theory is obtained by an analysis of the grounds for asserting a formula in a proof. Stephen Read essays a deduction of proof-theory embracing classical, relevant and modal logics and consistent with the appropriate semantics. "Relevant Logic" also contains a philosophical analysis of the notion of meaning as it relates to logical theory. The work is aimed at specialists in philosophical logic, formal logic, cognitive science, semantics and computer science.},
-  isbn = {978-0-631-16184-4},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2W7NJCSP/Read - 1989 - Relevant Logic Philosophical Examination of Infer.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Resnick2019,
-  title = {A {{Probability Path}}},
-  author = {Resnick, Sidney},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {1st ed. 1998. 3rd printing 2003 edition},
-  publisher = {{Birkh\"auser}},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YWALGPXS/Resnick_2019_A Probability Path.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Restall2002,
-  title = {An {{Introduction}} to {{Substructural Logics}}},
-  author = {Restall, Greg},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = sep,
-  edition = {1st edition},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BUAWXHJZ/Restall - 2002 - An Introduction to Substructural Logics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rey1998,
-  title = {A {{Narrow Representationalist Account}} of {{Qualitative Experience}}},
-  author = {Rey, Georges},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {S12},
-  pages = {435--457},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.19},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1998},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XJUCS9NR/Rey - 1998 - A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitativ.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rieber1994,
-  title = {The Paradoxes of Analysis and Synonymy},
-  author = {Rieber, S. D.},
-  year = {1994},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {41},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {103--116},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF01128913},
-  abstract = {The very idea of informative analysis gives rise to a well-known paradox. Yet a parallel puzzle, herein called the `paradox of synonymy', arises for statements which do not express analyses. The paradox of synonymy has a straightforward metalinguistic solution: certain words are referring to themselves. Likewise, the paradox of analysis can be solved by recognizing that certain expressions in an analysis statement are referring to their own semantic structures.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/URS9LK6D/Rieber - 1994 - The paradoxes of analysis and synonymy.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ritchie2016,
-  title = {Can {{Semantics Guide Ontology}}?},
-  author = {Ritchie, Katherine},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {94},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {24--41},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048402.2015.1045912},
-  abstract = {Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide ontology. Here, I argue that semantics can, at best, serve as a partial guide to ontological commitment. If semantics were to be our guide, semantic data and semantic treatments would need to be taken seriously. Through an examination of plurals and their treatments, I argue that there can be multiple, equally semantically adequate, treatments of a natural language theory. Further, such treatments can attribute different ontological commitments to a theory. Given this, I argue that semantics can fail to deliver determinate ontological commitments and determinate answers to ontological questions, more generally.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8LRQ4VTL/Ritchie - 2016 - Can Semantics Guide Ontology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rivieccio2009,
-  title = {What Is {{Abstract Algebraic Logic}}?},
-  author = {Rivieccio, Umberto},
-  year = {2009},
-  journal = {Epistemologia},
-  volume = {Rivista italiana di Filosofia della Scienza},
-  number = {XXXII},
-  pages = {173--196},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CH24UGWE/U-Rivieccio_What-is-Abstract-Algebraic-Logic_Applied-Logic-TU-Delft.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rivieccio2010,
-  title = {An {{Algebraic Study}} of {{Bilattice-Based Logics}}},
-  author = {Rivieccio, Umberto},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {arXiv:1010.2552 [math]},
-  eprint = {1010.2552},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {math},
-  abstract = {The aim of this work is to develop a study from the perspective of Abstract Algebraic Logic of some bilattice-based logical systems introduced in the nineties by Ofer Arieli and Arnon Avron. The motivation for such an investigation has two main roots. On the one hand there is an interest in bilattices as an elegant formalism that gave rise in the last two decades to a variety of applications, especially in the field of Theoretical Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. In this respect, the present study aims to be a contribution to a better understanding of the mathematical and logical framework that underlie these applications. On the other hand, our interest in bilattice-based logics comes from Abstract Algebraic Logic. In very general terms, algebraic logic can be described as the study of the connections between algebra and logic. One of the main reasons that motivate this study is the possibility to treat logical problems with algebraic methods and viceversa: this is accomplished by associating to a logical system a class of algebraic models that can be regarded as the algebraic counterpart of that logic. Starting from the work of Tarski and his collaborators, the method of algebraizing logics has been increasingly developed and generalized. In the last two decades, algebraic logicians have focused their attention on the process of algebraization itself: this kind of investigation forms now a subfield of algebraic logic known as Abstract Algebraic Logic (which we abbreviate AAL).},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Mathematics - Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3XV99LN9/Rivieccio - 2010 - An Algebraic Study of Bilattice-based Logics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Roberts2012,
-  title = {Information {{Structure}}: {{Towards}} an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics},
-  shorttitle = {Information {{Structure}}},
-  author = {Roberts, Craige},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Semantics and Pragmatics},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {6:1-69},
-  issn = {1937-8912},
-  doi = {10.3765/sp.5.6},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6CY9MWU7/2228-5868-1-PB.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Roberts2012a,
-  title = {Information {{Structure}}: {{Towards}} an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics},
-  shorttitle = {Information {{Structure}}},
-  author = {Roberts, Craige},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Semantics and Pragmatics},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {6--69},
-  issn = {1937-8912},
-  doi = {10.3765/sp.5.6},
-  abstract = {A framework for pragmatic analysis is proposed which treats discourse as a game, with context as a scoreboard organized around the questions under discussion by the interlocutors. The framework is intended to be coordinated with a dynamic compositional semantics. Accordingly, the context of utterance is modeled as a tuple of different types of information, and the questions therein \textemdash{} modeled, as is usual in formal semantics, as alternative sets of propositions \textemdash{} constrain the felicitous flow of discourse. A requirement of Relevance is satisfied by an utterance (whether an assertion, a question or a suggestion) iff it addresses the question under discussion. Finally, it is argued that the prosodic focus of an utterance canonically serves to reflect the question under discussion (at least in English), placing additional constraints on felicity in context. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.6 BibTeX info},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2014 Craige Roberts},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {assertion,focus,formal pragmatics,information structure,questions},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ASWALTBQ/Roberts_2012_Information Structure.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Roberts2020,
-  title = {Relative {{Necessity}} and {{Propositional Quantification}}},
-  author = {Roberts, Alexander},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {49},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {703--726},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-019-09534-8},
-  abstract = {Following Smiley's (The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28, 113\textendash 134 1963) influential proposal, it has become standard practice to characterise notions of relative necessity in terms of simple strict conditionals. However, Humberstone (Reports on Mathematical Logic, 13, 33\textendash 42 1981) and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley's now standard account of relative necessity. In their recent article, Hale and Leech (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46, 1\textendash 26 2017) propose a novel account of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems facing the standard account. Nevertheless, the current article argues that Hale \& Leech's account suffers from its own defects, some of which Hale \& Leech are aware of but underplay. To supplement this criticism, the article offers an alternative account of relative necessity which overcomes these defects. This alternative account is developed in a quantified modal propositional logic and is shown model-theoretically to meet several desiderata of an account of relative necessity.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NWWWAINV/Roberts_2020_Relative Necessity and Propositional Quantification.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Robertson2016,
-  title = {Essential vs. {{Accidental Properties}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Robertson, Teresa and Atkins, Philip},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2016},
-  edition = {Summer 2016},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {The distinction between essential versus accidentalproperties has been characterized in various ways, but it iscurrently most commonly understood in modal terms: an essentialproperty of an object is a property that it must have, while anaccidental property of an object is one that it happens tohave but that it could lack. Let's call this the basic modalcharacterization, where a modal characterization of anotion is one that explains the notion in terms ofnecessity/possibility. In the characterization just given of thedistinction between essential and accidental properties, the use ofthe word ``must'' reflects the fact thatnecessity is invoked, while the use of the word``could'' reflects that possibility isinvoked. The notions of necessity and possibility are interdefinable:to say that something is necessary is to say that its negation is notpossible; to say that something is possible is to say that itsnegation is not necessary; to say that an object must have a certainproperty is to say that it could not lack it; and to say that anobject could have a certain property is to say that it is not the casethat it must lack it., Many would say that each individual human could not fail to be human;if so, then the basic modal characterization counts the property ofbeing human as an essential property of each human. And, too, manywould say that although someone, say Socrates, is in fact fond ofdogs, Socrates could have lacked that property; if that is right, thenthe basic modal characterization counts the property of being fond ofdogs as an accidental property of Socrates., A modal characterization of the distinction between essential andaccidental properties is taken for granted in nearly all work inanalytic metaphysics since the 1950s. Advocates of the modalcharacterization have included Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967) and SaulKripke (1972/1980), among others. However, some othercharacterizations of the distinction (see \textsection 2) have recentlygained currency. It is worth stressing here at the outset thatalthough there is now some disagreement about how the distinctionbetween essential and accidental properties is to be drawn, there isnevertheless some agreement about cases. Most would agree that howeverthe distinction is drawn, it should come out that being human (orbeing human if existent) is an essential property of Socrates whilebeing fond of dogs is a merely accidental property of Socrates., Essentialism in general may be characterized as the doctrinethat (at least some) objects have (at least some) essentialproperties. This characterization is not universally accepted (see\textsection 3), but no characterization is; and at least this one has thevirtue of being simple and straightforward. As for specificessentialist claims, we have already encountered one\textemdash the claimthat the property of being human is essential to Socrates. Anotherexample is the claim that Socrates's biologicalorigin\textemdash Socrates's parents, or more particularly, the spermand egg from which Socrates arose\textemdash is essential to Socrates. Thefirst example is a brand of sortal essentialism while thesecond is a brand of origin essentialism. Both of these kindsof essentialisms have figured prominently in the philosophicalliterature.}
-}
-
-@article{Robinson2006,
-  title = {Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism},
-  author = {Robinson, Luke},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {115},
-  number = {458},
-  pages = {331--360},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5DUYTWHB/2006 - Moral holism, moral generalism, and moral dispositionalism - Robinson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EZJVFQXU/2006 - Moral holism, moral generalism, and moral dispositionalism - Robinson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Robinson2011,
-  title = {Moral Principles as Moral Dispositions},
-  author = {Robinson, Luke},
-  year = {2011},
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {156},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {289--309},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QA9HN3PL/2011 - Moral principles as moral dispositions - Robinson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QZEMMQPX/2011 - Moral principles as moral dispositions - Robinson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rocca2010,
-  title = {{{PSR}}},
-  author = {Rocca, Michael Della},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {Philosopher's Imprint},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {7},
-  pages = {1--13},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/25YR5GGK/2010 - PSR - Rocca.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WHS5SXFD/2010 - PSR - Rocca.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Rodriguez-Pereyra2005,
-  title = {Why {{Truthmakers}}},
-  booktitle = {Truthmakers: {{The}} Contemporary Debate},
-  author = {{Rodriguez-Pereyra}, Gonzalo},
-  editor = {Beebee, H. and Dodd, J.},
-  year = {2005},
-  pages = {17--31},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2006,
-  title = {Truthmakers},
-  author = {{Rodriguez-Pereyra}, Gonzalo},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {186--200}
-}
-
-@article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2015a,
-  title = {Grounding Is Not a {{Strict Order}}},
-  author = {{Rodriguez-Pereyra}, Gonzalo},
-  year = {2015/ed},
-  journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {517--534},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {2053-4477, 2053-4485},
-  doi = {10.1017/apa.2014.22},
-  abstract = {The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also argues that truthmaking is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {metametaphysics,metaphysics,ontology},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JR5MUG3D/Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Grounding is not a Strict Order.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rosen1990,
-  title = {Modal {{Fictionalism}}},
-  author = {Rosen, Gideon},
-  year = {1990},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {XCIX},
-  number = {395},
-  pages = {327--354},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/XCIX.395.327},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/AXYDPY6R/327.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Rosen2006,
-  title = {The {{Limits}} of {{Contingency}}},
-  booktitle = {Identity and {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Rosen, Gideon},
-  editor = {MacBride, Fraser},
-  year = {2006},
-  pages = {13--39},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}
-}
-
-@article{Rosen2010,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Dependence}}: {{Grounding}} and {{Reduction}}},
-  author = {Rosen, Gideon},
-  editor = {Hale, Bob and Hoffmann, Aviv},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology},
-  number = {2007},
-  pages = {109--136},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V7ZDK99K/2010 - Metaphysical Dependence Grounding and Reduction - Rosen.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rosen2015,
-  title = {Defining an {{Object}}},
-  author = {Rosen, Gideon},
-  year = {Draft},
-  journal = {Unpublished paper},
-  pages = {1--12},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2NVWUHJR/2015 - Defining an Object - Rosen.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z2PSW9WH/2015 - Defining an Object - Rosen.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rosen2015a,
-  title = {Real {{Definition}}},
-  author = {Rosen, Gideon},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
-  volume = {56},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {189--209},
-  issn = {2153-960X},
-  doi = {10.1111/phib.12067},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A8SXERUA/Rosen - 2015 - Real Definition.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Rosen2017,
-  title = {What Is a {{Moral Law}}?},
-  booktitle = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaethics}} 12},
-  author = {Rosen, Gideon},
-  year = {2017},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0006},
-  abstract = {This chapter explores bridge-law non-naturalism: the view that when a particular thing possesses a moral property or stands in a moral relation, this fact is metaphysically grounded in non-normative features of the thing in question together with a general moral law. Any view of this sort faces two challenges, analogous to familiar challenges in the philosophy of science: to specify the form of the explanatory laws, and to say when a fact of that form qualifies as a law. The chapter explores three strategies for answering these questions, all of which maintain that a moral law is a true generalization of the form [It is normatively necessary that whatever {$\phi$}‎s is (thereby) F].},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-880507-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {laws of nature,metaethics,metaphysical grounding,metaphysics,moral explanation,moral laws,normative grounding},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CKKYFI8U/Rosen - 2017 - What is a Moral Law.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Rosenblatt2011,
-  title = {Random {{Processes}}},
-  author = {Rosenblatt, M.},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = dec,
-  edition = {2nd ed. 1974. Softcover reprint of the original 2nd ed. 1974 edition},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  isbn = {978-1-4612-9854-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/77UGTAMT/Rosenblatt_2011_Random Processes.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Ross2002,
-  title = {The {{Right}} and the {{Good}}},
-  author = {Ross, William David},
-  year = {2002},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/278V7F95/2002 - The Right and the Good - Ross.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VPJMETYL/2002 - The Right and the Good - Ross.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Ross2012,
-  title = {A {{First Course}} in {{Probability}}},
-  author = {Ross, Sheldon},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = dec,
-  edition = {9th edition},
-  publisher = {{Pearson}},
-  address = {{Boston}},
-  isbn = {978-0-321-79477-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B85K8ZM5/cs229-prob.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TBA4LR8T/Ross - 2012 - A First Course in Probability.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rothschild2015,
-  title = {On the {{Dynamics}} of {{Conversation}}},
-  author = {Rothschild, Daniel and Yalcin, Seth},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  pages = {n/a-n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12121},
-  abstract = {There is a longstanding debate in the literature about static versus dynamic approaches to meaning and conversation. A formal result due to van Benthem (, ) is often thought to be important for understanding what, conceptually speaking, is at issue in the debate. We introduce the concept of a conversation system, and we use it to clarify the import of van Benthem's result. We then distinguish two classes of conversation systems, corresponding to two concepts of staticness. The first class corresponds to a generalization of the class of systems that van Benthem's result concerns. These are the strongly static conversation systems. The second class is broader, and allows for a certain commonly recognized form of context sensitivity. These are the weakly static conversation systems. In the vein of van Benthem's result, we supply representation theorems which independently characterize these two varieties of conversation system. We observe that some canonically dynamic semantic systems correspond to weakly static conversation systems. We close by discussing some hazards that arise in trying to bring our formal results to bear on natural language phenomena, and on the debate about whether the compositional semantics for natural language should take a dynamic shape.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LQ5FFGIE/Rothschild and Yalcin - 2015 - On the Dynamics of Conversation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rothschild2017,
-  title = {Yablo's Semantic Machinery},
-  author = {Rothschild, Daniel},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {174},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {787--796},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0759-3},
-  abstract = {Yablo's Aboutness introduces powerful new set of tools for analyzing meaning. I compare his account of subject matter to the related ideas employed in the semantics literature on questions and focus. I then discuss two applications of subject matter: to presupposition triggering and to ascriptions of shared content.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D4HR2QHT/Rothschild - 2017 - Yablo’s semantic machinery.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Rothstein1998,
-  title = {Events and {{Grammar}}},
-  author = {Rothstein, Susan},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = jul,
-  publisher = {{Springer Science \& Business Media}},
-  abstract = {In recent years, the study of events and their role as implicit arguments of predicates has been at the center of much important work in semantics and the syntax/semantics interface. This volume brings together fourteen original studies by leading scholars in semantics and the syntax/semantics interface, covering a broad spectrum of research into the role of events in grammar. The papers extensively address the following topics, among others: event arguments and thematic argument structure; the role of events in verbal aspectual distinctions; events and the distinction between stage and individual level predicates; the role of events in the analysis of plurality and scope relations, the mass/count distinction, and propositional attitudes.},
-  googlebooks = {UvGkn6OsBU0C},
-  isbn = {978-0-7923-4940-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Language Arts \& Disciplines / Grammar \& Punctuation,Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / General,Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / Historical \& Comparative,Language Arts \& Disciplines / Linguistics / Semantics,Philosophy / Language,Philosophy / Reference},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/J5HAAUXI/Rothstein - 1998 - Events and Grammar.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Routley1972,
-  title = {The Semantics of Entailment\textemdash{{II}}},
-  author = {Routley, Richard and Meyer, Robert K.},
-  year = {1972},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {53--73},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00649991},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8PBZWWXA/Routley and Meyer - 1972 - The semantics of entailment—II.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Rubin1967,
-  title = {Set Theory for the Mathematician},
-  author = {Rubin, Jean E.},
-  year = {1967},
-  publisher = {{Holden-Day}},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Mathematics / Logic,Mathematics / Set Theory,Set theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/F3B56SH3/[Jean_E._Rubin]_Set_Theory_for_the_Mathematician_((BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rumfitt2012,
-  title = {On {{A Neglected Path}} to {{Intuitionism}}},
-  author = {Rumfitt, Ian},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy},
-  volume = {31},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {101--109},
-  issn = {0167-7411, 1572-8749},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11245-011-9108-5},
-  abstract = {According to Quine, in any disagreement over basic logical laws the contesting parties must mean different things by the connectives or quantifiers implicated in those laws; when a deviant logician `tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject'. The standard (Heyting) semantics for intuitionism offers some confirmation for this thesis, for it represents an intuitionist as attaching quite different senses to the connectives than does a classical logician. All the same, I think Quine was wrong, even about the dispute between classicists and intuitionists. I argue for this by presenting an account of consequence, and a cognate semantic theory for the language of the propositional calculus, which (a) respects the meanings of the connectives as embodied in the familiar classical truth-tables, (b) does not presuppose Bivalence, and with respect to which (c) the rules of the intuitionist propositional calculus are sound and complete. Thus the disagreement between classicists and intuitionists, at least, need not stem from their attaching different senses to the connectives; one may deny the doctrine without changing the subject. The basic notion of my semantic theory is truth at a possibility, where a possibility is a way that (some) things might be, but which differs from a possible world in that the way in question need not be fully specific or determinate. I compare my approach with a previous theory of truth at a possibility due to Lloyd Humberstone, and with a previous attempt to refute Quine's thesis due to John McDowell.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TM4PSEKC/Rumfitt - 2012 - On A Neglected Path to Intuitionism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Russell1919,
-  title = {{The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: Lectures 5-6}},
-  shorttitle = {{The Philosophy of Logical Atomism}},
-  author = {Russell, Bertrand},
-  editor = {Sugden, Sherwood J. B.},
-  year = {1919},
-  journal = {Monist},
-  volume = {29},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {190--222},
-  issn = {0026-9662},
-  doi = {10.5840/monist19192922},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FB8HLQAE/monist29-0190 (1).pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Russell2014,
-  title = {Routledge {{Companion}} to {{Philosophy}} of {{Language}}},
-  editor = {Russell, Gillian and Fara, Delia Graff},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {1st edition},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  address = {{New York London}},
-  isbn = {978-1-138-77618-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4NAWZGC6/Russell and Fara - 2014 - Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Rydehn2021,
-  title = {Grounding and Ontological Dependence},
-  author = {Ryd{\'e}hn, Henrik},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1231--1256},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1818-4},
-  abstract = {Recent metaphysics has seen a surge of interest in grounding\textemdash a relation of non-causal determination underlying a distinctive kind of explanation common in philosophy. In this article, I investigate the connection between grounding and another phenomenon of great interest to metaphysics: ontological dependence. There are interesting parallels between the two phenomena: for example, both are commonly invoked through the use of ``dependence'' terminology, and there is a great deal of overlap in the motivations typically appealed to when introducing them. I approach the question of the relationship between grounding and ontological dependence through an investigation of their modal connections (or lack thereof). I argue, firstly, that on the common assumption that grounding is factive, it can be shown that no known variety of rigid ontological dependence is either necessary or sufficient for grounding. I also offer some suggestions in support of the claim that this generalizes to every possible form of rigid ontological dependence. I then broaden the discussion by considering a non-factive conception of grounding, as well as by looking at forms of generic (rather than rigid) ontological dependence. I argue that there is at least one form of rigid ontological dependence that is sufficient for non-factive grounding, and that a form of generic dependence may be necessary (but not sufficient) both for factive and non-factive grounding. However, justifying even these fairly weak modal connections between grounding and ontological dependence turns out to require some quite specific and substantive assumptions about the two phenomena that have only rarely been discussed.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K5Q545MQ/Rydéhn_2021_Grounding and ontological dependence.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Ryle1933,
-  title = {`{{About}}'},
-  author = {Ryle, G.},
-  year = {1933},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {10--12},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/1.1.10},
-  abstract = {G. Ryle;  `About', Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 1, 1 November 1933, Pages 10\textendash 12, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/1.1.10},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IRTIQIMU/Ryle - 1933 - ‘About’.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Ryle2009,
-  title = {The {{Concept}} of {{Mind}}},
-  author = {Ryle, Gilbert},
-  year = {2009},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  keywords = {behaviorism},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NU728TJ8/2009 - The Concept of Mind - Ryle.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WSVWGA54/2009 - The Concept of Mind - Ryle.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Salama2008,
-  title = {Topologies {{Induced}} by {{Relations}} with {{Applications}}},
-  author = {Salama, A. S.},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Journal of Computer Science},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {10},
-  pages = {877--887},
-  publisher = {{Science Publications}},
-  issn = {1552-6607},
-  doi = {10.3844/jcssp.2008.877.887},
-  langid = {american},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CPJXA5GA/Salama_2008_Topologies Induced by Relations with Applications.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UT3CSJJN/jcssp.2008.877.html}
-}
-
-@article{Salerno2007,
-  title = {Williamson on {{Counterpossibles}}},
-  author = {Salerno, Joe and Brogaard, Berit},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {The Reasoner},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TR2PWN2V/Salerno and Brogaard - 2007 - Williamson on Counterpossibles.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Salmon1987,
-  title = {The {{Fact}} That {{X}}=y},
-  author = {Salmon, Nathan U.},
-  year = {1987},
-  journal = {Philosophia},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {517--518},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N7S3B3KP/1987 - The Fact that x=y - Salmon.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Salmon1989,
-  title = {The {{Logic}} of {{What Might Have Been}}},
-  author = {Salmon, Nathan},
-  year = {1989},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {98},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {3--34},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.2307/2185369},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CXXFMUUS/Salmon - 1989 - The Logic of What Might Have Been.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Salmon1994,
-  title = {Causality without {{Counterfactuals}}},
-  author = {Salmon, Wesley C.},
-  year = {1994},
-  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {297--312},
-  publisher = {{[The University of Chicago Press, Philosophy of Science Association]}},
-  issn = {0031-8248},
-  abstract = {This paper presents a drastically revised version of the theory of causality, based on analyses of causal processes and causal interactions, advocated in Salmon (1984). Relying heavily on modified versions of proposals by P. Dowe, this article answers penetrating objections by Dowe and P. Kitcher to the earlier theory. It shows how the new theory circumvents a host of difficulties that have been raised in the literature. The result is, I hope, a more satisfactory analysis of physical causality.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6BH5L65Q/Salmon - 1994 - Causality without Counterfactuals.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Salmon2005,
-  title = {Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning},
-  author = {Salmon, Nathan U.},
-  year = {2005},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning brings together Nathan Salmon's influential papers on topics in the metaphysics of existence, non-existence, and fiction; modality and its logic; strict identity, including personal identity; numbers and numerical quantifiers; the philosophical significance of Godel's Incompleteness theorems; and semantic content and designation. Including a previously unpublished essay and a helpful new introduction to orient the reader, the volume offers rich and varied sustenance for philosophers and logicians.},
-  isbn = {0-19-928471-7},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PU63IPMV/2005 - Metaphysics, mathematics, and meaning - Salmon.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YAJY3DS9/2005 - Metaphysics, mathematics, and meaning - Salmon.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Savage1972,
-  title = {The {{Foundations}} of {{Statistics}}},
-  author = {Savage, Leonard J.},
-  year = {1972},
-  month = jun,
-  edition = {2nd Revised ed. edition},
-  publisher = {{Dover Publications}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  isbn = {978-0-486-62349-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EG6LDIPA/Savage_1972_The Foundations of Statistics.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Sayer1997,
-  title = {Essentialism, {{Social Constructionism}}, and Beyond},
-  author = {Sayer, Andrew},
-  year = {1997},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {The Sociological Review},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {453--487},
-  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Ltd}},
-  issn = {0038-0261},
-  doi = {10.1111/1467-954X.00073},
-  abstract = {Anti-essentialism has criticised a range of targets, from cultural essentialism and biological reductionism to causal explanation and foundationalism, and concerning topics ranging from markets to `race', identity and sexuality. The paper assesses these diverse lines of critique. Some social phenomena, like identities, clearly do not have essences, but it does not follow from this that other phenomena we study do not have essences or something like them. While a strong, or deterministic essentialism is always wrong and often dangerously misleading, a moderate, non-deterministic essentialism is necessary for explanation and for a social science that claims to be critical and have emancipatory potential. The concept of essence is problematic, but not for some of the epistemological and ontological reasons put forward by anti-essentialism. Strong variants of social constructionism are liable to invert rather than resolve the problems of strong essentialism, including those of its biological reductionist guises. While it may be best to avoid concepts of essences which assume that the distinguishing and generative properties of objects must coincide, we still need to distinguish classes of objects and identify causal powers which enable and constrain what those objects can do.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TCHKNL22/Sayer - 1997 - Essentialism, Social Constructionism, and beyond.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2000,
-  title = {Trumping {{Preemption}}},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2000},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {97},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {165--181},
-  publisher = {{Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2678388},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/95XR26HF/Schaffer - 2000 - Trumping Preemption.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2008,
-  title = {Truthmaker Commitments},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2008},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {141},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {7--19},
-  keywords = {1 ontological commitments,a theory are what,grounding á fundamental,ontological commitments,the ontological commitments of,the theory says exists,thus,truthmaker á commitment á},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/48GDUHJ5/2008 - Truthmaker commitments - Schaffer.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D774FM96/2008 - Truthmaker commitments - Schaffer.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FQNSDZZ7/2008 - Truthmaker commitments - Schaffer.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Schaffer2009,
-  title = {On {{What Grounds What}}},
-  booktitle = {Metametaphysics: {{New Essays}} on the {{Foundations}} of {{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  editor = {Manley, David and Chalmers, David J. and Wasserman, Ryan},
-  year = {2009},
-  pages = {347--383},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benbrastmckie/Documents/Philosophy/Papers/Explanation/Quotes/Schaffer2009.md;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U4VVRLCP/Schaffer - 2009 - On What Grounds What.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2010,
-  title = {Monism: {{The Priority}} of the {{Whole}}},
-  shorttitle = {Monism},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {119},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {31--76},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EC5ETWEM/Schaffer - 2010 - Monism The Priority of the Whole.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Schaffer2012,
-  title = {Grounding, {{Transitivity}}, and {{Contrastivity}}},
-  booktitle = {Metaphysical {{Grounding}}: {{Understanding}} the {{Structure}} of {{Reality}}},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  editor = {Correia, Fabrice and Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  year = {2012},
-  pages = {122--138},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TD3KWFKG/Schaffer - 2012 - Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2015,
-  title = {What {{Not}} to {{Multiply Without Necessity}}},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {93},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {644--664},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048402.2014.992447},
-  abstract = {The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle\textemdash The Laser\textemdash which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PTJETIV8/Schaffer - 2015 - What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2016,
-  title = {Grounding in the Image of Causation},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {173},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {49--100},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1},
-  abstract = {Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9HDAH93V/Schaffer - 2016 - Grounding in the image of causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2017,
-  title = {Laws for {{Metaphysical Explanation}}},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2017},
-  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {302--321},
-  issn = {1758-2237},
-  doi = {10.1111/phis.12111},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phis.12111},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S4TAP8BC/Schaffer - 2017 - Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schaffer2019,
-  title = {Anchoring as {{Grounding}}: {{On Epstein}}'s the {{Ant Trap}}},
-  shorttitle = {Anchoring as {{Grounding}}},
-  author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {99},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {749--767},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12645},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2019 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Inc},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Schiffer1999,
-  title = {The {{Epistemic Theory}} of {{Vagueness}}},
-  author = {Schiffer, Stephen},
-  year = {1999},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {33},
-  pages = {481--503},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.21},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1999},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8PHKJATC/Schiffer - 1999 - The Epistemic Theory of Vagueness.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NCJ9VWN4/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@article{Schiffer2000,
-  title = {Vagueness and {{Partial Belief}}},
-  author = {Schiffer, Stephen},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {34},
-  pages = {220--257},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.22},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 2000},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UMY5TQXP/Schiffer - 2000 - Vagueness and Partial Belief.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GJWZ5EAF/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@article{Schnieder2006a,
-  title = {A {{Certain Kind}} of {{Trinity}}: {{Dependence}}, {{Substance}}, {{Explanation}}},
-  shorttitle = {A {{Certain Kind}} of {{Trinity}}},
-  author = {Schnieder, Benjamin Sebastian},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {129},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {393--419},
-  issn = {0031-8116, 1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-005-4636-8},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Logic,Philosophy,Philosophy of Mind,Philosophy of Religion},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BJUV2ITC/Schnieder - 2006 - A Certain Kind of Trinity Dependence, Substance, .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schnieder2011,
-  title = {A {{Logic}} for `{{Because}}'},
-  author = {Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {4},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {445--465},
-  issn = {1755-0211, 1755-0203},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020311000104},
-  abstract = {In spite of its significance for everyday and philosophical discourse, the explanatory connective `because' has not received much treatment in the philosophy of logic. The present paper develops a logic for `because' based on systematic connections between `because' and the truth-functional connectives.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MH5VJHEZ/Schnieder - 2011 - A Logic for ‘Because’.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Schnieder2021,
-  title = {On Ground and Consequence},
-  author = {Schnieder, Benjamin},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1335--1363},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02012-9},
-  abstract = {What does it mean that some proposition follows from others? The standard way of spelling out the notion proceeds in modal terms: x follows from y iff necessarily, if y is true, so is x. But although this yields a useful and manageable account of consequence, it fails to capture certain aspects of our pre-theoretical understanding of consequence. In this paper, an alternative notion of logical consequence, based on the idea of grounding, is developed.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KXMVQEWV/Schnieder_2021_On ground and consequence.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Scholkopf2021,
-  title = {Towards {{Causal Representation Learning}}},
-  author = {Sch{\"o}lkopf, Bernhard and Locatello, Francesco and Bauer, Stefan and Ke, Nan Rosemary and Kalchbrenner, Nal and Goyal, Anirudh and Bengio, Yoshua},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = feb,
-  number = {arXiv:2102.11107},
-  eprint = {2102.11107},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2102.11107},
-  abstract = {The two fields of machine learning and graphical causality arose and developed separately. However, there is now cross-pollination and increasing interest in both fields to benefit from the advances of the other. In the present paper, we review fundamental concepts of causal inference and relate them to crucial open problems of machine learning, including transfer and generalization, thereby assaying how causality can contribute to modern machine learning research. This also applies in the opposite direction: we note that most work in causality starts from the premise that the causal variables are given. A central problem for AI and causality is, thus, causal representation learning, the discovery of high-level causal variables from low-level observations. Finally, we delineate some implications of causality for machine learning and propose key research areas at the intersection of both communities.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JSUQHU8Q/Schölkopf et al. - 2021 - Towards Causal Representation Learning.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IDWVCYHR/2102.html}
-}
-
-@article{Schroeter2004,
-  title = {The {{Limits}} of {{Conceptual Analysis}}},
-  author = {Schroeter, Laura},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {85},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {425--453},
-  issn = {1468-0114},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00209.x},
-  abstract = {Abstract: A priori conceptual analysis is once again part of the philosophical mainstream. Unlike their verificationist predecessors, modern conceptual analysts deny that we have armchair access to the essential nature of the objects and properties we think about. Instead, they claim we have access to how the reference of our words and thoughts is fixed. This position seems to resolve the apparent tension between semantic externalism and privileged access to one's own meanings. However, I argue that our grasp of reference-fixing conditions is as fallible as our understanding of essences.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00209.x},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PLQG6B57/Schroeter - 2004 - The Limits of Conceptual Analysis.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Schuller2022,
-  title = {Composing {{Complex}} and {{Hybrid AI Solutions}}},
-  author = {Sch{\"u}ller, Peter and Costeira, Jo{\~a}o Paolo and Crowley, James and Grosinger, Jasmin and Ingrand, F{\'e}lix and K{\"o}ckemann, Uwe and Saffiotti, Alessandro and Welss, Martin},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = feb,
-  number = {arXiv:2202.12566},
-  eprint = {2202.12566},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  abstract = {Progress in several areas of computer science has been enabled by comfortable and efficient means of experimentation, clear interfaces, and interchangable components, for example using OpenCV for computer vision or ROS for robotics. We describe an extension of the Acumos system towards enabling the above features for general AI applications. Originally, Acumos was created for telecommunication purposes, mainly for creating linear pipelines of machine learning components. Our extensions include support for more generic components with gRPC/Protobuf interfaces, automatic orchestration of graphically assembled solutions including control loops, sub-component topologies, and event-based communication,and provisions for assembling solutions which contain user interfaces and shared storage areas. We provide examples of deployable solutions and their interfaces. The framework is deployed at http://aiexp.ai4europe.eu/ and its source code is managed as an open source Eclipse project.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NQVP7UJG/Schüller et al. - 2022 - Composing Complex and Hybrid AI Solutions.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q7YGVEYZ/2202.html}
-}
-
-@article{Scott1966,
-  title = {The {{Notion}} of {{Rank}} in {{Set-Theory}}},
-  author = {Scott, Dana},
-  year = {1966},
-  journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {31},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {662--663}
-}
-
-@article{Scott1971,
-  title = {On {{Engendering}} an {{Illusion}} of {{Understanding}}},
-  author = {Scott, Dana},
-  year = {1971},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {21},
-  pages = {787--807},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3B56PNP2/Scott - 1971 - On Engendering an Illusion of Understanding.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Segerberg2020,
-  title = {The {{Logic}} of {{Action}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Stanford Encyclopedia}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Segerberg, Krister and Meyer, John-Jules and Kracht, Marcus},
-  editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2020},
-  edition = {Summer 2020},
-  publisher = {{Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}},
-  abstract = {In this article we provide a brief overview of the logic of action in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and artificial intelligence. The logic of action is the formal study of action in which formal languages are the main tool of analysis., The concept of action is of central interest to many disciplines: the social sciences including economics, the humanities including history and literature, psychology, linguistics, law, computer science, artificial intelligence, and probably others. In philosophy it has been studied since the beginning because of its importance for epistemology and, particularly, ethics; and since a few decades it is even studied for its own sake. But it is in the logic o faction that action is studied in the most abstract way., The logic of action began in philosophy. But it has also played a certain role in linguistics. And currently it is of great importance in computer science and artificial intelligence. For our purposes it is natural to separate the accounts of these developments.},
-  keywords = {events,frame problem,logic: dynamic epistemic,logic: non-monotonic,logic: propositional dynamic,logic: temporal,semantics: dynamic,situations: in natural language semantics,speech acts}
-}
-
-@book{Seneca2005,
-  title = {Great {{Ideas On}} the {{Shortness}} of {{Life}}},
-  author = {{Seneca}},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = feb,
-  edition = {UK ed. edition},
-  publisher = {{Penguin UK}},
-  address = {{London}},
-  abstract = {Timeless advice on the art of living well, from the celebrated Penguin Great Ideas series The writings of the ancient Roman philosopher Seneca offer powerful insights into stoicism, morality and the importance of reason, and continue to provide profound guidance to many through their eloquence, lucidity and wisdom. Throughout history, some books have changed the world. They have transformed the way we see ourselves - and each other. They have inspired debate, dissent, war and revolution. They have enlightened, outraged, provoked and comforted. They have enriched lives - and destroyed them. The Penguin Great Ideas series brings you the works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization, and helped make us who we are.},
-  isbn = {978-0-14-101881-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MZR642D3/Seneca - 2005 - Great Ideas On the Shortness of Life.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Shafer-Landau2007,
-  title = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaethics}}, {{Volume}} 2},
-  editor = {{Shafer-Landau}, Russ},
-  year = {2007},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HAKJ4NFB/2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2 - Unknown.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JD43G86N/2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2 - Unknown.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Shaffer2012,
-  title = {Counterfactuals and {{Scientific Realism}}},
-  author = {Shaffer, Michael J.},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = aug,
-  edition = {2012th edition},
-  publisher = {{Palgrave Macmillan}},
-  address = {{Basingstoke}},
-  isbn = {978-0-230-30845-9},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@phdthesis{Shaheen2014,
-  title = {Meaning and {{Explanation}}},
-  author = {Shaheen, Jonathan Louis},
-  year = {2014},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IIMGIINM/2014 - Meaning and Explanation - Shaheen.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V65F9QD9/2014 - Meaning and Explanation - Shaheen.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Shapiro2001,
-  title = {Classical {{Logic II}}: {{Higher-Order Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Blackwell Guide}} to {{Philosophical Logic}}},
-  author = {Shapiro, Stewart},
-  editor = {Goble, Lou},
-  year = {2001},
-  pages = {33--54},
-  publisher = {{Blackwell}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A8M6T6KI/2001 - Classical Logic II Higher-Order Logic - Shapiro.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VKQN6J2R/2001 - Classical Logic II Higher-Order Logic - Shapiro.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Sharma2020,
-  title = {{{CERTIFAI}}: {{Counterfactual Explanations}} for {{Robustness}}, {{Transparency}}, {{Interpretability}}, and {{Fairness}} of {{Artificial Intelligence}} Models},
-  shorttitle = {{{CERTIFAI}}},
-  booktitle = {Proceedings of the {{AAAI}}/{{ACM Conference}} on {{AI}}, {{Ethics}}, and {{Society}}},
-  author = {Sharma, Shubham and Henderson, Jette and Ghosh, Joydeep},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = feb,
-  eprint = {1905.07857},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, stat},
-  pages = {166--172},
-  doi = {10.1145/3375627.3375812},
-  abstract = {As artificial intelligence plays an increasingly important role in our society, there are ethical and moral obligations for both businesses and researchers to ensure that their machine learning models are designed, deployed, and maintained responsibly. These models need to be rigorously audited for fairness, robustness, transparency, and interpretability. A variety of methods have been developed that focus on these issues in isolation, however, managing these methods in conjunction with model development can be cumbersome and timeconsuming. In this paper, we introduce a unified and model-agnostic approach to address these issues: Counterfactual Explanations for Robustness, Transparency, Interpretability, and Fairness of Artificial Intelligence models (CERTIFAI). Unlike previous methods in this domain, CERTIFAI is a general tool that can be applied to any black-box model and any type of input data. Given a model and an input instance, CERTIFAI uses a custom genetic algorithm to generate counterfactuals: instances close to the input that change the prediction of the model. We demonstrate how these counterfactuals can be used to examine issues of robustness, interpretability, transparency, and fairness. Additionally, we introduce CERScore, the first black-box model robustness score that performs comparably to methods that have access to model internals.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning,Statistics - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/W4WKDMCV/Sharma et al. - 2020 - CERTIFAI Counterfactual Explanations for Robustne.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/T2T8ALTT/1905.html}
-}
-
-@article{Sherman2018,
-  title = {Open {{Questions}} and {{Epistemic Necessity}}},
-  author = {Sherman, Brett},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {68},
-  number = {273},
-  pages = {819--840},
-  issn = {0031-8094},
-  doi = {10.1093/pq/pqy025},
-  abstract = {Why can I not appropriately utter `It must be raining' while standing outside in the rain, even though every world consistent with my knowledge is one in which it is raining? The common response to this problem is to hold that epistemic must, in addition to quantifying over epistemic possibilities, carries some additional evidential information concerning the source of one'S evidence. I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic modals are mere quantifiers over epistemic possibilities. My central claim is that the seeming anomaly of the data above arises from a mistaken conception of what a possibility is. Instead of conceiving of possibilities as possible worlds, I argue that we should conceive of possibilities as answers to open questions.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3LZYMSMV/Sherman - 2018 - Open Questions and Epistemic Necessity.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Sider2001a,
-  title = {Four-{{Dimensionalism}}: {{An Ontology}} of {{Persistence}} and {{Time}}},
-  shorttitle = {Four-{{Dimensionalism}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2001},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {Four-Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four-dimensionalism faces. Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four-dimensionalism include novel arguments based on time travel, the debate beween spacetime substantivalists and relationalists, and vagueness. Also included is a comprehensive discussion of the paradoxes of coinciding material objects, and a novel resolution of those paradoxes based on temporal counterpart theory. In conclusion Sider replies to prominent objections to four-dimensionalism, including discussion of the problem of the rotating homogenous disk.Four Dimensionalism is an original and highly readable study of the metaphysics of time and identity.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-926352-3}
-}
-
-@article{Sider2002,
-  title = {The {{Ersatz Pluriverse}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {99},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {279--315},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/3655585},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 2002 Journal of Philosophy, Inc.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P6PAY4KT/Sider - 2002 - The Ersatz Pluriverse.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Sider2005,
-  title = {Reductive {{Theories}} of {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = sep,
-  doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.003.0008},
-  abstract = {Modality is important to philosophy for many reasons. A first reason derives from philosophy's traditional association with logic. Advances in modal logic in the middle of the twentieth century provided a reason to be interested in the modalities. Moreover, propositions that are logically true seem necessarily true. Another source of modality's importance is that necessary truth, according to one tradition, demarcates philosophical from empirical inquiry. Science identifies contingent aspects of the world, whereas philosophical inquiry reveals the essential nature of its objects; philosophical propositions are therefore necessarily true when true at all.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UBSKSL2K/reductive_theories_of_modality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Sider2009,
-  title = {Williamson's {{Many Necessary Existents}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {69},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {50--58},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/anp010},
-  abstract = {This note is to show that a well-known point about David Lewis\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquoteright\{\}s (1986) modal realism applies to Timothy Williamson\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquoteright\{\}s (1998; 2002) theory of necessary existents as well.1 Each theory, together with certain \$\textbackslash backslash\$textquotedblleft\{\}recombination\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquotedblright principles, generates individuals too numerous to form a set. The simplest version of the argument comes from Daniel Nolan (1996).2 Assume the following recombination principle: for each cardinal number, \$\textbackslash backslash\$ensuremath\{\$\textbackslash backslash\$nu\}, it\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquoteright\{\}s possible that there exist \$\textbackslash backslash\$ensuremath\{\$\textbackslash backslash\$nu\} nonsets. Then given Lewis\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquoteright\{\}s modal realism it follows that there can be no set of all (that is, Absolutely All) the nonsets. For suppose for reductio that there were such a set, A; let \$\textbackslash backslash\$ensuremath\{\$\textbackslash backslash\$nu\} be A\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquoteright\{\}s cardinality; and let \$\textbackslash backslash\$textmu be any cardinal number larger than \$\textbackslash backslash\$ensuremath\{\$\textbackslash backslash\$nu\}. By the recombination principle, it\$\textbackslash backslash\$textquoteright\{\}s possible that there exist \$\textbackslash backslash\$textmu nonsets; by modal realism, there exists a possible world containing, as parts, \$\textbackslash backslash\$textmu nonsets; each of these nonsets is a member of A}
-}
-
-@book{Sider2010,
-  title = {Logic for {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = jan,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  abstract = {Logic for Philosophy is an introduction to logic for students of contemporary philosophy. It is suitable both for advanced undergraduates and for beginning graduate students in philosophy. It covers i) basic approaches to logic, including proof theory and especially model theory, ii) extensions of standard logic that are important in philosophy, and iii) some elementary philosophy of logic. It emphasizes breadth rather than depth. For example, it discusses modal logic and counterfactuals, but does not prove the central metalogical results for predicate logic (completeness, undecidability, etc.) Its goal is to introduce students to the logic they need to know in order to read contemporary philosophy journal articles; its distinctive feature is that it is very user-friendly for students without an extensive background in mathematics; its niche is as the text for a "logical literacy" course.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-957558-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EDU28KK2/mpl_thms.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SMQKS4DL/_MT17 PN.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U2VACA2Q/Sider - 2010 - Logic for Philosophy.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Sider2013,
-  title = {Symposium on {{Writing}} the {{Book}} of the {{World}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {73},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {751--770},
-  issn = {0003-2638, 1467-8284},
-  doi = {10.1093/analys/ant085},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2F542EVB/Sider - 2013 - Symposium on Writing the Book of the World.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Sider2013a,
-  title = {Writing the {{Book}} of the {{World}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = nov,
-  edition = {Reprint edition},
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  abstract = {In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. In this ambitious and ground-breaking book, Theodore Sider argues that for a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts1em1ptconcepts that 'carve at the joints'1em1ptso that its conceptual structure matches reality's structure. There is an objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world'. According to Sider, metaphysics is primarily about fundamentality rather than necessity, conceptual analysis, or ontology. Fundamentality is understood in terms of structure: the fundamental truths are those truths that involve structural (joint-carving) concepts. Sider argues that part of the theory of structure is an account of how structure connects to other concepts. For example, structure can be used to illuminate laws of nature, explanation, reference, induction, physical geometry, substantivity, conventionality, objectivity, and metametaphysics. Another part is an account of how structure behaves. Since structure is a way of thinking about fundamentality, Sider's account implies distinctive answers to questions about the nature of fundamentality. These answers distinguish his theory of structure from other recent theories of fundamentality, including Kit Fine's theory of ground and reality, the theory of truthmaking, and Jonathan Schaffer's theory of ontological dependence.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-968750-3},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MVT3T6SF/[Theodore_Sider]_Writing_the_Book_of_the_World(BookZZ.org) (1).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Sider2014,
-  title = {Outscoping and {{Discourse Threat}}},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2014},
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {413--426},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A4JRG86G/2014 - Outscoping and Discourse Threat - Sider.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZZY59VVS/2014 - Outscoping and Discourse Threat - Sider.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Sider2016,
-  title = {On {{Williamson}} and Simplicity in Modal Logic},
-  author = {Sider, Theodore},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {46},
-  number = {4-5},
-  pages = {683--698},
-  issn = {0045-5091},
-  doi = {10.1080/00455091.2015.1132974},
-  abstract = {According to Timothy Williamson, we should accept the simplest and most powerful second-order modal logic, and as a result accept an ontology of "bare possibilia". This general method for extracting ontology from logic is salutary, but its application in this case depends on a questionable assumption: that modality is a fundamental feature of the world.},
-  keywords = {fundamentality,modality,necessitism,Williamson},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KVLAXKIR/Sider - 2016 - On Williamson and simplicity in modal logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@unpublished{Silva,
-  title = {Necessary and {{Sufficient Conditions Are Converse Relations}}},
-  author = {Silva, Matheus},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I5BSPXUP/Silva - Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Are Converse R.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Silver2019,
-  title = {Avoiding {{Late Preemption}} with the {{Right Kind}} of {{Influence}}},
-  author = {Silver, Kenneth},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Philosophia},
-  volume = {47},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {1297--1312},
-  issn = {1574-9274},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11406-018-0046-y},
-  abstract = {David Lewis championed a counterfactual account of causation, but counterfactual accounts have a notoriously difficult time handling cases of late preemption. These are cases in which we still count one event as the cause of another although the effect does not depend on the cause in the way taken to be necessary by the account. Lewis recognized these cases, but they have been shown to be problematic even for his final analysis of causation, the Influence Account. In this paper, I show how these cases led to and remain a problem for Lewis's Influence Account, and I give a new counterfactual account available to a Lewisian that can handle late preemption cases. What is crucial to my account is that a cause not merely has counterfactual influence over its effects, but that the cause has influence of the right kind. I conclude by arguing that even if problems remain with this account, they will not be problems of late preemption, and the problems stemming from other kinds of cases will be no worse for my account than for other counterfactual accounts.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causation,Counterfactual analysis,David Lewis,Dependence,Influence account},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X787I6FP/Silver - 2019 - Avoiding Late Preemption with the Right Kind of In.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Singh2019,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Topology}}},
-  author = {Singh, Tej Bahadur},
-  year = {2019},
-  publisher = {{Springer Singapore}},
-  address = {{Singapore}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-981-13-6954-4},
-  isbn = {9789811369537 9789811369544},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/76RSKNTX/Singh - 2019 - Introduction to Topology.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Skiles2015,
-  title = {Against {{Grounding Necessitarianism}}},
-  author = {Skiles, Alexander},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {80},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {717--751},
-  issn = {1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-014-9669-y},
-  abstract = {Can there be grounding without necessitation? Can a fact obtain wholly in virtue of metaphysically more fundamental facts, even though there are possible worlds at which the latter facts obtain but not the former? It is an orthodoxy in recent literature about the nature of grounding, and in first-order philosophical disputes about what grounds what, that the answer is no. I will argue that the correct answer is yes. I present two novel arguments against grounding necessitarianism, and show that grounding contingentism is fully compatible with the various explanatory roles that grounding is widely thought to play.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NA25EJK4/Skiles - 2015 - Against Grounding Necessitarianism.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Slaje2010,
-  title = {Neti Neti: {{On}} the Meaning of an {{Upanisadic}} Citation of Some Renown in {{Hindu}} Texts and {{Western}} Minds},
-  shorttitle = {Neti Neti},
-  author = {Slaje, Walter},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = dec,
-  publisher = {{Franz Steiner Verlag}},
-  address = {{Stuttgart}},
-  isbn = {978-3-515-09799-4},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Smiley1958,
-  title = {Entailment and {{Deducibility}}},
-  author = {Smiley, T. J.},
-  year = {1958},
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  volume = {59},
-  pages = {233--254},
-  publisher = {{[Aristotelian Society, Wiley]}},
-  issn = {0066-7374},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5MEND2VS/Smiley - 1958 - Entailment and Deducibility.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Smith1988,
-  title = {Making {{Moral Decisions}}},
-  author = {Smith, Holly M.},
-  year = {1988},
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {22},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {89--108},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  abstract = {This paper examines how a moral principle's usability for decision making is undermined by agents' ignorance or uncertainty about the features of their potential actions. 'internal' and 'external' usability are distinguished, And the idea of 'universal usability' is explained. The most promising approach for restoring usability in contexts of uncertainty (the "rules of thumb" solution) is developed in detail, But it is argued that this device fails. The question is raised why practical usability should be valued in a moral principle, And it is ultimately suggested that usability protects an important form of autonomy.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9XL8VSEK/1988 - Making Moral Decisions - Smith.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N7J6JM4I/1988 - Making Moral Decisions - Smith.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Smith2004,
-  title = {Ethics and the a Priori},
-  author = {Smith, Michael},
-  year = {2004},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TRKRA8MW/2004 - Ethics and the a priori - Smith.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZPWIEN8W/2004 - Ethics and the a priori - Smith.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Smullyan1947,
-  title = {Review: {{W}}. {{V}}. {{Quine}}, {{The Problem}} of {{Interpreting Modal Logic}}},
-  author = {Smullyan, Arthur Francis},
-  year = {1947},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {12},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {139--141},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5YGKXG6S/1947 - Review W. V. Quine, The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic - Smullyan.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Smullyan1948,
-  title = {Modality and {{Description}}},
-  author = {Smullyan, Arthur Francis},
-  year = {1948},
-  journal = {The journal of symbolic logic},
-  volume = {13},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {31--37},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E5SCSI8V/1948 - Modality and Description - Smullyan.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Snedegar2018,
-  title = {Reasons for and Reasons Against},
-  author = {Snedegar, Justin},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {175},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {725--743},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-017-0889-2},
-  abstract = {What an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus on competition between reasons for competing options. But what an agent ought to do also depends on the reasons against those options. The balancing metaphor does not provide an obvious way to represent reasons against. Partly as a result of this, there is a serious lack of work on reasons against. A simple view is that there is no problem here, since reasons against an option are really just more reasons for\textemdash in particular, reasons for certain alternatives. This simple view lets us maintain the balancing metaphor, and more importantly, it simplifies theorizing about the competition between reasons. This is because if it's true, there is really just one kind of competition, the competition between reasons for competing options. This paper challenges the simple view, arguing against several ways of identifying which alternatives to an option the reasons against it are reasons for. I also sketch a competing view, according to which reasons against are distinct from reasons for\textemdash these are two different normative relations. If this kind of view is correct, then our theory of the competition between reasons will need to recognize at least two kinds of competition: the one between reasons for competing options, and the one between the reasons for an option and the reasons against it.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E3CTKK54/Snedegar - 2018 - Reasons for and reasons against.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Soames1998,
-  title = {The {{Modal Argument}}: {{Wide Scope}} and {{Rigidified Descriptions}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Modal Argument}}},
-  author = {Soames, Scott},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.00084},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers Inc. 1998},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5TUNMC57/Soames - 1998 - The Modal Argument Wide Scope and Rigidified Desc.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6NUIJ9N2/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@article{Soares,
-  title = {Questions of {{Reasoning Under Logical Uncertainty}}},
-  author = {Soares, Nate and Fallenstein, Benja},
-  pages = {8},
-  abstract = {A logically uncertain reasoner would be able to reason as if they know both a programming language and a program, without knowing what the program outputs. Most practical reasoning involves some logical uncertainty, but no satisfactory theory of reasoning under logical uncertainty yet exists. A better theory of reasoning under logical uncertainty is needed in order to develop the tools necessary to construct highly reliable artificial reasoners. This paper introduces the topic, discusses a number of historical results, and describes a number of open problems.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VVR3CAJ8/Soares and Fallenstein - Questions of Reasoning Under Logical Uncertainty.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Soares2015,
-  title = {Two {{Attempts}} to {{Formalize Counterpossible Reasoning}} in {{Deterministic Settings}}},
-  booktitle = {Artificial {{General Intelligence}}},
-  author = {Soares, Nate and Fallenstein, Benja},
-  editor = {Bieger, Jordi and Goertzel, Ben and Potapov, Alexey},
-  year = {2015},
-  volume = {9205},
-  pages = {156--165},
-  publisher = {{Springer International Publishing}},
-  address = {{Cham}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-21365-1_17},
-  abstract = {This paper motivates the study of counterpossibles (logically impossible counterfactuals) as necessary for developing a decision theory suitable for generally intelligent agents embedded within their environments. We discuss two attempts to formalize a decision theory using counterpossibles, one based on graphical models and another based on proof search.},
-  isbn = {978-3-319-21364-4 978-3-319-21365-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BLENBLY5/Soares and Fallenstein - 2015 - Two Attempts to Formalize Counterpossible Reasonin.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Soares2015a,
-  title = {Toward {{Idealized Decision Theory}}},
-  author = {Soares, N. and Fallenstein, Benja},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {ArXiv},
-  abstract = {The shortcomings of two standard formulations of decision theory are discussed, and it is demonstrated that they cannot be used to describe an idealized decision procedure suitable for approximation by artificial systems. This paper motivates the study of decision theory as necessary for aligning smarter-than-human artificial systems with human interests. We discuss the shortcomings of two standard formulations of decision theory, and demonstrate that they cannot be used to describe an idealized decision procedure suitable for approximation by artificial systems. We then explore the notions of policy selection and logical counterfactuals, two recent insights into decision theory that point the way toward promising paths for future research.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BKUWM4PH/Soares and Fallenstein - 2015 - Toward Idealized Decision Theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Soares2015b,
-  title = {Toward {{Idealized Decision Theory}}},
-  author = {Soares, Nate and Fallenstein, Benja},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {arXiv:1507.01986 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1507.01986},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {This paper motivates the study of decision theory as necessary for aligning smarter-than-human artificial systems with human interests. We discuss the shortcomings of two standard formulations of decision theory, and demonstrate that they cannot be used to describe an idealized decision procedure suitable for approximation by artificial systems. We then explore the notions of policy selection and logical counterfactuals, two recent insights into decision theory that point the way toward promising paths for future research.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FUBCT3HF/Soares and Fallenstein - 2015 - Toward Idealized Decision Theory.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UCF2NMA3/1507.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Soares2017,
-  title = {Agent {{Foundations}} for {{Aligning Machine Intelligence}} with {{Human Interests}}: {{A Technical Research Agenda}}},
-  shorttitle = {Agent {{Foundations}} for {{Aligning Machine Intelligence}} with {{Human Interests}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Technological Singularity}}},
-  author = {Soares, Nate and Fallenstein, Benya},
-  editor = {Callaghan, Victor and Miller, James and Yampolskiy, Roman and Armstrong, Stuart},
-  year = {2017},
-  pages = {103--125},
-  publisher = {{Springer Berlin Heidelberg}},
-  address = {{Berlin, Heidelberg}},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-54033-6_5},
-  isbn = {978-3-662-54031-2 978-3-662-54033-6},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WU4VPK5U/Soares and Fallenstein - 2017 - Agent Foundations for Aligning Machine Intelligenc.pdf}
-}
-
-@inproceedings{Sokol2019,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Explanations}} of {{Machine Learning Predictions}}: {{Opportunities}} and {{Challenges}} for {{AI Safety}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterfactual {{Explanations}} of {{Machine Learning Predictions}}},
-  booktitle = {{{SafeAI}}@{{AAAI}}},
-  author = {Sokol, Kacper and Flach, Peter A.},
-  year = {2019},
-  abstract = {This paper describes the experience and the lessons learnt from explaining decision tree models trained on UCI German Credit and FICO Explainable Machine Learning Challenge data sets with class-contrastive counterfactual statements and reviews how counterfactUAL explanations can affect an artificial intelligence system and its safety by investigating their risks and benefits. One necessary condition for creating a safe AI system is making it transparent to uncover any unintended or harmful behaviour. Transparency can be achieved by explaining predictions of an AI system with counterfactual statements, which are becoming a de facto standard in explaining algorithmic decisions. The popularity of counterfactuals is mainly attributed to their compliance with the ``right to explanation'' introduced by the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation and them being understandable by a lay audience as well as domain experts. In this paper we describe our experience and the lessons learnt from explaining decision tree models trained on UCI German Credit and FICO Explainable Machine Learning Challenge data sets with class-contrastive counterfactual statements. We review how counterfactual explanations can affect an artificial intelligence system and its safety by investigating their risks and benefits. We show example explanations, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, show how they can be used to debug the underlying model, inspect its fairness and unveil security and privacy challenges},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FU3W3DZ4/Sokol and Flach - 2019 - Counterfactual Explanations of Machine Learning Pr.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Spirtes2001,
-  title = {Causation, {{Prediction}}, and {{Search}}, {{Second Edition}}},
-  author = {Spirtes, Peter and Glymour, Clark and Scheines, Richard},
-  year = {2001},
-  month = jan,
-  edition = {second edition},
-  publisher = {{A Bradford Book}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-19440-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KRTFAXAK/SPICPA-2.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stalnaker,
-  title = {The Problem of Logical Omniscience, {{I}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {89},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {425--440},
-  issn = {0039-7857, 1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF00413506},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WIM9EKK9/Stalnaker - The problem of logical omniscience, I.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Stalnaker1968,
-  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Conditionals}}},
-  booktitle = {Studies in {{Logical Theory}} ({{American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs}} 2)},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert C.},
-  editor = {Rescher, Nicholas},
-  year = {1968},
-  pages = {98--112},
-  publisher = {{Oxford: Blackwell}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TK62NMPJ/Stalnaker - 1968 - A Theory of Conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stalnaker1976,
-  title = {Possible {{Worlds}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  year = {1976},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {65--75},
-  issn = {0029-4624},
-  doi = {10.2307/2214477},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 1976 Wiley},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4N5P9TIT/Stalnaker - 1976 - Possible Worlds.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Stalnaker1987,
-  title = {Inquiry},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert C.},
-  year = {1987},
-  month = mar,
-  edition = {New Ed edition},
-  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge, Mass}},
-  abstract = {The abstract structure of inquiry - the process of acquiring and changing beliefs about the world - is the focus of this book which takes the position that the "pragmatic" rather than the "linguistic" approach better solves the philosophical problems about the nature of mental representation, and better accounts for the phenomena of thought and speech. It discusses propositions and propositional attitudes (the cluster of activities that constitute inquiry) in general and takes up the way beliefs change in response to potential new information, suggesting that conditional propositions should be understood as projections of epistemic policies onto the world. A Bradford Book.},
-  isbn = {978-0-262-69113-0},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RXYYZVRV/Stalnaker - 1987 - Inquiry.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Stalnaker1994,
-  title = {The {{Interaction}} of {{Modality}} with {{Quantification}} and {{Identity}}},
-  booktitle = {Modality, {{Morality}}, and {{Belief}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  editor = {{Sinnott-Armstrong}, Walter},
-  year = {1994},
-  pages = {12--28},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}}
-}
-
-@book{Stalnaker2003,
-  title = {Ways a {{World Might Be}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = feb,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8X3KJRRS/2003 - Ways a World Might Be - Stalnaker.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/N6AL3FYQ/[Robert_C._Stalnaker]_Ways_a_World_Might_Be._Metap(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stalnaker2006,
-  title = {Content and {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  editor = {Thomson, Judith and Byrne, Alex},
-  year = {2006},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4TZCAFKL/2006 - Content and Modality - Stalnaker.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Stalnaker2010,
-  title = {Merely Possible Propositions},
-  booktitle = {Modality: {{Metaphysics}}, {{Logic}}, and {{Epistemology}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  editor = {Hale, Bob and Hoffmann, Aviv},
-  year = {2010},
-  pages = {21---32},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/55SVTRZD/2010 - Merely possible propositions - Stalnaker.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I5MCW4R4/2010 - Merely possible propositions - Stalnaker.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Stalnaker2012,
-  title = {Mere {{Possibilities}}: {{Metaphysical Foundations}} of {{Modal Semantics}}},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  year = {2012},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/W9QX3K2Z/2012 - Mere Possibilities Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics - Stalnaker.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X4PATLUV/2012 - Mere Possibilities Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics - Stalnaker.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stalnaker2016,
-  title = {Models and Reality},
-  author = {Stalnaker, Robert},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {46},
-  number = {4-5},
-  pages = {709--726},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0045-5091},
-  doi = {10.1080/00455091.2016.1156979},
-  abstract = {Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this is sketched, with the help of an analogy with a Galilean relativist theory of spatial properties and relations.},
-  keywords = {Actualism,contingentism,Kripke models,necessitism,possible worlds},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1156979},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/SP63HFDU/Stalnaker - 2016 - Models and reality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stanley2001,
-  title = {Knowing {{How}}},
-  author = {Stanley, Jason C. and Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2001},
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {8},
-  pages = {1--40},
-  abstract = {Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/KM6QDUVC/2001 - Knowing How - Stanley, Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RYS2A2AU/2001 - Knowing How - Stanley, Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stanley2002,
-  title = {Modality {{And What Is Said}}},
-  author = {Stanley, Jason},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {36},
-  pages = {321--344},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.12},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2002},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/T3SVWJLW/Stanley - 2002 - Modality And What Is Said.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Stanley2011,
-  title = {Know How},
-  author = {Stanley, Jason},
-  year = {2011},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FJN7YIEP/2011 - Know how - Stanley.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UT62SCRY/2011 - Know how - Stanley.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stanley2011b,
-  title = {Knowing ({{How}})},
-  author = {Stanley, Jason},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {45},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {207--238},
-  keywords = {Download},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PJI8ETZU/2011 - Knowing (How) - Stanley.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WLCH9WWL/2011 - Knowing (How) - Stanley.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stanley2013,
-  title = {Motor Skill Depends on Knowledge of Facts},
-  author = {Stanley, Jason and Krakauer, John W},
-  year = {2013},
-  journal = {Frontiers in human neuroscience},
-  volume = {7},
-  number = {August},
-  pages = {503},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6EYDQ5P5/2013 - Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts - Stanley, Krakauer.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YTE8729Z/2013 - Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts - Stanley, Krakauer.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Star2011,
-  title = {Two Levels of Moral Thinking},
-  booktitle = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Normative Ethics}}},
-  author = {Star, Daniel},
-  year = {2011},
-  pages = {75--96},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6KIQHCLK/2011 - Two levels of moral thinking - Star.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I8MNFMHL/2011 - Two levels of moral thinking - Star.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Starr2020,
-  title = {Conditional and Counterfactual Logic},
-  author = {Starr, William B.},
-  year = {2020},
-  journal = {The Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HNFBH2GR/Starr - 2020 - Conditional and counterfactual logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Statman2013,
-  title = {Lambda {{Calculus}} with {{Types}}},
-  author = {Statman, Richard and Dekkers, Wil and Barendregt, Henk},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jun,
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge ; New York}},
-  abstract = {This handbook with exercises reveals in formalisms, hitherto mainly used for hardware and software design and verification, unexpected mathematical beauty. The lambda calculus forms a prototype universal programming language, which in its untyped version is related to Lisp, and was treated in the first author's classic The Lambda Calculus (1984). The formalism has since been extended with types and used in functional programming (Haskell, Clean) and proof assistants (Coq, Isabelle, HOL), used in designing and verifying IT products and mathematical proofs. In this book, the authors focus on three classes of typing for lambda terms: simple types, recursive types and intersection types. It is in these three formalisms of terms and types that the unexpected mathematical beauty is revealed. The treatment is authoritative and comprehensive, complemented by an exhaustive bibliography, and numerous exercises are provided to deepen the readers' understanding and increase their confidence using types.},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-76614-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5352ZMRQ/Richard Statman Henk Barendregt - 2013 - Lambda Calculus with Types.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stichter2007,
-  title = {Ethical Expertise: {{The}} Skill Model of Virtue},
-  author = {Stichter, Matt},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
-  volume = {10},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {183--194},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3ERKXAJM/2007 - Ethical expertise The skill model of virtue - Stichter.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MAC9MZCJ/2007 - Ethical expertise The skill model of virtue - Stichter.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Stone2009,
-  title = {Trumping the Causal Influence Account of Causation},
-  author = {Stone, Jim},
-  year = {2009},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {142},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {153--160},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-007-9180-2},
-  abstract = {Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis's causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Causal influence,Causation,Counterfactuals,David Lewis,Symmetrical redundant causation,Trumping preemption},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/S54T65V8/Stone - 2009 - Trumping the causal influence account of causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Strawson2015,
-  title = {`{{Self-intimation}}'},
-  author = {Strawson, Galen},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--31},
-  issn = {1572-8676},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11097-013-9339-6},
-  abstract = {(1) Aristotle, Dign\=aga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports\textemdash somehow carries within itself\textemdash awareness of itself . (2) This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no `higher-order' account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. (3) But (2) is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order to be constituted as awareness in the first place. (4) Can anything relate to itself in this way? Can there be a relation that is (i) necessarily one-term, (ii) reflexive, (iii) non-logical (non-trivial), (iv) concretely realizable, (v) dynamically real, (vi) such that its holding is a necessary condition of the existence of the thing it holds of? It helps to consider the thought this very thought is puzzling. (5) Many accept the reality of the kind of awareness of awareness posited in (1) and (2), and think it must be not only `pre-reflective' and `non-positional', but also irrelational or non-intentional. But perhaps such awareness of awareness can be fully relational and fully intentional, and can be legitimately said to be its own object or content, even while being pre-reflective and non-positional.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/35TMPE89/Strawson - 2015 - ‘Self-intimation’.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Strevens2007,
-  title = {Review of {{Woodward}}, "{{Making Things Happen}}"},
-  author = {Strevens, Michael},
-  editor = {Woodward, James},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {74},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {233--249},
-  publisher = {{[International Phenomenological Society, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Wiley]}},
-  issn = {0031-8205},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9EQF3294/Strevens - 2007 - Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Studd2016,
-  title = {Logic Exercises and Philosophy Tasks},
-  author = {Studd, James},
-  year = {2016},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NVLKWE9F/127-Exercises-HT16.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Studd2019,
-  title = {Everything, More or Less: {{A}} Defence of Generality Relativism},
-  shorttitle = {Everything, More or Less},
-  author = {Studd, James},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = jun,
-  series = {Oxford {{Philosophical Monographs}}},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things regardless of their kind. But how general can we be and do we ever succeed in theorizing about absolutely everything? Not according to generality relativism. In its most promising form, this kind of relativism maintains that what 'everything' and other quantifiers encompass is always open to expansion: no matter how broadly we may generalize, a more inclusive 'everything' is always available. The importance of the issue comes out, in part, in relation to the foundations of mathematics. Generality relativism opens the way to avoid Russell's paradox without imposing ad hoc limitations on which pluralities of items may be encoded as a set. On the other hand, generality relativism faces numerous challenges: What are we to make of seemingly absolutely general theories? What prevents our achieving absolute generality simply by using 'everything' unrestrictedly? How are we to characterize relativism without making use of exactly the kind of generality this view foreswears?This book offers a sustained defence of generality relativism that seeks to answer these challenges. Along the way, the contemporary absolute generality debate is traced through diverse issues in metaphysics, logic, and the philosophy of language; some of the key works that lie behind the debate are reassessed; an accessible introduction is given to the relevant mathematics; and a relativist-friendly motivation for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is developed.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-871964-9},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YZJR5JIC/Studd - Everything, more or less A defence of generality .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Summers2018,
-  title = {Common-{{Sense Causation}} in the {{Law}}},
-  author = {Summers, Andrew},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Oxford Journal of Legal Studies},
-  volume = {38},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {793--821},
-  issn = {0143-6503},
-  doi = {10.1093/ojls/gqy028},
-  abstract = {Judges often invoke `common sense' when deciding questions of legal causation. I draw on empirical evidence to refine the common-sense theory of legal causation developed by Hart and Honor\'e in Causation in the Law. I show that the two main common-sense principles that Hart and Honor\'e identified are empirically well founded; I also show how experimental research into causal selection can be used to specify these principles with greater precision than before. This exploratory approach can provide legal scholars with a plausible new set of hypotheses to use in re-examining the decided cases on legal causation. If correct, the new common-sense theory that I develop has important implications not only for debates within legal scholarship, but also for judicial practice on issues of legal causation across both criminal and private law.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/78FXGSXF/Summers - 2018 - Common-Sense Causation in the Law.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PIA76U6H/5108351.html}
-}
-
-@article{Sunehag2015,
-  title = {Deep {{Reinforcement Learning}} with {{Attention}} for {{Slate Markov Decision Processes}} with {{High-Dimensional States}} and {{Actions}}},
-  author = {Sunehag, Peter and Evans, Richard and {Dulac-Arnold}, Gabriel and Zwols, Yori and Visentin, Daniel and Coppin, Ben},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {arXiv:1512.01124 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1512.01124},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {Many real-world problems come with action spaces represented as feature vectors. Although high-dimensional control is a largely unsolved problem, there has recently been progress for modest dimensionalities. Here we report on a successful attempt at addressing problems of dimensionality as high as \$2000\$, of a particular form. Motivated by important applications such as recommendation systems that do not fit the standard reinforcement learning frameworks, we introduce Slate Markov Decision Processes (slate-MDPs). A Slate-MDP is an MDP with a combinatorial action space consisting of slates (tuples) of primitive actions of which one is executed in an underlying MDP. The agent does not control the choice of this executed action and the action might not even be from the slate, e.g., for recommendation systems for which all recommendations can be ignored. We use deep Q-learning based on feature representations of both the state and action to learn the value of whole slates. Unlike existing methods, we optimize for both the combinatorial and sequential aspects of our tasks. The new agent's superiority over agents that either ignore the combinatorial or sequential long-term value aspect is demonstrated on a range of environments with dynamics from a real-world recommendation system. Further, we use deep deterministic policy gradients to learn a policy that for each position of the slate, guides attention towards the part of the action space in which the value is the highest and we only evaluate actions in this area. The attention is used within a sequentially greedy procedure leveraging submodularity. Finally, we show how introducing risk-seeking can dramatically improve the agents performance and ability to discover more far reaching strategies.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Human-Computer Interaction,Computer Science - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HSUVTRUJ/Sunehag et al. - 2015 - Deep Reinforcement Learning with Attention for Sla.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NWA2DTKK/1512.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Szemerenyi1985,
-  title = {Syntax, Meaning, and Origin of the {{Indo-European}} Particle Kwe},
-  booktitle = {Festschrift F\"ur {{Helmut Gipper}}},
-  author = {Szemer{\'e}nyi, Oswald},
-  editor = {G., Heintz and P., Smitter},
-  year = {1985},
-  pages = {747--775},
-  publisher = {{Koerner}},
-  address = {{Baden-Baden}}
-}
-
-@article{Tan2019,
-  title = {Counterpossible {{Non-vacuity}} in {{Scientific Practice}}},
-  author = {Tan, Peter},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {116},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {32--60},
-  doi = {10.5840/jphil201911612},
-  abstract = {Part of the received wisdom regarding the counterfactual conditional is that counterfactuals whose antecedents are metaphysically impossible--commonly called counterpossibles--are indiscriminately vacuously true. This paper provides a new argument that this received wisdom is false. Drawing on a number of examples from across scientific practice, Tan argues that science routinely treats some counterpossibles as non-vacuously true and treats others as false.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy ; Metaphysics ; Credibility ; Science ; Wisdom ; Counterfactual Thinking;},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R6CXDH27/Tan - 2019 - Counterpossible Non-vacuity in Scientific Practice.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Tarski1936,
-  title = {Der {{Wahrheitsbegriff}} in Den {{Formalisierten Sprachen}}},
-  author = {Tarski, Alfred},
-  year = {1936},
-  journal = {Studia Philosophica},
-  volume = {1},
-  pages = {261--405}
-}
-
-@article{Tarski1936a,
-  title = {Grundzuge Des {{Systemenkalkuls}}. {{Zweiter Teil}}},
-  author = {Tarski, Alfred},
-  year = {1936},
-  journal = {Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {71--72}
-}
-
-@article{Teitel,
-  title = {Contingent {{Existence}} and the {{Reduction}} of {{Modality}} to {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Teitel, Trevor},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzx001},
-  abstract = {This paper first argues that we can bring out a tension between the following three popular doctrines: (i) the canonical reduction of metaphysical modality to essence, due to Fine, (ii) contingentism, which says that possibly something could have failed to be something, and (iii) the doctrine that metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic S5. After presenting two such arguments (one from the theorems of S4 and another from the theorems of B), I turn to exploring various conclusions we might draw in light of these results, and argue that none comes cost-free. In the course of laying out possible responses to my arguments, we'll have a chance to evaluate various doctrines about the interplay between contingency and essence, as well as develop some alternative reductions of metaphysical modality to essence. I don't come down decisively in favour of one response over the others, though I say some things that point towards the conclusion that essence has no role to play in reducing metaphysical modality.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WX6CHSVY/Teitel - Contingent Existence and the Reduction of Modality.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Thieme1968,
-  title = {\=Ade\'sa},
-  author = {Thieme, Paul},
-  year = {1968},
-  journal = {M\'elanges d' indianisme: \`a la m\'emoire de Louis Renou},
-  pages = {pp.\textasciitilde 715-723}
-}
-
-@article{Thomason1975,
-  title = {Categories of Frames for Modal Logic},
-  author = {Thomason, S. K.},
-  year = {1975},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {The Journal of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {40},
-  number = {03},
-  pages = {439--442},
-  issn = {0022-4812, 1943-5886},
-  doi = {10.2307/2272167},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QUT2EYZF/2272167.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Thompson2016,
-  title = {Grounding and {{Metaphysical Explanation}}},
-  author = {Thompson, Naomi},
-  year = {2016},
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  volume = {116},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {395--402},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MNN6KJDE/Thompson - 2016 - Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Thomson2006,
-  title = {Content and {{Modality}}: {{Themes}} from the {{Philosophy}} of {{Robert Stalnaker}}},
-  editor = {Thomson, Judith and Byrne, Alex},
-  year = {2006},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6B8ASFRA/2006 - Content and Modality Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker - Unknown.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Thorisson2007,
-  title = {Integrated {{A}}.{{I}}. Systems},
-  author = {Th{\'o}risson, Kristinn R.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Minds and Machines},
-  volume = {17},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {11--25},
-  issn = {1572-8641},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11023-007-9055-5},
-  abstract = {The broad range of capabilities exhibited by humans and animals is achieved through a large set of heterogeneous, tightly integrated cognitive mechanisms. To move artificial systems closer to such general-purpose intelligence we cannot avoid replicating some subset\textemdash quite possibly a substantial portion\textemdash of this large set. Progress in this direction requires that systems integration be taken more seriously as a fundamental research problem. In this paper I make the argument that intelligence must be studied holistically. I present key issues that must be addressed in the area of integration and propose solutions for speeding up rate of progress towards more powerful, integrated A.I. systems, including (a) tools for building large, complex architectures, (b) a design methodology for building realtime A.I. systems and (c) methods for facilitating code sharing at the community level.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Holistic artificial intelligence,Integration,Large-scale architectures,Scientific progress},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GWR642KG/Thórisson - 2007 - Integrated A.I. systems.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Tillman2016,
-  title = {Essence {{Facts}} and {{Explanation}}},
-  author = {Tillman, Chris},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {190--195},
-  issn = {2161-2234},
-  doi = {10.1002/tht3.210},
-  abstract = {Some essence facts have metaphysical explanations. Some metaphysical explanations for essence facts consist in nonessential facts.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Dependence,essence,Grounding,metaphysical explanation,Metaphysics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C3SEFK24/Tillman - 2016 - Essence Facts and Explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Tooley1977,
-  title = {The {{Nature}} of {{Laws}}},
-  author = {Tooley, Michael},
-  year = {1977},
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {7},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {667--698},
-  issn = {0045-5091},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4QF2GVHD/Tooley - 1977 - The Nature of Laws.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Torza2015,
-  title = {Speaking of {{Essence}}},
-  author = {Torza, Alessandro},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
-  volume = {65},
-  number = {261},
-  pages = {754--771},
-  issn = {0031-8094},
-  doi = {10.1093/pq/pqv036},
-  abstract = {Classical modalism about essence is the view that essence can be analysed in modal terms. Despite Kit Fine's influential critique, no general refutation of classical modalism has yet been given. In the first part of the paper, I provide such a refutation by showing that the notion of essence cannot be analysed in terms of any sentential operator definable in the language of standard quantified modal logic. As a reaction to Fine's critique, some have defended sophisticated modalism, which attempts to analyse essence in an enriched modal language quantifying over both possible and impossible worlds. In the second part of the paper, I argue that sophisticated modalism falls prey to variations on Fine's counterexamples to classical modalism. I conclude that the most promising approaches to understanding the notion of essence consist in taking essence either as primitive or as analysable via a combination of modal and non-modal notions.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PCUBIRUI/1506683.html}
-}
-
-@article{Torza2020,
-  title = {Ground and Modality},
-  author = {Torza, Alessandro},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {63},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {563--585},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2020.1758769},
-  abstract = {The grounding relation is routinely characterized by means of logical postulates. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I show that a subset of those postulates is incompatible with a minimal characterization of metaphysical modality. Then I consider a number of ways for reconciling ground with modality. The simplest and most elegant solution consists in adopting serious actualism, which is best captured within a first-order modal language with predicate abstraction governed by negative free logic. I also explore a number of alternative strategies by revising the ground-theoretic postulates, while keeping the modal ones fixed. As I argue, each of those strategies is either unviable, highly contentious, or insufficiently motivated.},
-  keywords = {actualism,existence,grounding necessitarianism,modal logic,natural properties,Necessitism,quantification,totality},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1758769},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/GCC77VMU/0020174X.2020.html}
-}
-
-@article{Trifogli2015,
-  title = {Ockham's {{Ontology I}}: {{Relations}}},
-  author = {Trifogli, Cecilia},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Class Notes},
-  pages = {(unpublished)}
-}
-
-@article{Turner2015,
-  title = {The Construction of Logical Space and the Structure of Facts},
-  author = {Turner, Jason},
-  year = {2015},
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LTXY7XLS/2015 - The construction of logical space and the structure of facts - Turner.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RCVLR5IV/2015 - The construction of logical space and the structure of facts - Turner.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Tye1994,
-  title = {Sorites {{Paradoxes}} and the {{Semantics}} of {{Vagueness}}},
-  author = {Tye, Michael},
-  year = {1994},
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {8},
-  pages = {189--206},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QBLIX5G4/Untitled.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Tye1998,
-  title = {Inverted {{Earth}}, {{Swampman}}, and {{Representationism}}},
-  author = {Tye, Michael},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {S12},
-  pages = {459--477},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.20},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1998},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IETQCTQQ/Tye - 1998 - Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Uzquiano2003,
-  title = {Plural {{Quantification}} and {{Classes}}},
-  author = {Uzquiano, Gabriel},
-  year = {2003},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
-  volume = {11},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {67--81},
-  issn = {0031-8019, 1744-6406},
-  doi = {10.1093/philmat/11.1.67},
-  abstract = {When viewed as the most comprehensive theory of collections, set theory leaves no room for classes. But the vocabulary of classes, it is argued, provides us with compact and, sometimes, irreplaceable formulations of largecardinal hypotheses that are prominent in much very important and very interesting work in set theory. Fortunately, George Boolos has persuasively argued that plural quantification over the universe of all sets need not commit us to classes. This paper suggests that we retain the vocabulary of classes, but explain that what appears to be singular reference to classes is, in fact, covert plural reference to sets.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FU8HEV8C/Uzquiano - 2003 - Plural Quantification and Classes.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Uzquiano2004,
-  title = {{Plurals and Simples}},
-  author = {Uzquiano, Gabriel and {The Hegeler Institute}},
-  editor = {Sugden, Sherwood J. B.},
-  year = {2004},
-  journal = {Monist},
-  volume = {87},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {429--451},
-  issn = {0026-9662},
-  doi = {10.5840/monist200487324},
-  langid = {ngerman},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U3LTNFTQ/429.full.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Uzquiano2014,
-  title = {Mereology and {{Modality}}},
-  booktitle = {Mereology and {{Location}}},
-  author = {Uzquiano, Gabriel},
-  editor = {Kleinschmidt, Shieva},
-  year = {2014},
-  pages = {33--56},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LFHIVZNR/MerMod.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Uzquiano2015,
-  title = {A {{Neglected Resolution}} of {{Russell}}'s {{Paradox}} of {{Propositions}}},
-  author = {Uzquiano, Gabriel},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic},
-  volume = {8},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {328--344},
-  issn = {1755-0203, 1755-0211},
-  doi = {10.1017/S1755020315000106},
-  abstract = {AbstractBertrand Russell offered an influential paradox of propositions in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics, but there is little agreement as to what to conclude from it. We suggest that Russell's paradox is best regarded as a limitative result on propositional granularity. Some propositions are, on pain of contradiction, unable to discriminate between classes with different members: whatever they predicate of one, they predicate of the other. When accepted, this remarkable fact should cast some doubt upon some of the uses to which modern descendants of Russell's paradox of propositions have been put in recent literature.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WZG3CIZV/Uzquiano - 2015 - A NEGLECTED RESOLUTION OF RUSSELL’S PARADOX OF PRO.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{vanBerkel2019,
-  title = {A {{Neutral Temporal Deontic STIT Logic}}},
-  author = {{van Berkel}, Kees and Lyon, Tim},
-  year = {2019},
-  journal = {arXiv:1907.03265 [cs, math]},
-  volume = {11813},
-  eprint = {1907.03265},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs, math},
-  pages = {340--354},
-  doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-60292-8_25},
-  abstract = {In this work we answer a long standing request for temporal embeddings of deontic STIT logics by introducing the multi-agent STIT logic TDS. The logic is based upon atemporal utilitarian STIT logic. Yet, the logic presented here will be neutral: instead of committing ourselves to utilitarian theories, we prove the logic TDS sound and complete with respect to relational frames not employing any utilitarian function. We demonstrate how these neutral frames can be transformed into utilitarian temporal frames, while preserving validity. Last, we discuss problems that arise from employing binary utility functions in a temporal setting.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Logic in Computer Science,Mathematics - Logic},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2V9GDWG6/van Berkel and Lyon - 2019 - A Neutral Temporal Deontic STIT Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{vanderWaa2021,
-  title = {Evaluating {{XAI}}: {{A}} Comparison of Rule-Based and Example-Based Explanations},
-  shorttitle = {Evaluating {{XAI}}},
-  author = {{van der Waa}, Jasper and Nieuwburg, Elisabeth and Cremers, Anita and Neerincx, Mark},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
-  volume = {291},
-  pages = {103404},
-  issn = {0004-3702},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2020.103404},
-  abstract = {Current developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) led to a resurgence of Explainable AI (XAI). New methods are being researched to obtain information from AI systems in order to generate explanations for their output. However, there is an overall lack of valid and reliable evaluations of the effects on users' experience of, and behavior in response to explanations. New XAI methods are often based on an intuitive notion what an effective explanation should be. Rule- and example-based contrastive explanations are two exemplary explanation styles. In this study we evaluate the effects of these two explanation styles on system understanding, persuasive power and task performance in the context of decision support in diabetes self-management. Furthermore, we provide three sets of recommendations based on our experience designing this evaluation to help improve future evaluations. Our results show that rule-based explanations have a small positive effect on system understanding, whereas both rule- and example-based explanations seem to persuade users in following the advice even when incorrect. Neither explanation improves task performance compared to no explanation. This can be explained by the fact that both explanation styles only provide details relevant for a single decision, not the underlying rational or causality. These results show the importance of user evaluations in assessing the current assumptions and intuitions on effective explanations.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Artificial Intelligence (AI),Contrastive explanations,Decision support systems,Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI),Machine learning,User evaluations},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ALVV8PVH/van der Waa et al. - 2021 - Evaluating XAI A comparison of rule-based and exa.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{VanFraassen1969,
-  title = {Facts and {{Tautological Entailments}}},
-  author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.},
-  year = {1969},
-  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {66},
-  number = {15},
-  pages = {477--487},
-  issn = {0022-362X},
-  doi = {10.2307/2024563},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FV9W3KY5/Van Fraassen - 1969 - Facts and Tautological Entailments.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{VanInwagen1998,
-  title = {Meta-{{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Van Inwagen, Peter},
-  year = {1998},
-  journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {2/3},
-  pages = {233--250},
-  issn = {0165-0106},
-  doi = {10.2307/20012842},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B3CHBFDM/20012842.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{vanRiel2013,
-  title = {Identity, {{Asymmetry}}, and the {{Relevance}} of {{Meanings}} for {{Models}} of {{Reduction}}},
-  author = {{van Riel}, Raphael},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {64},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {747--761},
-  publisher = {{Oxford Academic}},
-  issn = {0007-0882},
-  doi = {10.1093/bjps/axs028},
-  abstract = {Abstract.  Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so, water is identical to H2O (according to one interpretation of the term `reduction'). At the same time, if wa},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PHAHBGXF/van Riel - 2013 - Identity, Asymmetry, and the Relevance of Meanings.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{vanRiel2014,
-  title = {The {{Concept}} of {{Reduction}}},
-  author = {{van Riel}, Raphael},
-  year = {2014},
-  publisher = {{Springer}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/92FEW8IC/Riel - 2014 - The Concept of Reduction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Vayrynen2002,
-  title = {Moral {{Particularism}}},
-  author = {V{\"a}yrynen, Pekka},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {111},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {478--483},
-  issn = {0031-8108, 1558-1470},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-111-3-478},
-  abstract = {A timely and penetrating investigation, this book seeks to transform moral philosophy. In the face of continuing disagreement about which general moral principles are correct, there has been a resurgence of interest in the idea that correct moral judgements can be only about particular cases. This view\textendash moral particularism\textendash forecasts a revolution in ordinary moral practice that has until now consisted largely of appeals to general moral principles. Moral particularism also opposes the primary aim of most contemporary normative moral theory that attempts to show that either one general principle, or a set of general principles, is superior to all its rivals.},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@incollection{Vayrynen2008,
-  title = {Usable {{Moral Principles}}},
-  booktitle = {Challenging {{Moral Particularism}}},
-  author = {V{\"a}yrynen, Pekka},
-  editor = {Lance, Mark N. and Potr{\v c}, Matja{\v z} and Strahovnik, Vojko},
-  year = {2008},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}}
-}
-
-@incollection{Vayrynen2009,
-  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Hedged Moral Principles}}},
-  booktitle = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaethics}}, {{Volume}} 4},
-  author = {V{\"a}yrynen, Pekka},
-  editor = {{Shafer-Landau}, Russ},
-  year = {2009},
-  pages = {91---132},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MALNMDY5/10.1.1.365.5569.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Vetter2013,
-  title = {'{{Can}}' {{Without Possible Worlds}}: {{Semantics}} for {{Anti-Humeans}}},
-  shorttitle = {'{{Can}}' {{Without Possible Worlds}}},
-  author = {Vetter, Barbara},
-  year = {2013},
-  journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
-  volume = {13},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/EWJKJUFW/can-without-possible-worlds-semantics-for-anti-humeans.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Vetter2015,
-  title = {Potentiality: {{From Dispositions}} to {{Modality}}},
-  shorttitle = {Potentiality},
-  author = {Vetter, Barbara},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = feb,
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  address = {{New York, NY}},
-  abstract = {Individual objects have potentials: paper has the potential to burn, an acorn has the potential to turn into a tree, some people have the potential to run a mile in less than four minutes. Barbara Vetter provides a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of such potentials, and an account of metaphysical modality based on them. In contemporary philosophy, potentials have been recognized mostly in the form of so-called dispositions: solubility, fragility, and so on. Vetter takes dispositions as her starting point, but argues for and develops a more comprehensive conception of potentiality. She shows how, with this more comprehensive conception, an account of metaphysical modality can be given that meets three crucial requirements: (1) Extensional correctness: providing the right truth-values for statements of possibility and necessity; (2) formal adequacy: providing the right logic for metaphysical modality; and (3) semantic utility: providing a semantics that links ordinary modal language to the metaphysics of modality. The resulting view of modality is a version of dispositionalism about modality: it takes modality to be a matter of the dispositions of individual objects (and, crucially, not of possible worlds). This approach has a long philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle, but has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy. In recent years, it has become a live option again due to the rise of anti-Humean, powers-based metaphysics. The aim of Potentiality is to develop the dispositionalist view in a way that takes account of contemporary developments in metaphysics, logic, and semantics.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-871431-6},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Vetter2016,
-  title = {Counterpossibles (Not Only) for Dispositionalists},
-  author = {Vetter, Barbara},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {173},
-  number = {10},
-  pages = {2681--2700},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0671-x},
-  abstract = {Dispositionalists try to provide an account of modality\textemdash possibility, necessity, and the counterfactual conditional\textemdash in terms of dispositions.~But there may be a tension between dispositionalist accounts of possibility on the one hand, and of counterfactuals on the other. Dispositionalists about possibility must hold that there are no~impossible dispositions, i.e., dispositions with metaphysically impossible stimulus and/or manifestation conditions; dispositionalist accounts of counterfactuals, if they allow for non-vacuous counterpossibles, require that there are such impossible dispositions. I argue, first, that there are in fact no impossible dispositions; and second, that the dispositionalist can nevertheless acknowledge the non-vacuity of some counterpossibles. The strategy in the second part is one of `divide and conquer' that is not confined to the dispositionalist: it consists in arguing that counterpossibles, when non-vacuous, are read epistemically and are therefore outside the purview of a dispositional account.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XU98UTQF/Vetter - 2016 - Counterpossibles (not only) for dispositionalists.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Vickers1996,
-  title = {Topology via {{Logic}}},
-  author = {Vickers, Steven},
-  year = {1996},
-  month = sep,
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  isbn = {978-0-521-57651-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6R2DCDHC/Vickers_1996_Topology via Logic.djvu;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/B9TUBWGV/Vickers - 1996 - Topology via Logic.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{vonFintel2002,
-  title = {A Minimal Theory of Adverbial Quantification},
-  booktitle = {Context-Dependence in the Analysis of Linguistic Meaning},
-  author = {{von Fintel}, Kai},
-  editor = {Kamp, Hans and Partee, Barbara H.},
-  year = {2002},
-  series = {Current {{Research}} in the {{Semantics}}/{{Pragmatics Interface}}},
-  volume = {11},
-  pages = {137--175},
-  publisher = {{Brill}},
-  address = {{Amsterdam}},
-  isbn = {978-0-08-043694-4},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z5MMLE22/von Fintel - 2002 - A minimal theory of adverbial quantification.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wachter2017a,
-  title = {Transparent, Explainable, and Accountable {{AI}} for Robotics},
-  author = {Wachter, Sandra and Mittelstadt, Brent and Floridi, Luciano},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Science Robotics},
-  volume = {2},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {eaan6080},
-  issn = {2470-9476},
-  doi = {10.1126/scirobotics.aan6080},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZBV7JVXG/Wachter et al. - 2017 - Transparent, explainable, and accountable AI for r.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wachter2018,
-  title = {Counterfactual {{Explanations}} without {{Opening}} the {{Black Box}}: {{Automated Decisions}} and the {{GDPR}}},
-  shorttitle = {Counterfactual {{Explanations}} without {{Opening}} the {{Black Box}}},
-  author = {Wachter, Sandra and Mittelstadt, Brent and Russell, Chris},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {arXiv:1711.00399 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1711.00399},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {There has been much discussion of the right to explanation in the EU General Data Protection Regulation, and its existence, merits, and disadvantages. Implementing a right to explanation that opens the black box of algorithmic decision-making faces major legal and technical barriers. Explaining the functionality of complex algorithmic decision-making systems and their rationale in specific cases is a technically challenging problem. Some explanations may offer little meaningful information to data subjects, raising questions around their value. Explanations of automated decisions need not hinge on the general public understanding how algorithmic systems function. Even though such interpretability is of great importance and should be pursued, explanations can, in principle, be offered without opening the black box. Looking at explanations as a means to help a data subject act rather than merely understand, one could gauge the scope and content of explanations according to the specific goal or action they are intended to support. From the perspective of individuals affected by automated decision-making, we propose three aims for explanations: (1) to inform and help the individual understand why a particular decision was reached, (2) to provide grounds to contest the decision if the outcome is undesired, and (3) to understand what would need to change in order to receive a desired result in the future, based on the current decision-making model. We assess how each of these goals finds support in the GDPR. We suggest data controllers should offer a particular type of explanation, unconditional counterfactual explanations, to support these three aims. These counterfactual explanations describe the smallest change to the world that can be made to obtain a desirable outcome, or to arrive at the closest possible world, without needing to explain the internal logic of the system.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IH4ZQHMC/Wachter et al. - 2018 - Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Bl.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UYCYYX7B/1711.html}
-}
-
-@article{Wall2018,
-  title = {An Evaluation of the Construct of Emotional Sensitivity from the Perspective of Emotionally Sensitive People},
-  author = {Wall, Kiana and Kalpakci, Allison and Hall, Karyn and Crist, Nicholas and Sharp, Carla},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation},
-  volume = {5},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {14},
-  issn = {2051-6673},
-  doi = {10.1186/s40479-018-0091-y},
-  abstract = {Emotional sensitivity is a construct found in major developmental models of borderline personality disorder. However, the construct remains nebulous. The patient perspective is crucially important in helping to define and conceptualize any psychological construct \textendash{} especially one that plays such a large role in the developmental theories of a given disorder. The aim of the current study was to explore the meaning of emotional sensitivity from the perspective of those who identify as being emotionally sensitive.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LF54FHTP/Wall et al. - 2018 - An evaluation of the construct of emotional sensit.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Wallace2004,
-  title = {Reason and {{Value}}: {{Themes}} from the {{Moral Philosophy}} of {{Joseph Raz}}},
-  shorttitle = {Reason and {{Value}}},
-  author = {Wallace, R. Jay and Pettit, Philip and Scheffler, Samuel and Smith, Michael},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = mar,
-  publisher = {{Clarendon Press}},
-  abstract = {Reason and Value collects fifteen brand-new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics - including especially his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value - make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. The volume honours Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and will contribute toan enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject.},
-  googlebooks = {6IGex6vRMMMC},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-151640-5},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Law / Jurisprudence,Philosophy / Ethics \& Moral Philosophy,Philosophy / Political,Political Science / History \& Theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HX9MB7TK/Wallace et al. - 2004 - Reason and Value Themes from the Moral Philosophy.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wallace2010,
-  title = {Quantum {{Mechanics}} on {{Spacetime I}}: {{Spacetime State Realism}}},
-  shorttitle = {Quantum {{Mechanics}} on {{Spacetime I}}},
-  author = {Wallace, David and Timpson, Christopher G.},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
-  volume = {61},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {697--727},
-  issn = {0007-0882, 1464-3537},
-  doi = {10.1093/bjps/axq010},
-  abstract = {What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. 1 Introduction 2 Prolegomena 3 Wave-function Realism 4 Problems with Wave-function Realism 5 Spacetime State Realism 6 Locality 7 Non-unitary Dynamics on the Spacetime Ontology 8 Relativity and Poincar\'e Covariance 9 Finding the Appearances 10 Conclusion},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VD7NJCNY/Wallace and Timpson - 2010 - Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I Spacetime State .pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wallner2020,
-  title = {Essence, {{Explanation}}, and {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Wallner, Michael and Vaidya, Anand},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Philosophy},
-  volume = {95},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {419--445},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  issn = {0031-8191, 1469-817X},
-  doi = {10.1017/S0031819120000200},
-  abstract = {Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths are true in virtue of, grounded in, or explained by essentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call, Reductive Finean Essentialism and Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale on Non-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge the presence of a deep standoff between the two views.},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Wallner2021,
-  title = {The Ground of Ground, Essence, and Explanation},
-  author = {Wallner, Michael},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1257--1277},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1856-y},
-  abstract = {This paper is about the so-called meta-grounding question, i.e. the question of what grounds grounding facts of the sort `{$\phi$} is grounded in {$\Gamma$}'. An answer to this question is pressing since some plausible assumptions about grounding and fundamentality entail that grounding facts must be grounded. There are three different accounts on the market which each answer the meta-grounding question differently: Bennett's and deRosset's ``Straight Forward Account'' (SFA), Litland's ``Zero-Grounding Account'' (ZGA), and ``Grounding Essentialism'' (GE). I argue that if grounding is to be regarded as metaphysical explanation (i.e. if unionism is true), (GE) is to be preferred over (ZGA) and (SFA) as only (GE) is compatible with a crucial consequence of the thought that grounding is metaphysical explanation. In this manner the paper contributes not only to discussions about the ground of ground but also to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between ground, essence, and explanation.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WQE6XDDL/Wallner_2021_The ground of ground, essence, and explanation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Watson2020,
-  title = {The Explanation Game: {{A}} Formal Framework for Interpretable Machine Learning},
-  shorttitle = {The Explanation Game},
-  author = {Watson, David S. and Floridi, Luciano},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02629-9},
-  abstract = {We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining elements from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explanation(s) for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multiple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore overlapping causal patterns of variable granularity and scope. We characterise the conditions under which such a game is almost surely guaranteed to converge on a (conditionally) optimal explanation surface in polynomial time, and highlight obstacles that will tend to prevent the players from advancing beyond certain explanatory thresholds. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing a conceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as design new and improved solutions.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/X9HU65FG/Watson and Floridi - 2020 - The explanation game a formal framework for inter.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Watson2021,
-  title = {Local {{Explanations}} via {{Necessity}} and {{Sufficiency}}: {{Unifying Theory}} and {{Practice}}},
-  shorttitle = {Local {{Explanations}} via {{Necessity}} and {{Sufficiency}}},
-  author = {Watson, David and Gultchin, Limor and Taly, Ankur and Floridi, Luciano},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = jun,
-  number = {arXiv:2103.14651},
-  eprint = {2103.14651},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  abstract = {Necessity and sufficiency are the building blocks of all successful explanations. Yet despite their importance, these notions have been conceptually underdeveloped and inconsistently applied in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), a fast-growing research area that is so far lacking in firm theoretical foundations. Building on work in logic, probability, and causality, we establish the central role of necessity and sufficiency in XAI, unifying seemingly disparate methods in a single formal framework. We provide a sound and complete algorithm for computing explanatory factors with respect to a given context, and demonstrate its flexibility and competitive performance against state of the art alternatives on various tasks.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence,Computer Science - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/C6IQB9MX/Watson et al. - 2021 - Local Explanations via Necessity and Sufficiency .pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K5BJZTPI/2103.html}
-}
-
-@article{Wehmeier2017,
-  title = {Identity and Quantification},
-  author = {Wehmeier, Kai F.},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {174},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {759--770},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0706-3},
-  abstract = {It is a philosophical commonplace that quantification involves, invokes, or presupposes, the relation of identity. There seem to be two major sources for this belief: (1) the conviction that identity is implicated in the phenomenon of bound variable recurrence within the scope of a quantifier; (2) memories of Quine's insistence that quantification requires absolute identity for the values of variables. With respect to (1), I show that the only extant argument for a dependence of variable recurrence on identity, due to John Hawthorne, fails. I further show that the function of variable recurrence is not subsumed under that of identity, so that a dependence of the former on the latter, if any, would have to be of a rather indirect nature. With respect to (2), I argue that the relevant passage in Quine fails to establish a connection between quantification and the identity relation, and indeed wasn't intended by Quine to do so.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7CRWABQN/Wehmeier - 2017 - Identity and quantification.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wehmeier2018,
-  title = {Are Quantifiers Intensional Operators?},
-  author = {Wehmeier, Kai F.},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {0},
-  number = {0},
-  pages = {1--22},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2018.1470566},
-  abstract = {In this paper, I ask whether quantifiers are intensional operators, with variable assignments playing the role of indices. Certain formulations of extensional type theory suggest an affirmative answer, but the most satisfactory among them suffer from a contamination of their semantic ontology with syntactic material. I lay out `Fregean' versions of extensional type theory that are free from syntactic contamination and suggest a negative answer to our question.},
-  keywords = {abstraction,compositionality,Frege,intensional operators,Quantifiers,type theory},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/U73QZVAX/Wehmeier - 2018 - Are quantifiers intensional operators.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Wei2002,
-  title = {{{SEXUAL REFLEXOLOGY}}: {{THE TAO OF LOVE AND SEX}}},
-  shorttitle = {{{SEXUAL REFLEXOLOGY}}},
-  author = {Wei, Mantak Chia {and} W. U.},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = jan,
-  publisher = {{Universal Tao Publications}},
-  abstract = {A copy that has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.},
-  isbn = {978-974-85391-7-1},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HGBNZG7D/Wei_2002_SEXUAL REFLEXOLOGY.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Weiss2017,
-  title = {Semantics for {{Counterpossibles}}},
-  author = {Weiss, Yale},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {The Australasian Journal of Logic},
-  volume = {14},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {383--407},
-  issn = {1448-5052},
-  doi = {10.26686/ajl.v14i4.4050},
-  abstract = {The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. I first develop modifications of a Lewis-style sphere semantics with impossible worlds. I argue that this approach sanctions intuitively invalid inferences and is supported by philosophically problematic foundations. I then develop modifications of certain ceteris paribus conditional logics with impossible worlds. Tableaux are given for each of these in an appendix and soundness and completeness results are proved. While certain of the latter systems are shown to have similar problems to logics from the first approach, at least one relatively weak system appears to offer an adequate uniform semantics for counterpossibles and counterfactuals.},
-  copyright = {Copyright (c)},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VT7862BW/Weiss - 2017 - Semantics for Counterpossibles.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Weitz1950,
-  title = {Analysis and Real Definition},
-  author = {Weitz, Morris},
-  year = {1950},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {1},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {1--8},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/BF02565264},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5DPA8M9P/Weitz - 1950 - Analysis and real definition.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wen2007,
-  title = {A {{Propositional Logic}} with {{Relative Identity Connective}} and a {{Partial Solution}} to the {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Wen, Xuefeng},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Studia Logica},
-  volume = {85},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {251--260},
-  issn = {1572-8730},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11225-007-9030-4},
-  abstract = {We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction \$\$\{\textbackslash alpha \textbackslash equiv\_\{\textbackslash gamma\} \textbackslash beta\}\$\$, interpreted as the intensional identity of statements \$\$\{\textbackslash alpha\}\$\$and \$\$\{\textbackslash beta\}\$\$in the context \$\$\{\textbackslash gamma\}\$\$. PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko's sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2JZYK5MX/Wen - 2007 - A Propositional Logic with Relative Identity Conne.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{White1945,
-  title = {A {{Note}} on the "{{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}".},
-  author = {White, Morton G.},
-  year = {1945},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {54},
-  number = {213},
-  pages = {71--72},
-  publisher = {{[Oxford University Press, Mind Association]}},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4GLDUD4Q/White - 1945 - A Note on the Paradox of Analysis..pdf}
-}
-
-@article{White1948,
-  title = {On the {{Church-Frege Solution}} of the {{Paradox}} of {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {White, Morton G.},
-  year = {1948},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {9},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {305--308},
-  publisher = {{[International Phenomenological Society, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Wiley]}},
-  issn = {0031-8205},
-  doi = {10.2307/2103398},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RD74S3FR/White - 1948 - On the Church-Frege Solution of the Paradox of Ana.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Whitehead1962,
-  title = {Principia Mathematica : {{To}} *56},
-  author = {Whitehead, Alfred and Mathematica, Principia},
-  year = {1962},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge [England]}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q2XXKZFW/1962 - Principia mathematica to 56 - Whitehead, Mathematica.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Whitehead1963,
-  title = {Principia Mathematica},
-  author = {Whitehead, Alfred},
-  year = {1963},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CG2RJPVV/1963 - Principia mathematica - Whitehead.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Whitesitt2010,
-  title = {Boolean {{Algebra}} and {{Its Applications}}},
-  author = {Whitesitt, J. Eldon},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = mar,
-  publisher = {{Dover Publications Inc.}},
-  address = {{Mineola, N.Y}},
-  abstract = {This introduction to Boolean algebra begins with an intuitive approach to set theory and an axiomatic account of the fundamentals of Boolean algebra, proceeding to concise accounts of applications to symbolic logic, switching circuits, relay circuits, binary arithmetic, and probability theory. Answers to selected problems appear at the end. 1961 edition.},
-  isbn = {978-0-486-47767-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RM354RQ6/[J._Eldon_Whitesitt]_Boolean_Algebra_and_Its_Appli(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wiggins2007,
-  title = {Three {{Moments}} in the {{Theory}} of {{Definition}} or {{Analysis}}: {{Its Possibility}}, {{Its Aim}} or {{Aims}}, and {{Its Limit}} or {{Terminus}}},
-  shorttitle = {Three {{Moments}} in the {{Theory}} of {{Definition}} or {{Analysis}}},
-  author = {Wiggins, David},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  series = {New {{Series}}},
-  volume = {107},
-  pages = {73--109},
-  issn = {0066-7374},
-  copyright = {Copyright \textcopyright{} 2007 The Aristotelian Society},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YB5IYGSZ/Wiggins - 2007 - Three Moments in the Theory of Definition or Analy.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wiggins2012,
-  title = {Practical Knowledge: {{Knowing}} How to and Knowing That},
-  author = {Wiggins, David},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {121},
-  number = {481},
-  pages = {97--130},
-  issn = {0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzs026},
-  abstract = {Ryle's account of practical knowing is much controverted. The paper seeks to place present disputations in a larger context and draw attention to the connection between Ryle's preoccupations and Aristotle's account of practical reason, practical intelligence, and the way in which human beings enter into the way of being and acting that Aristotle denominates ethos. Considering matters in this framework, the author finds inconclusive the arguments that Stanley and Williamson offer for seeing knowing how to as a special case of knowing that. The paper then explores certain implications of the author's position for the philosophy of mind and the grammatical analysis of constructions involving `know how to'. It ends with a neo-Rylean remark about Aristotelian nous. I},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/8HA4Q3ZK/2012 - Practical knowledge Knowing how to and knowing that - Wiggins.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VUAA7CQF/2012 - Practical knowledge Knowing how to and knowing that - Wiggins.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wildman2021,
-  title = {Against the Reduction of Modality to Essence},
-  author = {Wildman, Nathan},
-  year = {2021},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {198},
-  number = {6},
-  pages = {1455--1471},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-017-1667-6},
-  abstract = {It is a truth universally acknowledged that a claim of metaphysical modality, in possession of good alethic standing, must be in want of an essentialist foundation. Or at least so say the advocates of the reductive-essence-first view (the REF, for short), according to which all (metaphysical) modality is to be reductively defined in terms of essence. Here, I contest this bit of current wisdom. In particular, I offer two puzzles\textemdash one concerning the essences of non-compossible, complementary entities, and a second involving entities whose essences are modally `loaded'\textemdash that together strongly call into question the possibility of reducing modality to essence.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FF7UBAEI/Wildman - 2021 - Against the reduction of modality to essence.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Williams1985,
-  title = {Ethics and the {{Limits}} of {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Williams, Bernard},
-  year = {1985},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PAR5UCZM/1987 - Ethics and the limits of Philosophy - Shklar.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZVGWAPRP/1985 - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy - Williams.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williams2007,
-  title = {Eligibility and {{Inscrutability}}},
-  author = {Williams, J. Robert G.},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {116},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {361--399},
-  issn = {0031-8108, 1558-1470},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-2007-002},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/JB3AJ9V6/Williams - 2007 - Eligibility and Inscrutability.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williams2010a,
-  title = {Fundamental and {{Derivative Truths}}},
-  author = {Williams, J Robert G},
-  year = {2010},
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {119},
-  number = {2005},
-  pages = {103--141},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D6TMD99Z/2010 - Fundamental and Derivative Truths - Williams, Williams.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z4S2RDGC/2010 - Fundamental and Derivative Truths - Williams.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Williamson,
-  title = {Objects, {{Properties}} and {{Contingent Existence}}},
-  booktitle = {Themes from {{Barcan Marcus}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  editor = {Essler, W. K.},
-  year = {forthcoming},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6Y4JRR5Y/Bernepaper.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson1985,
-  title = {Converse {{Relations}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {1985},
-  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {94},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {249--262},
-  issn = {0031-8108},
-  doi = {10.2307/2185430},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5BC28XXQ/2185430.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Williamson1996,
-  title = {Vagueness},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {1996},
-  month = may,
-  edition = {Revised ed. edition},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  address = {{New York}},
-  abstract = {If you keep removing single grains of sand from a heap, when is it no longer a heap? From discussions of the heap paradox in classical Greece, to modern formal approaches like fuzzy logic, Timothy Williamson traces the history of the problem of vagueness. He argues that standard logic and formal semantics apply even to vague languages and defends the controversial, realist view that vagueness is a form of ignorance - there really is a grain of sand whose removal turns a heap into a non-heap, but we can never know exactly which one it is.},
-  isbn = {978-0-415-13980-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VYJE24Q7/Williamson - 1996 - Vagueness.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson1998,
-  title = {Bare {{Possibilia}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {1998},
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {48},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {257--273},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NMH79PNK/Williamson - 1998 - Bare Possibilia.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson1998a,
-  title = {The {{Broadness}} of the {{Mental}}: {{Some Logical Considerations}}},
-  shorttitle = {The {{Broadness}} of the {{Mental}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  volume = {32},
-  number = {S12},
-  pages = {389--410},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.17},
-  copyright = {Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 1998},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D3IW8YH9/Williamson - 1998 - The Broadness of the Mental Some Logical Consider.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3IENB267/abstract.html}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson1999,
-  title = {Truthmakers and the Converse {{Barcan}} Formula},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {1999},
-  journal = {Dialectica},
-  volume = {53},
-  number = {314},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5PWJBADZ/1999 - Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LJ3F3EQC/1999 - Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2000,
-  title = {Existence and {{Contingency}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2000},
-  journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},
-  volume = {100},
-  pages = {321--343}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2000a,
-  title = {The {{Necessary Framework}} of {{Objects}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2000},
-  journal = {Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy},
-  volume = {19},
-  pages = {201--208},
-  abstract = {If you have two similar knives, each consisting of a handle and a blade, you can imagine a knife consisting of the handle of the knife on the right and the blade of the knife on the left. Even though no such knife is ever made, there seems to be a particular possible knife that you are imagining, because your description is specific enough to answer the question `Which possible knife are you thinking about?'. You might even give it a name. If there are merely possible knives, many other kinds have merely possible members too. What place is there, if any, for merely possible Fs? Until we have an adequate answer to the question, we shall not properly understand the nature of possibility and its dual, necessity. Even the simplest logical characteristics of the phrase `possible F' are often misunderstood.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/I2B6PB3M/2000 - The Necessary Framework of Objects - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TITJPVIP/2000 - The Necessary Framework of Objects - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Williamson2002,
-  title = {Necessary {{Existents}}},
-  booktitle = {Logic, {{Thought}} and {{Language}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  editor = {O'Hear, A},
-  year = {2002},
-  pages = {233--251},
-  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
-  address = {{Cambridge}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/XMU45KI9/2002 - Necessary Existents - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YF544YME/2002 - Necessary Existents - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Williamson2002a,
-  title = {Knowledge and Its {{Limits}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2002},
-  month = oct,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford, New York}},
-  abstract = {Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a fundamental kind of mental state sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analysing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts light on a wide variety of philosophical issues: the problem of scepticism, the nature of evidence, probability and assertion, the dispute between realism and anti-realism and the paradox of the surprise examination. Williamson relates the new conception to structural limits on knowledge which imply that what can be known never exhausts what is true. The arguments are illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology for the twenty-first century.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-925656-3}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2003,
-  title = {Everything},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2003},
-  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
-  volume = {17},
-  pages = {1--86},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6TLGSHAC/2003 - Everything - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/R6IHP4H6/2003 - Everything - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2006,
-  title = {Stalnaker on the {{Interaction}} of {{Modality}} with {{Quantification}} and {{Identity}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2006},
-  journal = {Thomson and Byrne},
-  pages = {1--48},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BZCRU5TK/2006 - Stalnaker on the Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/UMJKHKNE/2006 - Stalnaker on the Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2007,
-  title = {How {{Probable Is}} an {{Infinite Sequence}} of {{Heads}}?},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2007},
-  journal = {Analysis},
-  volume = {67},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {173--180},
-  publisher = {{[Analysis Committee, Oxford University Press]}},
-  issn = {0003-2638},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/G4HCRZ2A/Williamson - 2007 - How Probable Is an Infinite Sequence of Heads.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2010,
-  title = {Necessitism, {{Contingentism}}, and {{Plural Quantification}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {119},
-  number = {475},
-  pages = {657--748},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzq042},
-  abstract = {Necessitism is the view that necessarily everything is necessarily something; contingentism is the negation of necessitism. The dispute between them is reminiscent of, but clearer than, the more familiar one between possibilism and actualism. A mapping often used to `translate' actualist discourse into possibilist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of a first-order modal language to a sentence the contingentist (but not the necessitist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables the necessitist to extract a `cash value' from what the contingentist says. Similarly, a mapping often used to `translate' possibilist discourse into actualist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of the language to a sentence the necessitist (but not the contingentist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables the contingentist to extract a `cash value' from what the necessitist says. Neither mapping is a translation in the usual sense, since necessitists and contingentists use the same language with the same meanings. The former mapping is extended to a second-order modal language under a plural interpretation of the second-order variables. It is proved that the latter mapping cannot be. Thus although the necessitist can extract a `cash value' from what the contingentist says in the second-order language, the contingentist cannot extract a `cash value' from some of what the necessitist says, even when it raises significant questions. This poses contingentism a serious challenge.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5A54RQ6H/Williamson - 2010 - Necessitism, Contingentism, and Plural Quantificat.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Williamson2013,
-  title = {Modal {{Logic}} as {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = may,
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  abstract = {Are there such things as merely possible people, who would have lived if our ancestors had acted differently? Are there future people, who have not yet been conceived? Questions like those raise deep issues about both the nature of being and its logical relations with contingency and change. In Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson argues for positive answers to those questions on the basis of an integrated approach to the issues, applying the technical resources of modal logic to provide structural cores for metaphysical theories. He rejects the search for a metaphysically neutral logic as futile. The book contains detailed historical discussion of how the metaphysical issues emerged in the twentieth century development of quantified modal logic, through the work of such figures as Rudolf Carnap, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Arthur Prior, and Saul Kripke. It proposes higher-order modal logic as a new setting in which to resolve such metaphysical questions scientifically, by the construction of systematic logical theories embodying rival answers and their comparison by normal scientific standards. Williamson provides both a rigorous introduction to the technical background needed to understand metaphysical questions in quantified modal logic and an extended argument for controversial, provocative answers to them. He gives original, precise treatments of topics including the relation between logic and metaphysics, the methodology of theory choice in philosophy, the nature of possible worlds and their role in semantics, plural quantification compared to quantification into predicate position, communication across metaphysical disagreement, and problems for truthmaker theory.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MGVGDNWG/2013 - Modal Logic as Metaphysics - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Williamson2013a,
-  title = {Identity and Discrimination},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2013},
-  publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
-  address = {{Oxford}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9BXLFVST/2013 - Identity and discrimination - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/M9QA6QFG/2013 - Identity and discrimination - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2013b,
-  title = {Logic, {{Metalogic}} and {{Neutrality}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {79},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {211--231},
-  issn = {0165-0106, 1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-013-9474-z},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Ethics,Logic,Ontology,Philosophy},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7BSGTHBZ/Williamson - 2013 - Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Williamson2013c,
-  title = {Metaphysics and {{Higher-Order Modal Logic}}},
-  booktitle = {Ways {{Things Are}}: {{Studies}} in {{Ontology}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  editor = {Kanzian, Christian and L{\"o}ffler, Winfried and Quitterer, Josef},
-  year = {2013},
-  pages = {17--36},
-  publisher = {{Philosophical Analysis}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9U2SFHH4/2013 - Metaphysics and Higher-Order Modal Logic - Williamson.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Z87U33ZS/2013 - Metaphysics and Higher-Order Modal Logic - Williamson.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2013d,
-  title = {Wittgenstein's {{Metaphilosophy}}, by {{A1}} - {{Paul Horwich}} . {{Oxford}}: {{PB}} - {{Clarendon Press}} , 2012, Xv + 225 Pp. {{ISBN}} 978-0-1996-6112-1 Pb \textsterling 16.99},
-  shorttitle = {Wittgenstein's {{Metaphilosophy}}, by {{A1}} - {{Paul Horwich}} . {{Oxford}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {21},
-  pages = {e7-e10},
-  issn = {1468-0378},
-  doi = {10.1111/ejop.12036},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2013 John Wiley \& Sons Ltd},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2014,
-  title = {Very {{Improbable Knowing}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Erkenntnis},
-  volume = {79},
-  number = {5},
-  pages = {971--999},
-  issn = {0165-0106, 1572-8420},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10670-013-9590-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Epistemology,Ethics,Logic,Ontology,Philosophy},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A6V95S3R/Williamson - 2014 - Very Improbable Knowing.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2014a,
-  title = {Pr\'ecis of {{Modal Logic}} as {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {88},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {713--716},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12099},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright{} 2014 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2016,
-  title = {Modal Science},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2016},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {46},
-  number = {4-5},
-  pages = {453--492},
-  issn = {0045-5091},
-  doi = {10.1080/00455091.2016.1205851},
-  abstract = {This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those assumptions arguably include some necessitist principles.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/VSJXSI6I/Williamson - 2016 - Modal science.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2018,
-  title = {Spaces of {{Possibility}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements},
-  volume = {82},
-  pages = {189--204},
-  issn = {1358-2461, 1755-3555},
-  doi = {10.1017/S135824611800019X},
-  abstract = {We care not just how things are but how they could have been otherwise \textendash{} about possibility and necessity as well as actuality. Many philosophers regard such talk as beyond the reach of respectable science, since observation tells us how things are but (allegedly) not how they could have been otherwise. I argue that, on the contrary, such criticisms are ill-founded: possibility and necessity are studied in natural science, for example through phase spaces, abstract mathematical representations of the possible states of a physical system. The possibility is objective, not merely epistemic, though it may be more restricted than pure metaphysical possibility. The elements of a phase space are very similar to Kripke's possible worlds, despite being time slices rather than total histories. The absence of explicit modal operators in the mathematical models used by scientists does not show science to be non-modal; rather, it manifests reliance on a mathematical framework for theorizing about objective possibility similar to the mathematical framework of possible worlds model theory.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3PRPJADN/Williamson - 2018 - Spaces of Possibility.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Williamson2018a,
-  title = {Doing {{Philosophy}}: {{From Common Curiosity}} to {{Logical Reasoning}}},
-  shorttitle = {Doing {{Philosophy}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = aug,
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  address = {{Oxford, United Kingdom}},
-  abstract = {What are philosophers trying to achieve? How can they succeed? Does philosophy make progress? Is it in competition with science, or doing something completely different, or neither?  Timothy Williamson tackles some of the key questions surrounding philosophy in new and provocative ways, showing how philosophy begins in common sense curiosity, and develops through our capacity to dispute rationally with each other. Discussing philosophy's ability to clarify our thoughts, he explains why such clarification depends on the development of philosophical theories, and how those theories can be tested by imaginative thought experiments, and compared against each other by standards similar to those used in the natural and social sciences. He also shows how logical rigour can be understood as a way of enhancing the explanatory power of philosophical theories. Drawing on the history of philosophy to provide a track record of philosophical thinking's successes and failures, Williamson overturns widely held dogmas about the distinctive nature of philosophy in comparison to the sciences, demystifies its methods, and considers the future of the discipline.  From thought experiments, to deduction, to theories, this little book will cause you to totally rethink what philosophy is.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-882251-6},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{Williamson2018b,
-  title = {Counterpossibles},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Topoi},
-  volume = {37},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {357--368},
-  issn = {1572-8749},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11245-016-9424-x},
-  abstract = {The paper clarifies and defends the orthodox view that counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true against recent criticisms. It argues that apparent counterexamples to orthodoxy result from uncritical reliance on a fallible heuristic used in the processing of conditionals. A comparison is developed between such counterpossibles and vacuously true universal generalizations.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/K8TMPCF4/Williamson - 2018 - Counterpossibles.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Williamsona,
-  title = {Degrees of {{Freedom}}: {{Is Good Philosophy Bad Science}}?},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IKLTLQ8B/Disputatio25.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{WilliamsonDraft,
-  title = {How Did We Get Here from There? {{The}} Transformation of Analytic Philosophy},
-  shorttitle = {How Did We Get Here from There?},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  year = {Draft},
-  abstract = {Opponents of analytic philosophy often associate it with logical positivism. From a historical point of view, it is clear that one main strand in the development of the broad tradition known as `analytic philosophy' was indeed the logical positivism},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9L5NFE5P/How_did_we_get_here_from_there_1.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wilson2014,
-  title = {No {{Work}} for a {{Theory}} of {{Grounding}}},
-  author = {Wilson, Jessica M.},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Inquiry},
-  volume = {57},
-  number = {5-6},
-  pages = {535--579},
-  issn = {0020-174X},
-  doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2014.907542},
-  abstract = {It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation\textemdash{} `Grounding'\textemdash is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold `in virtue of'', be (constitutively) `metaphysically dependent on', or be `nothing over and above' some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence\textemdash for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on\textemdash which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/FI3H8P8U/Wilson - 2014 - No Work for a Theory of Grounding.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wilson2017,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Causation}}},
-  author = {Wilson, Alastair},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jan,
-  journal = {No\^us},
-  pages = {n/a-n/a},
-  issn = {1468-0068},
-  doi = {10.1111/nous.12190},
-  abstract = {There is a systematic and suggestive analogy between grounding and causation. In my view, this analogy is no coincidence. Grounding and causation are alike because grounding is a type of causation: metaphysical causation. In this paper I defend the identification of grounding with metaphysical causation, drawing on the causation literature to explore systematic connections between grounding and metaphysical dependence counterfactuals, and I outline a non-reductive counterfactual theory of grounding along interventionist lines.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/NZ9GDWPG/Wilson - 2017 - Metaphysical Causation.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wilson2018,
-  title = {Grounding {{Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality}}},
-  author = {Wilson, Alastair},
-  year = {2018},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {96},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {716--728},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12305},
-  abstract = {This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.12305},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YBL94FQC/Wilson - 2018 - Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Q336XPRC/phpr.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Wilsonforthcoming,
-  title = {Metaphysical {{Emergence}}: {{Weak}} and {{Strong}}},
-  shorttitle = {Metaphysical {{Emergence}}},
-  booktitle = {Metaphysics in {{Contemporary Physics}}},
-  author = {Wilson, Jessica M.},
-  editor = {Bigaj, Tomasz and Wuthrich, Christian},
-  year = {forthcoming},
-  publisher = {{Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/85XKJ5V2/MEWaS.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Witt2010,
-  title = {Feminist {{Metaphysics}}: {{Explorations}} in the {{Ontology}} of {{Sex}}, {{Gender}} and the {{Self}}},
-  shorttitle = {Feminist {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Witt, Charlotte},
-  year = {2010},
-  month = nov,
-  publisher = {{Springer Science \& Business Media}},
-  abstract = {The present volume is an exciting new collection of original essays by outstanding feminist theorists including Sally Haslanger, Marilyn Frye and Linda Alcoff. Feminist Metaphysics is the first collection of articles addressing metaphysical issues from a feminist perspective. The essays cover central feminist topics including: the ontology of sex and gender, persons, identity and subjectivity, and the relations among experience, ideology and reality. Many of the papers combine cutting-edge feminist theory with contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of language. The volume is also distinctive in including articles representing both analytic and continental perspectives on metaphysics. The essays are philosophically sophisticated and are primarily intended for a professional audience of philosophers and feminist theorists.},
-  isbn = {978-90-481-3783-1},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / General,Philosophy / Metaphysics,Psychology / Human Sexuality,Social Science / Feminism \& Feminist Theory,Social Science / Gender Studies},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4YUJK8PQ/[Charlotte_Witt]_Feminist_Metaphysics_Exploration(BookZZ.org).pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wobcke2000,
-  title = {An {{Information-Based Theory}} of {{Conditionals}}},
-  author = {Wobcke, Wayne},
-  year = {2000},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic},
-  volume = {41},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {95--141},
-  publisher = {{University of Notre Dame}},
-  issn = {0029-4527, 1939-0726},
-  doi = {10.1305/ndjfl/1038234607},
-  abstract = {We present an approach to combining three areas of research which we claim are all based on information theory: knowledge representation in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science using prototypes, plans, or schemata; formal semantics in natural language, especially the semantics of the `if-then' conditional construct; and the logic of subjunctive conditionals first developed using a possible worlds semantics by Stalnaker and Lewis. The basic premise of the paper is that both schema-based inference and the semantics of conditionals are based on Dretske's notion of information flow and Barwise and Perry's notion of a constraint in situation semantics. That is, the connection between antecedent AAA and consequent BBB of a conditional `if AAA were the case then BBB would be the case' is an informational relation holding with respect to a pragmatically determined utterance situation. The bridge between AI and conditional logic is that a prototype or planning schema represents a situation type, and the background assumptions underlying the application of a schema in a situation correspond to channel conditions on the flow of information. Adapting the work of Stalnaker and Lewis, the semantics of conditionals is modeled by a refinement ordering on situations: a conditional `if AAA then BBB' holds with respect to a situation if all the minimal refinements of the situation that support AAA also support BBB. We present new logics of situations, information flow, and subjunctive conditionals based on three-valued partial logic that formalizes our approach, and conclude with a discussion of the resulting theory of conditionals, including the "paradoxes" of conditional implication, the difference between truth conditions and assertability conditions for subjunctive conditionals, and the relationship between subjunctive and indicative conditionals.},
-  langid = {english},
-  mrnumber = {MR1932225},
-  zmnumber = {1025.03014},
-  keywords = {conditional logic,knowledge representation,situation semantics},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2MWF7V2E/Wobcke - 2000 - An Information-Based Theory of Conditionals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Wolpert2013,
-  title = {The Lesson of {{Newcomb}}'s Paradox},
-  author = {Wolpert, David H. and Benford, Gregory},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  volume = {190},
-  number = {9},
-  pages = {1637--1646},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-011-9899-3},
-  abstract = {In Newcomb's paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb's paradox is that game theory's expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for what you should choose. Here we show that the conflicting recommendations assume different probabilistic structures relating your choice and the algorithm's prediction. This resolves the paradox: the reason there appears to be two conflicting recommendations is that the probabilistic structure relating the problem's random variables is open to two, conflicting interpretations. We then show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in Newcomb's paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. We end by showing that Newcomb's paradox is time-reversal invariant; both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its `prediction' after you make your choice rather than before.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/PPGHH49D/Wolpert and Benford - 2013 - The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Woods2018,
-  title = {Emptying a {{Paradox}} of {{Ground}}},
-  author = {Woods, Jack},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = aug,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {47},
-  number = {4},
-  pages = {631--648},
-  issn = {1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-017-9442-1},
-  abstract = {Sometimes a fact can play a role in a grounding explanation, but the particular content of that fact make no difference to the explanation\textemdash any fact would do in its place. I call these facts vacuous grounds. I show that applying the distinction between-vacuous grounds allows us to give a principled solution to Kit Fine and Stephen Kramer's paradox of (reflexive) ground. This paradox shows that on minimal assumptions about grounding and minimal assumptions about logic, we can show that grounding is reflexive, contra the intuitive character of grounds. I argue that we should never have accepted that grounding is irreflexive in the first place; the intuitions that support the irreflexive intuition plausibly only require that grounding be non-vacuously irreflexive. Fine and Kramer's paradox relies, essentially, on a case of vacuous grounding and is thus no problem for this account.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/LYDG3GYE/Woods - 2018 - Emptying a Paradox of Ground.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Woodward2004,
-  title = {Making {{Things Happen}}: {{A Theory}} of {{Causal Explanation}}},
-  shorttitle = {Making {{Things Happen}}},
-  author = {Woodward, James},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = jan,
-  doi = {10.1093/0195155270.001.0001},
-  abstract = {Abstract. This book develops a manipulationist theory of causation and explanation: causal and explanatory relationships are relationships that are potentially},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/CDF66MNW/Woodward - 2004 - Making Things Happen A Theory of Causal Explanati.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2MXTJ74H/4324.html}
-}
-
-@incollection{Woodward2016,
-  title = {Causation in {{Science}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Oxford Handbook}} of {{Philosophy}} of {{Science}}},
-  author = {Woodward, James},
-  editor = {Humphreys, Paul},
-  year = {2016},
-  pages = {163--184},
-  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9HSGC2WC/Woodward - 2016 - Causation in Science.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QDWGZYC7/WOOCIS-2.html}
-}
-
-@article{Wu2014,
-  title = {Generalized {{Scott Topology}} on {{Sets}} with {{Families}} of {{Pre-orders}}},
-  author = {Wu, Li-Gang and Fan, Lei},
-  year = {2014},
-  month = feb,
-  journal = {Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science},
-  series = {Proceedings of the 6th {{International Symposium}} on {{Domain Theory}} and {{Its Applications}} ({{ISDT}})},
-  volume = {301},
-  pages = {103--115},
-  issn = {1571-0661},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.entcs.2014.01.009},
-  abstract = {[Fan L., W. Ji and W. L. Wang. ``The Information Order Approximation and Generalized Chains' Completion'', Beijing: Capital Normal University, Preprint, 2005. (in Chinese), Lei Fan] proposed a class of sets with families of pre-orders (R-posets for short). They are not only a non-symmetric generalization of sfe [Monteiro L., Semantic Domains Based on Sets with Families of Equivalences. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 11 (1998): 1\textendash 34, L.Monteiro] but also a special case of quasi-metric spaces (qms, [Smyth M. B., Quasi Uniformities: Reconciling Domains with Metric Spaces. Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Mathematical Foundations of Programming Language Semantics, APR. 8-10, 1987. Lecture Notes In Computer Science, Vol. 298 (1988): 236-253. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, M. B. Smyth]) and generalized ultrametric spaces (gums, [Rutten J. J. M. M., ``Elements of Generalized Ultrametric Domain Theory''. Technical Report CS-R9507, CWI, Amsterdam, 1995, J. J. M. M. Rutten]). In this paper, we define a kind of generalized Scott topology on R-posets and discuss some basic properties of the topology. Some relevant interesting examples are offered. It is worth pointing out that an R-monotone functions is R-continuous if and only if (iff for short) it's continuous with respect to (w.r.t for short) the generalized Scott topology.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {-continuous,-posets,Generalized Scott Topology,Scott Topology},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y4IAKZNI/Wu_Fan_2014_Generalized Scott Topology on Sets with Families of Pre-orders.pdf}
-}
-
-@misc{Xia2022,
-  title = {Neural {{Causal Models}} for {{Counterfactual Identification}} and {{Estimation}}},
-  author = {Xia, Kevin and Pan, Yushu and Bareinboim, Elias},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = sep,
-  number = {arXiv:2210.00035},
-  eprint = {2210.00035},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2210.00035},
-  abstract = {Evaluating hypothetical statements about how the world would be had a different course of action been taken is arguably one key capability expected from modern AI systems. Counterfactual reasoning underpins discussions in fairness, the determination of blame and responsibility, credit assignment, and regret. In this paper, we study the evaluation of counterfactual statements through neural models. Specifically, we tackle two causal problems required to make such evaluations, i.e., counterfactual identification and estimation from an arbitrary combination of observational and experimental data. First, we show that neural causal models (NCMs) are expressive enough and encode the structural constraints necessary for performing counterfactual reasoning. Second, we develop an algorithm for simultaneously identifying and estimating counterfactual distributions. We show that this algorithm is sound and complete for deciding counterfactual identification in general settings. Third, considering the practical implications of these results, we introduce a new strategy for modeling NCMs using generative adversarial networks. Simulations corroborate with the proposed methodology.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/IMJD4RSL/Xia et al. - 2022 - Neural Causal Models for Counterfactual Identifica.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BT7NCU7T/2210.html}
-}
-
-@article{Yablo,
-  title = {{{MODELS AND REALITY}}},
-  author = {Yablo, Stephen},
-  abstract = {The title comes from a well-known paper of Putnam's (Putnam [1980]). The content is very different. Putnam uses model theory1 to cast doubt on our ability to engage semantically with an objective world. The role of mathematics for him is to prove},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/QGW3JJTT/MODELS_AND_REALITY.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yablo1998,
-  title = {Does {{Ontology Rest}} on a {{Mistake}}?: {{Stephen Yablo}}},
-  shorttitle = {Does {{Ontology Rest}} on a {{Mistake}}?},
-  author = {Yablo, Stephen},
-  year = {1998},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume},
-  volume = {72},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {229--262},
-  issn = {1467-8349},
-  doi = {10.1111/1467-8349.00044},
-  abstract = {The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of `guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them\textemdash or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of non-literality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/5E36DNZF/Yablo - 1998 - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake Stephen Yablo.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yablo2012,
-  title = {Explanation, {{Extrapolation}}, and {{Existence}}},
-  author = {Yablo, S.},
-  year = {2012},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {121},
-  number = {484},
-  pages = {1007--1029},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzs120},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@book{Yablo2014,
-  title = {{Aboutness}},
-  author = {Yablo, Stephen},
-  year = {2014},
-  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
-  address = {{Berlin, Boston}},
-  isbn = {978-1-4008-4598-9},
-  langid = {ENGL},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/35C5FVLA/Yablo - 2014 - Aboutness.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/E9VDWF5M/aboutness theory.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yablo2017,
-  title = {Precis of Aboutness},
-  author = {Yablo, Stephen},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
-  volume = {174},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {771--777},
-  issn = {1573-0883},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11098-016-0755-7},
-  abstract = {A lightning fast summary of Yablo, Aboutness, cutting many corners in the interests of brevity. The emphasis is on ``ways.'' Substituting ``ways for S to be true'' in for ``worlds in which S is true'' improves a number of philosophical explanations. The subject matter of S is identified with S's ways of holding in a world, or failing, as the case may be. S contains T iff T is implied by S, and T's ways of being true (false) are implied by ways for S to be true (false); this kind of way-implication is the same as subject matter inclusion. S's surplus content over T is explained as that portion of the content of S that is not about whether T. Subject matter is cast throughout as a full partner in meaning.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/A8YA34ML/Yablo - 2017 - Precis of aboutness.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yalcin2007a,
-  title = {Epistemic {{Modals}}},
-  author = {Yalcin, Seth},
-  year = {2007},
-  month = nov,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {116},
-  number = {464},
-  pages = {983--1026},
-  issn = {0026-4423, 1460-2113},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzm983},
-  abstract = {Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommend an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are explored.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7JEJV38A/Yalcin - 2007 - Epistemic Modals.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yalcin2015,
-  title = {Quantifying {{In}} from a {{Fregean Perspective}}},
-  author = {Yalcin, Seth},
-  year = {2015},
-  month = apr,
-  journal = {Philosophical Review},
-  volume = {124},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {207--253},
-  issn = {0031-8108, 1558-1470},
-  doi = {10.1215/00318108-2842186},
-  abstract = {As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities: (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy. This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb and as binding a variable within the scope of the attitude verb. This essay is interested in addressing the question what the semantic analysis of this kind of reading should look like from a Fregean perspective\textemdash a perspective according to which attitude states are generally relations to structured Fregean thoughts composed of senses. The Fregean view faces a challenge of compositionality here. This essay describes the challenge and offers a response on the Fregean's behalf.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {attitude verbs,de re attitudes,de se attitudes,Frege,quantification,senses,variable binding},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/4FKPVPUY/Yalcin - 2015 - Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yalcin2018,
-  title = {Belief as {{Question-Sensitive}}},
-  author = {Yalcin, Seth},
-  year = {2018},
-  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
-  volume = {97},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {23--47},
-  issn = {1933-1592},
-  doi = {10.1111/phpr.12330},
-  langid = {english},
-  annotation = {\_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/phpr.12330},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MWI6RP5F/phpr.html}
-}
-
-@article{Yamamoto2017,
-  title = {Results in {{Modal Correspondence Theory}} for {{Possibility Semantics}}},
-  author = {Yamamoto, Kentar{\^o}},
-  year = {2017},
-  month = jun,
-  abstract = {Author(s): Yamamoto, Kentar\^o},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/HEPDSKQ5/Yamamoto - 2017 - Results in Modal Correspondence Theory for Possibi.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yi2005,
-  title = {The {{Logic}} and {{Meaning}} of {{Plurals}}. {{Part I}}},
-  author = {Yi, Byeong-Uk},
-  year = {2005},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
-  volume = {34},
-  number = {5-6},
-  pages = {459--506},
-  issn = {0022-3611, 1573-0433},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10992-005-0560-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {aggregate,irreducibility of plurals,Logic,natural language,plural,regimentation of plurals,second-order logic,semantics,set,singular,the many,the one},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/YDXJGHQC/Yi - 2005 - The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part I.pdf}
-}
-
-@incollection{Yi2013,
-  title = {The {{Logic}} of {{Classes}} of the {{No-Class Theory}}},
-  booktitle = {The {{Palgrave Centenary Companion}} to {{Principia Mathematica}}},
-  author = {Yi, Byeong-uk},
-  editor = {Griffin, Nicholas and Linsky, Bernard},
-  year = {2013},
-  series = {History of {{Analytic Philosophy}}},
-  pages = {96--129},
-  publisher = {{Palgrave Macmillan UK}},
-  doi = {10.1057/9781137344632_6},
-  abstract = {In developing modern logic, Frege aims to substantiate the logicist view of arithmetic. In this view, arithmetic is reducible to logic: one can define all arithmetical notions using only logical notions, and prove all arithmetic truths using only logical truths together with definitions of arithmetical notions. A key component of his attempt to show this is his analysis of numbers as extensions of `concepts' or properties (Frege, 1884: 80).1 Russell, who shares Frege's logicism, accepts the same analysis of number. In his early analysis of mathematics, he writes: ... a number is nothing but a class of similar classes: this definition allows the deduction of all the usual properties of numbers ... and is the only one (so far as I know) which is possible in terms of the fundamental concepts of general logic. (POM: 116)2 Like Frege, Russell identifies classes as extensions and considers the notion of extension a logical notion because it pertains to the logic or semantics of predicates.},
-  copyright = {\textcopyright 2013 Byeong-uk Yi},
-  isbn = {978-1-349-46611-5 978-1-137-34463-2},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {History of Mathematical Sciences,History of Philosophy,Logic,Philosophy of Mathematics,Philosophy of Mind,Philosophy of Science}
-}
-
-@misc{Yudkowsky2010,
-  title = {Timeless {{Decision Theory}}},
-  author = {Yudkowsky, Eliezer},
-  year = {2010},
-  publisher = {{Machine Intelligence Research Institute}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/7U6DMQER/TDT.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Yudkowsky2018,
-  title = {Functional {{Decision Theory}}: {{A New Theory}} of {{Instrumental Rationality}}},
-  shorttitle = {Functional {{Decision Theory}}},
-  author = {Yudkowsky, Eliezer and Soares, Nate},
-  year = {2018},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {arXiv:1710.05060 [cs]},
-  eprint = {1710.05060},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  abstract = {This paper describes and motivates a new decision theory known as functional decision theory (FDT), as distinct from causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. Functional decision theorists hold that the normative principle for action is to treat one's decision as the output of a fixed mathematical function that answers the question, "Which output of this very function would yield the best outcome?" Adhering to this principle delivers a number of benefits, including the ability to maximize wealth in an array of traditional decision-theoretic and game-theoretic problems where CDT and EDT perform poorly. Using one simple and coherent decision rule, functional decision theorists (for example) achieve more utility than CDT on Newcomb's problem, more utility than EDT on the smoking lesion problem, and more utility than both in Parfit's hitchhiker problem. In this paper, we define FDT, explore its prescriptions in a number of different decision problems, compare it to CDT and EDT, and give philosophical justifications for FDT as a normative theory of decision-making.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/RGGVWXGD/Yudkowsky and Soares - 2018 - Functional Decision Theory A New Theory of Instru.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/WNM4P9GL/1710.html}
-}
-
-@article{Zalta2006,
-  title = {Essence and {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Zalta, Edward N.},
-  year = {2006},
-  month = jul,
-  journal = {Mind},
-  volume = {115},
-  number = {459},
-  pages = {659--694},
-  issn = {1460-2113, 0026-4423},
-  doi = {10.1093/mind/fzl659},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P6EGMYSI/fzl659.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Zanetti2020,
-  title = {Grounding and Auto-Abstraction},
-  author = {Zanetti, Luca},
-  year = {2020},
-  month = jun,
-  journal = {Synthese},
-  issn = {1573-0964},
-  doi = {10.1007/s11229-020-02710-3},
-  abstract = {Abstraction principles and grounding can be combined in a natural way (Rosen in Hale B, Hoffmann A (eds) Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 109\textendash 136, 2010; Schwartzkopff in Grazer philosophische studien 82(1):353\textendash 373, 2011). However, some ground-theoretic abstraction principles entail that there are circles of partial ground (Donaldson in No\^us 51(4):775\textendash 801, 2017). I call this problem auto-abstraction. In this paper I sketch a solution. Sections~1 and~2 are introductory. In Sect.~3 I start comparing different solutions to the problem. In Sect.~4 I contend that the thesis that the right-hand side of an abstraction principle is (metaphysically) prior to its left-hand side motivates an independence constraint, and that this constraint leads to predicative restrictions on the acceptable instances of ground-theoretic abstraction principles. In Sect.~5 I argue that auto-abstraction is acceptable unless the left-hand side is essentially grounded by the right-hand side. In Sect.~6 I highlight several parallelisms between auto-abstraction and the puzzles of ground. I finally compare my solution with the strategies listed in Sect.~3.},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/D9ETCQCZ/Zanetti - 2020 - Grounding and auto-abstraction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{Zhang2019,
-  title = {Topologies Induced by the Representation of a Betweenness Relation as a Family of Order Relations},
-  author = {Zhang, Hua-Peng and {P{\'e}rez-Fern{\'a}ndez}, Ra{\'u}l and De Baets, Bernard},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = may,
-  journal = {Topology and its Applications},
-  volume = {258},
-  pages = {100--114},
-  issn = {0166-8641},
-  doi = {10.1016/j.topol.2019.02.045},
-  abstract = {Betweenness relations are the mathematical formalization of the geometrical notion of an element being in between other two elements. In this paper, we exploit a well-known result representing a betweenness relation as a family of order relations and analyse the corresponding family of induced (Alexandrov) topologies. In particular, the intersection of this family of topologies is proved to be the anti-discrete topology and a necessary and sufficient condition for the supremum of this family of topologies to be the discrete topology is provided. Interestingly, this condition is proved to hold when dealing with a finite set. We end with a discussion on the relation between the topology induced by an order relation or a metric and the family of topologies induced by the betweenness relation induced by the same order relation or metric.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Betweenness relation,Metric,Preorder relation,Topology},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ERMTUL6L/Zhang et al_2019_Topologies induced by the representation of a betweenness relation as a family.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/9WVFLXUD/S0166864118306187.html}
-}
-
-@misc{Zhang2019a,
-  title = {Composable {{Planning}} with {{Attributes}}},
-  author = {Zhang, Amy and Lerer, Adam and Sukhbaatar, Sainbayar and Fergus, Rob and Szlam, Arthur},
-  year = {2019},
-  month = apr,
-  number = {arXiv:1803.00512},
-  eprint = {1803.00512},
-  eprinttype = {arxiv},
-  primaryclass = {cs},
-  publisher = {{arXiv}},
-  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1803.00512},
-  abstract = {The tasks that an agent will need to solve often are not known during training. However, if the agent knows which properties of the environment are important then, after learning how its actions affect those properties, it may be able to use this knowledge to solve complex tasks without training specifically for them. Towards this end, we consider a setup in which an environment is augmented with a set of user defined attributes that parameterize the features of interest. We propose a method that learns a policy for transitioning between "nearby" sets of attributes, and maintains a graph of possible transitions. Given a task at test time that can be expressed in terms of a target set of attributes, and a current state, our model infers the attributes of the current state and searches over paths through attribute space to get a high level plan, and then uses its low level policy to execute the plan. We show in 3D block stacking, grid-world games, and StarCraft that our model is able to generalize to longer, more complex tasks at test time by composing simpler learned policies.},
-  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
-  keywords = {Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/MIJAVYZY/Zhang et al. - 2019 - Composable Planning with Attributes.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/6DVMSA54/1803.html}
-}
-
-@article{Zhang2022,
-  title = {Haecceity {{Mereology}}},
-  author = {Zhang, Ruoyu},
-  year = {2022},
-  month = sep,
-  journal = {Metaphysica},
-  volume = {23},
-  number = {2},
-  pages = {275--294},
-  publisher = {{De Gruyter}},
-  issn = {1874-6373},
-  doi = {10.1515/mp-2021-0034},
-  abstract = {Haecceities are non-qualitative properties for individuation but the current theories about haecceities are still to be much more explored. This paper aims to develop a ``haecceity mereology'' \textendash{} that is, an ontological system that understands substances as mereological combinations of haecceities and qualitative properties. In this way, the view developed is an alternative to Paul's (2002. ``Logical Parts.'' No\^us 36 (4): 578\textendash 96; 2006. ``Coincidence as Overlap.'' No\^us 40 (4): 623\textendash 59) mereological approach. Three rules are proposed: (1) If S is a substance, then there is one and only one haecceity which is S's qualitative part; (2) For all the fusions with the same haecceity, at most only one of those fusions is a substance; (3) When all the relevant elements are abundant, every element must overlap at least one substance. This is the first ontology of haecceities in the recent literature and would be a model for systematic metaphysics.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {composition,haecceities,identity,individuation,mereology,necessity,substances,universals}
-}
-
-@article{Zhao2011,
-  title = {Order Topology and Bi-{{Scott}} Topology on a Poset},
-  author = {Zhao, Bin and Wang, Kai Yun},
-  year = {2011},
-  month = oct,
-  journal = {Acta Mathematica Sinica, English Series},
-  volume = {27},
-  number = {11},
-  pages = {2101},
-  issn = {1439-7617},
-  doi = {10.1007/s10114-011-0273-7},
-  abstract = {In this paper, some properties of order topology and bi-Scott topology on a poset are obtained. Order-convergence in posets is further studied. Especially, a sufficient and necessary condition for order-convergence to be topological is given for some kind of posets.},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {06B35,54A20,bi-Scott topology,doubly continuous poset,order topology,Order-convergence},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/ZZ624G3G/Zhao_Wang_2011_Order topology and bi-Scott topology on a poset.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{Zimmerman2004,
-  title = {Oxford {{Studies}} in {{Metaphysics}}},
-  author = {Zimmerman, Dean and Bennett, Karen},
-  year = {2004},
-  month = jan,
-  publisher = {{OUP Oxford}},
-  abstract = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this new series will be a much-needed focus for it. OSM will offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighboring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.},
-  isbn = {978-0-19-926772-9},
-  langid = {english},
-  keywords = {Philosophy / Metaphysics}
-}
-
-@book{zotero-5248,
-  title = {Continuous-{{Time Markov Decision Processes}}},
-  langid = {english},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/P32WVWHX/978-3-642-02547-1.html}
-}
-
-@book{zotero-null-16545,
-  title = {Our {{Knowledge}} of the {{Internal World}}},
-  abstract = {On the traditional Cartesian picture, knowledge of one's own internal world \textemdash{} of one's current thoughts and feelings \textemdash{} is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. The philosophical problem is to explain how we can move beyond this knowledge, how we can form a conception of an objective world, and how we can know that the world answers to our conception of it. This book is in the anti-Cartesian tradition that seeks to reverse the order of explanation.},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/BAII6AJS/Our Knowledge of the Internal World.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{zotero-null-16679,
-  title = {Introduction to {{Metalogic}}},
-  author = {Hardegree, Gary},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/2MYIKPHP/Ch 3 - Induction.pdf}
-}
-
-@article{zotero-null-177,
-  title = {Introduction to Natural Deduction},
-  author = {Clemente Laboreo, Daniel},
-  year = {2004}
-}
-
-@incollection{zotero-null-198,
-  title = {Reply to {{Fine}}},
-  booktitle = {Williamson on {{Modality}}},
-  author = {Williamson, Timothy},
-  editor = {McCullagh, Mark and {Yli-Vakkuri}, Juhani},
-  publisher = {{Routledge}},
-  address = {{London}},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/TRWDNI8S/WoMFine.pdf;/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/V22LBZ4M/WoMFine.docx}
-}
-
-@article{zotero-null-30,
-  title = {Having a {{Part Twice Over}}},
-  author = {Bennett, Karen},
-  year = {2013},
-  month = mar,
-  journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
-  volume = {91},
-  number = {1},
-  pages = {83--103},
-  issn = {0004-8402},
-  doi = {10.1080/00048402.2011.637936},
-  abstract = {I argue that it is intuitive and useful to think about composition in the light of the familiar functionalist distinction between role and occupant. This involves factoring the standard notion of parthood into two related notions: being a parthood slot and occupying a parthood slot. One thing is part of another just in case it fills one of that thing's parthood slots. This move opens room to rethink mereology in various ways, and, in particular, to see the mereological structure of a composite as potentially outreaching the individual entities that are its parts. I sketch one formal system that allows things to have individual entities as parts multiple times over. This is particularly useful to David Armstrong, given Lewis's charge that his structural universals must do exactly that. I close by reflecting upon the nature and point of formal mereology.}
-}
-
-@article{zotero-null-304,
-  title = {The {{Stone Representation Theorem}} for {{Boolean Algebras}}},
-  author = {Dirks, Matthew},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/Y62ZPL39/Dirks.pdf}
-}
-
-@book{zotero-null-362,
-  title = {Interrogative {{Investigations}}},
-  abstract = {Interrogative constructions are the linguistic forms by which questions are expressed. Their analysis is of great interest to linguists, as well as to computer scientists, human-computer interface designers, and philosophers. Interrogative constructions have played a central role in the development of modern syntactic theory. Nonetheless, to date most syntactic work has taken place quite separately from formal semantic and pragmatic work on interrogatives. Although there has by now been a significant amount of work on interrogatives across a variety of languages, there exist few syntactic and semantic treatments that provide a comprehensive account of a wide range of interrogative constructions and uses in a single language. This book closes the gap in research on this subject. By developing the frameworks of Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar and Situation Semantics, the authors provide an account that rigorously integrates syntactic, semantic, and contextual dimensions of interrogatives. The challenge of providing exhaustive coverage of the interrogative constructions of English, including various constructions that occur solely in dialogue interaction, leads to new insights about a variety of contentious theoretical issues. These include matters of semantic ontology, the quantificational status of wh-phrases, the semantic effect of wh-fronting, the status of constructions in grammatical theory, the integration of illocutionary information in the grammar, and the nature of ellipsis resolution in dialogue. The account is stated with sufficient rigor to enable fairly direct computational implementation.}
-}
-
-@article{zotero-null-409,
-  title = {A {{Tutorial On Bilattices}}},
-  author = {Arieli, Ofer}
-}
-
-@article{zotero-null-47,
-  title = {Propositional Quantifiers in Modal Logic},
-  author = {Fine, Kit},
-  year = {1970},
-  month = dec,
-  journal = {Theoria},
-  volume = {36},
-  number = {3},
-  pages = {336--346},
-  issn = {1755-2567},
-  doi = {10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00432.x},
-  langid = {english}
-}
-
-@article{zotero-null-77,
-  title = {Friendship: {{East}} and {{West}}},
-  author = {Sluga, Hans},
-  file = {/home/benjamin/Zotero/storage/3NW3P877/Friendship East and West (revised).pdf}
-}
diff --git a/minimal/minimal.lua b/minimal/minimal.lua
deleted file mode 100644
index e0cc408..0000000
--- a/minimal/minimal.lua
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/nvim-lua/plenary.nvim"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/hrsh7th/nvim-cmp"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/hrsh7th/cmp-nvim-lsp"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/hrsh7th/cmp-buffer"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/hrsh7th/cmp-omni"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/neovim/nvim-lspconfig"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/williamboman/mason.nvim"
--- vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "PATH/williamboman/mason-lspconfig.nvim"
-vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "/home/benjamin/.local/share/nvim/site/pack/packer/start/cmp-omni"
-vim.opt.runtimepath:append  "/home/benjamin/.local/share/nvim/site/pack/packer/start/cmp-omni/after"
-vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "/home/benjamin/.local/share/nvim/site/pack/packer/start/nvim-cmp"
-vim.opt.runtimepath:append  "/home/benjamin/.local/share/nvim/site/pack/packer/start/nvim-cmp/after"
-vim.opt.runtimepath:prepend "/home/benjamin/.local/share/nvim/site/pack/packer/start/vimtex"
-vim.opt.runtimepath:append  "/home/benjamin/.local/share/nvim/site/pack/packer/start/vimtex/after"
-
-vim.cmd[[filetype plugin indent on]]
-
-local cmp = require("cmp")
-
-cmp.setup({
-  sources = cmp.config.sources({
-    { name = "omni" },
-    { name = "nvim_lsp" },
-    { name = "buffer", keyword_length = 3 },
-  }),
-})
-
-vim.g.vimtex_view_method = "zathura"
diff --git a/minimal/minimal.tex b/minimal/minimal.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index fb9ad19..0000000
--- a/minimal/minimal.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-\documentclass[11pt]{article}
-\usepackage[a4paper, margin=4cm]{geometry}
-\usepackage[english]{babel}
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{\sc TITLE}
-\author{\it Benjamin Brast-McKie}
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent
-ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-\section{Introduction}\label{Intro}
-
-\cite{Sta}
-
-\bibliographystyle{plain}
-\bibliography{minimal}
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/snippets/tex.snippets b/snippets/tex.snippets
deleted file mode 100644
index 21603a6..0000000
--- a/snippets/tex.snippets
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-# -- SNIPPETS --
-#
-# new glossary entry
-snippet gloss "Glossary Entry"  b
-	\newglossaryentry{${1:entry}}{
-			name = {${2:name}},
-			symbol = {\ensuremath{${3:symbol}}},
-			description = {${4:description}}
-	}
-#
-
-# custom theorem enviornment
-snippet customthm "Custom Theorem" b
-	\vspace{.1in}
-	\begin{customthm}{(${1:label})}
-		${2:claim}
-	\end{customthm}
-
-	\begin{Answer}
-		${0}
-	\end{Answer}
-#
-
-# framed text enviornment
-snippet textbox "Text Box" b
-	\begin{tcolorbox}
-		${0}
-	\end{tcolorbox}
-#
-
-# new command
-snippet nc "New Command" b
-	\newcommand{${1:cmd}}[${2:opt}]{${3:realcmd}} ${0}
-#
-
-#usepackage
-snippet up "Use Package" b
-	\usepackage[${1:options}]{${2:package}} ${0}
-#
-
-# \begin{}...\end{}
-snippet begin "Begin End"
-	\begin{${1:env}}
-		${2:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{$1}${0}
-#
-
-# Align(ed)
-snippet align "Align Env" b
-	\begin{align${1:ed}}
-		\label{${2:name}}
-		${0}
-	\end{align$1}
-#
-
-# Quote
-snippet quote "Quotation" b
-	\vspace{-.1in}
-	\begin{quote}\singlespacing\small
-		${0}
-		\hfill(p.~${1})
-	\end{quote}
-	\vspace{.1in}
-#
-
-# Labelalign
-snippet labelalign "Label Align" b
-	\vspace{.05in}
-	\begin{labelalign} %\small\onehalfspacing
-		\item[${2:\it} ${3:Label:}] ${0}
-	\end{labelalign}
-	\vspace{.05in}
-#
-
-# Enumerate
-snippet enum "Enumerate" b
-	\begin{enumerate}
-		\item[${1:\it }${2:Label:}] ${0}
-	\end{enumerate}
-#
-
-# Itemize
-snippet item "Itemize" b
-	\begin{itemize}
-		\item[${1:\it} ${2:Label:}] ${0}
-	\end{itemize}
-#
-
-#Item
-snippet i "Item"
-	\item[${1:\it} ${2:Label:}] ${0}
-#
-
-# Cases
-snippet case "Cases" 
-	${1:LHS}=	
-	\begin{cases}
-		${2:Value}, &\text{ if } ${3:case}\\
-		${4:Value}, &\text{ otherwise.} ${5:otherwise}.
-	\end{cases}${0}
-#
-
-# Section
-snippet sec "Section" b
-	\section{${1:Name}}%
-		\label{sec:${2:$1}}
-		${0}
-#
-
-# Sub Section
-snippet sub "Sub Section" b
-	\subsection{${1:Name}}%
-		\label{sub:${2:$1}}
-		${0}
-#
-
-# Sub Sub Section
-snippet ssub "Sub Sub Section" b
-	\subsubsection{${1:Name}}%
-		\label{sub:${2:$1}}
-		${0}
-#
-
-# Hyper Section
-snippet hsec "Hyper Section" b
-	\hypsection{${1:Name}}%
-		\label{sec:${2:$1}}
-		${0}
-#
-
-# Hyper Sub Section
-snippet hsub "Hyper Sub Section" b
-	\hypsubsection{${1:Name}}%
-		\label{sub:${2:$1}}
-		${0}
-#
-
-# Hyper Sub Sub Section
-snippet hssub "Hyper Sub Sub Section" b
-	\hypsubsubsection{${1:Name}}%
-		\label{sub:${2:$1}}
-		${0}
-#
-
-#Formating text: italic, bold, underline, small capital, emphase ..
-snippet it "Italics" wi
-	\textit{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet tt "Teletype" wi
-	\texttt{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet bf "Bold" wi
-	\textbf{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet sc "Small Caps" wi
-	\textsc{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet tsub "Subscripted" i
-	\textsubscript{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet tsup "Superscripted" i
-	\textsuperscript{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-#Math font
-snippet mf "Mathfrak" w
-	\mathfrak{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet mc "Mathcal" w
-	\mathcal{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet ms "Mathscr" w
-	\mathscr{${1}}${0}
-#
-
-#misc
-snippet fproof "Footnote Proof" bi
-	\footnote{\textit{Proof:} ${1:Begin} \qed}${0}
-#
-
-snippet lab "Label" wi
-	\label{${1:LABEL}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet fn "Footnote" wi
-	\footnote{${1:FOOTNOTE}}${0}
-#
-
-snippet fig "Figure environment" b
-	\begin{figure}
-	\begin{center}
-		\includegraphics[scale=${1}]{Figures/${2}}
-	\end{center}
-	\caption{${3}}
-	\label{fig:${4}}
-	\end{figure}
-	${0}
-#
-
-snippet tikz "Tikz environment" b
-	\begin{figure}[htpb]
-	\begin{center}
-	\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=${1:1}, transform shape]
-		${2}
-	\end{tikzpicture}
-	\end{center}
-	\caption{${3}}%
-	\label{fig:${4}}
-	\end{figure}
-	${0}
-
-snippet lemma "Lemma" bi
-	\begin{lemma}
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{lemma}
-
-snippet prop "Proposition" bi
-	\begin{prop}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{prop}
-
-snippet thrm "Theorem" bi
-	\begin{theorem}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{theorem}
-
-snippet prf "Proof" bi
-	\begin{myproof}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{myproof}
-
-snippet def "Definition" bi
-	\begin{definition}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{definition}
-
-snippet prob "Problem" bi
-	\begin{problem}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{problem}
-
-snippet corl "Corollary" bi
-	\begin{corollary}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{corollary}
-
-snippet example "Example" bi
-	\begin{example}[$1]
-		${0:${VISUAL}}
-	\end{example}
-
-
-
-
-
diff --git a/templates/Glossary.tex b/templates/Glossary.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 86538fa..0000000
--- a/templates/Glossary.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-%%% GLOSSARY %%%
-
-% Add to main file
-
-% \usepackage[automake,nogroupskip,
-%   postpunc={dot},% full stop after description
-%   nostyles,% don't load default style packages
-%   % load glossaries-extra-stylemods.sty and glossary-tree.sty:
-%   stylemods={tree}
-%   ]{glossaries-extra}
-% % \usepackage{glossary-superragged}
-% \loadglsentries{Glossary}
-% \newcommand{\g}{\glssymbol*}
-% \makeglossaries
-
-% \printglossary[style={index}]
-
-%%% ENTRIES %%%
-\newglossaryentry{Q}{% settings:
-    name = {Operator},
-    symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{Q}}},
-    description = {stands for any $n$-place sentential operator.}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{L}{% settings:
-  name = {Language},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{L}}},
-  description = {includes a set of sentence letters and operators}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{part}{% settings:
-  name = {Proper parthood},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\sqsubset}},
-  description = {is defined in terms of improper parthood}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{wfas}{% settings:
-  name = {Well-formed atomic sentences},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{wfas}}}},
-  description = {generated from a stock of sentence letters}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{wfs}{% settings:
-  name = {Well-formed sentences},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{wfs}}}},
-  description = {generated from a stock of sentence letters}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{ext}{% settings:
-  name = {Extensional sentences},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{ext}}}},
-  description = {generated from a stock of sentence letters}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{id}{% settings:
-  name = {Identity sentences},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{id}}}},
-  description = {generated from a stock of sentence letters}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{nid}{% settings:
-  name = {Non-identity sentences},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{nid}}}},
-  description = {generated from a stock of sentence letters}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{eq}{% settings:
-  name = {Equivalence sentences},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{eq}}}},
-  description = {generated from a stock of sentence letters}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{comp}{% settings:
-  name = {Complexity},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{comp}}}},
-  description = {of a sentence}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{lit}{% settings:
-  name = {Sentence letters},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathbb{L}}},
-  description = {make up the atoms of the language}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{glb}{% settings:
-  name = {Greatest lower bound},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{glb}}}},
-  description = {with respect to a given order}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{lub}{% settings:
-  name = {Least upper bound},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\operatorname{\texttt{lub}}}},
-  description = {with respect to a given order}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{s}{% settings:
-  name = {State space},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{S}}},
-  description = {consisting of a set of states and partial order}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{M}{% settings:
-  name = {Model},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{M}}},
-  description = {of the language assigns sentence letters to propositions}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{N}{% settings:
-  name = {Normal models},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{N}}},
-  description = {is the class of all models in which sentence letter are assigned to normal propositions}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{C}{% settings:
-  name = {Contents},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathbb{C}}},
-  description = {defined over a state space}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{P}{% settings:
-  name = {Propositions},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathbb{P}}},
-  description = {defined over a state space}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{B}{% settings:
-  name = {Bilattice},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{B}}},
-  description = {of propositions defined over a state space}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{R}{% settings:
-  name = {Regular models},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\mathcal{R}}},
-  description = {is the class of all models in which sentence letter are assigned to regular propositions}
-}
-
-\newglossaryentry{parteq}{% settings:
-  name = {Improper parthood},
-  symbol = {\ensuremath{\sqsubseteq}},
-  description = {is a partial order over a space of states}
-}
-
diff --git a/templates/HandOut.tex b/templates/HandOut.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 18030ca..0000000
--- a/templates/HandOut.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-
-\documentclass[a4paper, 11pt]{article} % Font size (can be 10pt, 11pt or 12pt) and paper size (remove a4paper for US letter paper)
-
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} % Better typography
-\usepackage{graphicx} % Required for including pictures
-\usepackage{wrapfig} % Allows in-line images
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\usepackage{setspace}
-\usepackage{amssymb, amsmath, mathrsfs} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{stmaryrd}
-\usepackage{mathtools}
-\usepackage{mathpazo} % Use the Palatino font
-\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} % Required for accented characters
-\usepackage{array}
-\usepackage{bibentry}
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-
-\linespread{1.05} % Change line spacing here, Palatino benefits from a slight increase by default
-
-\newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-\newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-\newcommand{\interpret}[1]{\llbracket#1\rrbracket} %%Double brackets
-%\DeclarePairedDelimiter\ceil{\lceil}{\rceil}    
-
-\makeatletter
-\renewcommand\@biblabel[1]{\textbf{#1.}} % Change the square brackets for each bibliography item from '[1]' to '1.'
-\renewcommand{\@listI}{\itemsep=0pt} % Reduce the space between items in the itemize and enumerate environments and the bibliography
-
-\renewcommand{\maketitle}{ % Customize the title - do not edit title and author name here, see the TITLE block below
-\begin{flushright} % Right align
-{\LARGE\@title} % Increase the font size of the title
-
-\vspace{10pt} % Some vertical space between the title and author name
-
-{\@author} % Author name
-\\\@date % Date
-
-\vspace{30pt} % Some vertical space between the author block and abstract
-\end{flushright}
-}
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	TITLE
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\title{\textbf{Handout Title}} % Subtitle
-
-\author{\textsc{CLASS OR TOPIC}\\ \em Benjamin Brast-McKie} % Institution
-
-\date{\today} % Date
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle % Print the title section
-
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\section*{First Section}
-
-\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.2in,labelsep=.15in] %,label=(\arabic*)]%,label=\roman*]
-\item[\bf Definition:] Begin definition\dots
-\end{enumerate}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-\vfill
-
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-\bibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/Letter.tex b/templates/Letter.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 09e91d6..0000000
--- a/templates/Letter.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-
-\documentclass[a4paper, 11pt]{article} % Font size (can be 10pt, 11pt or 12pt) and paper size (remove a4paper for US letter paper)
-
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} % Better typography
-\usepackage{graphicx} % Required for including pictures
-\usepackage{wrapfig} % Allows in-line images
-\usepackage[top=1.25in, bottom=1in, left=1.65in, right=1.65in]{geometry} %%Margins
-\usepackage{mathpazo} % Use the Palatino font
-\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} % Required for accented characters
-\linespread{1.05} % Change line spacing here, Palatino benefits from a slight increase by default
-
-\makeatletter
-\renewcommand\@biblabel[1]{\textbf{#1.}} % Change the square brackets for each bibliography item from '[1]' to '1.'
-\renewcommand{\@listI}{\itemsep=0pt} % Reduce the space between items in the itemize and enumerate environments and the bibliography
-
-\renewcommand{\maketitle}{ % Customize the title - do not edit title and author name here, see the TITLE block below
-\begin{flushright}
-{\large\@author} % Author name
-\\\@date % Date
-\end{flushright}
-
-\begin{flushleft} % Right align
-{\Large\@title} % Increase the font size of the title
-\end{flushleft}
-}
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	TITLE
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\title{\textbf{Dear NAME,}} % Subtitle
-
-\author{DATE} % Author
-
-\date{} % Date
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle % Print the title section
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-%\renewcommand{\abstractname}{Summary} % Uncomment to change the name of the abstract to something else
-
-\pagenumbering{gobble}
-\vspace{0pt} % Some vertical space between the abstract and first section
-
-\noindent Begin document...
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/MacPhilArticle.tex b/templates/MacPhilArticle.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index cf1a709..0000000
--- a/templates/MacPhilArticle.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%%% FORMATTING %%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{article} %%Font size and document presets
-\usepackage[top=1in, bottom=1in, left=1.25in, right=1.25in]{geometry} %%Margins
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} %% Makes subtle line spacing shifts
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\setenumerate{label=(\arabic*), wide=\parindent} %%Changes enumeration style: use \begin{enumerate}
-\usepackage{setspace} %%Enables \doublespacing command for double linespacing
-\expandafter\def\expandafter\quote\expandafter{\quote\onehalfspacing} %%Makes 1.5 quote spacing
-%\usepackage{mdwlist} %% Compressed lists, use star: \begin{enumerate*} \end{'' *}
-%\usepackage{indentfirst} %%Indents first line of first paragraph of each section
-%\raggedbottom %% Lose the constraint on equalising page content
-%\frenchspacing %%Makes the sentence spacing single spaced
-%\usepackage{multicol} %% Use \begin{multicols}{3} for three columns and \end{multicols} after
-
-
-%%% HEADER %%%
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} %%Permits \pagestyle{fancy}
-\pagestyle{fancy} %%Header style
-\usepackage{titlesec} %%Header style
-\titlespacing*{\subsection}{\parindent}{.25in}{\wordsep}% Reduces spacing after headings
-\rhead{Benjamin Brast-McKie} %%Right header
-\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{$\S$\thesection\ #1}} %%Left header command
-\lhead{\nouppercase{$\S$\rightmark}} %%Left header
-
-
-%%% SECTIONS %%%
-\usepackage{hyperref}
-%\renewcommand\thesubsubsection{P\arabic{subsubsection}} 
-\usepackage{tocloft}%change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-\cftsetindents{subsubsection}{0.228in}{0.346in} %change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-\newcommand{\hypsection}[1]{\section[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsection}[1]{\subsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsubsection}[1]{\subsubsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-
-
-%%% FOOTNOTES %%%
-\usepackage{scrextend} %%Allows for changes to foodnotes
-\deffootnote[1em]{0in}{1em}{\textsuperscript{\thefootnotemark \ }} %%Footnote style
-\setlength{\footnotesep}{0.125in} %%Space between footnotes
-
-
-%%% SYMBOLS %%%
-\usepackage{amssymb, amsmath, mathrsfs} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{stmaryrd} %%Use \llbracket and \rrbracket for double brackets
-%\usepackage{cancel} %%\cancel strikes out text diagonally
-%\usepackage{fitch} 
-%\usepackage{turnstile} 
-%\usepackage{linguex}
-%\usepackage{schemata}
-
-
-%%% GRAPHICS %%%
-%\usepackage{graphicx}
-%\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.jpeg,.jpg}
-%\usepackage{fancybox}
-	%\begin{figure}[ht]
-	%\shadowbox{\includegraphics{figure-file}}}
-	%\end{figure}
-
-
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-%\usepackage{bibentry} %%Replace \bibliography{} with \nobibliography{} for no bib
-%\usepackage{epigraph} %%Use \epigraph{text}{citation}
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-%   \citet{key} ==>>                Jones et al. (1990)
- %   \citet*{key} ==>>               Jones, Baker, and Smith (1990)
- %   \citep{key} ==>>                (Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep*{key} ==>>               (Jones, Baker, and Smith, 1990)
- %   \citep[chap. 2]{key} ==>>       (Jones et al., 1990, chap. 2)
- %   \citep[e.g.][]{key} ==>>        (e.g. Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep[e.g.][p. 32]{key} ==>>   (e.g. Jones et al., p. 32)
- %   \citeauthor{key} ==>>           Jones et al.
- %   \citeauthor*{key} ==>>          Jones, Baker, and Smith
- %   \citeyear{key} ==>>             1990
-\usepackage{etoolbox} %%For \citepos
-\usepackage{xstring} %%For \citepos
-
-\makeatletter %definition of \citepos
-%\patchcmd{\NAT@test}{\else \NAT@nm}{\else \NAT@nmfmt{\NAT@nm}}{}{} %turn on for numeric citations
-\DeclareRobustCommand\citepos % define \citepos
-  {\begingroup
-   \let\NAT@nmfmt\NAT@posfmt% same as for citet except with a different name format
-   \NAT@swafalse\let\NAT@ctype\z@\NAT@partrue
-   \@ifstar{\NAT@fulltrue\NAT@citetp}{\NAT@fullfalse\NAT@citetp}}
-   
-\let\NAT@orig@nmfmt\NAT@nmfmt %makes adapt to last names ending with an 's'.
-\def\NAT@posfmt#1{%
-  \StrRemoveBraces{#1}[\NAT@temp]%
-  \IfEndWith{\NAT@temp}{s}
-    {\NAT@orig@nmfmt{#1'}}
-    {\NAT@orig@nmfmt{#1's}}}
-\makeatother
-
-
-%%% DEFINITIONS FOR LOGICAL SYMBOLS AND QUOTES %%%
-%\newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-%\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\ttuple}[1]{$\langle$#1$\rangle$} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-%\newcommand{\interpret}[1]{\llbracket#1\rrbracket} %%Double brackets
-%\newcommand{\sq}[1]{`#1'} %%Proper opened-closed single quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\dq}[1]{``#1"} %%Proper opened-closed double quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\qed}[0]{$\hfill\square$} %%Box at end of proofs
-%\newcommand{\qed}[0]{$\hfill\Box$} %%Box at end of proofs
-%\newcommand{\parteq}[0]{\sqsubseteq}
-%\renewcommand{\part}[0]{\sqsubset}
-%\newcommand{\ceil}[1]{\lceil#1\rceil} %%Corner quotes
-%\newcommand{\lrceil}[1]{\llceil#1\rrceil} %%Corner quotes
-%\DeclareSymbolFont{symbolsC}{U}{txsyc}{m}{n} %%For strictif
-%\DeclareMathSymbol{\strictif}{\mathrel}{symbolsC}{74} %%For strictif
-%\newcommand{\M}[0]{\mathcal{M}}
-%\renewcommand{\L}[0]{\mathcal{L}}
-
-
-%%% ENVIRONMENTS %%%
-%\newenvironment{senum}[2][topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]{\begin{enumerate}[#1,topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]\begin{singlespace}#2}{\end{singlespace}\end{enumerate}\vspace{.175in}}
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TITLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{TITLE}
-\author{Benjamin Brast-McKie}
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent BEGIN ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-\doublespacing
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NOTES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\section{Section Title}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BIBLIOGRAPHY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\newpage
-\begin{small} %%Makes bib small text size
-\singlespacing %%Makes single spaced
-\bibliographystyle{Analysis} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-%\setlength{\bibsep}{0.5pt} %%Changes spacing between bib entries
-\bibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-\thispagestyle{empty} %%Removes page numbers
-\end{small} %%End makes bib small text size
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/MultipleAnswer.tex b/templates/MultipleAnswer.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index cb15ca1..0000000
--- a/templates/MultipleAnswer.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-% Short Sectioned Assignment
-% LaTeX Template
-% Version 1.0 (5/5/12)
-%
-% This template has been downloaded from:
-% http://www.LaTeXTemplates.com
-%
-% Original author:
-% Frits Wenneker (http://www.howtotex.com)
-%
-% License:
-% CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/)
-%
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	PACKAGES AND OTHER DOCUMENT CONFIGURATIONS
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\documentclass[paper=a4, fontsize=11pt]{scrartcl} % A4 paper and 11pt font size
-
-\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} % Use 8-bit encoding that has 256 glyphs
-\usepackage{fourier} % Use the Adobe Utopia font for the document - comment this line to return to the LaTeX default
-\usepackage[english]{babel} % English language/hyphenation
-\usepackage{amsmath,amsfonts,amsthm} % Math packages
-
-\usepackage{lipsum} % Used for inserting dummy 'Lorem ipsum' text into the template
-
-\usepackage{sectsty} % Allows customizing section commands
-\allsectionsfont{\centering \normalfont\scshape} % Make all sections centered, the default font and small caps
-
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} % Custom headers and footers
-\pagestyle{fancyplain} % Makes all pages in the document conform to the custom headers and footers
-\fancyhead{} % No page header - if you want one, create it in the same way as the footers below
-\fancyfoot[L]{} % Empty left footer
-\fancyfoot[C]{} % Empty center footer
-\fancyfoot[R]{\thepage} % Page numbering for right footer
-\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt} % Remove header underlines
-\renewcommand{\footrulewidth}{0pt} % Remove footer underlines
-\setlength{\headheight}{13.6pt} % Customize the height of the header
-
-\numberwithin{equation}{section} % Number equations within sections (i.e. 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2 instead of 1, 2, 3, 4)
-\numberwithin{figure}{section} % Number figures within sections (i.e. 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2 instead of 1, 2, 3, 4)
-\numberwithin{table}{section} % Number tables within sections (i.e. 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2 instead of 1, 2, 3, 4)
-
-\setlength\parindent{0pt} % Removes all indentation from paragraphs - comment this line for an assignment with lots of text
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	TITLE SECTION
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\newcommand{\horrule}[1]{\rule{\linewidth}{#1}} % Create horizontal rule command with 1 argument of height
-
-\title{	
-\normalfont \normalsize 
-\textsc{university, school or department name} \\ [25pt] % Your university, school and/or department name(s)
-\horrule{0.5pt} \\[0.4cm] % Thin top horizontal rule
-\huge Assignment Title \\ % The assignment title
-\horrule{2pt} \\[0.5cm] % Thick bottom horizontal rule
-}
-
-\author{John Smith} % Your name
-
-\date{\normalsize\today} % Today's date or a custom date
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle % Print the title
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	PROBLEM 1
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\section{Problem title}
-
-\lipsum[2] % Dummy text
-
-\begin{align} 
-\begin{split}
-(x+y)^3 	&= (x+y)^2(x+y)\\
-&=(x^2+2xy+y^2)(x+y)\\
-&=(x^3+2x^2y+xy^2) + (x^2y+2xy^2+y^3)\\
-&=x^3+3x^2y+3xy^2+y^3
-\end{split}					
-\end{align}
-
-Phasellus viverra nulla ut metus varius laoreet. Quisque rutrum. Aenean imperdiet. Etiam ultricies nisi vel augue. Curabitur ullamcorper ultricies
-
-%------------------------------------------------
-
-\subsection{Heading on level 2 (subsection)}
-
-Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. 
-\begin{align}
-A = 
-\begin{bmatrix}
-A_{11} & A_{21} \\
-A_{21} & A_{22}
-\end{bmatrix}
-\end{align}
-Aenean commodo ligula eget dolor. Aenean massa. Cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Donec quam felis, ultricies nec, pellentesque eu, pretium quis, sem.
-
-%------------------------------------------------
-
-\subsubsection{Heading on level 3 (subsubsection)}
-
-\lipsum[3] % Dummy text
-
-\paragraph{Heading on level 4 (paragraph)}
-
-\lipsum[6] % Dummy text
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	PROBLEM 2
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\section{Lists}
-
-%------------------------------------------------
-
-\subsection{Example of list (3*itemize)}
-\begin{itemize}
-	\item First item in a list 
-		\begin{itemize}
-		\item First item in a list 
-			\begin{itemize}
-			\item First item in a list 
-			\item Second item in a list 
-			\end{itemize}
-		\item Second item in a list 
-		\end{itemize}
-	\item Second item in a list 
-\end{itemize}
-
-%------------------------------------------------
-
-\subsection{Example of list (enumerate)}
-\begin{enumerate}
-\item First item in a list 
-\item Second item in a list 
-\item Third item in a list
-\end{enumerate}
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/NiceArticle.tex b/templates/NiceArticle.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 536d7df..0000000
--- a/templates/NiceArticle.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-
-\documentclass[a4paper, 11pt]{article} % Font size (can be 10pt, 11pt or 12pt) and paper size (remove a4paper for US letter paper)
-
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} % Better typography
-\usepackage{graphicx} % Required for including pictures
-\usepackage{wrapfig} % Allows in-line images
-
-\usepackage{mathpazo} % Use the Palatino font
-\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} % Required for accented characters
-\linespread{1.05} % Change line spacing here, Palatino benefits from a slight increase by default
-
-\makeatletter
-\renewcommand\@biblabel[1]{\textbf{#1.}} % Change the square brackets for each bibliography item from '[1]' to '1.'
-\renewcommand{\@listI}{\itemsep=0pt} % Reduce the space between items in the itemize and enumerate environments and the bibliography
-
-\renewcommand{\maketitle}{ % Customize the title - do not edit title and author name here, see the TITLE block below
-\begin{flushright} % Right align
-{\LARGE\@title} % Increase the font size of the title
-
-\vspace{50pt} % Some vertical space between the title and author name
-
-{\large\@author} % Author name
-\\\@date % Date
-
-\vspace{40pt} % Some vertical space between the author block and abstract
-\end{flushright}
-}
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	TITLE
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\title{\textbf{Unnecessarily Long Essay Title}\\ % Title
-Focused and Deliciously Witty Subtitle} % Subtitle
-
-\author{\textsc{Ford Prefect} % Author
-\\{\textit{Interstellar University}}} % Institution
-
-\date{\today} % Date
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle % Print the title section
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-%\renewcommand{\abstractname}{Summary} % Uncomment to change the name of the abstract to something else
-
-\begin{abstract}
-
-\end{abstract}
-
-\hspace*{3,6mm}\textit{Keywords:}% Keywords
-
-\vspace{30pt} % Some vertical space between the abstract and first section
-
-
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/PhilBeamer.tex b/templates/PhilBeamer.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c8c254..0000000
--- a/templates/PhilBeamer.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-% Beamer Presentation
-% LaTeX Template
-% Version 1.0 (10/11/12)
-%
-% This template has been downloaded from:
-% http://www.LaTeXTemplates.com
-%
-% License:
-% CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/)
-%
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	PACKAGES AND THEMES
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\documentclass{beamer}
-
-\mode<presentation> {
-
-% The Beamer class comes with a number of default slide themes
-% which change the colors and layouts of slides. Below this is a list
-% of all the themes, uncomment each in turn to see what they look like.
-
-%\usetheme{default}
-%\usetheme{AnnArbor}
-%\usetheme{Antibes}
-%\usetheme{Bergen}
-%\usetheme{Berkeley}
-%\usetheme{Berlin}
-%\usetheme{Boadilla}
-%\usetheme{CambridgeUS}
-%\usetheme{Copenhagen}
-%\usetheme{Darmstadt} %Nice
-%\usetheme{Dresden} %Nice
-\usetheme{Frankfurt} %Nice
-%\usetheme{Goettingen} %Sidebar
-%\usetheme{Hannover}
-%\usetheme{Ilmenau}
-%\usetheme{JuanLesPins}
-%\usetheme{Luebeck}
-%\usetheme{Madrid}
-%\usetheme{Malmoe}
-%\usetheme{Marburg}
-%\usetheme{Montpellier}
-%\usetheme{PaloAlto}
-%\usetheme{Pittsburgh}
-%\usetheme{Rochester}
-%\usetheme{Singapore}
-%\usetheme{Szeged}
-%\usetheme{Warsaw}
-
-% As well as themes, the Beamer class has a number of color themes
-% for any slide theme. Uncomment each of these in turn to see how it
-% changes the colors of your current slide theme.
-
-%\usecolortheme{albatross}
-%\usecolortheme{beaver}
-%\usecolortheme{beetle}
-%\usecolortheme{crane}
-%\usecolortheme{dolphin}
-%\usecolortheme{dove}
-%\usecolortheme{fly}
-%\usecolortheme{lily}
-%\usecolortheme{orchid}
-%\usecolortheme{rose}
-%\usecolortheme{seagull}
-%\usecolortheme{seahorse}
-%\usecolortheme{whale}
-%\usecolortheme{wolverine}
-
-%\setbeamertemplate{footline} % To remove the footer line in all slides uncomment this line
-%\setbeamertemplate{footline}[page number] % To replace the footer line in all slides with a simple slide count uncomment this line
-
-%\setbeamertemplate{navigation symbols}{} % To remove the navigation symbols from the bottom of all slides uncomment this line
-}
-
-%%% SYMBOLS AND STYLES %%%
-
-\DeclareSymbolFont{symbolsC}{U}{txsyc}{m}{n} 
-\DeclareMathSymbol{\strictif}{\mathrel}{symbolsC}{74}
-\usepackage{multicol}
-\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-\setbeamercovered{transparent}
-\usepackage{graphicx}
-
-	
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-\newcommand\citeapl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s#1} %%Use \citeapl is for possessive author name only.
-\newcommand\citea[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}#1} %%Use \citea is for author name only, with optional page numbers.
-\newcommand\citepl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s (\citeyear[#1]{#2})}%%The command \citepl is for possessive citations.
-\usepackage{bibentry}
-
-\usepackage{graphicx} % Allows including images
-\usepackage{booktabs} % Allows the use of \toprule, \midrule and \bottomrule in tables
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	TITLE PAGE
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-\title[Short title]{Early Interpretations of the Barcan Formula} % The short title appears at the bottom of every slide, the full title is only on the title page
-
-\author{Benjamin Brast-McKie} % Your name
-\institute[Oxford] % Your institution as it will appear on the bottom of every slide, may be shorthand to save space
-{
-University of Oxford \\ % Your institution for the title page
-\medskip
-\textit{benjamin.brast-mckie@philosophy.ox.ac.uk} % Your email address
-}
-\date{\today} % Date, can be changed to a custom date
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\titlepage % Print the title page as the first slide
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Plan}
-
-\tableofcontents[hideallsubsections]
-
-\end{frame}
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-%	PRESENTATION SLIDES
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-%%% NOTES %%%
-
-%Recall: \pause for 
-
-%Recall: ITEMIZE
-
-%\begin{itemize}  
-%\item<1-> 
-%\end{itemize}
-
-%\onslide<1->{ SLIDE }
-
-%\begin{itemize}[<+(1)->]
-%\begin{itemize}[<+->]
-
-%------------------------------------------------
-\section{FIRST} 
-%------------------------------------------------
-
-\subsection{FIRST SUB}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{FRAME TITLE}
-
-
-
-\end{frame}
-
-
-
-
-
-%----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-\nobibliography{Zotero}
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review}
-
-\end{document} 
diff --git a/templates/PhilPaper.tex b/templates/PhilPaper.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 25e8ab3..0000000
--- a/templates/PhilPaper.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%%% FORMATTING %%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{article} %%Font size and document presets
-\usepackage[a4paper, margin=4cm]{geometry} %Annina style
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} %% Makes subtle line spacing shifts
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\setenumerate{label=(\arabic*), wide=\parindent} %%Changes enumeration style: use \begin{enumerate}
-\usepackage{setspace} %%Enables \doublespacing command for double linespacing
-% \usepackage{multicol} %% Use \begin{multicols}{3} for three columns and \end{multicols} after
-% \usepackage{adjmulticol}
-\usepackage{verbatim} %% Enables \begin{comment} ... \end{comment}
-% \usepackage{rotating} %% Enables rotating symbols
-% \usepackage{lplfitch} %% logic package 
-% \usepackage{bold-extra} %% bold+small caps
-% \usepackage{bussproofs}
-
-
-%%% HEADER %%%
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} %%Permits \pagestyle{fancy}
-\pagestyle{fancy} %%Header style
-\usepackage{titlesec} %%Header style
-\titlespacing*{\subsection}{\parindent}{.25in}{\wordsep}% Reduces spacing after headings
-\rhead{Benjamin Brast-McKie} %%Right header
-\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{\thesection\ #1}} %%Left header command
-\lhead{\nouppercase{$\S$\rightmark}} %%Left header
-
-
-%%% SECTIONS %%%
-\usepackage{hyperref}
-% \usepackage{tocloft}%change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-% \cftsetindents{subsubsection}{0.228in}{0.346in} %change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-\newcommand{\hypsection}[1]{\section[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsection}[1]{\subsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsubsection}[1]{\subsubsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-
-
-%%% FOOTNOTES %%%
-\usepackage{scrextend} %%Allows for changes to foodnotes
-\deffootnote[1em]{0in}{1em}{\textsuperscript{\thefootnotemark \ }} %%Footnote style
-\setlength{\footnotesep}{0.125in} %%Space between footnotes
-
-
-%%% SYMBOLS %%%
-\usepackage{amssymb,amsmath,mathrsfs,mathabx,colonequals} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{tipa}
-%%% GLOSSARY %%%
-% \usepackage[automake,%builds index
-%   nogroupskip,% makes spacing of entries uniform
-%   postpunc={dot},% full stop after description
-%   nostyles,% don't load default style packages
-%   % load glossaries-extra-stylemods.sty and glossary-tree.sty:
-%   stylemods={tree}
-%   ]{glossaries-extra}
-% \loadglsentries{Glossary}% sources file from local project folder
-% \newcommand{\g}{\glssymbol*}% unstar to allow hyperlinks
-% \makeglossaries
-
-% \printglossary[style={index}] %Add to end
-
-
-%%% GRAPHICS %%%
-% \usepackage{graphicx}
-% \DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.jpeg,.jpg}
-% \usepackage{fancybox}
-	% \begin{figure}[ht]
-	% \shadowbox{\includegraphics{figure-file}}}
-	% \end{figure}
-
-
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-% \usepackage{bibentry} %%Replace \bibliography{} with \nobibliography{} for no bib
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
- %   \citet{key} ==>>                Jones et al. (1990)
- %   \citet*{key} ==>>               Jones, Baker, and Smith (1990)
- %   \citep{key} ==>>                (Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep*{key} ==>>               (Jones, Baker, and Smith, 1990)
- %   \citep[chap. 2]{key} ==>>       (Jones et al., 1990, chap. 2)
- %   \citep[e.g.][]{key} ==>>        (e.g. Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep[e.g.][p. 32]{key} ==>>   (e.g. Jones et al., p. 32)
- %   \citeauthor{key} ==>>           Jones et al.
- %   \citeauthor*{key} ==>>          Jones, Baker, and Smith
- %   \citeyear{key} ==>>             1990
-\usepackage{etoolbox} %%For \citepos
-\usepackage{xstring} %%For \citepos
-
-\makeatletter %definition of \citepos
-% \patchcmd{\NAT@test}{\else \NAT@nm}{\else \NAT@nmfmt{\NAT@nm}}{}{} %turn on for numeric citations
-\DeclareRobustCommand\citepos% define \citepos
-  {\begingroup
-   \let\NAT@nmfmt\NAT@posfmt% same as for citet except with a different name format
-   \NAT@swafalse\let\NAT@ctype\z@\NAT@partrue
-   \@ifstar{\NAT@fulltrue\NAT@citetp}{\NAT@fullfalse\NAT@citetp}
-  }
-   
-\let\NAT@orig@nmfmt\NAT@nmfmt %makes adapt to last names ending with an 's'.
-\def\NAT@posfmt#1{%
-  \StrRemoveBraces{#1}[\NAT@temp]%
-  \IfEndWith{\NAT@temp}{s}
-    {\NAT@orig@nmfmt{#1'}}
-    {\NAT@orig@nmfmt{#1's}}}
-\makeatother
-
-%%% DEFINITIONS FOR LOGICAL SYMBOLS AND QUOTES %%%
-% \newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-% \newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-% \newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-% \newcommand{\qedp}[0]{$\hfill\Diamond$} %%Box at end of proofs
-% \newcommand{\ceil}[1]{\lceil#1\rceil} %%Corner quotes
-% \newcommand{\floor}[1]{\lfloor#1\rfloor} %%Corner quotes
-
-
-%%% ENVIRONMENTS %%%
-\usepackage{amsthm}
-
-\newtheoremstyle{theorem}
-{}                % Space above
-{}                % Space below
-{\normalfont}        % Theorem body font % (default is "\upshape")
-{}                % Indent amount
-{\bfseries}       % Theorem head font % (default is \mdseries)
-{}               % Punctuation after theorem head % default: no punctuation
-{.18in}               % Space after theorem head
-{}                % Theorem head spec
-\theoremstyle{theorem}
-\newtheorem{theorem}{}% theorem counter resets every \subsection
-\renewcommand{\thetheorem}{T\arabic{theorem}}% Remove subsection from theorem counter representation
-
-
-\newtheoremstyle{Lthm}
-{}                % Space above
-{}                % Space below
-{\normalfont}        % Theorem body font % (default is "\upshape")
-{}                % Indent amount
-{\bfseries}       % Theorem head font % (default is \mdseries)
-{}               % Punctuation after theorem head % default: no punctuation
-{.18in}               % Space after theorem head
-{}                % Theorem head spec
-\theoremstyle{Lthm}
-\newtheorem{Lthm}{}[subsection]% theorem counter resets every \subsection
-\renewcommand{\theLthm}{L\arabic{Lthm}}% Remove subsection from theorem counter representation
-
-\newtheoremstyle{Pthm}
-{}                % Space above
-{}                % Space below
-{\normalfont}        % Theorem body font % (default is "\upshape")
-{}                % Indent amount
-{\bfseries}       % Theorem head font % (default is \mdseries)
-{}               % Punctuation after theorem head % default: no punctuation
-{.18in}               % Space after theorem head
-{}                % Theorem head spec
-\theoremstyle{Pthm}
-\newtheorem{Pthm}{}[subsection]% theorem counter resets every \subsection
-\renewcommand{\thePthm}{P\arabic{Pthm}}% Remove subsection from theorem counter representation
-
-\usepackage{calc}
-\makeatletter
-\newcommand{\labelalign@original@item}{}
-\let\labelalign@original@item\item
-\newcommand*{\labelalign@envir}{labelalign}
-\newlength{\labelalign@totalleftmargin}
-\newlength{\labelalign@linewidth}
-\newcommand{\labelalign@makelabel}[1]{\llap{#1}}%
-\newcommand{\labelalign@item}[1][]{%
-  \setlength{\@totalleftmargin}%
-       {\labelalign@totalleftmargin+\widthof{\textbf{#1 }}+.25in-\leftmargin}%
-  \setlength{\linewidth}
-       {\labelalign@linewidth-\widthof{\textbf{#1 }}-.25in+\leftmargin}%
-  \par\parshape \@ne \@totalleftmargin \linewidth
-  \labelalign@original@item[\textbf{#1}]%
-}
-\newenvironment{labelalign}
-  {\list{}{\setlength{\labelwidth}{0in}%
-           \let\makelabel\labelalign@makelabel}%
-   \setlength{\labelalign@totalleftmargin}{\@totalleftmargin}%
-   \setlength{\labelalign@linewidth}{\linewidth}%
-   \renewcommand{\item}{\ifx\@currenvir\labelalign@envir
-                           \expandafter\labelalign@item
-                        \else
-                           \expandafter\labelalign@original@item
-                        \fi}}
-  {\endlist}
-\makeatother
-
-%%% CROSS REFERENCES %%%
-\newcounter{acount}
-\newcommand{\aitem}[1]{%
-  \item[\bf #1] \refstepcounter{acount}\label{#1}
-}
-\newcommand{\aref}[1]{\hyperref[#1]{#1}}
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TITLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{\sc TITLE} %\thanks{}
-\author{\it Benjamin Brast-McKie} 
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-% \vspace{.1in}
-
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent
-ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\hypsection{Introduction}\label{Intro}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% GLOSSARY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-% \printglossary[style={index}] %Add to end
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BIBLIOGRAPHY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\newpage
-\begin{footnotesize} %%Makes bib footnotesize text size
-\singlespacing %%Makes single spaced
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-\setlength{\bibsep}{5pt} %%Changes spacing between bib entries
-\bibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-\thispagestyle{empty} %%Removes page numbers
-\end{footnotesize} %%End makes bib small text size
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/Root.tex b/templates/Root.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index d56cb86..0000000
--- a/templates/Root.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%%% FORMATTING %%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{report} %%Font size and document presets
-\usepackage[top=1in, bottom=1in, left=1.25in, right=1.25in]{geometry} %%Margins
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} %% Makes subtle line spacing shifts
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\setenumerate{label=(\arabic*), wide=\parindent} %%Changes enumeration style: use \begin{enumerate}
-\usepackage{setspace} %%Enables \doublespacing command for double linespacing
-\expandafter\def\expandafter\quote\expandafter{\quote\onehalfspacing} %%Makes 1.5 quote spacing
-%\usepackage{mdwlist} %% Compressed lists, use star: \begin{enumerate*} \end{'' *}
-%\usepackage{indentfirst} %%Indents first line of first paragraph of each section
-%\raggedbottom %% Lose the constraint on equalising page content
-%\frenchspacing %%Makes the sentence spacing single spaced
-%\usepackage{multicol} %% Use \begin{multicols}{3} for three columns and \end{multicols} after
-
-
-%%% MULTIPLE FILES %%%
-\usepackage{subfiles}
-\usepackage{hyperref}
-\usepackage{bibentry}
-
-
-%%% HYPER SECTIONS %%%
-\usepackage{bold-extra} %% bold+small caps
-\usepackage{titlesec}
-\usepackage{tocloft} %% change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-%\cftsetindents{subsubsubsection}{0.228in}{0.346in} %change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-\newcommand{\hypsection}[1]{\section[\bfseries{\scshape{#1}}]{\hyperlink{toc}{\sc \textbf{#1}}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\schapter}[1]{\chapter[\bfseries{\scshape{#1}}]{\hyperlink{toc}{\LARGE#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsection}[1]{\subsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsubsection}[1]{\subsubsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypasubsubsection}[1]{\subsubsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\Psubsection}[2][]{\subsubsubsection[\normalfont{#2}]{\hyperlink{#1}{\normalfont{#2}}}\label{#1}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\Lsubsection}[2][]{\Lthm[\normalfont{#2}]{\hyperlink{#1}{\normalfont{#2}}}\label{#1}} %%use to jump back to toc
-% \renewcommand{\href}[1]{\hypertarget{#1}{\ref{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-  \makeatletter
-    \renewcommand{\href}[1]{\Hy@raisedlink{\hypertarget{#1}{}}\ref{#1}}
-  \makeatother
-
-
-\titleclass{\subsubsubsection}{straight}[\subsection]
-\newcounter{subsubsubsection}[subsubsection]
-\renewcommand\thesubsubsubsection{\arabic{section}.\arabic{subsubsubsection}}
-\renewcommand\theparagraph{\arabic{section}.\arabic{paragraph}} % optional; useful if paragraphs are to be numbered
-
-\titleformat{\subsubsubsection}
-  {\normalfont\normalsize\bfseries}{\thesubsubsubsection}{1em}{}
-
-\titlespacing*{\subsubsubsection}
-{0pt}{3.25ex plus 1ex minus .2ex}{1.5ex plus .2ex}
-
-\titleformat{\paragraph}
-  {\normalfont\normalsize\bfseries}{\theparagraph}{1em}{}
-
-\titlespacing*{\paragraph}
-{0pt}{3.25ex plus 1ex minus .2ex}{1.5ex plus .2ex}
-
-\makeatletter
-\renewcommand\paragraph{\@startsection{paragraph}{4}{\z@}%
-  {-2.5ex\@plus -1ex \@minus -.25ex}%
-  {1.25ex \@plus .25ex}%
-  {\normalfont\normalsize\bfseries}} 
-\def\toclevel@subsubsubsection{2}
-\def\toclevel@paragraph{4}
-\def\l@subsubsubsection{\@dottedtocline{2}{1.5em}{2.3em}}
-\def\l@paragraph{\@dottedtocline{4}{10em}{5em}}
-\makeatother
-
-\setcounter{secnumdepth}{2}
-\setcounter{secnumdepth}{4}
-\setcounter{tocdepth}{1}
-%\renewcommand\thesection{\sc\LARGE Chapter \arabic{section}:}
-%\renewcommand\thesubsection{\arabic{section}.\arabic{subsection}}
-\renewcommand\thesubsubsubsection{P\arabic{subsubsubsection}} 
-\renewcommand\theparagraph{L\arabic{paragraph}} 
-
-
-
-%%% HEADER %%%
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} %%Permits \pagestyle{fancy}
-\pagestyle{fancy} %%Header style
-\usepackage{titlesec} %%Header style
-\titlespacing*{\subsection}{\parindent}{.25in}{\wordsep}% Reduces spacing after headings
-\rhead{Benjamin Brast-McKie} %%Right header
-\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{$\S$\thesection\ #1}} %%Left header command
-\renewcommand{\chaptermark}[1]{\markright{#1}{}}
-\lhead{\nouppercase{\rightmark}} %%Left header
-
-
-%%% FOOTNOTES %%%
-\usepackage{scrextend} %%Allows for changes to foodnotes
-\deffootnote[1em]{0in}{1em}{\textsuperscript{\thefootnotemark \ }} %%Footnote style
-\setlength{\footnotesep}{0.125in} %%Space between footnotes
-
-%%% SYMBOLS %%%
-\usepackage{amssymb, amsmath, mathrsfs} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{stmaryrd} %%Use \llbracket and \rrbracket for double brackets
-%\usepackage{cancel} %%\cancel strikes out text diagonally
-%\usepackage{fitch}    
-%\usepackage{turnstile}
-%\usepackage{linguex}
-%\usepackage{schemata}
-
-%%% GRAPHICS %%%
-%\usepackage{graphicx}
-%\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.jpeg,.jpg}
-%\usepackage{fancybox}
-	%\begin{figure}[ht]
-	%\shadowbox{\includegraphics{figure-file}}}
-	%\end{figure}
-	
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-%\usepackage{bibentry} %%Replace \bibliography{} with \nobibliography{} for no bib
-%\usepackage{epigraph} %%Use \epigraph{text}{citation}
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-\newcommand\citepl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s (\citeyear[#1]{#2})} %%Use \citepl for possessive citation.
-\newcommand\citea[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}#1} %%Use \citea is for author name only, with optional page numbers.
-\newcommand\citeapl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s#1} %%Use \citeapl is for possessive author name only.
-%   \citet{key} ==>>                Jones et al. (1990)
- %   \citet*{key} ==>>               Jones, Baker, and Smith (1990)
- %   \citep{key} ==>>                (Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep*{key} ==>>               (Jones, Baker, and Smith, 1990)
- %   \citep[chap. 2]{key} ==>>       (Jones et al., 1990, chap. 2)
- %   \citep[e.g.][]{key} ==>>        (e.g. Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep[e.g.][p. 32]{key} ==>>   (e.g. Jones et al., p. 32)
- %   \citeauthor{key} ==>>           Jones et al.
- %   \citeauthor*{key} ==>>          Jones, Baker, and Smith
- %   \citeyear{key} ==>>             1990
-
-
-%%% DEFINITIONS FOR LOGICAL SYMBOLS AND QUOTES %%%
-%\newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-%\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\ttuple}[1]{$\langle$#1$\rangle$} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-%\newcommand{\interpret}[1]{\llbracket#1\rrbracket} %%Double brackets
-%\newcommand{\sq}[1]{`#1'} %%Proper opened-closed single quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\dq}[1]{``#1"} %%Proper opened-closed double quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\qed}[0]{$\hfill\square$} %%Box at end of proofs
-
-
-%%% ENVIRONMENTS %%%
-%\newenvironment{senum}[2][topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]{\begin{enumerate}[#1,topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]\begin{singlespace}#2}{\end{singlespace}\end{enumerate}\vspace{.175in}}
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TITLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{TITLE}
-\author{Benjamin Brast-McKie}
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent BEGIN ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-\setlength\cftaftertoctitleskip{10pt}
-\addtocontents{toc}{\protect\hypertarget{toc}{}}
-\renewcommand{\contentsname}{\LARGE\sc Table of Contents}
-
-\strut\vspace{-50pt}
-\tableofcontents
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\pagebreak
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\doublespacing
-
-% \section*{Introduction} % Turn on to included introduction in TOC
-% \addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{}Introduction}%
-
-\subfile{Chapters/Ch1/Ch1}
-  
-\subfile{Chapters/Ch2/Ch2}
-
-% \section*{Conclusion}
-% \addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{\protect\numberline{}Conclusion}%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BIBLIOGRAPHY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\newpage
-\begin{small} %%Makes bib small text size
-\singlespacing %%Makes single spaced
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-%\setlength{\bibsep}{0.5pt} %%Changes spacing between bib entries
-\bibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-\thispagestyle{empty} %%Removes page numbers
-\end{small} %%End makes bib small text size
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/SubFile.tex b/templates/SubFile.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f0b740..0000000
--- a/templates/SubFile.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-%NOTE: to be used with \usepackage{subfiles} in the main file.
-%Subfiles go in folders which live with the main file.
-%Bibliography and preamble go in the main file.
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\documentclass[../../Root.tex]{subfiles} %Each instance of `../' elevates one folder to find the main file
-
-\begin{document}
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-% \tableofcontents % Can be useful to load a TOC while writing
-
-\doublespacing
-
-\schapter{TITLE}
-
-\hypsection{TITLE}
-
-\hypsubsection{TITLE}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-\nobibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/Subfiles/Chapters/Ch1/Ch1.tex b/templates/Subfiles/Chapters/Ch1/Ch1.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 50a848f..0000000
--- a/templates/Subfiles/Chapters/Ch1/Ch1.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-%NOTE: to be used with \usepackage{subfiles} in the main file.
-%Subfiles go in folders which live with the main file.
-%Bibliography and preamble go in the main file.
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\documentclass[../../Root.tex]{subfiles} %Each instance of `../' elevates one folder to find the main file
-
-\begin{document}
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\tableofcontents
-
-\doublespacing
-
-\section{TITLE}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-\nobibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/Subfiles/Chapters/Ch2/Ch2.tex b/templates/Subfiles/Chapters/Ch2/Ch2.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f7f9aa..0000000
--- a/templates/Subfiles/Chapters/Ch2/Ch2.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-%NOTE: to be used with \usepackage{subfiles} in the main file.
-%Subfiles go in folders which live with the main file.
-%Bibliography and preamble go in the main file.
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\documentclass[../../Root.tex]{subfiles} %Each instance of `../' elevates one folder to find the main file
-
-\begin{document}
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\tableofcontents
-
-\doublespacing
-
-\schapter{TITLE}
-
-\section{TITLE}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-\nobibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/Subfiles/Root.tex b/templates/Subfiles/Root.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 26d4185..0000000
--- a/templates/Subfiles/Root.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%%% FORMATTING %%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{report} %%Font size and document presets
-\usepackage[top=1in, bottom=1in, left=1.25in, right=1.25in]{geometry} %%Margins
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} %% Makes subtle line spacing shifts
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\setenumerate{label=(\arabic*), wide=\parindent} %%Changes enumeration style: use \begin{enumerate}
-\usepackage{setspace} %%Enables \doublespacing command for double linespacing
-\expandafter\def\expandafter\quote\expandafter{\quote\onehalfspacing} %%Makes 1.5 quote spacing
-%\usepackage{mdwlist} %% Compressed lists, use star: \begin{enumerate*} \end{'' *}
-%\usepackage{indentfirst} %%Indents first line of first paragraph of each section
-%\raggedbottom %% Lose the constraint on equalising page content
-%\frenchspacing %%Makes the sentence spacing single spaced
-%\usepackage{multicol} %% Use \begin{multicols}{3} for three columns and \end{multicols} after
-
-
-%%% MULTIPLE FILES %%%
-\usepackage{subfiles}
-\usepackage{hyperref}
-\usepackage{bibentry}
-
-
-%%% HYPER SECTIONS %%%
-\usepackage{bold-extra} %% bold+small caps
-\usepackage{titlesec}
-\usepackage{tocloft} %% change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-%\cftsetindents{subsubsubsection}{0.228in}{0.346in} %change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-\newcommand{\hypsection}[1]{\section[\bfseries{\scshape{#1}}]{\hyperlink{toc}{\sc \textbf{#1}}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\schapter}[1]{\chapter[\bfseries{\scshape{#1}}]{\hyperlink{toc}{\LARGE#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsection}[1]{\subsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsubsection}[1]{\subsubsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-
-
-%%% HEADER %%%
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} %%Permits \pagestyle{fancy}
-\pagestyle{fancy} %%Header style
-\usepackage{titlesec} %%Header style
-\titlespacing*{\subsection}{\parindent}{.25in}{\wordsep}% Reduces spacing after headings
-\rhead{Benjamin Brast-McKie} %%Right header
-\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{$\S$\thesection\ #1}} %%Left header command
-\lhead{\nouppercase{\rightmark}} %%Left header
-
-%%% FOOTNOTES %%%
-\usepackage{scrextend} %%Allows for changes to foodnotes
-\deffootnote[1em]{0in}{1em}{\textsuperscript{\thefootnotemark \ }} %%Footnote style
-\setlength{\footnotesep}{0.125in} %%Space between footnotes
-
-%%% SYMBOLS %%%
-\usepackage{amssymb, amsmath, mathrsfs} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{stmaryrd} %%Use \llbracket and \rrbracket for double brackets
-%\usepackage{cancel} %%\cancel strikes out text diagonally
-%\usepackage{fitch}    
-%\usepackage{turnstile}
-%\usepackage{linguex}
-%\usepackage{schemata}
-
-%%% GRAPHICS %%%
-%\usepackage{graphicx}
-%\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.jpeg,.jpg}
-%\usepackage{fancybox}
-	%\begin{figure}[ht]
-	%\shadowbox{\includegraphics{figure-file}}}
-	%\end{figure}
-	
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-%\usepackage{bibentry} %%Replace \bibliography{} with \nobibliography{} for no bib
-%\usepackage{epigraph} %%Use \epigraph{text}{citation}
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-\newcommand\citepl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s (\citeyear[#1]{#2})} %%Use \citepl for possessive citation.
-\newcommand\citea[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}#1} %%Use \citea is for author name only, with optional page numbers.
-\newcommand\citeapl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s#1} %%Use \citeapl is for possessive author name only.
-%   \citet{key} ==>>                Jones et al. (1990)
- %   \citet*{key} ==>>               Jones, Baker, and Smith (1990)
- %   \citep{key} ==>>                (Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep*{key} ==>>               (Jones, Baker, and Smith, 1990)
- %   \citep[chap. 2]{key} ==>>       (Jones et al., 1990, chap. 2)
- %   \citep[e.g.][]{key} ==>>        (e.g. Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep[e.g.][p. 32]{key} ==>>   (e.g. Jones et al., p. 32)
- %   \citeauthor{key} ==>>           Jones et al.
- %   \citeauthor*{key} ==>>          Jones, Baker, and Smith
- %   \citeyear{key} ==>>             1990
-
-
-%%% DEFINITIONS FOR LOGICAL SYMBOLS AND QUOTES %%%
-%\newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-%\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\ttuple}[1]{$\langle$#1$\rangle$} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-%\newcommand{\interpret}[1]{\llbracket#1\rrbracket} %%Double brackets
-%\newcommand{\sq}[1]{`#1'} %%Proper opened-closed single quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\dq}[1]{``#1"} %%Proper opened-closed double quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\qed}[0]{$\hfill\square$} %%Box at end of proofs
-
-
-%%% ENVIRONMENTS %%%
-%\newenvironment{senum}[2][topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]{\begin{enumerate}[#1,topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]\begin{singlespace}#2}{\end{singlespace}\end{enumerate}\vspace{.175in}}
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TITLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{TITLE}
-\author{Benjamin Brast-McKie}
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent BEGIN ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-\tableofcontents
-
-\pagebreak
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\doublespacing
-
-\section*{Introduction}
-\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\protect\numberline{}Introduction}%
-
- 
-\subfile{Chapters/Ch1/Ch1}
-  
-\subfile{Chapters/Ch2/Ch2}
-
-\section*{Conclusion}
-\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\protect\numberline{}Conclusion}%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BIBLIOGRAPHY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\newpage
-\begin{small} %%Makes bib small text size
-\singlespacing %%Makes single spaced
-\bibliographystyle{PhilReview} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-%\setlength{\bibsep}{0.5pt} %%Changes spacing between bib entries
-\bibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-\thispagestyle{empty} %%Removes page numbers
-\end{small} %%End makes bib small text size
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/Thesis.tex b/templates/Thesis.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 5298485..0000000
--- a/templates/Thesis.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%%% FORMATTING %%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{report} %%Font size and document presets
-\usepackage[top=1in, bottom=1in, left=1.25in, right=1.25in]{geometry} %%Margins
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} %% Makes subtle line spacing shifts
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\setenumerate{label=(\arabic*), wide=\parindent} %%Changes enumeration style: use \begin{enumerate}
-\usepackage{setspace} %%Enables \doublespacing command for double linespacing
-\expandafter\def\expandafter\quote\expandafter{\quote\onehalfspacing} %%Makes 1.5 quote spacing
-%\usepackage{mdwlist} %% Compressed lists, use star: \begin{enumerate*} \end{'' *}
-%\usepackage{indentfirst} %%Indents first line of first paragraph of each section
-%\raggedbottom %% Lose the constraint on equalising page content
-%\frenchspacing %%Makes the sentence spacing single spaced
-%\usepackage{multicol} %% Use \begin{multicols}{3} for three columns and \end{multicols} after
-
-
-%%% MULTIPLE FILES %%%
-\usepackage{subfiles}
-\usepackage{hyperref}
-\usepackage{bibentry}
-
-
-%%% HYPER SECTIONS %%%
-\usepackage{bold-extra} %% bold+small caps
-\usepackage{titlesec}
-\usepackage{tocloft} %% change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-%\cftsetindents{subsubsubsection}{0.228in}{0.346in} %change alignment of subsubsection in toc
-\newcommand{\hypsection}[1]{\section[\bfseries{\scshape{#1}}]{\hyperlink{toc}{\sc \textbf{#1}}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsection}[1]{\subsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-\newcommand{\hypsubsubsection}[1]{\subsubsection[#1]{\hyperlink{toc}{#1}}} %%use to jump back to toc
-
-
-%%% HEADER %%%
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} %%Permits \pagestyle{fancy}
-\pagestyle{fancy} %%Header style
-\usepackage{titlesec} %%Header style
-\titlespacing*{\subsection}{\parindent}{.25in}{\wordsep}% Reduces spacing after headings
-\rhead{Benjamin Brast-McKie} %%Right header
-\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{$\S$\thesection\ #1}} %%Left header command
-\lhead{\nouppercase{\rightmark}} %%Left header
-
-%%% FOOTNOTES %%%
-\usepackage{scrextend} %%Allows for changes to foodnotes
-\deffootnote[1em]{0in}{1em}{\textsuperscript{\thefootnotemark \ }} %%Footnote style
-\setlength{\footnotesep}{0.125in} %%Space between footnotes
-
-%%% SYMBOLS %%%
-\usepackage{amssymb, amsmath, mathrsfs} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{stmaryrd} %%Use \llbracket and \rrbracket for double brackets
-%\usepackage{cancel} %%\cancel strikes out text diagonally
-%\usepackage{fitch}    
-%\usepackage{turnstile}
-%\usepackage{linguex}
-%\usepackage{schemata}
-
-%%% GRAPHICS %%%
-%\usepackage{graphicx}
-%\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.jpeg,.jpg}
-%\usepackage{fancybox}
-	%\begin{figure}[ht]
-	%\shadowbox{\includegraphics{figure-file}}}
-	%\end{figure}
-	
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-%\usepackage{bibentry} %%Replace \bibliography{} with \nobibliography{} for no bib
-%\usepackage{epigraph} %%Use \epigraph{text}{citation}
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-\newcommand\citepl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s (\citeyear[#1]{#2})} %%Use \citepl for possessive citation.
-\newcommand\citea[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}#1} %%Use \citea is for author name only, with optional page numbers.
-\newcommand\citeapl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s#1} %%Use \citeapl is for possessive author name only.
-%   \citet{key} ==>>                Jones et al. (1990)
- %   \citet*{key} ==>>               Jones, Baker, and Smith (1990)
- %   \citep{key} ==>>                (Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep*{key} ==>>               (Jones, Baker, and Smith, 1990)
- %   \citep[chap. 2]{key} ==>>       (Jones et al., 1990, chap. 2)
- %   \citep[e.g.][]{key} ==>>        (e.g. Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep[e.g.][p. 32]{key} ==>>   (e.g. Jones et al., p. 32)
- %   \citeauthor{key} ==>>           Jones et al.
- %   \citeauthor*{key} ==>>          Jones, Baker, and Smith
- %   \citeyear{key} ==>>             1990
-
-
-%%% DEFINITIONS FOR LOGICAL SYMBOLS AND QUOTES %%%
-%\newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-%\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\ttuple}[1]{$\langle$#1$\rangle$} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-%\newcommand{\interpret}[1]{\llbracket#1\rrbracket} %%Double brackets
-%\newcommand{\sq}[1]{`#1'} %%Proper opened-closed single quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\dq}[1]{``#1"} %%Proper opened-closed double quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\qed}[0]{$\hfill\square$} %%Box at end of proofs
-
-
-%%% ENVIRONMENTS %%%
-%\newenvironment{senum}[2][topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]{\begin{enumerate}[#1,topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]\begin{singlespace}#2}{\end{singlespace}\end{enumerate}\vspace{.175in}}
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TITLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{TITLE}
-\author{Benjamin Brast-McKie}
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent BEGIN ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-\tableofcontents
-
-\pagebreak
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-\doublespacing
-
-\section*{Introduction}
-\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\protect\numberline{}Introduction}%
-
- 
-\subfile{Chapters/Ch1/FirstFile}
-  
-\subfile{Chapters/Ch2/SecondFile}
-
-\section*{Conclusion}
-\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\protect\numberline{}Conclusion}%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BIBLIOGRAPHY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\newpage
-\begin{small} %%Makes bib small text size
-\singlespacing %%Makes single spaced
-\bibliographystyle{Phil_Review} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-%\setlength{\bibsep}{0.5pt} %%Changes spacing between bib entries
-\bibliography{Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-\thispagestyle{empty} %%Removes page numbers
-\end{small} %%End makes bib small text size
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/TikZArc.tex b/templates/TikZArc.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 452e298..0000000
--- a/templates/TikZArc.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-%%%%%%%%%            TikZ Example            %%%%%%%%%
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{article}
-
-%################################################
-%########            Packages            ########
-%################################################
-
-\usepackage{tikz}    % Diagrams
-\usetikzlibrary{positioning,arrows,shadows,shapes,patterns,decorations.pathmorphing}    % Some TikZ libraries
-
-%>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
-%>>>>>>            Setup            >>>>>>
-%>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
-
-\tikzset{
-modal/.style={
-    >=stealth',
-    shorten >=1pt,
-    shorten <=1pt,
-    auto,
-    node distance=2cm,
-    semithick
-},
-state/.style={
-    circle,
-    draw,
-    minimum size=0.5cm,
-    fill=gray!15
-},
-point/.style={
-    circle,
-    draw,
-    inner sep=0.5mm,
-    fill=black
-},
-sees/.style={
-    ->
-},
-seen/.style={
-    <-
-},
-seens/.style={
-    <->
-},
-rfl/.style={
-    ->,
-    in=120,
-    out=60,
-    loop,
-    looseness=5
-}}
-
-\newcommand{\stack}[1]{{\def\arraystretch{0.6}\begin{array}{c} #1 \end{array}}}
-
-%::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
-%::::::            Front Matter            ::::::
-%::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\textbf{Example 1:}
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[modal, node distance=1cm]
-\node[point]    (p1)    [label=above:$p_1$]    {};
-\node[point]    (p2)    [right of=p1, label=above:$\stack{p_1 \\ p_2}$]    {};
-\node[point]    (p3)    [right of=p2, label=above:$\stack{p_1 \\ p_2 \\ p_3}$]    {};
-\node[point]    (r)     [below of=p2, label=below:$t_\mathsf{root}$]    {};
-\node           (con)   [right of=p3]    {$\cdots$};
-\node[point]    (pw)    [right of=con, label=above:$\stack{p_1 \\ p_2 \\ p_3 \\ \vdots}$, label=right:``$t_\omega$'']    {};
-\node           (T')     [below of=r]    {$\mathcal{T}$};
-
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (p1);
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (p2);
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (p3);
-\path    (r)    edge[sees,dashed, bend right=25]    (pw);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{center}
-
-\textbf{Example 2:}
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[modal, node distance=1.5cm]
-\node[point]    (0)    [label=above:$p_1$, label=below:$0$]    {};
-\node[point]    (1)    [right of=0, label=above:$p_2$, label=below:$1$]    {};
-\node[point]    (2)    [right of=1, label=above:$p_1$, label=below:$2$]    {};
-\node[point]    (3)    [right of=2, label=above:$p_2$, label=below:$3$]    {};
-\node           (r)    [right of=3]    {$\cdots$};
-\node[point]    (-1)   [left of=0, label=above:$p_2$, label=below:$-1$]    {};
-\node[point]    (-2)   [left of=-1, label=above:$p_1$, label=below:$-2$]   {};
-\node[point]    (-3)   [left of=-2, label=above:$p_2$, label=below:$-3$]   {};
-\node           (l)    [left of=-3]    {$\cdots$};
-
-\path    (l)    edge[sees]    (-3);
-\path    (-3)   edge[sees]    (-2);
-\path    (-2)   edge[sees]    (-1);
-\path    (-1)   edge[sees]    (0);
-\path    (0)    edge[sees]    (1);
-\path    (1)    edge[sees]    (2);
-\path    (2)    edge[sees]    (3);
-\path    (3)    edge[sees]    (r);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{center}
-
-\textbf{Example 3:}
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[modal, node distance=1.5cm]
-\node[point]    (e)    [label=above:$p_1$, label=below:$e$]    {};
-\node[point]    (m)    [right of=e, label=below:$m$]    {};
-\node[point]    (o)    [right of=m, label=above:$p_2$, label=below:$o$]    {};
-
-\path    (e)    edge[sees, bend left=25]    (m);
-\path    (m)    edge[sees, bend left=25]    (e);
-\path    (o)    edge[sees, bend left=25]    (m);
-\path    (m)    edge[sees, bend left=25]    (o);
-\path    (m)    edge[rfl, in=60, out=120, looseness=30]    (m);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{center}
-
-\textbf{Example 4:}
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[modal]
-\node    (r)                         {$t_\mathsf{root}$};
-\node    (1p1)  [above left=5mm of r]    {$p_1$};
-\node    (1p2)  [above left=5mm of 1p1]  {$p_2$};
-\node    (1p3)  [above left=5mm of 1p2]  {$p_3$};
-\node    (1pd)  [above left=-2mm of 1p3]  {\rotatebox[origin=c]{-10}{$\ddots$}};
-
-\node    (2p1)  [above=5mm of r]         {$p_1$};
-\node    (2p2)  [above=5mm of 2p1]       {$p_1$};
-\node    (2p3)  [above=5mm of 2p2]       {$p_2$};
-\node    (2p4)  [above=5mm of 2p3]       {$p_3$};
-\node    (2pd)  [above=1mm of 2p4]       {$\vdots$};
-
-\node    (3p1)  [above right=5mm of r]   {$p_1$};
-\node    (3p2)  [above right=5mm of 3p1] {$p_1$};
-\node    (3p3)  [above right=5mm of 3p2] {$p_1$};
-\node    (3p4)  [above right=5mm of 3p3] {$p_2$};
-\node    (3p5)  [above right=5mm of 3p4] {$p_3$};
-\node    (3pd)  [above right=-2mm of 3p5] {\rotatebox[origin=c]{80}{$\ddots$}};
-
-\node    (con)  [below right=1mm of 3p3]  {$\ddots$};
-\node    (cont) [below right=1mm of con]  {$\vdots$};
-
-\node    (wp1)  [right=5mm of r]          {$p_1$};
-\node    (wp2)  [right=5mm of wp1]        {$p_1$};
-\node    (wp3)  [right=5mm of wp2]        {$p_1$};
-\node    (wp4)  [right=5mm of wp3]        {$p_1$};
-\node    (wpd)  [right=0mm of wp4]        {$\dots$};
-
-
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (1p1);
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (2p1);
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (3p1);
-\path    (r)    edge[sees]    (wp1);
-
-\path    (1p1)  edge[sees]    (1p2);
-\path    (1p2)  edge[sees]    (1p3);
-
-\path    (2p1)  edge[sees]    (2p2);
-\path    (2p2)  edge[sees]    (2p3);
-\path    (2p3)  edge[sees]    (2p4);
-
-\path    (3p1)  edge[sees]    (3p2);
-\path    (3p2)  edge[sees]    (3p3);
-\path    (3p3)  edge[sees]    (3p4);
-\path    (3p4)  edge[sees]    (3p5);
-
-\path    (wp1)  edge[sees]    (wp2);
-\path    (wp2)  edge[sees]    (wp3);
-\path    (wp3)  edge[sees]    (wp4);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{center}
-
-\pagebreak
-\textbf{Example 5:}
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[modal]
-\node[state]    (h1)                       {H};
-\node[state]    (h2)    [right of = h1]    {H};
-\node[state]    (h3)    [right of = h2]    {H};
-\node[state]    (t1)    [above right of = h1]    {T};
-\node[state]    (t2)    [above right of = h2]    {T};
-\node[state]    (t3)    [above right of = h3]    {T};
-\node           (e)     [right of = h3]    {\dots};
-
-\path    (h1)    edge[rfl, in=150, out=210]    (h1);
-\path    (t1)    edge[rfl]    (t1);
-
-\path    (h1)    edge[sees]    (h2);
-\path    (h2)    edge[sees]    (h3);
-\path    (h3)    edge[sees]    (e);
-
-\path    (h1)    edge[sees,dashed]    (t1);
-\path    (h2)    edge[sees,dashed]    (t2);
-\path    (h3)    edge[sees,dashed]    (t3);
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{center}
-
-\textbf{Example 6:}
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tikzpicture}[node distance=1ex]
-\node    (A->B)                                {$A \rightarrow B$};
-\node    (A&-B)    [below=of A->B]             {$A \wedge \neg B$};
-\node    (-A)      [below left=7mm of A&-B]    {$\neg A$};
-\node    (A)       [below=of -A]               {$A$};
-\node    (x-A)     [below=of A]                {$\times$};
-\node    (B)       [below right=7mm of A&-B]   {$B$};
-\node    (A2)      at (x-A -| B) [yshift=-7mm] {$A$};
-\node    (-B)      [below=of A2]               {$\neg B$};
-\node    (x-B)     [below=of -B]               {$\times$};
-
-\path    (A&-B)    edge[-]    (-A);
-\path    (A&-B)    edge[-]    (B);
-\path    (B)       edge[-]    (A2);
-
-\node    (1)    [left=2cm of A->B]    {1.};
-\node    (2)    at (1 |- A&-B)        {2.};
-\node    (3)    at (1 |- -A)          {3.};
-\node    (4)    at (1 |- A)           {4.};
-\node    (5)    at (1 |- A2)          {5.};
-\node    (6)    at (1 |- -B)          {6.};
-
-\path    (5)    edge[-,dashed]    (A2);
-\path    (6)    edge[-,dotted]    (-B);
-
-\node    (r1)   [right=2cm of A->B]   {P};
-\node    (r2)   at (r1 |- A&-B)       {P};
-\node    (r3)   at (r1 |- -A)         {($\rightarrow$), 1};
-\node    (r4)   at (r1 |- A)          {($\wedge$), 2};
-\node    (r5)   at (r1 |- A2)         {($\wedge$), 2};
-\node    (r6)   at (r1 |- -B)         {($\wedge$), 2};
-\end{tikzpicture}
-\end{center}
-
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/TuftsSample.tex b/templates/TuftsSample.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 0b5786d..0000000
--- a/templates/TuftsSample.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-\documentclass{tufte-handout}
-
-%\geometry{showframe}% for debugging purposes -- displays the margins
-
-\usepackage{amsmath}
-
-% Set up the images/graphics package
-\usepackage{graphicx}
-\setkeys{Gin}{width=\linewidth,totalheight=\textheight,keepaspectratio}
-\graphicspath{{graphics/}}
-
-\title{An Example of the Usage of the Tufte-Handout Style\thanks{Inspired by Edward~R. Tufte!}}
-\author[The Tufte-LaTeX Developers]{The Tufte-\LaTeX\ Developers}
-\date{24 January 2009}  % if the \date{} command is left out, the current date will be used
-
-% The following package makes prettier tables.  We're all about the bling!
-\usepackage{booktabs}
-
-% The units package provides nice, non-stacked fractions and better spacing
-% for units.
-\usepackage{units}
-
-% The fancyvrb package lets us customize the formatting of verbatim
-% environments.  We use a slightly smaller font.
-\usepackage{fancyvrb}
-\fvset{fontsize=\normalsize}
-
-% Small sections of multiple columns
-\usepackage{multicol}
-
-% Provides paragraphs of dummy text
-\usepackage{lipsum}
-
-% These commands are used to pretty-print LaTeX commands
-\newcommand{\doccmd}[1]{\texttt{\textbackslash#1}}% command name -- adds backslash automatically
-\newcommand{\docopt}[1]{\ensuremath{\langle}\textrm{\textit{#1}}\ensuremath{\rangle}}% optional command argument
-\newcommand{\docarg}[1]{\textrm{\textit{#1}}}% (required) command argument
-\newenvironment{docspec}{\begin{quote}\noindent}{\end{quote}}% command specification environment
-\newcommand{\docenv}[1]{\textsf{#1}}% environment name
-\newcommand{\docpkg}[1]{\texttt{#1}}% package name
-\newcommand{\doccls}[1]{\texttt{#1}}% document class name
-\newcommand{\docclsopt}[1]{\texttt{#1}}% document class option name
-
-\begin{document}
-
-\maketitle% this prints the handout title, author, and date
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent This document describes the Tufte handout \LaTeX\ document style.
-It also provides examples and comments on the style's use.  Only a brief
-overview is presented here; for a complete reference, see the sample book.
-\end{abstract}
-
-%\printclassoptions
-
-The Tufte-\LaTeX\ document classes define a style similar to the
-style Edward Tufte uses in his books and handouts.  Tufte's style is known
-for its extensive use of sidenotes, tight integration of graphics with
-text, and well-set typography.  This document aims to be at once a
-demonstration of the features of the Tufte-\LaTeX\ document classes
-and a style guide to their use.
-
-\section{Page Layout}\label{sec:page-layout}
-\subsection{Headings}\label{sec:headings}
-This style provides \textsc{a}- and \textsc{b}-heads (that is,
-\Verb|\section| and \Verb|\subsection|), demonstrated above.
-
-The Tufte-\LaTeX\ classes will emit an error if you try to use
-\linebreak\Verb|\subsubsection| and smaller headings.
-
-% let's start a new thought -- a new section
-\newthought{In his later books},\cite{Tufte2006} Tufte
-starts each section with a bit of vertical space, a non-indented paragraph,
-and sets the first few words of the sentence in \textsc{small caps}.  To
-accomplish this using this style, use the \Verb|\newthought| command:  
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{newthought\{In his later books\}, Tufte starts\ldots}
-\end{docspec}
-
-\subsection{Sidenotes}\label{sec:sidenotes}
-One of the most prominent and distinctive features of this style is the
-extensive use of sidenotes.  There is a wide margin to provide ample room
-for sidenotes and small figures.  Any \Verb|\footnote|s will automatically
-be converted to sidenotes.\footnote{This is a sidenote that was entered
-using the \texttt{\textbackslash footnote} command.}  If you'd like to place ancillary
-information in the margin without the sidenote mark (the superscript
-number), you can use the \Verb|\marginnote| command.\marginnote{This is a
-margin note.  Notice that there isn't a number preceding the note, and
-there is no number in the main text where this note was written.}
-
-The specification of the \Verb|\sidenote| command is:
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{sidenote[\docopt{number}][\docopt{offset}]\{\docarg{Sidenote text.}\}}
-\end{docspec}
-
-Both the \docopt{number} and \docopt{offset} arguments are optional.  If you
-provide a \docopt{number} argument, then that number will be used as the
-sidenote number.  It will change of the number of the current sidenote only and
-will not affect the numbering sequence of subsequent sidenotes.
-
-Sometimes a sidenote may run over the top of other text or graphics in the
-margin space.  If this happens, you can adjust the vertical position of the
-sidenote by providing a dimension in the \docopt{offset} argument.  Some
-examples of valid dimensions are:
-\begin{docspec}
-  \ttfamily 1.0in \qquad 2.54cm \qquad 254mm \qquad 6\Verb|\baselineskip|
-\end{docspec}
-If the dimension is positive it will push the sidenote down the page; if the
-dimension is negative, it will move the sidenote up the page.
-
-While both the \docopt{number} and \docopt{offset} arguments are optional, they
-must be provided in order.  To adjust the vertical position of the sidenote
-while leaving the sidenote number alone, use the following syntax:
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{sidenote[][\docopt{offset}]\{\docarg{Sidenote text.}\}}
-\end{docspec}
-The empty brackets tell the \Verb|\sidenote| command to use the default
-sidenote number.
-
-If you \emph{only} want to change the sidenote number, however, you may
-completely omit the \docopt{offset} argument:
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{sidenote[\docopt{number}]\{\docarg{Sidenote text.}\}}
-\end{docspec}
-
-The \Verb|\marginnote| command has a similar \docarg{offset} argument:
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{marginnote[\docopt{offset}]\{\docarg{Margin note text.}\}}
-\end{docspec}
-
-\subsection{References}
-References are placed alongside their citations as sidenotes,
-as well.  This can be accomplished using the normal \Verb|\cite|
-command.\sidenote{The first paragraph of this document includes a citation.}
-
-The complete list of references may also be printed automatically by using
-the \Verb|\bibliography| command.  (See the end of this document for an
-example.)  If you do not want to print a bibliography at the end of your
-document, use the \Verb|\nobibliography| command in its place. 
-
-To enter multiple citations at one location,\cite{Tufte2006,Tufte1990} you can
-provide a list of keys separated by commas and the same optional vertical
-offset argument: \Verb|\cite{Tufte2006,Tufte1990}|.  
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{cite[\docopt{offset}]\{\docarg{bibkey1,bibkey2,\ldots}\}}
-\end{docspec}
-
-\section{Figures and Tables}\label{sec:figures-and-tables}
-Images and graphics play an integral role in Tufte's work.
-In addition to the standard \docenv{figure} and \docenv{tabular} environments,
-this style provides special figure and table environments for full-width
-floats.
-
-Full page--width figures and tables may be placed in \docenv{figure*} or
-\docenv{table*} environments.  To place figures or tables in the margin,
-use the \docenv{marginfigure} or \docenv{margintable} environments as follows
-(see figure~\ref{fig:marginfig}):
-
-\begin{marginfigure}%
-  %\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{helix}
-  \caption{This is a margin figure.  The helix is defined by 
-    $x = \cos(2\pi z)$, $y = \sin(2\pi z)$, and $z = [0, 2.7]$.  The figure was
-    drawn using Asymptote (\url{http://asymptote.sf.net/}).}
-  \label{fig:marginfig}
-\end{marginfigure}
-\begin{Verbatim}
-\begin{marginfigure}
-  \includegraphics{helix}
-  \caption{This is a margin figure.}
-\end{marginfigure}
-\end{Verbatim}
-
-The \docenv{marginfigure} and \docenv{margintable} environments accept an optional parameter \docopt{offset} that adjusts the vertical position of the figure or table.  See the ``\nameref{sec:sidenotes}'' section above for examples.  The specifications are:
-\begin{docspec}
-  \doccmd{begin\{marginfigure\}[\docopt{offset}]}\\
-  \qquad\ldots\\
-  \doccmd{end\{marginfigure\}}\\
-  \mbox{}\\
-  \doccmd{begin\{margintable\}[\docopt{offset}]}\\
-  \qquad\ldots\\
-  \doccmd{end\{margintable\}}\\
-\end{docspec}
-
-Figure~\ref{fig:fullfig} is an example of the \Verb|figure*|
-environment and figure~\ref{fig:textfig} is an example of the normal
-\Verb|figure| environment.
-
-\begin{figure*}[h]
- % \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{sine.pdf}%
-  \caption{This graph shows $y = \sin x$ from about $x = [-10, 10]$.
-  \emph{Notice that this figure takes up the full page width.}}%
-  \label{fig:fullfig}%
-\end{figure*}
-
-\begin{figure}
-%  \includegraphics{hilbertcurves.pdf}
-%  \checkparity This is an \pageparity\ page.%
-  \caption{Hilbert curves of various degrees $n$.
-  \emph{Notice that this figure only takes up the main textblock width.}}
-  \label{fig:textfig}
-  %\zsavepos{pos:textfig}
-  \setfloatalignment{b}
-\end{figure}
-
-Table~\ref{tab:normaltab} shows table created with the \docpkg{booktabs}
-package.  Notice the lack of vertical rules---they serve only to clutter
-the table's data.
-
-\begin{table}[ht]
-  \centering
-  \fontfamily{ppl}\selectfont
-  \begin{tabular}{ll}
-    \toprule
-    Margin & Length \\
-    \midrule
-    Paper width & \unit[8\nicefrac{1}{2}]{inches} \\
-    Paper height & \unit[11]{inches} \\
-    Textblock width & \unit[6\nicefrac{1}{2}]{inches} \\
-    Textblock/sidenote gutter & \unit[\nicefrac{3}{8}]{inches} \\
-    Sidenote width & \unit[2]{inches} \\
-    \bottomrule
-  \end{tabular}
-  \caption{Here are the dimensions of the various margins used in the Tufte-handout class.}
-  \label{tab:normaltab}
-  %\zsavepos{pos:normaltab}
-\end{table}
-
-\section{Full-width text blocks}
-
-In addition to the new float types, there is a \docenv{fullwidth}
-environment that stretches across the main text block and the sidenotes
-area.
-
-\begin{Verbatim}
-\begin{fullwidth}
-Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet...
-\end{fullwidth}
-\end{Verbatim}
-
-\begin{fullwidth}
-\small\itshape\lipsum[1]
-\end{fullwidth}
-
-\section{Typography}\label{sec:typography}
-
-\subsection{Typefaces}\label{sec:typefaces}
-If the Palatino, \textsf{Helvetica}, and \texttt{Bera Mono} typefaces are installed, this style
-will use them automatically.  Otherwise, we'll fall back on the Computer Modern
-typefaces.
-
-\subsection{Letterspacing}\label{sec:letterspacing}
-This document class includes two new commands and some improvements on
-existing commands for letterspacing.
-
-When setting strings of \allcaps{ALL CAPS} or \smallcaps{small caps}, the
-letter\-spacing---that is, the spacing between the letters---should be
-increased slightly.\cite{Bringhurst2005}  The \Verb|\allcaps| command has proper letterspacing for
-strings of \allcaps{FULL CAPITAL LETTERS}, and the \Verb|\smallcaps| command
-has letterspacing for \smallcaps{small capital letters}.  These commands
-will also automatically convert the case of the text to upper- or
-lowercase, respectively.
-
-The \Verb|\textsc| command has also been redefined to include
-letterspacing.  The case of the \Verb|\textsc| argument is left as is,
-however.  This allows one to use both uppercase and lowercase letters:
-\textsc{The Initial Letters Of The Words In This Sentence Are Capitalized.}
-
-
-
-\section{Installation}\label{sec:installation}
-To install the Tufte-\LaTeX\ classes, simply drop the
-following files into the same directory as your \texttt{.tex}
-file:
-\begin{quote}
-  \ttfamily
-  tufte-common.def\\
-  tufte-handout.cls\\
-  tufte-book.cls
-\end{quote}
-
-% TODO add instructions for installing it globally
-
-
-
-\section{More Documentation}\label{sec:more-doc}
-For more documentation on the Tufte-\LaTeX{} document classes (including commands not
-mentioned in this handout), please see the sample book.
-
-\section{Support}\label{sec:support}
-
-The website for the Tufte-\LaTeX\ packages is located at
-\url{http://code.google.com/p/tufte-latex/}.  On our website, you'll find
-links to our \smallcaps{svn} repository, mailing lists, bug tracker, and documentation.
-
-\bibliography{sample-handout}
-\bibliographystyle{plainnat}
-
-
-
-\end{document}
diff --git a/templates/WinPhilArticle.tex b/templates/WinPhilArticle.tex
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ceab90..0000000
--- a/templates/WinPhilArticle.tex
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREAMBLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-%%% FORMATTING %%%
-\documentclass[11pt]{article} %%Font size and document presets
-\usepackage[top=1in, bottom=1in, left=1.25in, right=1.25in]{geometry} %%Margins
-\usepackage[protrusion=true,expansion=true]{microtype} %% Makes subtle line spacing shifts
-\usepackage{enumitem} %%Enables control over enumerate and itemize environments
-\setenumerate{label=(\arabic*), wide=\parindent} %%Changes enumeration style: use \begin{enumerate}
-\usepackage{setspace} %%Enables \doublespacing command for double linespacing
-\expandafter\def\expandafter\quote\expandafter{\quote\onehalfspacing} %%Makes 1.5 quote spacing
-%\usepackage{mdwlist} %% Compressed lists, use star: \begin{enumerate*} \end{'' *}
-%\usepackage{indentfirst} %%Indents first line of first paragraph of each section
-%\raggedbottom %% Lose the constraint on equalising page content
-%\frenchspacing %%Makes the sentence spacing single spaced
-%\usepackage{multicol} %% Use \begin{multicols}{3} for three columns and \end{multicols} after
-
-
-
-%%% HEADER %%%
-\usepackage{fancyhdr} %%Permits \pagestyle{fancy}
-\pagestyle{fancy} %%Header style
-\usepackage{titlesec} %%Header style
-\titlespacing*{\subsection}{\parindent}{.25in}{\wordsep}% Reduces spacing after headings
-\rhead{Benjamin Brast-McKie} %%Right header
-\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{$\S$\thesection\ #1}} %%Left header command
-\lhead{\nouppercase{\rightmark}} %%Left header
-
-%%% FOOTNOTES %%%
-\usepackage{scrextend} %%Allows for changes to foodnotes
-\deffootnote[1em]{0in}{1em}{\textsuperscript{\thefootnotemark \ }} %%Footnote style
-\setlength{\footnotesep}{0.125in} %%Space between footnotes
-
-%%% SYMBOLS %%%
-\usepackage{amssymb, amsmath, mathrsfs} %%Math packages
-\usepackage{stmaryrd} %%Use \llbracket and \rrbracket for double brackets
-%\usepackage{cancel} %%\cancel strikes out text diagonally
-%\usepackage{fitch}    
-%\usepackage{turnstile}
-%\usepackage{linguex}
-%\usepackage{schemata}
-
-%%% GRAPHICS %%%
-\usepackage{graphicx}
-%\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.jpeg,.jpg}
-%\usepackage{fancybox}
-	%\begin{figure}[ht]
-	%\shadowbox{\includegraphics{figure-file}}}
-	%\end{figure}
-	
-%%% CITATIONS %%%
-%\usepackage{bibentry} %%Replace \bibliography{} with \nobibliography{} for no bib
-%\usepackage{epigraph} %%Use \epigraph{text}{citation}
-\usepackage[round]{natbib} %%Or change 'round' to 'square' for square backers
-\setcitestyle{aysep={}}
-\newcommand\citepl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s (\citeyear[#1]{#2})} %%Use \citepl for possessive citation.
-\newcommand\citea[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}#1} %%Use \citea is for author name only, with optional page numbers.
-\newcommand\citeapl[2][]{\citeauthor{#2}'s#1} %%Use \citeapl is for possessive author name only.
-%   \citet{key} ==>>                Jones et al. (1990)
- %   \citet*{key} ==>>               Jones, Baker, and Smith (1990)
- %   \citep{key} ==>>                (Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep*{key} ==>>               (Jones, Baker, and Smith, 1990)
- %   \citep[chap. 2]{key} ==>>       (Jones et al., 1990, chap. 2)
- %   \citep[e.g.][]{key} ==>>        (e.g. Jones et al., 1990)
- %   \citep[e.g.][p. 32]{key} ==>>   (e.g. Jones et al., p. 32)
- %   \citeauthor{key} ==>>           Jones et al.
- %   \citeauthor*{key} ==>>          Jones, Baker, and Smith
- %   \citeyear{key} ==>>             1990
-
-
-%%% DEFINITIONS FOR LOGICAL SYMBOLS AND QUOTES %%%
-%\newcommand{\corner}[1]{\ulcorner#1\urcorner} %%Corner quotes
-%\newcommand{\tuple}[1]{\langle#1\rangle} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\ttuple}[1]{$\langle$#1$\rangle$} %%Angle brackets
-%\newcommand{\set}[1]{\lbrace#1\rbrace} %%Set brackets
-%\newcommand{\interpret}[1]{\llbracket#1\rrbracket} %%Double brackets
-%\newcommand{\sq}[1]{`#1'} %%Proper opened-closed single quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\dq}[1]{``#1"} %%Proper opened-closed double quotation marks
-%\newcommand{\qed}[0]{$\hfill\square$} %%Box at end of proofs
-
-
-%%% ENVIRONMENTS %%%
-%\newenvironment{senum}[2][topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]{\begin{enumerate}[#1,topsep=0in, itemsep=.05in]\begin{singlespace}#2}{\end{singlespace}\end{enumerate}\vspace{.175in}}
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TITLE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\begin{document}
-\title{TITLE}
-\author{Benjamin Brast-McKie}
-\date{\today}
-\maketitle
-\thispagestyle{empty}
-
-\begin{abstract}
-\noindent BEGIN ABSTRACT
-\end{abstract}
-
-\doublespacing
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% DOCUMENT %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\section{Section Title}
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BIBLIOGRAPHY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-
-
-\newpage
-\begin{small} %%Makes bib small text size
-\singlespacing %%Makes single spaced
-\bibliographystyle{C:/texmf/bibtex/bst/Analysis} %%bib style found in bst folder, in bibtex folder, in texmf folder.
-%\setlength{\bibsep}{0.5pt} %%Changes spacing between bib entries
-\bibliography{C:/texmf/bibtex/bib/Zotero} %%bib database found in bib folder, in bibtex folder
-\thispagestyle{empty} %%Removes page numbers
-\end{small} %%End makes bib small text size
-
-\end{document}
\ No newline at end of file